Judgment HARI LAL AGRAWAL, J. 1. This application in revision is by the legal representatives of one Chandrabhukhan Prasad Missir. Their father was defendant fourth party in Title Suit No. 137 of 1948. The suit was for declaration that the plaintiffs were the next reversioners to the estate of one Prasidh Narain Mishra and were entitled to possession of the properties in suit. 2. The said Chandra Bhukhan Prasad Missir was subsequently added as fourth party to the suit on 24-6-1955 under the provisions of O. 1, R. 10 of the Civil P. C. claiming to be the next reversioner. The title suit was dismissed in favour of the said Chandra Bhukhan Prasad Missir holding that it was he, who was the real next reversioner and not the plaintiffs. 3. Plaintiffs (opposite party Nos. 1 and 2) filed First Appeal No. 82 of 1956 in this Court and in the said appeal they made an application for appointment of a receiver. This Court by order dated 13-8-1959 in the first appeal, appointed Chandra Bhukhan Prasad Missir as the receiver. The appeal was ultimately compromised on 5-5-1964. Chandra Bhukhan Prasad Missir died on 3-1-1967. Long time after a petition was filed by the plaintiffs on 7-11-1970 in the trial court stating that the accounts submitted by the said receiver had not been accepted by the Court so far and the plaintiffs objections were still pending. It was further stated that the receiver having been dead, it was necessary to bring his heirs and legal representatives on the record. The names were mentioned in the petition in question. The petition was allowed by the trial court and having issued the notice to the petitioners, the trial court by the impugned order dated 14-11-1972 not only considered the accounts of the receiver but determined the gross income derived by him out of the estate. It also considered the Pleader Commissioners report. The accounts that had been considered by the court below were from the beginning of 1959 since Chandra Bhukhan Prasad Missir was appointed as receiver. It is this order that has been challenged in this court. 4. Mr. Bimal Bhushan Sen appearing for the petitioners contended that the remedy of the plaintiffs (opposite party Nos. 1 and 2) on the death of the receiver, was by way of suit and the matter could not have been gone into in this proceeding. It is this order that has been challenged in this court. 4. Mr. Bimal Bhushan Sen appearing for the petitioners contended that the remedy of the plaintiffs (opposite party Nos. 1 and 2) on the death of the receiver, was by way of suit and the matter could not have been gone into in this proceeding. In support of his proposition he placed reliance upon a Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Smt. Bari Bahoo V/s. Sharda Prasad, AIR 1954 Nag 366. 5. Mr. A. K. Roy appearing for the opposite party, however, contended that the trial Court was quite competent to dispose of the account matter of the receiver in the suit itself without dragging the parties to a fresh suit. According to his contention, the death of the receiver did not matter in the least. 6. Under the provisions of O. 40, R. 4 of the Civil P. C., where a receiver (a) fails to submit his accounts at such periods and in such form as the Court directs, or (b) fails to pay the amount due from him as the Court directs, or (c) occasions loss to the property by his wilful default or gross negligence, the Court may direct his property to be attached and may sell such property, and may apply the proceeds to make good any amount found to be due from him or any loss occasioned by him. 7. The provisions of the above rule, therefore, enjoin upon the Court the powers to scrutinise the accounts submitted by a receiver and to determine the questions as to whether the receiver had occasioned loss to the property by his wilful default or negligence or any amount is payable by him as a result of the scrutiny of the accounts submitted by him. Mr. Roy contends that the remedy of the petitioners or for the sake of that, the cause of action to them would accrue only when any property in their hands was attached in pursuance of the Courts order and at that stage it would be open to the petitioners to contest the propriety of the claim of the opposite party as well as the liability of the property in their hands for the claim in question. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon the case of Chaparaddi V/s. Kabil Molla, AIR 1943 Cal 244. 8. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon the case of Chaparaddi V/s. Kabil Molla, AIR 1943 Cal 244. 8. Having given my anxious consideration to the respective contentions advanced by the learned counsel, I find myself unable to accept the contention of Mr. Roy. The scheme of R. 4 of O. 40 of the Civil P. C. as also appears from the discussions in the Nagpur case, contemplates the presence of the receiver. If the receiver would have been alive, it was not necessary that the matter in question could be investigated only by a separate suit and not in a summary proceeding. This proposition finds full support from Chaparaddis case, AIR 1943 Cal 244 (supra). The Nagpur High Court also has not deviated from this view and there is a clear observation in this decision also that "if the receiver were alive, an application would have lain against him and a suit was not absolutely necessary." 9. The questions which, however, falls before us is different and as already said above, it is as to whether the above position would alter if the receiver is dead. The nature of the impugned order is executable and the point as to what property would be liable in satisfaction of the claim would be a matter falling in execution, but the order has got a binding force like a decree or any other executable order. 10. Mr. Bimal Bhushan Sen has contended that in this summary proceeding the accounts right from the year 1959 have been taken and large number of complicated questions as to whether the receiver was in possession of the entire estate or the land which required for their decision a detailed evidence, had been gone into. The learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court have clearly observed that R. 4 of O. 40 does not apply to a dead receiver and contemplates his continued existence and that the position alters after the receiver is dead, and if the receiver is alive an application for accounts lies against him. This is no doubt true that in the case before us the receiver had already died on 3-1-1967. He had already submitted his accounts before his death, but somehow or the other, the matter remained pending. This is no doubt true that in the case before us the receiver had already died on 3-1-1967. He had already submitted his accounts before his death, but somehow or the other, the matter remained pending. After the death of the receiver the petitioners were brought on the record to answer the plaintiffs objections to the accounts submitted by the receiver. In essence, therefore, the application did not remain confined to the passing of the accounts but became an application for taking accounts from the legal representatives of the deceased receiver and, in my opinion, the proper remedy available to the opposite party was to institute a properly constituted suit against the legal heirs and representatives of the receiver or whomever they thought liable for the deficiency or loss, if any. 11. I would, accordingly, hold that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has committed an apparent error of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. The application is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order is set aside. In the circumstances, however, I shall make no order as to costs. CHAUDHARY SIA SARAN SINHA, J. 12 I agree.