Judgment SHIVANUGRAH NARAIN, J. 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing order No. 21 dated 13-8-1973 and the order dated 27th Sept. 1973 (Copies whereof are Annexures 3 and 4 respectively to the writ application) both of which were passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna (respondent No. 1) in a petition under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 filed by Sri Maheshwari Prasad Sinha (respondent No. 2). By the first order, namely, the order dated 13-8-1973 respondent No. 1 rejected the petition for stay of further proceedings in the aforesaid case on the ground of the issue of notification under S. 18 FB of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. By the second order respondent No. 1 disposed of the aforesaid petition under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 , allowing the claim of respondent No. 2. 2. The relevant facts are these: The Bihar Co-operative Weavers Spinning Mills Limited, is an industrial undertaking at Mokameh in the district of Patna. The petitioner is the Chief Executive Officer of the aforesaid Industrial undertaking. Sri Maheshwari Prasad Sinha, respondent No. 2 was an employee of the aforesaid industrial undertaking. Respondent No. 2 filed a petition dated 19-7-1971 (Copy whereof is Annexure-1 to this writ application) under S. 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . In the aforesaid petition the petitioner claimed that he had been illegally retrenched by the order dated 6-9-1960 of the Managing Director of the industrial undertaking, that even after the retrenchment, he was asked to continue and discharge his duties till the handing over of the charge and, therefore, continued to perform his duties as store in-charge till he handed over the charge of the stores to the Factory Manager on 9-11-1969. He further stated therein that he made various representations to different authorities for their intervention but all these proved fruitless and thereafter, he filed the application. On these allegations, the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to receive from the industrial undertaking a sum of Rs. 775.41 Ps. On account of arrears of salary from 8-9-1969 to 20-9-1969 and salaries for the month of October, 1969 and for 19 days in November, 1969, as also a sum of Rs. 326/- as notice pay for one month and retrenchment compensation and gratuity of Rs. 775.41 Ps. On account of arrears of salary from 8-9-1969 to 20-9-1969 and salaries for the month of October, 1969 and for 19 days in November, 1969, as also a sum of Rs. 326/- as notice pay for one month and retrenchment compensation and gratuity of Rs. 1630 and a sum of Rs 1800/- as Provident Fund accumulations including contributions of the employer and a sum of Rs. 221/- as petty expenses refundable to him. 3. By notification dated 24th August, 1972, the management of the aforesaid industrial undertaking was taken over by the Government of India under S. 18-A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act) for a period of fifteen years. Subsequently, the Government of India issued the notification No. S. O. 305 (E) dated 30th May, 1973 under S. 18 FB of the Act, a copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ application and which, so far as is relevant, runs thus:. "......And whereas the Central Government is satisfied that in relation to the said Industrial undertaking it is necessary so to do in the interests of the general public with a view to preventing fall in the volume of production of the schedule Industry, namely the cotton textile Industry. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) sub-section (1) of S. 18 FB of the said Act, the Central Government hereby declares that the operation of all contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements awards standing orders or other instruments in force immediately before the date of issue of this order (other than those relating to secured liabilities to banks and financial institutions) to which the said industrial undertaking is a party or which may be applicable to such industrial undertaking or company shall remain suspended for a period of one year and all the rights privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said period. The petition under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was pending and the National Textile Corporation Limited which was empowered by the Central Government to take over the management of the Industrial undertaking was added as opposite party No. 3 in that case. The petition under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was pending and the National Textile Corporation Limited which was empowered by the Central Government to take over the management of the Industrial undertaking was added as opposite party No. 3 in that case. On behalf of the Manager of the Industrial undertaking, a petition for stay of the proceedings of the case for a period of one year from the date of the aforesaid order of the Central Government dated 30th May, 1973 was filed. That petition as I have already stated was rejected by the impugned order dated 13-8-1973 passed by the presiding officer of the Labour Court, which held that the adjudication of the claim under S. 33-C (2) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not covered by the order of the Central Government. The Labour Court proceeded to adjudicate upon the petition and after hearing the parties, by the impugned order dated 27-9-1973 allowed the application. 4. Cause has been show on behalf of Respondents No. 2. 5. The application so far as it relates to the quashing of the order dated 13-8-1973 refusing to stay the proceedings before the Labour Court has become infructuous, because the proceeding has been adjudicated upon and final order disposing of the case passed therein. We are therefore concerned in this case essentially with the final order dated 27-9-1973 allowing the claim made by the respondent employee of the industrial undertaking. 