JUDGNEMT C. R. Thakur, J.—The petitioner has by this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India called in question the termination order (Annexure 16) dated 23rd July, 1973, from the post of Commander in the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. 2. The petitioner had joined the Emergency Commission of the Indian Army with effect from April 14, 1963. He continued in the Army upto August 21, 1967, when he was deputed to the Indo Tibetan Border Police, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. He was absorbed in the Indo-Tibetan Border Police after his services were dispensed with by the Army authorities but the continuity in service was maintained and he was given seniority from the date of joining the Army. He was appointed as Company Commander in the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (shortly called the Border Police) with effect from 22-8-1967 on the terms and conditions of appointment as contained Annexure 1 to this petition. He was governed by the Central Reserve Police Force Act and the Rules, as amended from time to time. After completion of three years service in 1970, the petitioner became entitled to quasi- permanent status. With effect from May 1, 1970, the Government of India converted 8o per cent of 80 various sanctioned temporary posts in the Border Police Battalions into permanent posts vide Annexure 2. The post of the Company Commander held by the petitioner was also converted into a permanent post. Then all the 64 posts of Company Commander were declared permanent. The petitioner was at serial No. 30 in the seniority list (Annexure 3). Six persons were promoted to the posts of Assistant Commandants, as such the petitioner was placed at serial No. 24 in the seniority list. The petitioner had completed four years of service on September 10, 1972, and, therefore, he was sanctioned a uniform grant of Rs. 450/-, representing the balance of initial uniform grant of Rs. 900/-, as admissible to him, vide Central Reserve Police Force Rule 94 (a) (2) (ii). Respondent 2 also certified him to be fit for permanent retention in the Force (Annexures 4 & 5). 3. The petitioner further averred that on October 18, 1971, a party of eight personnels, including Constable Palas Ram, under Havaidar Amar Singh left for Kunnu Post but due to heavy snow-fall and hailstorm the party had disorganised and scattered. Respondent 2 also certified him to be fit for permanent retention in the Force (Annexures 4 & 5). 3. The petitioner further averred that on October 18, 1971, a party of eight personnels, including Constable Palas Ram, under Havaidar Amar Singh left for Kunnu Post but due to heavy snow-fall and hailstorm the party had disorganised and scattered. Out of the party personnels, Palas Ram could no^ reach the destination and was reported missing. The petitioner despatched a search party on October 19, 1971 for a search for the missing constable Palas Ram. Another party which was also sent reported the recovery of a coat, Parkha and some blood-stained earth but there was no trace of anybody. Later on a Court of Enquiry, consisting of Shri J. P. Verma, I. P. S. Assistant Commandant, Presiding Officer, the petitioner and Jamadar Gurdyal Singh Kapoor, Junior Commissioned Officer, was constituted under the orders of the higher authority. The Court of Enquiry came to the conclusion that in the absence of any evidence it could not be established as to what actually happened to the missing constable Palas Ram. The proceedings were forwarded thereafter to the higher authorities. 4. Thereafter the matter of disappearance of Constable Palas Ram was resported to the Local Civil Police by the Commandant, VI Battalion of the Border Police, which also started investigation. The party of eight personnels including Hav. Amar Singh was arrested by the Civil Police, Kalpa. These persons were subsequently suspended by the Commandant. This enquiry was conducted by one Dharam Prakash, S. I. of Police. It is averred that during the course of enquiry by the Court of Enquiry, one day Dharam Prakash S. I. came to Kunnu Post in a drunken state and tried to disturb the proceedings by shouting and using abusive language and created a scene. The result was that the Presiding Officer of the Court of Enquiry preferred a complaint before the Superior Border Police authorities and requested that civil police may be requested to entrust the enquiry to some other. On August 2, 1972 the civil police also interrogated the petitioner. On his appearance before the District Inspector, Himachal Pradesh Police, Kalpa, he was informed that he was to be charged under section 302 IPC for the alleged murder of Palas Ram in conspiracy with Subedar Sadhu Singh, A Company. On August 2, 1972 the civil police also interrogated the petitioner. On his appearance before the District Inspector, Himachal Pradesh Police, Kalpa, he was informed that he was to be charged under section 302 IPC for the alleged murder of Palas Ram in conspiracy with Subedar Sadhu Singh, A Company. The matter was reported by the petitioner to the Commandant as also to the Deputy Inspector-General Border Police on August 5, 1972, vide Annexure 6. The civil police also failed to establish any case and, therefore, the proceedings" were dropped. The suspension orders of the entire party including Hav. Amar Singh were revoked. 