Judgment S.K.CHOUDHURI, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioner prays for quashing the order contained in Annexure-4 dated the 29th May, 1976 passed by the Chairman Giridih Municipality allowing the application for mutation filed by respondent No. 4 for mutation of his name along with his two brothers namely, respondents Nos. 2 and 3. According to the petitioner holding Nos. 370 and 371 in ward No. 4 of Giridih Municipality was acquired by the joint family of Hazarimal Kishorelal in the name of one Mangi Lal, father of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 by a registered deed dated the 13th February, 1939. It is not disputed that after the aforesaid purchase the said Mangi Lal was mutated in the municipality and municipal taxes were paid. According to the petitioner the municipal taxes were paid by the joint family. It is also stated that with regard to the aforesaid property however the name of Ram Chandra Seth grand-uncle of the petitioner was entered in the Zamindari Sherista and rents were paid in his name and receipts were in the custody of the petitioner. The aforesaid Mangi Lal died some time in 1957. Thereafter, it appears that Tarachand Jain, father of the petitioner filed an application for mutation of his name in place of the aforesaid Mangi Lal. It appears that respondents Nos. 2 to 4 who were sons of the deceased Mangi Lal also filed an application for mutation of their names in place of their father. The matter was heard and by the order contained in Annexure-1 dated the 27th May, 1970 passed by the Executive Officer, Giridih Municipality the name of Tarachand Jain was mutated. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order respondents Nos. 2 to 4 preferred a writ application before the High Court at Patna which was numbered as C.W. J. C. 1276 of 1970. The said writ application however was dismissed by the order dated 2nd July, 1970. A copy of the order has been made Annexure-5 to the supplementary affidavit filed in this case. The said copy shows that the application was summarily dismissed with the observation that the writ petitioner viz. Respondents 2 to 4 could institute a suit for establishing their right if such a suit would lie. It appears that thereafter respondents Nos. 2 to 4 did not choose to file any suit and kept silent in the matter. The said copy shows that the application was summarily dismissed with the observation that the writ petitioner viz. Respondents 2 to 4 could institute a suit for establishing their right if such a suit would lie. It appears that thereafter respondents Nos. 2 to 4 did not choose to file any suit and kept silent in the matter. Some time in 1971 the petitioner applied for mutation of his name in place of his father claiming title in the holdings in question by virtue of second partition held between the members of the families of the branch of Shri Tarachand Jain. This application was allowed by order dated the 4th April, 1973 by the Chairman of the Giridih Municipality, a copy of which has been made Annexure-2 to the writ application. After a lapse of more than one year respondent No. 4 filed an application for mutation of his name along with the name of his two brothers respondents 2 and 3 on the ground that previously his father was mutated with regard to the holdings in question till 1970 when his name was removed by the Municipality and the name of Tarachand Jain father of the petitioner was substituted. In the said petition he has stated that after the death of their father he along with other brothers have become owners and their names should be mutated in place of their father and the said application has been made Annexure-3 to the writ application. After the said application was filed the matter was heard, ultimately by order dated the 29th May, 1976, the Chairman of the Giridih Municipality directed mutation of the names of respondents 2 to 4 against holdings in question. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioner has preferred the present writ application. 2. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 Commr. of the Giridih Municipality through the Chairman. It appears on reading the said counter-affidavit that respondent No. 1 has supported the order contained in Annexure-4 dated the 29th May, 1976 and has stated that the Chairman rightly passed the said order on the materials and evidence available before the Chairman. Another counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 2 to 4 challenging the allegations made in the writ petition. In that counter-affidavit they have taken the stand similar to respondent No. 1 that the impugned order contained in Annex. Another counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 2 to 4 challenging the allegations made in the writ petition. In that counter-affidavit they have taken the stand similar to respondent No. 1 that the impugned order contained in Annex. 4 is a valid order and cannot be set aside by this Court. 