6. The only argument urged by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that in view of the provisions of sub-section (4) of S. 18-FB of the Act, the proceeding instituted upon the application under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was stayed by the operation of law from the date of issue of the notification dated 30th May,1973, under S. 18-F of the Act and therefore any order passed in the aforesaid proceeding after 30th May, 1973, was null and void and completely without jurisdiction. If in view of the provisions of sub-s. (4) of S. 18FB of the Act, the proceedings before the Labour Court were by operation of law stayed from the date of the notification there can be no doubt that all orders passed subsequent thereto including the impugned order disposing of the proceeding dated 27-9-1973 were without jurisdiction having been passed during the period in which the proceedings were stayed by operation of law. The main question for determination, therefore, is if sub-s. (4) of S. 18FB of the Act read with the notification issued under sub-s. (1) of S. 18FB dated 30th May, 1973 had the effect of staying the proceedings under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 , pending before the Labour Court. 7. Section 18FB of the Act reads thus: "18-FB. 7. Section 18FB of the Act reads thus: "18-FB. Power of Central Government to make certain declarations in relation to industrial undertaking the management or control of which has been taken over under S. 18-A, S. 18-AA or S. 18-FA (1) the Central Government may if it is satisfied in relation to an industrial undertaking or any part thereof the management or control of which has been taken over under S. 18-A, whether before or after the commencement of the Industries (Development and Regulation Amendment Act, 1971 or under S. 18-AA or S. 18-FA, that it is necessary so to do in the interests of the general public with a View to preventing fall in the volume of production of any scheduled industry, it may, by notified order, declare that (a) All or any of the enactments specified in the Third Schedule shall not apply or shall apply with such adaptations whether by way of modification, addition or omission (which does not, however affect the policy of the said enactments) to such industrial undertaking as may be specified in such notified order, or (b) the operation of all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force (to which such industrial undertaking or the company owning such undertaking is a party or which may be applicable to such industrial undertaking or company) immediately, before the date of issue of such notified order shall remain suspended or that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such adaptations and in such manner as may be specified in the notified order. (2) The notified order made under sub-section shall remain in force in the first instance for period of one year, but the duration of such notified order may be extended from time to time by a further notified order by a period not exceeding one year at a time. Provided that no such notified order shall, in any case, remain in force (a) after the expiry of the period for which the management of the industrial undertaking was taken over under Section 18-A, S. 18-AA or S. 18-FA, or (b) for more than five years in the aggregate from the date of issue of the first notified order, whichever is earlier. (3) Any notified order made under sub-sec. (1) shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, agreement or instrument or any decree or order of a Court, Tribunal Officer or other authority or of any submission, settlement or standing order. (4) Any. remedy for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability referred to in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) and. suspended or modified by a notified order made under that sub-section shall, in accordance with the terms of the notified order, remain suspended or modified, and all proceedings relating thereto pending before any Court, Tribunal, Officer or other authority shall accordingly remain stayed or be continued subject to such adaptations, so, however, that on the notified order ceasing to have effect (a) any right, privilege, obligation or liability so remaining suspended or modified shall become revived and enforceable as if the notified order had never been made; (b) any proceeding so remaining stayed shall be proceeded with, subject to the provisions of any law which may then be in force, from the stage which had been reached when the proceeding became stayed. (5) In computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability referred to in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1), the period during which it or the remedy for the enforcement thereof remained suspended shall be excluded. It is, therefore, manifest that sub-sec. (4) of S. 18-FB of the Act in explicit and peremptory terms directs that all proceedings specified therein "pending before any Court, Tribunal, Officer or other authority shall, accordingly, remain stayed in accordance with the terms of the notified order under S. 18-FB of the Act. It is, however, equally manifest that only certain kinds of proceedings are to remain stayed for, according to sub-sec. (4) of S. 18-FB of the Act, proceedings relating thereto only are to remain stayed. The proceedings, therefore, which are directeed to remain stayed must be (i) proceedings relating thereto i.e. relating to "any remedy for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability", (ii) the right, privilege, obligation or liability must be one referred to in cl. (4) of S. 18-FB of the Act, proceedings relating thereto only are to remain stayed. The proceedings, therefore, which are directeed to remain stayed must be (i) proceedings relating thereto i.e. relating to "any remedy for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability", (ii) the right, privilege, obligation or liability must be one referred to in cl. (b) of sub-section, that is to say any right, privilege, obligation or liability accruing or arising under any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force (to which such industrial undertaking or the company owning such undertaking is a party or which may be applicable to such industrial undertaking or company) immediately before the date of the issue of such notified order", and (iii) the rights must have been suspended or modified by notified order made under sub-s. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act. 8. That the case instituted upon an application under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 , pending before the Labour Court is a proceeding pending before a Court or Tribunal, admits of no doubt. In my opinion, it is also not open to question that the proceedings under S. 33-C (2) are proceedings relating to a remedy for the enforcement of a right. The question to be decided by the Labour Court in a proceeding under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is what is the amount of money which a workman is entitled to receive from the employer or the amount at which a benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which the workman is entitled to receive from the employer, should be computed, The foundation of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in a proceeding under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is the entitlement, that is to say, the existence of a right in the workman to receive from the employer in money or in benefits which are capable of being computed in terms of money and the Labour Court determines the amount of money due or the amount at which the benefit should be computed and the amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided in sub-s. (1) of S. 33-C. It is, therefore, a proceeding for the recovery of the amount due. Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, provides a machinery for adjudication and recovery of the amount due to the workman and, therefore, it is certainly a proceeding relating to a remedy for enforcement of the right of a workman to receive from his employer a certain sum of money or the monetary equivalent of a benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. 9. The learned Advocate for the respondent-workman contended that the proceeding under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was not a proceeding relating to any remedy for the enforcement of a right, because it provided not only for the recovery of the amount, but also for adjudication of the amount due. It was contended that a remedy for enforcement of a right must be confined to a remedy for enforcement simpliciter of a right already determined by an authority empowered to adjudicate upon it end cannot include a proceeding for adjudication of the right itself. In Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva, (1963 (2) Lab LJ 608) : ( AIR 1964 SC 752 ), Gajendragad- kar, J., as he then was, speaking for the Supreme Court observed: "There is no doubt that the three categories of claim mentioned in S. 33-C(l) fall under S. 33-C(2) and in that sense S. 33-C (2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding......... (at page 611 of the report (1963-2 Lab LJ) : {at p. 755 of AIR 1964 SC). But even apart from the fact that S. 33-C (2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding, it is not correct to say that a proceeding for enforcement of a right after adjudication of the same is not a proceeding relating to "any remedy for the enforcement of any right". What sub-s. (4) of S. 18-B requires is that it must be a proceeding relating to any remedy not that the proceeding itself must be a remedy for the enforcement of any right. The words "relating to enlarge the scope of the proceedings covered by sub-s. (4) and a proceeding which may not per se be a remedy for enforcement of a right may be a proceeding relating to such remedy if it is connected with such remedy. The words "relating to enlarge the scope of the proceedings covered by sub-s. (4) and a proceeding which may not per se be a remedy for enforcement of a right may be a proceeding relating to such remedy if it is connected with such remedy. A proceeding for adjudication of a right is certainly a proceeding connected with and therefore relating to a remedy for the enforcement of a right. Moreover, a proceeding in which the right itself is adjudicated and thereafter enforced is also a proceeding for enforcement of a right. The proceeding before the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of ths Constitution is a proceeding for enforcement of a fundamental right and it has never been contended that in a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the right which is sought to be enforced, may not be adjudicated upon but must have been previously determined to exist. In Kaye v. Sutherland (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 147 the question for determination was whether the plaintiff could be allowed leave to serve a writ of summons out of jurisdiction in an action by the outgoing tenant of a firm in Yorkshire to recover from his landlord who was ordinarily resident in Scotland, compensation for tenant-right, according to the custom of the country. It was held by the Queens Bench Division that it was an action to enforce "a contract, obligation or liability affecting land and, therefore, the Court had power under O. 11, R. 1 (b) of the Supreme Court Rules to allow service of the writ of summons out of the jurisdiction. It must, therefore, be held that the proceeding under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is a proceeding relating to a remedy for enforcement of a right. 10. The next question for consideration is, is the right or privilege of the workman, which was being adjudicated upon and enforced in the proceeding under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, a right or privilege referred to in cl. 10. The next question for consideration is, is the right or privilege of the workman, which was being adjudicated upon and enforced in the proceeding under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, a right or privilege referred to in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act, that is to say, a right or privilege accruing or arising under "any of the contract, assurance of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders, or other instruments in force (to which such industrial undertaking or the company owning such undertaking is a party or which may be applicable to such industrial undertaking or company) immediately, before the date of issue of the notified order under S. 18-FB of the Act, that is to say, before 30th May, 1973 ? To determine this question, it is necessary to examine the right sought to be enforced by the application