5. Thereafter the higher authorities ordered to institute a departmental enquiry against Havildar Amar Singh, incharge party. Subsequently he was demoted to the rank of Naik. 6. The enquiry by the civil police was re-opend on the reported statement made after the lapse of about one year and ten months of one Sonam Ram, ex-Constable of VI Battalion of the Border Police, who stated that he was eye-witness to the murder of constable Palas Ram. It was said that Dharam Prakash S. I. against whom a complaint was lodged was said to have found a skull purporting to be that of missing constable Palas Ram in the forest area. 7. It is further averred that Sonam Ram ex-Constable who was working in A Company under the command of the petitioner was transferred to E Company in the same Battalion on the report of the petitioner about his poor and unsatisfactory conduct. Subsequently he was discharged from the service. Ever since his transfer and discharge, Sonam Ram harboured feelings of enmity towards the petitioner. As a result of his discharge Sonam Ram came forward with the allegation that he saw constable Palas Ram being murdered and contacted S. I. Dharam Prakash of the civil police against whom a complaint bad been lodged by the Presiding Officer of the Court of Enquiry. Dharam rrakash and other civil police authorities poisoned the Commandant co the effect that the petitioners conduct in connection with Palas Rams case was not fair. Ail of a sudden, on May 29, 1973, the Commandant VI Battalion of the Border Police ordered the transfer of the petitioner from A Company to B Company. Shri D. S. Malik, Assistant Commandant, officiating Company Commander B Company was simultaneously transferred to A Company. Ail of a sudden, on May 29, 1973, the Commandant VI Battalion of the Border Police ordered the transfer of the petitioner from A Company to B Company. Shri D. S. Malik, Assistant Commandant, officiating Company Commander B Company was simultaneously transferred to A Company. The transfer of the petitioner was being effected by the Commandant without prior approval of transfer having been secured from the Deputy Tnspector. General of even any order from him to this effect. The petitioner further averred that the order of transfer made by the Commandant, who was not competent to transfer him, was a colourable exercise of power connected with the case of missing constable Palas Ram. The petitioner, however, could not hand over the charge of his post consequent to his transfer orders. He made a request for interview in connection with his transfer and to explain the facts with regard to the disappearance of constable Palas Ram, but he did not receive any reply. However, on a reminder being issued, he was informed on June 4, 1973 that he would be communicated the decision on his application which was under consideration. He was on June 5, 1973 called upon to submit a written explanation to the Deputy Inspector-General through the Commandant for not having handed over the charge of his Compand and on the same day he received another order in the evening from the Commandant that his interview with the Deputy Inspector-General stood deferred. Thereafter he was taken ill and he replied to the order on June 6, 1973. On June 15, 1973 the petitioner was called for interview and he was told that the transfer order had no connection with the case of Palas Ram. On July 2), 1973 the petitioner was handed over a letter (Annexure 16) terminating forthwith his services under Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965. It was stated in that order that he was to be paid salary in lieu of one month notice but in fact he was not paid his salary and allowances in compliance to the order, Annexure 16. The petitioner vide his letter, dated July 31, 1973 to the Commandant requested for one month salary as per termination order. It was stated in that order that he was to be paid salary in lieu of one month notice but in fact he was not paid his salary and allowances in compliance to the order, Annexure 16. The petitioner vide his letter, dated July 31, 1973 to the Commandant requested for one month salary as per termination order. The Commandant asked him to sign the pay bill even though the petitioner could not do so because after the termination order coming into effect he ceased to possess disbursing and drawing powers. The petitioner requested for payment of T. A. and for issue of a discharge certificate, but he was not either given the T. A. or the discharge certificate. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner brought this writ petition for quashing the order of termination and also to declare him to be a permanent or at any rate a quasi-permanent Company Commander in the Border Police and also to declare him entitled to all the consequential benefits including the benefit of salary and seniority. 