VENKATACHALIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiff-Indian Hume Pipe Company limited-arises out of and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27-9-1972 in OS. No. 107 of 1971 on the file of the Court of the principal Civil Judge, Bangalore City, negativing plaintiff's claim of rs. 23,349. 25 on account of an alleged increase in the price of steel and cement, pursuant to a price escalation clause in the contract for the supply of 2454 RCC Poles entered into with defendant. ( 2 ) THE relevant and admitted facts are the following; on 18-12-1957 the Karnataka Electricity Board placed an order with the plaintiff for the supply of 2454 RCC. Poles. The terms of the contract provided that if during the period of performance of the contract there was any increase in the price of steel and cement over and above the agreed basic rate of Rs. 560/- per ton of steel and Rs. 102. 50 per ton of cement, the difference would be added on to and become part of the price. Plaintiff, claiming that there were such increases, by a supplementary bill dated 10-8-1964 claimed a sum of Rs. 7,569. 60 on accoimt of increase in the price of steel and Rs. 5,739. 47 on account of the increase in the price of cement. A sum of Rs. 266. 18 was claimed towards Sales tax on these two sums. After protracted correspondence stretching over several years plaintiff, on 15-4-71, instituted the present suit claiming the said sum of Rs. 13,575. 25 and interest thereon, at 1 per cent per mensem amounting to Rs. 9,774/- in all Rs. 23,349. 25. The contract of supply as well as the circumstance that it contained such an escalation clause providing for the liability on the part of the defendant to pay for the difference in prices of steel and cement in excess of the agreed basic price is admitted. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT, while pleading that the suit was barred by limitation also raised some defence as to the merits of the claim. ( 4 ) ON the pleadings before it, the Court below framed the following issues : (1) Whether the suit is barred by time as alleged in para-1 of the written statement ? (2) Whether plaintiff incurred excess payment as alleged in para 3 of the plaint ? ( 4 ) ON the pleadings before it, the Court below framed the following issues : (1) Whether the suit is barred by time as alleged in para-1 of the written statement ? (2) Whether plaintiff incurred excess payment as alleged in para 3 of the plaint ? (3) Whether the defendant admitted the claim as alleged in para-4 of the plaint ? (4) Whether the defendant is liable for interest ? If , so what amount ? (5) To what reliefs ? ( 5 ) ON an appreriation of the evidence on record, the Court below recorded a finding in favour of the plaintiff on Issue No. (2) to the effect that there was a rise in the price of steel and cement and that its extent was as claimed by the plaintiff, except for a sum of Rs. 120 which was disallowed. But, on Issues 1, 3 and 4 it held against the plaintiff and the suit came to be dismissed. This decree of dismissal is challenged in this appeal by the plaintiff. ( 6 ) WE have heard Sri C. N. Kamath, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, and Sri M. P. Eswarappa, learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent. We have been taken through the evidence on record and the judgment of the Court-below. ( 7 ) AT the outset it must be noticed that during the trial defendant did not adduce any evidence to rebut the evidence on the side of the plaintiff in regard to the increase in prices or its extent. Indeed, during the trial, it was stated by the Counsel for the defendant that defendant was not able to adduce any evidence on the merits of the claim as the relevant records had been misplaced and that it would rest its defence on the plea of limitation only. The Court-below accepted the evidence adduced for the plaintiff in regard to the existence and the extent of the escalation in prices. This aspect of the case is therefore concluded against the defendant. However, the Court-below dismissed the suit as statute barred. The Court-below accepted the evidence adduced for the plaintiff in regard to the existence and the extent of the escalation in prices. This aspect of the case is therefore concluded against the defendant. However, the Court-below dismissed the suit as statute barred. ( 8 ) SRI C. N. Kamath, learned Counsel for the plaintiff - appellant, contended that the view of the Court below that the suit was barred by time was erroneous, in as much as it failed to recognise and give due effect to Exhibits P20 and P21, letters dated 8-8-1970 and 11-8-1970 respectively which according to him, contained a promosse to pay the debt and that such a promise-even if the statute had run by then- brought about a valid and enforceable contract within the meaning of s. 25 (3) of the Indian Contract Act. Sri M. P. Eswarappa, learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent, however, sought to support the findings of the Court-below in this behalf. ( 9 ) THE questions that, therefore, arise in this appeal are: (a) Whether the letters Exhibit P. 20 dated 8-8-1970 and. Exhibit p. 21 dated 11-8-1970 from the defendant to the plaintiff constitute or contain a promise to pay a time barred debt within the meaning of s. 25 (3) of the Indian Contract Act; and (b) Whether plaintiff is entitled to interest till date of suit. ( 10 ) EXHIBIT P. 20 is the letter dated 8-8-1970 