B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) WHEN Civil Revision Application No. 1512 of 1972 came up for hearing before S. H. Sheth J. he referred the following four questions to a Division Bench :- (1) Whether the award passed under the B. A. D. R. Act is deemed to be a decree under clause (iii) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 38 of that Act ? (2) Whether by virtue of the provisions of clause (iii) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 38 of the B. A. D. R. Act whether in the instant case (sic) attracted the provisions of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 ? (3) If answer to the second question is in the negative whether it attracted Article 181 residuary Article of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 ? (4) If the award under the execution was not governed by any of the aforementioned provisions whether it was governed by any other provision of law in relation (sic) to limitation ?when the matter came up before a Division Bench consisting of S. H. Sheth and C. V. Rane JJ. after referring to the earlier judgments of the learned Single Judge of this High Court and judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court and the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court they considered it necessary to refer the matter to a still larger Bench to reconcile the conflict. That is how the matter has come up before this Full Bench. ( 2 ) AS the questions herein raised also arose in Civil Revision Application No. 517 of 1970 the same was directed to be heard with Civil Revision Application No. 1512 of 1972 and that is how the cognate matter also came up before us. ( 3 ) FOR a proper appraisal of the questions raised before us it would be advantageous to refer to some relevant facts which transpire from the record in Civil Revision Application No. 1512 of 1972. One Chheda Akha Arja Arjan was the creditor of Barot Nagdan Parvat and his deceased brother Karsan Parbat. The debt came up for adjustment under the relevant Debt Relief Act and award was made by the Debt Adjustment Court that the debtor should pay to Chheda Akha Arjan the creditor a sum of Rs. One Chheda Akha Arja Arjan was the creditor of Barot Nagdan Parvat and his deceased brother Karsan Parbat. The debt came up for adjustment under the relevant Debt Relief Act and award was made by the Debt Adjustment Court that the debtor should pay to Chheda Akha Arjan the creditor a sum of Rs. 163-50 P. and after 1-1-1957 the debtor would be entitled to recover possession of a field known as Bandhadi situate within the revenue limits of Rav village on payment of first instalment of Rs. 100. It transpired before the Debt Adjustment Court that the field in question was mortgaged with possession with the father of creditor Chheda Akha Arjan and this debt was to be adjusted and by award debt was adjusted. Award was made an 26th December 1956 One of the co-debtors namely Karsan died and surviving debtor filed the execution application under the provisions of the Agricultural Debtors Relief Act in 1968. The creditor resisted the application inter alia contending that the application was barred by limitation. In the mean time the original creditor was dead and his heir was impleaded as creditor. The executing Court overruled all the objections raised by the creditor and held that the debtor was entitled to recover possession. An appeal was preferred by the creditor to the District Court Kutch at Bhuj being Appeal No. 2 of 1971. The District Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the executing Court The creditor preferred Revision Application to this High Court and as stated earlier four questions formulated by the learned Single Judge have been referred to this Full Bench. ( 4 ) THE material question is whether an application for execution of an award made under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1947 (B. A. D. R. Act for short) would be governed by Article 181 or 182 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 and incidentally by corresponding articles of the Limitation Act 1963 Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 provides a period of limitation of three years; or where a certified copy of the decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by Article 183 or by sec. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been registered six years. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been registered six years. Article 183 provides a period of limitation of 12 years to enforce a judgment decree or order of any Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction or an order of the Supreme Court. Article 181 is a residuary article which provides a period of limitation of three years in respect of an application for which no period of limitation is provided for elsewhere in the Schedule or by sec. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 136 of the Limitation Act 1963 provides a period of limitation of twelve years for the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court. Article 137 provides a period of limitation for an application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Division in which the Article is placed It may be mentioned that it is placed in Third Division headed applications. ( 5 ) IN Civil Revision Applications Nos. 189 and 190 of 1962 decided on 15th April 1966 by Divan J (as he then was) it was held that the application for execution of an award under the B. A. D. R. Act would be governed by Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908 Same view was also taken by S. H. Sheth J. in Civil Revision Application No. 652 of 1967 decide on 12th December 1969. This view was followed by A. D. Desai J. in Civil Revision Applications Nos. 504 and 505 of 1970 decided on 9 July 1973. ( 6 ) THE question is whether an award made under the B. A. D. R. Act is a decree. Award has been defined in sec. 2 (i) to mean an award made under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 8 or secs. 9 38 or 33 or as confirmed or modified by the Court in appeal. Sec. 4 provides for making an application either by the creditor or by the debtor for adjustment of debts. Sec. 5 casts an