8. The respondents took up preliminary objection to the effect that the order terminating services of the petitioner is wholly an innocuous order and it cannot be labelled as a penal one. The petitioner was a temporary employee and his services have been terminated by a proper authority under the rules. These are disputed questions of fact involved in the writ petition and as such no writ is maintainable. It was denied that the petitioner had acquired the status of a permanent employee. It was further contended that no officer of the rank of the petitioner had so far been confirmed against permanent post due to administrative reasons. It was also denied that the petitioner was one of the seniormost Company Commander. His services were terminated according to the terms of his appointment. The petitioner was never declared as a quasi-permanent employee and he had been a temporary employee only throughout. The certificate as referred to by the petitioner in para 13 of the petition had become procedurally necessary and it was issued by the Inspector-General under rule 94 (a) (2) (ii) of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules to enable the petitioner to dray his uniform grant. It was further averred that the Commandant was fully competent to order transfer of the petitioner. It was further averred that the Commandant was fully competent to order transfer of the petitioner. It was also averred that the petitioner had actually drawn his salary for the month of July, 1973 amounting to Rs. 1130/- vide treasury voucher no. 14, dated 1-8-1973 and also another identical amount of Rs. 1130/-in lieu of a months notice vide treasury voucher no. 15 again dated 1-8-1973, both the amounts having been drawn from the Kalpa Treasury. The petitioner drew his emoluments after the termination order came into effect when he had ceased to possess the drawing and disbursing powers and hence the submission of the petitioner is wholly self-contradictory. The services of the petitioner had been terminated in terms of para 4 (i) of the offer of appointment (Annexure 1 to the petition). The petitioner was not entitled to the issue of a discharge certificate in view of the clear provisions of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The petitioner was also not entitled to any T. A. It was also averred that no extraneous consideration influenced the appointing authority to terminate his services. 9. The petitioner did not file any rejoinder to this writ petition. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner was a permanent employee because after having put in 4 years service he was certified to be fit for permanency. Annexure 4, dated February 10, 1972, only states that on completion of 3 years service as Company Commandar, the petitioner was sanctioned a uniform grant of Rs. 450/- representing the balance of his initial uniform grant of Rs. 900/-as admissible to him under C.R.P. Rules 94 (a) (2) (ii). In the next paragraph it has been stated : "It is certified that the officer is fit for permanent retention in the Force." This rule which has been referred to above does not say that this uniform allowance is only granted when a person is appointed against a substantive or a permanent post. Clause (ii) of Rule 94 (a) (2) reads as under: "Rs. Clause (ii) of Rule 94 (a) (2) reads as under: "Rs. 450/- representing the balance on completion of three years service as gazetted officer in the Force or on confirmation, whichever is earlier, subject to the stipulation that the officer concerned, if not substantive when the amount becomes due, is certified by the Inspector-General of Police as fit for permanent retention in the Force." In the instant case the petitioner had admittedly put in more than three years service on February 10, 1972 when this uniform grant was allowed to him and this grant as is evident is admissible only on the completion of three years service in the Force or on confirmation whichever is earlier. There is no order of confirmation and he had already put in more than three years service and, therefore, he was entitled to the grant of Rs. 450/- as uniform grant. But, this would not mean that he had become a permanent employee or had been posted against a substantive post. The only thing was that he was held entitled to this grant on completion of three years service under clause (ii) of sub-rule (2) of rule 94 and not that it conferred any right on the petitioner to contend that he had become a permanent hand. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to rule 108 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules which provides for probation and confirmation. Sub-rule (1) says that the selected candidates shall be appointed or promoted to a superior post in the Force on probation for a period of two years. Sub-rule (3) states that on the completion of the period of probation, the candidates shall, if considered fit for permanent appointment, be confirmed in their appointments subject to the availability of substantive vacancies in permanent posts. Sub-rule (3) says that the Government may extend the period of two years specified in sub-rule (1). Sub-rule (4) states that if on the expiration of the period of probation if the person is not found to be fit for permanent appointment the candidate may be discharged or the Government may pass such orders as they think fit. Sub-rule (3) says that the Government may extend the period of two years specified in sub-rule (1). Sub-rule (4) states that if on the expiration of the period of probation if the person is not found to be fit for permanent appointment the candidate may be discharged or the Government may pass such orders as they think fit. Sub-rule (5) of this rule reads as under : "Where no action is taken by Government under sub-rule (2) or (3) or (4), the period after the prescribed period of probation shall be treated as an engagement from month to month terminable on either side on the expiration of one calendar months notice in writing." Hence it is obvious that in case the petitioner is not confirmed after the expiry of the probationary period or the period is not extended or he is not discharged then his retention shall be treated as an engagement from month to month terminable on either side on the expiration of one calendar months notice in writing. The petitioner cannot rely upon this rule in his favour. It rather helps the respondents. Therefore, the submission of the petitioners learned counsel that in view of rule 108 after the expiry of two years period he stood confirmed, especially to the post against which he was to be made permanent was available and that if his probation was not extended or discharged then he was automatically confirmed is not correct in view of sub-rule (5) of rule 108 of the aforesaid rules. 