from the defendant addressed to the Advocate of the plaintiff and is sent in response to a notice issued earlier. Exhibit P. 21 is another communication from the defendant to the plaintiff. ( 11 ) THE Court-below dealing with the contention urged before it that these two communications amounted to a promise to pay a debt of which the plaintiff might have enforced payment, but for the law of limitation, was of the view that the claim in question could not be held to be a debt within the meaning of S. 25 (3) of the Contract Act as the sum was not an 'ascertained sum' and that Exts. P20 and P21 could not also be construed to contain a promise, either express or implied to pay. ( 12 ) IN the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Limited v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Central), Calcutta, AIR. 1966 SC. 1370. P20 and P21 could not also be construed to contain a promise, either express or implied to pay. ( 12 ) IN the case of Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Limited v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Central), Calcutta, AIR. 1966 SC. 1370. the Supreme court while considering whether a liability to pay Income-tax was 'debt' within the meaning of S. 2 (m) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, observed as follows :" (13) If we ascertain the meaning of the word "debt", the expression 'owed' does not cause any difficulty. The verb 'owe' means "to be under an obligation to pay". It does not really add to the meaning of the word "debt". What does the word "debt" mean ? A simple but a clear definition of the word is found in Webb v. Stenlon, (1883) 11 QBD 518 at p. 527 wherein Lindley, L. J. , said: a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation, debitum in praesenti, solvendum in future. " (22) We have briefly noticed the judgments cited at the Bar. There is no conflict on the definition of the word "debt". All the decisions agree that the meaning of the expression "debt" may take colour from the provisions of the concerned Act: It may have different shades of meaning. But the following definition is unanimously accepted : a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in future by reason of a present obligation: debitum in praesenti solvendum in future'. " this view as to what constitutes a 'debt' was reaffirmed in the case of P. S, L. Ramanathan Chettiar v. O. R. M. Ramanathan Chettiah, AIR 1969 SC 1047. ( 13 ) THE amplitude of the expression "debt" occurring in S. 25 (3) of the Contract Act, ascertained in the light of the above observations, would, in our opinion, clearly include the obligation referred to in exhibits P. 20 and P. 21. ( 14 ) THE next question is whether or not the language of Exhibits p. 20 and P. 21 constitutes a promise to pay. Sri C. N. Kamath relied on the decision in Chasemore v. Turner, (1874) 10 LR. QB. ( 14 ) THE next question is whether or not the language of Exhibits p. 20 and P. 21 constitutes a promise to pay. Sri C. N. Kamath relied on the decision in Chasemore v. Turner, (1874) 10 LR. QB. 500 where in an action commenced in the year 1873 by the payees of a promissory note dated 1-10-1858 against one of its makers, the letter from the defendant to the plaintiff dated 29-5-1867-at which time the claim was barred by law of limitation-to the effect that :"the old account between us which has been standing over so long has not escaped our memory, and as soon as we can get cur affairs arranged we will see you are paid ; perhaps, in the meantime, you will let your clerk send me an account of how it stands"was held to amount to a promise to pay and afford a fresh cause of action. Pollock, B. stated :"on the whole, it seems to me that this document fairly and reasonably points to a promise, made by the defendant to pay after they have had the opportunity of going through their accounts and arranging their affairs, and so forth. It was a matter in their own hands. A reasonable time having elapsed the promise is sufficient to take the case out of the statute". Under law, a barred debt is a valid consideration for a promise to pay under S. 25 (3) of the Indian Contract Act and it is not necessary that the promisor should have known it to be barred on. the date he made the promise, ( 15 ) SRI M P. Eswarappa, learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent, however, strenuously contended that the expression in Exhibits p. 20 and P. 21 sought to be relied upon by the plaintiff were so vague as not to admit of being construed as a promise to pay, and that, at any rate, the said documents did not constitute an absolute or unqualified promise. He further urged that the contents of these two communications show that what the defendant agreed to do was to examine the matter and that there was no occasion then for the defendant to make a promise at all to pay. He further urged that the contents of these two communications show that what the defendant agreed to do was to examine the matter and that there was no occasion then for the defendant to make a promise at all to pay. He invited our attention to clause (2) of Exhibit p-2 and urged that till the claim under the price variation clause 'was supported by documentary proof to the satisfaction of the defendant, no liability would arise at all. Sri M. P. Eswarappa relying on certain observations in Shapoor Fredoom Mazda v. Durga Prasad Chamaria and others, AIR. 1961 SC. 1236. and in Hafiz Allah Baksh v. Hamid