under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. So far as the claim for arrears of salary from 8-9-1969 to 20-9-1969 and for salaries for the month of October, 1969 and for 19 days in November, 1969, is concerned, it is based on the contract of employment to which the employer was a party and in seeking to enforce his claim therefor, the workman was clearly seeking to enforce his right which had accrued under the contract before the date of the notification. This has not been controverted and, indeed, could not be controverted on behalf of the workman. The claims for the recovery of Provident Fund accumulations and petty expenses refundable to the workman are also, in my opinion, referable to the contract of service and an implied contract, to refund the expenses incurred by the workman in the course of performance of his duties respectively. The aforesaid claims are, therefore, claims based on a right accruing under the contract. The claim for notice pay for a month and retrenchment compensation is admittedly based on the provisions of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which deal with conditions precedent to retrenchment of a workman. Therefore, in claiming the amounts by way of notice pay and retrenchment compensation, the respondent workman was seeking to enforce a right conferred on him by S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A right accruing or arising under a statute is not specifically mentioned in cl. Therefore, in claiming the amounts by way of notice pay and retrenchment compensation, the respondent workman was seeking to enforce a right conferred on him by S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A right accruing or arising under a statute is not specifically mentioned in cl. (b) of sub-s. (l) of S. 18-FB of the Act. The argument on behalf of the petitioner, however, is that the expression "instruments in force" in cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act "includes within its ambit" statutes and a right arising under a statutory provision like S. 25-F aforesaid is a right accruing or arising under an instrument in force which is applicable to the industrial undertaking and the right accrued before the date of issue of the notified order under S. 18-FB of the Act. The right to the notice-pay and retrenchment compensation if any, accrued under S. 25-F before 30th May,1973 which is the date of issue of the notified order. The crucial question for determination, therefore, is whether the expression "instruments in force" in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act includes within its ambit statutes, or statutory instruments. 11. The general rule of construction is not only to look at the words but to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning according to what would appear to be the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances: per Ray, Chief Justice, in Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1978 SC 997 at p. 1001 of the report). To arrive at the proper meaning of the expression "other instruments" in S. 18-FB of the Act, we have to consider not only the meaning of the expression "instruments" but also the setting and context. in which it occurs and the object of the enactment. The expression "instruments" occurring in S. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was construed by the Supreme Court in Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commr., Tripura, (1964 (1) Cri LJ 132): ( AIR 1964 SC 173 ). The Supreme Court speaking through Sinha, C. J. explained the meaning of the expression "instrument" thus: "The General Clauses Act does not define the expression "instrument". The Supreme Court speaking through Sinha, C. J. explained the meaning of the expression "instrument" thus: "The General Clauses Act does not define the expression "instrument". Therefore, the expression must be taken to have been used in the sense in which it is generally understood in legal parlance. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (Third Edn., Vol. 2. page 1472), "instrument" is described as follows: "An instrument is a writing, and generally imports a document of a formal legal kind. Semble, the word may include an Act of Parliament............(11) Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 and 45 Vict. C. 41) S. 2 (xiii). Instrument includes deed, will, inclosure, award and Act of Parliament............" The expression is also used to signify a deed inter partes or a charter or a record or other writing of a formal nature. But in the context of the General Clauses Act, it has to be understood as including reference to a formal legal writing like an order made under a statute or sub-ordinate legislation or any document of a formal character made under constitutional or statutory authority. We have no doubt in our mind that the expression "instrument" in S. 8 was meant to include reference to the Order made by the President in exercise of his constitutional powers............... (at page 137 of the report). The expression "instrument in writing" in the definition of trustee in S. 1. Larceny Act, 1861 (24 and 25 Vict. C, 96) was held by the British High Court to include the printed rule of a savings bank, even though, the Court read the expression ejusdem generis with "deed or will". See Queen v. Fletcher, ( (1862) 31 LJMC 206). 12. It will thus be seen that the expression "instrument" is generally understood in legal parlance as an expression having a wide connotation and meaning a document of a formal legal kind and is wide enough to include within its ambit a legislative enactment. 