JUDGMENT Datta, J. This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of Debiprosad Pal, J. dated the 30th July, 1973 affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge, Second Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, dated the 6th September, 1963. The Plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of possession of the suit land on eviction of the defendant therefrom on notice to quit. The plaintiff's case was that the defendant was a monthly tenant under the debuttar estate of Sri Sri Iswar Sridhar Jew in respect of one plot of land surrounded on all sides by brick built walls and sheds overhead on ground floor of premises No. 133, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road Calcutta, at a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- according to the English Calendar month. The tenancy was determined by a notice to quit dated the 27th July, 1961 determining the tenancy with the expiry of the last day of August 1961. The ground for eviction was default in payment of rent for more than four months within a period of 12 months and it was submitted that the defendant accordingly was not entitled to any protection against eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. In the schedule of the plaint the said premises are described as follows "One plot of land surrounded on all sides by brick built walls and shed overhead measuring 528 sq. ft. on the ground floor at premises No. 133, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road", and thereafter the boundary is given. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant, who filed a written statement contending that he was a thika tenant in respect of the suit land and not a tenant within the meaning of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and in respect of that land he took settlement on May 4, 1957 from the then Shebait, S.C. Srimani for the purpose of starting a factory and godown. It is his further case that he walled it up on two sides and constructed a tiled shed thereon for the purpose. It was further stated that the land measuring 528 sq. ft. including the land lying under the wall. It was denied that the land was taken only for the purpose of godown. The validity as also the service of the notice to quit was disputed and it was contended that the tenancy was not determined. It was further stated that the land measuring 528 sq. ft. including the land lying under the wall. It was denied that the land was taken only for the purpose of godown. The validity as also the service of the notice to quit was disputed and it was contended that the tenancy was not determined. It was further denied that he was a defaulter and as the shebait of the plaintiff refused to accept rent the defendant tendered rent from January 1961 to April 1961 by money order, but the same was returned with the postal endorsement "owner out of Calcutta". Thereafter the defendant remitted the rent for May 1961 and on his refusal he had been depositing rent with the Thika Controller, Calcutta. It was denied that the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act had any application. It was accordingly submitted that the suit should be dismissed. 3. On a trial on evidence the learned Judge held that there was no structure on the land at the time of the creation of the tenancy in occupation of the defendant. The learned Judge further found that there was a boundary wall on the western side of the land separating the premises No. 133, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road from the contiguous property and a part of the boundary wall formed the western boundary of the land let out to the defendant. The learned Judge further held that by mere existence of the wall on the west side of the suit premises the suit property did not cease to be vacant land for the purpose of section 2(5) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. In the premises it was held that the defendant was a thika tenant and not a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Accordingly the court had no jurisdiction to try the suit for eviction as such jurisdiction was expressly conferred under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 on the Thika Tenancy Controller. The learned Judge accordingly directed that the plaint should be returned on contest to the filing pleader of the plaintiff for starting appropriate proceeding before the Thika Controller. 4. Accordingly the court had no jurisdiction to try the suit for eviction as such jurisdiction was expressly conferred under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 on the Thika Tenancy Controller. The learned Judge accordingly directed that the plaint should be returned on contest to the filing pleader of the plaintiff for starting appropriate proceeding before the Thika Controller. 4. Against this decision the plaintiff preferred an appeal and as already stated, the appeal was disposed of by Debiprosad Pal, J. It was held that what was really let out was a vacant plot of land as evidenced by the security deposit and rent receipts forming a part of premises No. 133, Acharya Prafulla Chandra Road measuring 528 sq. feet for the godown purpose. The learned Judge held that the two tests to establish a thika tenancy were satisfied in this case as what was let out was land and the defendant had constructed a structure upon the land for the purpose of the tenancy which authorised him to erect such structure. As a result the appeal was dismissed. The present appeal is against this decision. 5. The first point requiring consideration is the nature of the tenancy that was created by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. The shebait who inducted the defendant in the premises with effect from May 1957 had died in the meantime. P.W.1, who is the officer of the debuttar estate, had given evidence and stated that he was present when the tenancy was created. It was further stated that there were brick built walls on three sides of the suit land and also a Ranigunge tiled roof thereon though in rickety condition. The land along with the structure as also the walls were settled with the defendant according to this witness. He has further said that the same was taken for use as godown for storing nuts and bolts. It has been further stated that one side of the land had a thin brick built wall which fell and thereafter the land had been surrounded by tin sheets by the defendant. 6. It would be of interest to refer to the security deposit, receipt Ext. A which is practically the only contemporaneous document granted by D. N, Srimani, the then shebait in favour of the defendant. 6. It would be of interest to refer to the security deposit, receipt Ext. A which is practically the only contemporaneous document granted by D. N, Srimani, the then shebait in favour of the defendant. The receipt is to the following effect; "Received from Mohan Lall Kar, Eastern Engineering Company, through self the sum of Rs. 40/- only on account of security deposit for letting out one piece of land of 133, Upper Circular Road measuring 528 sq. ft. (22 X 24) from May, 1957 at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month payable on or before 4th day of the succeeding month". 