obligation on every creditor and debtor to file a true and correct statement before Court. Sec. 8 provides for recording settlements in respect of the dispute about adjustment of debts. Sec. 4 provides for making an application either by the creditor or by the debtor for adjustment of debts. Sec. 5 casts an obligation on every creditor and debtor to file a true and correct statement before Court. Sec. 8 provides for recording settlements in respect of the dispute about adjustment of debts. Sec. 9 provides for making an award on the basis of the settlement if the Court is satisfied that settlement has been made by the debtor voluntarily and for his benefit. Sec. 32 provides for making an award. Award has to be in the prescribed form and shall show therein particulars specified in the section. Sec. 38 provides for registration of every award in the manner provided for in Chapter II-A and sub-sec. (3) provides for execution of the award. Sub-clause (iii) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 38 provides that if the Court has passed an order for the delivery of possession of any property under clause (v) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 32 such order shall on the application be executed by the Court as if it were a decree passed by it. Sec. 43 (2) provides for an appeal to the District Court to be filed within 60 days from the date mentioned in the sub-section and then further provides that in computing the period of sixty days the provisions contained in secs. 4 5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 shall so far as may be apply. We may also take a note of sec. 46 which provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 shall apply to all proceedings under the Chapter. ( 7 ) THE question posed is whether any period of limitation is prescribed for executing award. It may be made clear that B. A. D. R. Act does not provide for any period of limitation for executing the award. ( 7 ) THE question posed is whether any period of limitation is prescribed for executing award. It may be made clear that B. A. D. R. Act does not provide for any period of limitation for executing the award. ( 8 ) TWO questions posed before us are (i) As the award is executable as a decree Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 would be attracted; and (ii) in any case in the absence of application of any specific article residuary Article 181 would be attracted and limitation would be of three years commencing from the time the right to apply accrues ( 9 ) ON the first question it must be confessed that there are three earlier decisions of this Court in which it has been in terms held that Limitation Act applies to the application for execution of the award and limitation would be of 12 years; and in reaching the conclusion reliance has been placed on the language of secs. 36 38 read with sec. 46. Three decisions are those rendered by Divan J. (as he then was) in Civil Revision Application Nos. 189 and 190 of 1962 decided on 15th April 1966 by S. H. Sheth J. in Civil Revision Application No. 562 of 1967 decided on 12th December 1969 and A. D. Desai J. in Civil Revision Application Nos. 504 and 505 of 1970 decided on 9th July 1976. With greatest respect we may say that these decisions overlook the obvious in sec. 38 (3) (iii) that even by fiction award is not to be deemed to be a decree but if the award directs amongst other things delivery of possession that part of the award directing delivery of possessions to be executed as a decree. By fiction of law only a specific part of award is to be treated as a decree. Award as a whole is not a decree. It is to be treated as a decree for the purpose of sec. 38 (3) (iii) and the fiction is limited to the mode prescribed for delivery of possession in the Code of Civil Procedure All the awards under the Act are not to be executed as a decree nor are they executable as decree. Mode of execution of an award is provided for in sec. 38 (3) (iii) and the fiction is limited to the mode prescribed for delivery of possession in the Code of Civil Procedure All the awards under the Act are not to be executed as a decree nor are they executable as decree. Mode of execution of an award is provided for in sec. 38 (i) and (ii) and briefly it provides for execution through the Collector the procedure to be followed by the Collector being one prescribed under the Bombay Land Revenue Code for recovering arrears of land revenue. It would be merely stating an obvious that where amount is payable under a decree made by civil court it is to be recovered by the procedure prescribed in Order XXI. It cannot be recovered as an arrears of 1and revenue by the Collector. It is only where an order involves delivery of possession that sub-clause (iii) of sub-sec. (3) enacts a fiction that for delivery of possession Court may proceed to execute the award as if it were a decree passed by it. But for the fiction enacted in the relevant provision the legislature clearly intimated that award was not a decree. If it were a decree sub-clause (iii) of sub-sec. (3) would be redundant and superfluous and unless inevitable redundancy or superfluity cannot be attributed to the legislature. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench of this High Court in KESHAVLAL V. ATMARAM A. I. R. 1967 GUJ. 101 in which Bhagwati J. (as he then was) has observed as under:it is clear that where an award is made by the Debt Adjustments Court in an application for adjustment of debts under sec. 4 of the Act such award would not be a decree for though it would be the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy between them such adjudication would not be in a suit. An application for adjustment of debts under sec. 4 of the Act is not a suit and an award on the application would not therefore be a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 (2) of the Code. An application for adjustment of debts under sec. 4 of the Act is not a suit and an award on the application would not therefore be a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 (2) of the Code. AT another stage it is also observed: if the award were a decree within the meaning of the Code it would have been totally unnecessary to