12. The second point that has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the termination of his services under the terms and conditions of his letter of appointment was unwarranted. The letter of appointment is Annexure 1, dated 5th September, 1967. Para 1 of this letter states that the post is temporary and is likely to continue indefinitely. Para 2 mentions the scale of pay and the allowances and the fixation of pay and seniority in the case of a released Army Officer. Para 3 talks about the entitlement of allowances. Para 4 (i) is reproduced as below: "The appointment may be terminated at any time by a months notice given by either side viz. the appointee or the appointing authority, without assigning any reason. Para 3 talks about the entitlement of allowances. Para 4 (i) is reproduced as below: "The appointment may be terminated at any time by a months notice given by either side viz. the appointee or the appointing authority, without assigning any reason. The appointing authority, however, reserves the right of terminating the services of the appointee forthwith or before the expiry of the stipulated period of notice by making payment to him of a sum equivalent to the pay and allowances for the period of notice or the unexpired portion thereof." The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the termination order was wrong, inasmuch as the petitioner had not been made the payment of his salary in lieu of one months notice, as envisaged under sub-para (1) of para 4. According to the learned counsel one of the conditions of his appointment, that in case of termination of his services he was to be made the payment of his salary and allowances in lieu of one months notice or the unexpired portion thereof has not been complied with. The petitioner was not paid his salary. The impugned Annexure lb says that the services have been terminated in pursuance of proviso to sub-rule (1) of rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. It was stated therein that he shall be paid a sum equivalent to the amount of pay and allowances for a period of one month (in lieu of the period of notice). Therefore, from this order it is evident that his services were terminated forthwith without any notice of a month and, therefore, according to the terms of this order also he was entitled to the payment of his salary and allowances simultaneously with the service of this order of termination of his services. To be more precise, the submission made by the petitioner is that he was not made payment simultaneously along with the order of termination of his services. This assertion that no salary or allowances were paid in compliance to the order of termination, Annexure 16 is found in para 48 of the petition. To be more precise, the submission made by the petitioner is that he was not made payment simultaneously along with the order of termination of his services. This assertion that no salary or allowances were paid in compliance to the order of termination, Annexure 16 is found in para 48 of the petition. The later portion of the reply given by the respondents in para 40 of the return to this paragraph 48 is that: "In fact when the petitioner submitted his application dated 31-7-1973 (annexure 17 filed by the petitioner) asking for a months salary, the Aommandant, vide his letter dated 1-8-73 (annexure 20 filed by the petitioner) also advised the petitioner on these lines that he himself was the drawing and disbursing officer and that he was personally responsible to draw the salary and allowances. Incidentally, the petitioner actually drew his salary for the month of July, 1973, amounting to Rs. 1130/- vide treasury voucher No. 14, dated 1-8-1973 and also another identical amount of Rs. 11.0/-in lieu of a months notice vide treasury voucher No. 15 again dated 1-8-73, both the amounts having been drawn from the Kalpa Treasury". There is no rejoinder filed by the petitioner to controvert this submission made by the respondents in reply. Hence this uncontroverted reply falsifies the assertion of the petitioner made in para 48 of the petition as also para 49 of the same. In view of this reply it is not necessary to further go into the matter of non-payment of salary and allowances when the petitioner had actually drawn the same In his capacity as drawing and disbursing officer. 