7. The rent receipts upto November 1957 also mentions the demised property as "Premises No. 133, Upper Circular Road, one plot of land 528 sq.ft." while in receipt from December 1957. on wards the words "for god own purpose" had been added. This document, Ext. A which was made in or about the time of the creation of the tenancy clearly indicates that only a piece of land measuring 22 X 24 ft. was let out to the defendant. In the plaint it will be seen that the suit property has been described as one plot of land surrounded on all sides by brick built walls and shed overhead on the ground floor of premises No. 133, Acharyya Prafulla Chandra Road. The plaint does not mention that there was any shed forming part of the demised property and the description of the tenancy given in the plaint is different from what was mentioned in the security deposit and rent receipts. 8. Under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 the premises has been defined as follows : "Section 2- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context... (f) "premises" means any building or part of a building or any hut or part of a hut let separately and includes (i) gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertaining thereto." 9. The plaint as framed was intended to bring the tenancy within the ambit of this Act, but it would clearly be seen that what was let out as evidenced by the security deposit and rent receipts was neither any building or part of a building or any hut or part of a hut and lands appertaining thereto but a piece of land measuring 528 sq. ft. ft. Accordingly the demised property cannot be "premises" as contemplated under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 so that the tenancy so created will not come under its operation. 10. Mr. Mitter has contended that the demised property has been described as land which really is not a conclusive evidence that only land was let out, as; the word "land" is used to include everything thereon including any structure as was observed in the case of (1) Shantilata De v. Saraju Bala Devi, reported in 60 CWN 642, as follows: "The word 'land' may mean land together with structure situated on the land. It may also mean the bare land, the ground, the soil or the site of the land exclusive of such structures. We are of the opinion that the word 'land' in sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 2 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, means the bare land exclusive of structures situated thereon." 11. Mr. Mitter also refers to section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act in respect of the definition of land as including all things attached thereto and in the Land Acquisition Act also the word "land" has been used to include structures thereon. There can be little dispute that land may include in appropriate cases structures on it, but in the case before us it is clear from the security deposit as also from the rent receipts that what was let out was really bare land and there was no mention of any structure thereon' except boundary walls in the western boundary of the land which we shall consider at the appropriate stage. Even in the plaint there is no clear indication that any structure formed part of the defendant's tenancy. The evidence given in support of the existence of structure is unworthy of any credence as P.W. 2 could not definitely remember if there was any structure thereat all and there is no mention of any structure in security deposit and rent receipts. In this state of affairs, we are unable to accept the contention that there was any structure on the •land except the boundary wall an the western side. 12. In this state of affairs, we are unable to accept the contention that there was any structure on the •land except the boundary wall an the western side. 12. Even though there was a boundary wall on one side of the land demarcating it from the adjacent property the point for consideration now is whether such boundary wall amounted to structure and included in the tenancy as to render it outside the ambit of the Thika Tenancy Act. In this connection Mr. Mitter referred to a decision in the case of (2) Annapurna Seal v. Tincowrie Dutta & anr., reported in 66 CWN 338 in which Bachawat, J. in his concurring judgment expressed himself as follows: "I think that the pucca walls may well be said to be structures. They are things of substantial size built up of component parts and intended to remain on the land permanently." 13. We may 'note here that this observation was made in the context of the facts and circumstances prevailing in the case as the boundary wall was expressly mentioned as part of the demised property. P.B. Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) was, however, of opinion that boundary walls by themselves and nothing more will not be structure. His Lordship observed as follows : "Here in the case on the facts, the land, to begin with, had a boundary wall. A boundary wall, by itself and nothing more may still nevertheless make the land come within the meaning of the Thika Tenancy Act. But then facts may be such that if what is called the boundary wall is itself used as part of the building, providing walls for rooms or for other purposes, then it might as well be not vacant land or bare land within the meaning of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. The walls may be used for purposes of the business of advertisement and other similar purposes. In each case it will depend on the facts." 14. We are not inclined to accept the broad proposition made by Bachawat, J. to the effect that an boundary walls by themselves win be structures. As is well known such structures are intended to keep the boundary of the land free from encroachments. In each case it will depend on the facts." 14. We are not inclined to accept the broad proposition made by Bachawat, J. to the effect that an boundary walls by themselves win be structures. As is well known such structures are intended to keep the boundary of the land free from encroachments. If, however, the boundary wall is being utilised to be a part of the structure which the tenant might erect on the demised land, or is otherwise utilised by the tenant, as observed by P.B. Mukherji, J. the position may be otherwise. In this case however we are relieved of such consideration. In the evidence before us, it is nobody's case that the boundary walls were utilised by the tenant in any manner in respect of its structure or otherwise and in fact there is also the evidence that the boundary walls had been in a very dilapidated condition. In that view of the matter even if we assume that the boundary wall was there and formed a part of the demised land, it could not be a demise of structure as well so as to bring it outside the operation of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. Accordingly, in agreement with the finding of the court below we are of opinion that notwithstanding the existence of the boundary wall the demise to the tenant was continued to be a demise of the vacant land or which the tenant undisputedly had built his structure, thereby bringing the tenancy outside also the operation of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The tenancy was thus within the meaning of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, so the Court where the plaint was filed had no jurisdiction in entertain such plaint. 15. For all these reasons, this appeal fails and is dismissed with cost. Ray, J.: I agree.