3. Mr. Brajkishore Prasad No. 2, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the impugned order contained in Annexure-4 dated 29-5-1976 having been passed by the Chairman of the Giridih Municipality is nullity and without jurisdiction, as the Chairman of the said municipality could not have passed the order of mutation on the application filed by respondent No. 4 in view of the fact that the Executive Officer of the Municipality has already been appointed under Sec.37B of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act 1922 (hereinafter to be called as the Act) which enumerates the power of the Executive Officer of the Municipality. Under Clause (a) of the said section the Executive power for the purpose of carrying the administration of the municipality shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules and bye-laws made thereunder and the general control of the commissioners at a meeting, vests in the Executive Officer. It is not disputed at the Bar that now there is an Executive Officer for the Giridih Municipality and the said Executive Officer has power to correct any assessment list under sec. 107 of the Act but the argument of Mr. Govind Pd. appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, who also argued the case for respondents Nos. 2 to 4 on instruction received from the learned counsel appearing for the said respondents, is that the application by respondent No. 4 having been filed under sec. 108 of the Act before the Chairman the same could be validly entertained and disposed of by the Chairman under that very section namely, sec. 108. His further argument is that the said section not having been mentioned in the 5th Schedule of the Act the Chairman did not cease to have the jurisdiction to entertain such application. In order to appreciate the argument raised by the learned counsel for the parties it will be relevant to quote the relevant portion of sec. 107 of the Act which reads thus : "107. Amendment and duration of list. In order to appreciate the argument raised by the learned counsel for the parties it will be relevant to quote the relevant portion of sec. 107 of the Act which reads thus : "107. Amendment and duration of list. (1) The Commissioners may from time to time alter or amend the assessment list in any of the following ways : (a) by entering therein the name of any person or any property which ought to have been entered, or any property which has become liable to taxation after the publication of the assessment list under sec. 115 : (b) by substitution for the name of the owner or occupier of any holding the name of any other person who has succeeded by transfer or otherwise to the ownership or occupation of the holding". We are concerned with the aforesaid clauses (a) and (b) and other clauses are not relevant for the decision of the present case. On reading the aforesaid sec. 107 of the Act it is clear that the Commissioner has power to alter or amend the assessment list which has already been published under sec. 115 of the Act. The Commissioners have also power to substitute the name of the owner or occupier of any holding on an application made by a person who succeeded by transfer or otherwise of the ownership or occupation of the holding. Sec.108 makes provision for making an application to the Chairman where title to any of the holding is transferred. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that when an application is made under sec. 108 of the Act the same has to be dealt with in accordance with law as laid down in sec. 107 of the Act. It is not disputed that the power which was vested in the Commissioners for altering or amending the assessment list under sec. 107 now vests in the Executive Officer by virtue of sec. 37B of the Act. In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order contained in Annexure-4 having been passed by the Chairman is without jurisdiction. The aforesaid contention is supported by the decision in Yadunandan Prasad V/s. Smt. Saudamini Sinha, AIR 1976 Pat 340 a Bench decision of this Court to which I was also a member. In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order contained in Annexure-4 having been passed by the Chairman is without jurisdiction. The aforesaid contention is supported by the decision in Yadunandan Prasad V/s. Smt. Saudamini Sinha, AIR 1976 Pat 340 a Bench decision of this Court to which I was also a member. In that decision it has been expressly held as follows:- (at p 341 of AIR). "......It is manifest, therefore, that the power which was originally exercisable by the Chairman in accordance with sec. 24 of the Act before its amendment by the Amending Act with respect to mutation of the name of any person with respect to any holding under clause (b) of Sec.107 (1) of the Act was taken away from him and vested in the Executive Officer. Prima facie there does not seem to be any doubt in this respect". In view of the aforesaid decision it has to be held that the learned counsel for the petitioner was right in his submission that the order contained in Annexure-4 is without jurisdiction and is nullity. 