13. The third point agitated is that even though rule 5 which has now been amended applies to the case of the petitioner and he has been paid salary in accordance therewith yet the order, Annexure 16, is punitive and not innocuous. The ground for termination of his services is the enquiry into the case of death of Palas Ram as already mentioned above. Therefore, according to him, the foundation for termination of the services is the alleged misconduct of the petitioner in connection with the murder of Palas Ram. Further that the petitioner disobeyed the order of transfer, inasmuch as he did not hand over the charge as directed. Therefore, according to him, the foundation for termination of the services is the alleged misconduct of the petitioner in connection with the murder of Palas Ram. Further that the petitioner disobeyed the order of transfer, inasmuch as he did not hand over the charge as directed. According to the petitioner, these are the grounds which formed the very basis for the termination of his services, have already given the facts about the missing of Palas Ram and the consequent enquiries conducted in that behalf. The impugned order, Annexure 16, would show that it is a simple order of termination without casting any stigma. If there is no stigma then there cannot be said to be any violation of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. The learned counsel submits that the Court has to look to the attendant circumstances, resulting into the passing of the termination order. The attendant circumstances, as already stated above, are the enquiries and the alleged misconduct of the petitioner in connection with the alleged murder of Palas Ram as also the disobedience of the order of transfer. The learned counsel has also cited a number of authorities to show that the order of termination was by way of punishment. Although rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules was quoted in the order of termination, it was nothing, but the colourable exercise of power. In substance and in effect the termination was by way of punishment. There can be no dispute with the principle that the Court has to see whether the order is merely a motive or the very foundation for termination of the services of the petitioner. The various documents that have been filed and referred to by the learned counsel do not in any way show that the enquiry into the death of Palas Ram and the alleged disobedience of the order of transfer formed the very basis for the termination of the services of the petitioner. No doubt the petitioner was arrested by the civil police, Kalpa, but nothing was found against him and his party and the police enquiry proved futile and so was the enquiry conducted by the Court of enquiry on which the petitioner himself was one of the members. There is no doubt that the petitioner on receipt of the order of transfer did not hand over the charge. There is no doubt that the petitioner on receipt of the order of transfer did not hand over the charge. He had been making representations from time to time for interview and to explain the circumstances that led to the missing of Palas Ram. But, nothing can be inferred from the record as also the documents referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was because of the aforesaid two facts that services of the petitioner were terminated. It was one of the conditions of his service that his services were liable to be terminated by one months notice or without notice on payment of one month salary in lieu of the notice without assigning any reasons. In para 24 onwards of the petition the allegations made by the petitioner are against Sonam Ram, and Dharam Prakash and there is nothing against the respondents if they were instrumental in making allegations against him with regard to the alleged murder of Palas Ram. In para 28 he has made a specific mention that Palas Ram ex-constable who was working in A Company under his command was transferred to E Company in the same Battalion on his report due to his poor and unsatisfactory conduct. Subsequently he was discharged from service. Ever since his transfer and as a result of his discharge the said Sonam Ram harboured feelings of enmity towards the petitioner and did not hesitate to express his ill-will towards him openly. In para 30 of the petition it has been stated that as a consequence of his discharge, Sonam Ram came forward with the allegation that he saw constable Palas Ram being murdered and contacted S. I. Dharam Prakash of the civil police against whom a complaint had already been lodged by the Assistant Commandant, Presiding Officer of the Court of Inquiry. Dharam Prakash and other higher civil police authorities tried to poison the mind of the Commandant to the effect that petitioners conduct in connection with Palas Rams case was not fair although this was done with the motive to vindicate the grudge that Dharam Prakash and Sonam Ram bore against the petition. Therefore, from this what follows is that the allegations of mala fide are against Dharam Prakash and Sonam Ram and not against the authorities, i. e. the respondents. Therefore, from this what follows is that the allegations of mala fide are against Dharam Prakash and Sonam Ram and not against the authorities, i. e. the respondents. The only submission as made in para 31 is that the civil police authorties tried to poison the mind of the Commandant. But, there is nothing to infer that the Commandant was in any way prejudiced against the petitioner so as to pass an order of termination. It is pure and simple order of termination without casting any stigma so as to be hit by the provisions of Article 311. The removal, therefore, cannot be said to be consequent to the enquiries or the prejudice of any kind on the part of the respondents, nor is it because of the alleged disobedience of the order of transfer. That being so, this submission that the enquiries into the death of Palas Ram and the disobedience to the order of transfer is the very foundation for the passing of the order of termination, is not established. 14. In these circumstances, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.