JUDGMENT 1. IN the Rule, the petitioners have impeached a determination dated 23rd September, 1970, made by the Second Labour Court, West Bengal, in a proceeding under section 33a of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. THE petitioner No. 1 Regent Estates Limited, owns and carries on business under the name and style India Automobiles viz., petitioner No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the said petitioners. It has been stated that the said petitioners at all material times were and still are carrying, on business for the purposes more fully stated in memorandum of Articles of Association. Sri Prokash Chandra Hazra (Respondent No. 2), was employed and was working in the Workshop of the India Automobiles (petitioner No. 2), as Leatheman and it has been alleged that he continued as such until he left his services. On April 20, 1964, the said respondent No. 2 remained absent from his duties without permission and/or information or any leave. On that date he was found to be working on a Leathe machine in an outside Workshop, which act on his part, the said petitioners have stated, to be in gross violation and in breach of the conditions of employment and amounted to a major misconduct and detrimental to the workings of the (Petitioner No. 2) 3. BECAUSE of such misconduct, a charge-sheet dated May 1, 1964, was issued and stated to have been duly served on the Respondent No. 2, asking him to show cause, why he should not be dismissed from his services for such misconduct. The said Respondent No. 2 was also suspended immediately and on an explanation submitted by him, which was considered by the employer to be insufficient, they decided to hold an enquiry into the charges and also to give another opportunity to him to explain his conduct, by proper notice. In that view of the matter, a notice dated May 5, 1964, was issued by the India Automobiles, the petitioner No. 2 to the said employee for the purpose of holding an enquiry. The said petitioners have stated that such enquiry was held on May 8, 1964 and the witnesses which were produced by them were cross-examined by the employee, but he did not adduced any defence witness. The said petitioners have stated that such enquiry was held on May 8, 1964 and the witnesses which were produced by them were cross-examined by the employee, but he did not adduced any defence witness. However, the management further decided to give another opportunity to him to adduce defence witness, and as such on July 1, 1964, issued a notice and thereafter, the further proceeding in the instant case took place. It has been stated that the Respondent employee duly participated in the enquiry and very opportunities were given to him in compliance with the principles of natural justice. The Enquiry Officer made his report, wherein he found the employee concerned guilty of the charge as levelled. It has further been stated that on completion of the enquiry and the connected proceedings, it was determined that the said employee should be dismissed from his services, but the Management again took a lenient view and in. order to give another opportunity to him, so that he may continue in service and improve the same and his conduct, the employee concerned was only suspended and it was further decided not to pay him his wages for the said period of suspension. The said petitioners have stated that consequent to such decision, the said employees was directed to join his duties immediately by a letter of August 3, 1964. It has been alleged that the employee concerned did not accept the decision as aforesaid and wanted to join his duties on the precondition that the Management should agree to allow him to take such steps as he may be advised challenging their illegal acts. To that, he was further informed that such challenge may be thrown by him at his own risk and peril and he was again requested to join his duties. It has been alleged that inspite of notice, the employee concerned refused to and/or failed or neglected to assume his duties, and in such circumstances, the India Automobiles, petitioner No, 2, by letter of August 24, 1964, intimated him that because of his refusal or negelct to join his duties, he should be deemed to have left his services. 4. THEREAFTER, the Respondent employee filed an application under section 33a of the Industrial Disputes Act,, complaining breach of section 33 (2) (b) of the said Act and the Case was registered as Case No. 40/33a/67. 4. THEREAFTER, the Respondent employee filed an application under section 33a of the Industrial Disputes Act,, complaining breach of section 33 (2) (b) of the said Act and the Case was registered as Case No. 40/33a/67. The india Automobiles, petitioner No. 2, categorically denied the allegations and filed their written statement and necessary documents before the Respondent Tribunal. Such proceeding was initiated before the Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, but subsequently by an order of July 29,1967, the Respondent State of West Bengal, has transferred the same to the Respondent Labour Court, which has made a determination in favour of the employee and directed his reinstatement by an Award dated September 23, 1970. At the time of hearing of the rule Mr. Anil Das Chowdhury, learned advocate appearing for the Respondent employee referred to section 58 of the constitution (Forty-Second Amendment)Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the said amendment) and submitted that the present proceedings cannot continue in view of the "other remedy" under Article 226 (3), available before the Supreme Court for or against the impugned determination, by an application under Article 136 of the constitution of India and the said petitioner not having availed of such 'other remedy' under the Central law cannot maintain the petition or even ask this Court to entertain the same. From a reference to the order made on February 25, 1977, it would appear that inspite of due opportunities, the said petitioner could not give any effective answer or reply to the preliminary point as raised. 