12-A. I now turn to the setting and context in which the expression "instrument" occurs. It occurs in cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act. Section 18-FB of the Act is the sole section contained in Chap. 11-AB and is headed power to provide relief to certain industrial undertakings and cl. 12-A. I now turn to the setting and context in which the expression "instrument" occurs. It occurs in cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act. Section 18-FB of the Act is the sole section contained in Chap. 11-AB and is headed power to provide relief to certain industrial undertakings and cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act empowers the State Government to suspend by a notified order the operation of "all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force" to which such industrial undertaking is a party or which is applicable to it immediately before the date of issue of the notified order and also to suspend rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date etc. The object of S. 18-FB is, therefore, clearly to provide relief to the industrial undertaking concerned by freeing it for the time being from the burden imposed upon it by various contracts, agreements, settlements, awards etc. The underlying idea behind the suspension of the obligations and the stay of proceeding for enforcement of the aforesaid obligations is obviously to provide a breathing time to the industrial undertaking during which the industrial undertaking temporarily freed from the crippling burden imposed by its previous obligations might recuperate and be put back on its feet. Section 18-FB of the Act, therefore, is clearly a remedial legislation designed to afford relief to the industrial under taking concerned and the words and expressions contained thereunder must; receive beneficial construction, which,, according to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, (12th Edn.), means that where Judges "are faced with a choice between a wide meaning which carries out what appears to have been the object of the legislature more fully, and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, they will often choose the former" (at page 92). To put it in other words, if the words and expressions are fairly susceptible of such a meaning, the construction put upon those words and expressions shall be such "as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy." Now, it is well known that the obligations imposed upon an industrial undertaking are not wholly or even mainly contractual. To put it in other words, if the words and expressions are fairly susceptible of such a meaning, the construction put upon those words and expressions shall be such "as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy." Now, it is well known that the obligations imposed upon an industrial undertaking are not wholly or even mainly contractual. The State by means of legislation prescribes many of the obligations that an employer may owe to his employee. The obligation to pay bonus according to the requirement of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, or to pay minimum wages in certain industries under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, or to pay retrenchment compensation ane notice-pay under S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or other benefits under Ss. 25-FB and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are all imposed by statute. If S. 18-FB is so construed as to deny to the Government the power to suspend the rights and obligations created by statutes, even when the power under S. 18-FB of the Act is exercised, the industrial undertaking may continue to be the subject of crippling burdens incurred in the past before the date of the notified order under S. 18-FB of the Act and the object of providing a breathing time, within which the industrial undertaking may be put back on its feet, may not be fully achieved if not altogether defeated. The object underlying the enactment of S. 18-FB, therefore, indicates that the expression "instrument" must be construed in its widest connotation and so as to include within its ambit legislative enactments e.g. the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . 13. Nor does the collocation in which the expression "instrument" occurs point to the contrary. The expression other "instruments" follows contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders in the context in which they occur, the expression agreements and settlements means agreements and settlements which do not amount to contracts, for example, agreements and settlements arrived at between the industrial undertaking and organisation or workers as a result of the collective bargaining and conciliation proceedings, respectively. The expression awards includes both, awards given on voluntary arbitration and statutory awards like awards of the Industrial Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . Standing orders obviously mean standing orders referred to and certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The expression awards includes both, awards given on voluntary arbitration and statutory awards like awards of the Industrial Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . Standing orders obviously mean standing orders referred to and certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The statute has, therefore, clearly evinced its intention to include within its sweep rights and obligations arising not only under contracts, but also arising as a result of adjudication or as a result of statutory provisions or as a result of orders made in pursuance of a statute. Rights under contracts and agreements and settlements arise by act inter partes, rights under awards arise as a result of adjudication, while rights under standing orders arise due to the operation of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It is, therefore, manifest that the rights referred to in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act include not only rights created by acts inter partes but also rights created by the operation of law. This conclusion is reinforced by the use of both the expressions "to which such industrial undertaking,......... is a party", "and/or which may be applicable to such industrial undertaking......" The only common denominator between contracts, agreements and settlements and awards, standing orders is that they are solemn legal documents and rights, privileges etc. accrue or arise thereunder. If the expression "instrument" is construed as including a legislative enactment, it will fall within that common denominator. 