Khan,. AIR. 1931 All. 160. urged that to constitute a promise within the meaning of S. 25 (3) of the Contract act, there ought to be an admission of jural relationship of debtor and creditor coupled with a distinct and express promise to pay. He also referred to Pulyath Govinda Nair v. Parekalathil Achutan Noir, AIR. 1940 Mad. 678. Laxminarayan Patro v. The State of Orissa and others; 1975 (2) LAB IC, 1554. Ghourimissa and others v. S. J. Kirmani, AIR 1974 Mad. 191 . and N. Ethirajulu Naidu v. K. R. Chinnikrishna Chettiar, AIR. 1975 Mad. 333. and urged that the promises to pay so. as to fall within S. 25 (3) of the contract Act must be clear, absolute and unqualified promises which Exhibits P. 20 and P. 21, according to M. P. Eswarappa, were not. Sri Eswarappa urged that Exhibits P. 20 and P. 21 might, at the highest, manifest an 'intention' to pay which does not constitute a 'promise' to pay. It is not necessary to advert to the various forms and aspects in which this question came to present itself in the cases cited by Sri M. P. Eswarappa. What emerges from the authorities is that the words must reasonably be clear-and reasonably admit of being construed to amount to a promise to pay. The only generalisation that can be made is the obvious one that each ease turns on its own facts. No infallible criterion emerges as to what words spell-out and what words are necessary to constitute a promise to pay. All the cases cited by Sri M. P. Eswarappa are only useful as illustrations affording indications of the kind of considerations which may, relevantly, be borne in mind. No infallible criterion emerges as to what words spell-out and what words are necessary to constitute a promise to pay. All the cases cited by Sri M. P. Eswarappa are only useful as illustrations affording indications of the kind of considerations which may, relevantly, be borne in mind. ( 16 ) IN the present case, Exhibits P. 20 and P. 21 came in the wake of and in response to the notice Exhibit P. 19. Para 9 of Exhibit P. 19 reads as follows:"9. Hence this notice is issued to you calling upon you to pay the claim of our clients in respect of claims for increase in basic rate of steel and cement for Rs. 13,575-25 Ps. as regards your order no. LO 167-68, dt. 16-12-57 within two months from the date of the receipt of this notice. "in reply to this, defendant states in Exts. P20 and P21 as follows :"all efforts are being put forth and arrangements will be made for payment of outstanding dues as may be payable in terms of the above order, (vide Ext. P20 ). I have for acknowledgment the above Registered Notice from your Advocate and wish to state that the matter is being examined and necessary action will be taken in evolving and arranging payment as may be due in terms of the order". (Vide Ext. P21 ). ( 17 ) IN our opinion, on a consideration of all the circumstances, and, in particular, having regard to the specific demands from the plaintiff, in the context of which Exts. P20 and P21 came into being, it seems to us that these documents fairly and reasonably point to a promise made by the defendant to pay after it had had the opportunity of going through its accounts. There is no vagueness about it as contended by Sri M. P. Eswarappa. The said Exts. P20 and P21 reasonably admit of being construed as a promise to pay within the meaning of Sec. 25 (3) of the contract Act. Accordingly, we answer point (a) in favour of the Pltff. ( 18 ) THIS claim concerns interest on the sum of Rupees 13,575-25 till the date of the suit. The said Exts. P20 and P21 reasonably admit of being construed as a promise to pay within the meaning of Sec. 25 (3) of the contract Act. Accordingly, we answer point (a) in favour of the Pltff. ( 18 ) THIS claim concerns interest on the sum of Rupees 13,575-25 till the date of the suit. Sri C. N. Kamath relied upon S. 61 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which provides that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the Court may award interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of the price, to the seller in the suit by him for the amount of the price from the date of the tender of the goods or from the date on which the price was payable. According to Sri C. N. Kamath, the subject-matter of the suit claim is in essence, a part of the price, and that therefore, interest has to be granted from 20-6-64, the date of the supplementary bill. However, the cause of action relied upon by the plaintiff is a fresh promise to pay which was made on 8-8-70. This promise does not encompass a promise to pay interest. It is clear from the facts of the case that plaintiff inordinately delayed the institution of the suit and, but for Exts. P20 and P21 dt. 8-8-70 and 11-8-70 respectively, the claim would have been statute barred. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, we think that this is not a case in which interest up to the date of suit is allowable. Accordingly, we answer point (b) against the plaintiff. ( 19 ) IN the result, this appeal is allowed in part and in reversal of the decree of dismissal made by the Court-below, we decree plaintiff's suit for the sum of Rs. 13,575-25 together with pendente lite and luture interest at 6 per cent per annum. The plaintiff-appellant will be entitled to its costs in proportion to its success both in the Court below and in this appeal from the defendant, which will bear its own costs both here and below. --- *** --- .