use the words as if it were a decree passed by it. Therefore it is crystal clear that the award made by the Debt Adjustment Court is not a decree. An exactly identical view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in GANESH VINAYAK V. BHAU BABBANA 71 L. R. 284. The Division Bench has in terms held that the Court dealing with applications under the B. A. D. R. Act is not a civil court and as Article 182 applied to applications for execution of a decree or order of any civil court it did not apply to applications for execution of the award the award itself not being called a decree or order of civil court. It was held that Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1963 is not applicable to an application for execution of an award. As the award is not a decree for its execution Article 136 of the Limitation Act 1963 or for that matter Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 would not be attracted. ( 10 ) THE real controversy centres round the second question whether an application for execution of the award for which no period of limitation is provided would be governed by residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963 or Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 Article 137 prescribes a period of limitation for three years in respect of any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Division meaning thereby in Division No. III headed APPLICATIONS. Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 prescribed a period of limitation of three years for application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule i. e. Schedule I or by sec. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 There was a serious cleavage of opinion between different Courts about the scope and ambit of Article 181 and its corresponding Article 137. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 There was a serious cleavage of opinion between different Courts about the scope and ambit of Article 181 and its corresponding Article 137. One view was that Article 181 would govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and no other applications; and other view was that it would govern applications not merely those under the Code of Civil Procedure but even other applications in respect of which there was no other provision in the Division headed APPLICATIONS. The earliest decision with respect to the controversy is of BAI MANEKLAL V. MANEKJI KAVASJI 7 BOM. 213 in which the view taken was that Article 181 only relates to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure in which case no period of limitation has been prescribed for the application. The question came up before the Supreme Court first in SHAH MULCHAND and CO. V. JAWAHAR MILLS LTD. A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 98. After referring to Privy Councils decision in HENSRAJ GUPTA V. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR 60 IND. APP. 13 and several other decisions bearing on the subject it was observed that this long catena of decisions may well be said to have as it were added the words under the Code in the first column of that Article (Article 181 ). However the matter was not finally concluded by the Supreme Court and further argument on the subject was kept open The problem again figured before the Supreme Court in BOMBAY GAS COMPANY V. GOPAL BHIVA A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 752 in which case the Supreme Court treated: it as well settled that Article 181 applies only to applications which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure and so its extension to applications made under sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would not be justified. In reaching this conclusion ratio in Shah Mulchand and Co. s case (supra) was affirmed. The very question again came up before Supreme Court in WAZIR CHAND V. UNION OF INDIA A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 990. The question figured in the context of an application under sec. 26 of the Arbitration Act and argument in terms was that application would be governed by Article 181. s case (supra) was affirmed. The very question again came up before Supreme Court in WAZIR CHAND V. UNION OF INDIA A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 990. The question figured in the context of an application under sec. 26 of the Arbitration Act and argument in terms was that application would be governed by Article 181. Negativing the argument while recognising the fact that by amendment made by the Arbitration Act 10 of 1940 Articles 158 and 178 were modified and by this modification the reason which persuaded the Courts to hold that the expression under the Code was deemed added to Art. 181 has now disappeared but on that account the expression applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule in Art. 181 cannot be given a connotation different from the one which prevailed for near 60 years before 1940. The view that Article 181 applies only to applications under the Code was reaffirmed ( 11 ) AFTER the introduction of the Limitation Act 1963 Art. 137 though placed in the Division headed APPLICATIONS forms a separate part. The question arose whether this change in the language and placement of Article 137 would make any difference in its interpretation especially on the question whether the article applies like its predecessor Article 181 to- applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only or any other application in a proceeding to which Limitation Act would apply by reference to sec. 3 and the provisions contained in secs. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act 1963 This very specific question came up for decision before the Supreme Court in ATHANI MUNICIPALITY V. LABOUR COURT HUBLI A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1335. The argument was that Article 137 would govern applications under sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. An attempt was to reopen the question specifically settled on this point in Bombay Gas Company Limited (supra ). The argument turned upon the construction of Article 137 its placement and difference in the language when compared with Article 181 The contention was negatived observing that the view expressed by the Supreme Court with reference to Article 181 must be held to be applicable even when considering the scope and applicability of Art. 137 in the new Limitation Act of 1963. After noting difference in language its placement in the Division and other relevant considerations it was held that even further alteration made in the articles contained in the third division of the schedule to the new Limitation Act containing references to applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be held to have materially altered the scope of the residuary Article 137 which deals with other applications. It was held that the intention of the legislature was not to drastically alter the scope of this article so as to include within it all applications irrespective of the fact whether they had any reference to the Code of Civil Procedure. The ratio of the decision is that even Art. 137 would apply to applications under Code of Civil Procedure only its scope is not further extended. In terms it was held that article does not apply to application under sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Last in this series of decisions is one in NITYANAND V. L. I. C. OF INDIA A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 209 where again the question of application of Art. 137 in the context of application under sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act surfaced before the Supreme Court. After referring to earlier decisions bearing on the subject and not differing therefrom the point before the Court was disposed of on another ground namely that Art. 137 only contemplates applications to Courts and Labour Court is not a court contemplated by the Article and therefore Article 137 would not apply. ( 12 ) IT would thus appear that the view expressed by the Supreme Court in terms is that Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 only applies to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and the difference in the language between Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963 its placement in the Division and other relevant considerations the view remained the same that Article 137 would only cover applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 13 ) AN application for execution of an award to be made under sec. 38 of the B. A. D. R. Act would not be an application under the Code of Civil Procedure and obviously Article 181 would not apply and no other article was relied upon to show that any particular period of limitation would govern it. ( 13 ) AN application for execution of an award to be made under sec. 38 of the B. A. D. R. Act would not be an application under the Code of Civil Procedure and obviously Article 181 would not apply and no other article was relied upon to show that any particular period of limitation would govern it. Therefore with utmost respect to our learned Brothers who held to the contrary in the earlier decisions referred to in this judgment we are of the opinion that an application for execution of an award made under the B. A. D. R. Act would not be governed by Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 and no other article of Limitation Act would apply and therefore no period of limitation is prescribed for its execution. The application for execution of an award cannot be rejected on the ground that it is barred by limitation. ( 14 ) ANOTHER question was that the Court set up under the B. A. D. R. Act is not a Civil Court and in view of the provisions contained in secs. 4 5 and other relevant provisions of the Limitation Act 1963 Limitation Act would not apply to the proceedings under the B. A. D. R. Act Undoubtedly secs. 3 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 refer to proceedings in the Court. Expression court is not defined. The contention was that before Limitation Act applies to any proceeding proceeding must be before the Court. The authority or Tribunal before whom proceedings are pending must be a Court and it is not sufficient that i has merely trapping of a Court. It was contended that Court set up under the B. A. D. R. Act is a Special Tribunal for adjustment debts and it is not a court. In view of our answer on the first point it is not necessary to examine this contention. ( 15 ) OUR answer therefore to the questions posed is as under: (1) An award made by a Court set up under the B. A. D. R. Act or under any of the provisions of the said Act is not a decree. For the purpees of sec. ( 15 ) OUR answer therefore to the questions posed is as under: (1) An award made by a Court set up under the B. A. D. R. Act or under any of the provisions of the said Act is not a decree. For the purpees of sec. 38 (3) (iii) of the B. A. D. R. Act by fiction of law it is deemed to be a decree so as to provide for the same procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure for delivery of possession; the answer has to be understood to mean that by the provisions contained in sec. 33 (3) (iii) the procedure prescribed for delivery of possession in the Code of Civil Procedure while executing decree awarding possession is written with pen and ink in the B. A. D. R. Act. (2) As the award made under the B. A. D. R. Act is not a decree an application for execution of award would not be governed by Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 because Article 182 only applies to the execution of decree made by the Civil Court. (3) Even though our answer to question No. 2 is in the negative our further answer to question No. 3 is that Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 would not apply to an application for execution of the award because that article in its application is confined to application under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of which ko other provision is made in the Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 (4) No article of Indian Limitation Act 1908 would apply to an application for execution of an award made under the B. A. D. R. Act. 16 With these answers the matter will go back to the learned Single Judge for disposal of each case. There shall be no order as to costs of hearing before the Full Bench. Answer accordingly. .