4. The argument which was put forward by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that an application having been preferred by respondent No. 4 being an application under sec. 108 and the said section not having been mentioned in schedule 5 of the Act the Chairman of the Municipality continued to hold his power to dispose of the same under that section in accordance with law. This argument was taken notice of in the aforesaid. Yadunandan Pd.s case, AIR 1976 Pat 340 Supra and was negatived. It has been held in that case (at p. 341 of AIR): "......The only provision in that regard is contained in Clause (b) of sec. 107 (1) and at no other place. It is, therefore, clear that by the amendment made in the year, 1965, the Legislature clearly intended that although the notice of transfer of title to any holding is to be given to the Chairman, the necessary alteration has to be made by the Executive Officer on that basis". 107 (1) and at no other place. It is, therefore, clear that by the amendment made in the year, 1965, the Legislature clearly intended that although the notice of transfer of title to any holding is to be given to the Chairman, the necessary alteration has to be made by the Executive Officer on that basis". Learned counsel for the respondents however contended that the decision on the latter point as decided in Yadunandan Prasads case is not correct as in that case no notice was taken of the case of Chairman and the Municipal Commissioner of the Chakradharpur Municipality V/s. Bishwanath Jagatramka, AIR 1975 Pat 158 . Learned Counsel for the respondents also in this regard referred to two more decisions viz. the case of Abrar Ali Khan V/s. Patna City Municipality, 1962 41 ILR(Pat) 338 and Patna Municipal Corporation V/s. Ladley Saran, 1963 0 BLJR 214. Both these decisions have been taken notice of in Chakradharpur Municipality case (Supra). That was a case for recovery of certain amount as arrears of Municipal tax by the Chakradharpur Municipality against the defendant of that suit. In that suit the defence was that the property for which the tax was due had already been transferred to one Mewawati Devi by a registered deed of gift dated the 8th June, 1957. The defendant of that suit denied his liability to pay any tax. It has been held in that case that the municipal authority was not justified in rejecting the application for amendment of the assessment list filed on behalf of Mewawati Devi on the ground that the arrears of tax on the said holding had not been cleared off. Their Lordships held that the municipal authority was not at all justified in rejecting the said application for mutation on that ground and therefore it was illegal on the part of the municipal authority not to mutate the name of the said Mewawati Devi who actually became the owner of the property by virtue of the deed of gift and her name ought to have been mutated. In that view of the matter their Lordships upheld the decision of the court below by which the suit was dismissed. This decision is not an authority for the proposition that the application having been filed under S. 108 of the Act the same should be disposed under that very section and not under sec. In that view of the matter their Lordships upheld the decision of the court below by which the suit was dismissed. This decision is not an authority for the proposition that the application having been filed under S. 108 of the Act the same should be disposed under that very section and not under sec. 107 of the Act. The other two cases which were referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents have been discussed in this judgment and it has been held that Abrar Ali Khans case has laid down the law correctly namely that : "Even in the absence of an application for mutation under sec. 108 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act it was a duty imposed upon the plaintiff-respondent to alter or amend the assessment list under sec. 107 (1) (b) of the Act after following the procedure mentioned in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Sec.107. It is, therefore, not open to the plaintiff-respondent in the present case to take advantage of its own laches or negligence in not entering the mutation of title in its assessment list. As we have already pointed out, the defendants are not liable to pay Municipal taxes for the period in question because they are not owners within the meaning of sec. 3(18) of the Act, read with sec. 100(1) of the Act". Thus it is clear that the decision cited by learned counsel for the respondents in no way supports his contention. In my opinion the point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is supported by the decision in Yadunandan Prasads case, AIR 1976 Pat 340 (Supra). 5. Learned counsel for the respondents also contended that the order contained in annexure-2 dated the 4th April, 1973 in favour of the Petitioners having been passed by the Chairman should on the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. No material has been shown to us by the learned counsel for the respondents that at the relevant time when the order contained in annexure-2 was passed there was the Executive Officer. No material has been shown to us by the learned counsel for the respondents that at the relevant time when the order contained in annexure-2 was passed there was the Executive Officer. Learned counsel for the petitioner rightly contended that in order to succeed on that point the respondents must show that at the relevant time there was an Executive Officer who could pass such order which is a question of fact and the said point cannot be allowed to be raised here at this stage. Further we are also not concerned as to the validity or otherwise of Annexure-2 as the same is not under challenge before us. 6. In the result, the application is allowed with costs. The impugned order contained in annexure-4 dated the 29th May, 1976 passed by the Chairman, Giridih Municipality is quashed. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/-. SHIVANUGRAH NARAIN, J. 7 I agree. As, however, it was argued by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that the decision in Yadunandan Prasad V/s. Smt. Saudamini ( AIR 1976 Pat 340 ) is not correct and requires reconsideration, I wish to add a few words of my own. It was contended by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that sec. 108 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 (hereinafter called "the Act") confers upon the Chairman of a Municipality a power to amend the assessment list independently of and apart from sec. 107 of the Act and as sec. 108 of the Act is not one of the sections enumerated in the 5th schedule of the amending Act Bihar Act 20 of 1965, the power of the Chairman to pass an order amending the assessment list survived. This contention was considered and rejected in the decision referred to above and, if I may say so with respect, rightly. Sec.108 is merely a provision for giving notice to the Chairman of devolution of the property. It nowhere says what the Chairman would do on receipt of that notice. The only provision for amending the assessment list apart from the provision regarding the revision after expiry of the statutory period is contained in sec. 107 of the Act. As pointed out by Narasimham, C. J., speaking for the Full Bench of this Court in Kamini Devi V/s. Chairman of Buxar Municipality, AIR 1967 Pat 96 . The only provision for amending the assessment list apart from the provision regarding the revision after expiry of the statutory period is contained in sec. 107 of the Act. As pointed out by Narasimham, C. J., speaking for the Full Bench of this Court in Kamini Devi V/s. Chairman of Buxar Municipality, AIR 1967 Pat 96 . "Sec.107 is a special section which deals with amendments and alterations in the assessment list in the interim period between the original general assessment and the revision of the same after the expiry of the statutory period as referred to in sec. 106." Construed in the context of sec. 107, it is manifest that the power of the municipal authorities to amend the assessment list is derived from and confined to sec. 107 and the municipal authorities have no power to amend the list during the aforesaid interim period apart from sec. 107. The aforesaid conclusion finds support from the Full Bench decision in Kamini Devis case referred to above in which it was held that by virtue of sec. 24, in the absence of a resolution to the contrary by the Commissioners at a meeting, the Chairman could exercise all the powers of the Commissioners under sec. 107 and thus pass an order of mutation of the house of a person in the municipal assessment list. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Chairman to pass an order of mutation was defeated with reference to the provisions of sec. 107 read with sec. 24 of the Act and not with reference to sec. 108. As sec. 107 is one of the provisions mentioned in the 5th Schedule, the powers thereunder, in view of sec. 37B, can be exercised only by the Executive Officer. As pointed out in the decision referred to above, the power of the Chairman under sec. 24 of the Act is qualified by addition of the expression except such powers as are under this Act exercisable by the Executive Officer." The previous Bench decision, if I may say so with respect, is, therefore, clearly correct and requires no reconsideration. As pointed out in the decision referred to above, the power of the Chairman under sec. 24 of the Act is qualified by addition of the expression except such powers as are under this Act exercisable by the Executive Officer." The previous Bench decision, if I may say so with respect, is, therefore, clearly correct and requires no reconsideration. The learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to two Bench decisions of this Court, one reported in 1963 B.L. J. R. 214 and the other 1975 B. B. C. J. 176 : ( AIR 1975 Pat 158 ) but, as my learned brother has shown, those decisions have no bearing on the question presented for the decision in the instant case. 8 The other contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner having obtained an order for mutation in their favour from the Chairman himself and not having raised apparently any objection to his jurisdiction to pass the impugned order cannot now be permitted to raise the question of jurisdiction is, in my opinion, equally misconceived. In view of sec. 37B of the Act it is manifest that there is now an inherent want of jurisdiction in the Chairman to pass an order under sec. 107 of the Act. And it is well settled that no consent can give authority or jurisdiction where there is inherent want of jurisdiction, the question of acquiescence etc. is irrelevant. See the decision of the Supreme Court in the United Commercial Bank Ltd. V/s. their Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230 .