14. It was strenuously argued on behalf of the workman respondent that, as the expression "other instruments" is a generic expression following the particular expressions, contracts, assurances of property, awards, standing orders, it must be construed ejusdem generis with the particular expressions preceding it and thus be restricted to "instruments" to which the industrial undertaking was a party or which were framed after taking its views into consideration. But, as pointed out by Maxwell on "The Interpretation of Statutes" unless there is a genus or class or category, there is no room for any application of the ejusdem generis doctrine, (12th Edition at page 299). The only genus of which contracts, awards, standing orders can be said to be species, is a formal legal document, creating rights, privileges, obligations etc. Within that genus, statutes are obviously included. The only genus of which contracts, awards, standing orders can be said to be species, is a formal legal document, creating rights, privileges, obligations etc. Within that genus, statutes are obviously included. So, even if the expression "instrument" is read ejusdem generis with the words which precede it, it will still include a legislative enactment like S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Further, to quote Maxwell again: "The ejusdem generis doctrine is by no means an absolute one, and if it can be seen from a wider inspection of the scope of the legislation that the general words sought to be construed generally, they are so construed notwithstanding that they follow more particular expressions." (Twelfth Edition at pages 303 and 304). The object and the scope of S. 18-FB of the Act clearly show that the general expression "other instruments" should be construed generally and given a wide connotation so as to include within its ambit legislative enactments. 15 Nor am I able to accept the argument that as cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act specifically empowers the Central Government to declare that all or any of the enactments specified in the Third Schedule shall not apply to the industrial undertaking concerned, the expression "instrument" does not include a legislative enactment. The power under cl. (a) is to declare that the enactments specified in the Third Schedule shall not apply at all, that is to say, cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) confers a power to make the provision of the enactments specified in the Third Schedule inapplicable to the industrial undertaking concerned. So far that industrial undertaking is concerned no rights under the enactments specified will at all accrue or arise under the enactments aforesaid. Sub-cl. (b) merely confers a power to suspend the operation of rights arising or accruing under contracts etc. or other instruments and it postulates the accrual and the arising of rights under the instruments or contracts etc. The result of a notification under cl. (a) is that no rights under those enactments accrue at all. The result of a notification under cl. (b) construing instruments to include legislative enactments is that rights will accrue under those enactments. But during the period of the operation of the notified order, they shall remain suspended and will become again enforceable after the expiry of the time specified thereunder. Further, cl. The result of a notification under cl. (b) construing instruments to include legislative enactments is that rights will accrue under those enactments. But during the period of the operation of the notified order, they shall remain suspended and will become again enforceable after the expiry of the time specified thereunder. Further, cl. (a) deals with the position after the issue of the notified order, while (b) deals with the position as it obtained immediately before the issue of the notified order. The two powers are, therefore, distinct and separate and have different objects. The existence of the first power in relation to certain enactments does not, therefore, negative the existence of the second power, namely the power to suspend the operation of certain enactments and of the rights accrued thereunder. Further, one of the enactments specified in the Third Schedule is the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act (XX of 1946) and in spite of that cl. (b) makes express provision for the suspension of the operation of standing orders under the said Act and of rights accruing thereunder. There is, therefore, intrinsic evidence in S. 18-FB of the Act itself that the use of the expression "enactments" in cl. (a) does not negative the power of the Government to suspend the operation of rights arising under legislative " enactments. I, therefore, hold that the expression "instrument" in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 18-FB of the Act includes legislative enactments like S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . It follows, therefore, that in the proceedings under S. 33-C (2) all the rights, which the workman respondent was seeking to enforce, were rights referred to in cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act and as the notified order declared that the rights accruing under contracts or other instruments in force shall remain suspended for a period of one year from the date of the notification, it is obvious that the rights, which the respondent workman was seeking to enforce in the application under S. 33-C (2), had been suspended under sub-s. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act. On these findings, it must be held that sub-s. (4) of S. 18-FB of the Act, read with the notification dated 30th May, 1973 issued under sub-sec. On these findings, it must be held that sub-s. (4) of S. 18-FB of the Act, read with the notification dated 30th May, 1973 issued under sub-sec. (1) of S. 18-FB of the Act, had the effect of staying the proceeding under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 , namely, Case No. 8 of 1971 pending before the Labour Court, patna, and the impugned orders dated 13-8-1973 and 27-9-1973 having been passed in contravention of the mandatory provisions of sub-s. (4) of S. 18-FB of the Act, are null and void as they were passed during the period the notified order was in force. 16. I would, accordingly, allow the application and quash the order dated 27-9-1973 of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna, passed in case No. 8 of 1971 copy whereof is Annexure 4 to the writ application. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. S.K.JHA, J. 17 I agree.