5. IT is true that during the pendency of the Rule, section 38 of the said amendment became operative from february 1, 1977 and as a result thereof the old Article 226 has been substituted by the new Article 226, which specifically lays down that in cases coming under sub clauses (b) and (d), Sub-Article (3) of Article 226 would be a bar. Such bar of course will not be available in cases falling under sub clause (a. As stated hereinbefore, it has been submitted on behalf of the employee concerned that in view of section 58 (1) of the said Act, the case should now be dealt with and considered in accordance with the present or new provision of Article 226 and as such the same should be deemed to have abated for the availability of 'other remedy' particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore. 6. 6. THE provisions of section 58 of the said Act, as earlier held by this Court in the case of Probodh Chandra Roy vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors., 81 C. W. N. 555; 1977 (1) C. L. J. 237, would not be hit or affected by Article 226 since the same lays down the procedure to be followed by the High Courts or a guideline for them in entertaining matters under the said Article and has made provisions for interpreting the same or putting the Same into action. The said section does not purport to change the provisions of the present Article 226 and further is in consonance with and not against the object either of the Constitution or of the said amendment. It has also been held in that case that the word "law" as used in Article 226 (3) would mean not only the law for the infraction of and under which the application is made, but also the law, which is for the time being in force and in cases where the redress of the injuries as referred to in sub-clauses (b) and (d) of Article 226 (1), can be obtained affectively either by way of a suit or by way of other remedy under the connected statute, an application would not ordinarily be maintainable and the same cannot be entertained. It has further been observed that when preliminary points, as in the instant case are raised they must be decided and determined first. So when the preliminary point has been raised, the Court will have to be satisfied whether the Rule could have been issued in the event of the provisions of the said amendment in force since the Rule was issued prior to the appointed date and to find out whether the provisions of Article 136 of the Constitution of India, which is a discretionary power vested in the Supreme Court, and again is subject to certain limitations and restrictions imposed by the Court, as held in the case of Ram Saran Das vs. Commercial Tax Officer, A. I. R. 19. 62 S. C. 1326, would come under the term "other remedy" as in Article 226 (3) and thus to disentitle the petitioner to maintain the petition. 62 S. C. 1326, would come under the term "other remedy" as in Article 226 (3) and thus to disentitle the petitioner to maintain the petition. The power under the said Article 136 as has been observed in the cases of Union of India vs. Apte, A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1533 and State of Maharastra vs. Dadanuja, A. I. R, 1971 S. C. 1722 can be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases or as has been observed in the case of Ram Saran Das vs. Commercial Tax Officer (Supra), in special circumstances as are shown to exist. The power under the Article, as observed in the cases of Sauwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 715 and State of Andhra Pradesh vs. I. B. S. P. Rao, A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 648, cannot be exhaustively defined but interference will not be permitted unless there has been disregard to the form of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise, and a substantial or grave injustice has been done. So the relief in the form or shape of "other remedy" as mentioned in Article 226 (3) on an application under Article 136 as aforesaid, is not or will not be automatic, and as a matter of course. 