ASSAN HAJI v. SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE — 1977 DIGILAW 9 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. Inherent power under S.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is sought to be invoked here. That section reads: "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." An order to be passed under the section should be to secure the ends of justice. That does not mean that to secure the ends of justice any order can be passed under the section. There are restrictions imposed by the section itself in passing orders to secure the ends of justice. Thus orders to be passed under it should be for one or the other of the three purposes referred there. They are: (1) to give effect to any order under this Codee (2) to prevent abuse of the process of Courte and (3) or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Orders to be passed under categories 1 to 3 have all a common quality which constitutes them a genus. That quality is securing the ends of justice. Cases coming under category No. (3) are particular unspecified cases coming under that genus. Use of the words "or otherwise" in category No. (3) although it literally makes that category general, omnibus and sweeping, as it follows two particular and specific categories, namely categories 1 and 2, in interpreting it according to the rules of interpretation of statutes it has to be assumed that the intention of the statute was to confine it to cases of similar kind as those specified in categories Nos. (1) and (2). In other words the language of the section must be construed ejusdem generis. Consequently for invoking the power under S.482 of the Code it is not sufficient it it is merely shown that it is for securing the ends of justice. It has further to be shown that it is for giving effect to any order passed under the Code or for preventing abuse of the process of court or for a purpose analogous to them. 2. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Pampapathy v. State of Mysore AIR. 1967 S. C. 286 and Superintendent and Remembrancer, W.B. v. Mohan Singh AIR. 2. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Pampapathy v. State of Mysore AIR. 1967 S. C. 286 and Superintendent and Remembrancer, W.B. v. Mohan Singh AIR. 975 S.C.1002 do not show that it is a different interpretation that has to be given to the provisions of the Section. In Henry Fernandez v. State 1971 KLT. 510 in dealing with S.561A of the predecessor Code of 1898 corresponding to S 482 of the present Code of 1973 I said that the only limitations for exercise of the powers under that section were absence of express provision in the Code to redress wrong and exercise of the power being necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. I did not consider there what the words "or otherwise to secure the ends of justice" appearing in the section meant. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that here he was invoking the inherent power as there was abuse of the process of the court and he mentioned the order passed on September 13, 1975, by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Perinthalmanna, as constituting abuse of the process of the Court. That order was passed in a summary proceeding under Ss 133 to 138 of the Code for removal of nuisance. The petitioner here is said to have caused obstruction to the use of a pubic pathway. It was that obstruction that was sought to be removed. Conditional order under S.133 was passed on June 26, 1975. There was dispute between the parties about the public nature of the pathway. Title deeds, Exts. D1 and D2, and rent and revenue receipts, Exts. D3 to D5, were produced by the petitioner in support of his denial of the public nature of the pathway The Magistrate did not find them reliable evidence in support of such denial. Consequently he passed on September 13,1975 order under S.137 (2) refusing to stay the proceeding but to continue it. Final order under S.138 was passed on December 20,1975. That order was challenged in revision before the Sessions Judge, Manjeri. In the revision petition no ground was taken that the order passed on September 13, 1975 constituted abuse of the process of the court. Final order under S.138 was passed on December 20,1975. That order was challenged in revision before the Sessions Judge, Manjeri. In the revision petition no ground was taken that the order passed on September 13, 1975 constituted abuse of the process of the court. The only point pressed when the revision petition was heard was about the propriety of the final order passed under S.138 of the Code The revision petition was dismissed on September 27,1976. 4. S.133 to 139A of the predecessor Code correspond to S.133 to 138 of the present Code In dealing with them a Division Bench of this Court, to which I was a party, said in Velayudhan v. Kesavan Nair 1968 KLT. 889. that the proper place for the provisions of S.137 of the old Code was after S.139A and that there were two distinct stages in the enquiry contemplated by those sections. In the present Code the provisions of S.139A of the old Code have been incorporated and given due precedence. In the present case the order dated September 13,1975 was passed in passing from stage 1, as contemplated by Velayudhan v. Kesavan Nair, 1968 KLT. 889 to stage 2 in the enquiry. That was only an interlocutory order. 5. The order passed on September 13, 1975 ceased to be in force after the parsing of the final order on December 20,1975. In the revision from the final order there was no challenge to the order passed on September 13,1975. Power under S.482 of the Code is not sought to be invoked here for giving effect to any order or for preventing abuse of the process of court or for a purpose analogous to them. I decline to act under S.482 of the Code. This petition is dismissed.