7. "REMEDY" is the means by which the violation of a right is prevented, redressed or compensated. Remedies are of four kinds: (1) by act of the party injured, the principal of which are defence, recaption, distress, entry, abatement and seizure; (2) by operation of Jaw, as in the case of retainer and remitter; (3) by agreement between the parties e. g. by accord and satisfaction, and arbitration; and (4) by judicial REMEDY, e. g. action or suit. The last are called judicial remedies, as opposed to the first three classes, which are extra-judicial. "REMEDY" according to Strouds' Judicial Dictionary, means something which require the same to be remedied or REMEDY against the property or person of the debtor or proceedings for punishing or REMEDYing. Remedy is thus the means, given by law, for the recovery of a right, or of compensation for the infringement thereof. "REMEDY" according to Strouds' Judicial Dictionary, means something which require the same to be remedied or REMEDY against the property or person of the debtor or proceedings for punishing or REMEDYing. Remedy is thus the means, given by law, for the recovery of a right, or of compensation for the infringement thereof. The word "relief" is not a term of exact or precise technicality, but simply means the REMEDY, which a court of justice may afford in regard to some actual or apprehended wrong or injury, such REMEDY being large or small, as the case may be. But the word "relief" is not synonymous with "cause of action", that term includes all the reliefs covered by the facts, on the strength of which a plaintiff, as has been observed in Sareuti vs. Kupi Behari Lai, I. L. R. 5 All. 359 (P. D.) comes into Court. "relief" again is the specific assistance prayed for by a party who institutes an action. So "REMEDY" or "other REMEDY" as mentioned in Article 226 (3), is not a relief and those two terms cannot be equated with each other or used one for the other. According to Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th Edition), the right enforced in a Civil proceedings is either a primary or a sanctioning right. A sanctioning right is one which arises out of the violation of another right All others are primary; they are rights which have been some other sourse than wrongs. Thus A's right not to be libelled or assulted is primary; but his right to obtain pecuniery compensation from one who has libelled or assaulted him is sanctioning. 8. THE administration of Civil justice according to Salmond, therefore, falls into two parts, according as the right enforced belongs to the one or the other of these two classes. Sometimes it is impossible for the law to enforce the primary right; sometimes it is possible but not expedient. A sanctioning right almost invariably consists of a claim to receive money from the wrong doer. The enforcement of a primary right may be conveniently termed specific enforcement. They may be proceedings whereby a defendent is compelled to pay a debt, to perform a contract, to restore land or chattels wrongfully taken or detained, to refrain from committing or continuing a trespass or nuisance or to repay money received by mistake or obtained by fraud. The enforcement of a primary right may be conveniently termed specific enforcement. They may be proceedings whereby a defendent is compelled to pay a debt, to perform a contract, to restore land or chattels wrongfully taken or detained, to refrain from committing or continuing a trespass or nuisance or to repay money received by mistake or obtained by fraud. In all these cases the right enforced is primary right itself, not a substituted sanctioning right. What the law does is to insist on the specific establishment or reestablishment of the actual state of things required by the rule of right, not of another state of things which may be regarded as its equivalent or substitute. Thus the Court while considering the question of bar as imposed by the words in Article 226 (3) will not be justified and authorised to look into the ultimate effect viz., whether any relief would be available to the claimant or not and such factor should not be a consideration that since no effective relief would be available, the "other remedy" as mentioned in the said Article should not be a bar in the exercise of jurisdiction. . If other remedy, as in the instant case, is available, the proceedings should be deemed to have abated and in view of the restrictions as imposed by the said amendment, this Court will not be justified in entertaining the application or making any interference on the basis thereof. Since an application under Article 136 would come within the purview and mischief of "other remedy" as used in Article 226 (3), the fact that an appeal to the Supreme Court under the said Article is not one as of right or of course, would be of no or little consideration and as stated hereinbefore, the availability of the relief or the non-availability of the same under the said Article would also be of no or of irrelevant consideration. Thus, sub-section (1) read with sub-section (2) of section 58 of the said amendment would apply in the case and so under Article 226 (3) the instant writ petition will not be maintainable now. So the preliminary point succeeds and as. such the Rule is discharged, on. the basis thereof. There will be no order for costs. Thus, sub-section (1) read with sub-section (2) of section 58 of the said amendment would apply in the case and so under Article 226 (3) the instant writ petition will not be maintainable now. So the preliminary point succeeds and as. such the Rule is discharged, on. the basis thereof. There will be no order for costs. Let it also be recorded that in view of the order which I have proposed, I have not gone into the merits of the case and the respective contentions and this order is made subject to the proviso to section 58 (2) of the said amending Act. Rule discharged.