Judgment NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, J. 1. The petitioner in this writ application was initially appointed as a temporary typist on 20th January, 1958 in the Department of Agriculture and was posted in the office of the Regional Director, Agricultural Research Institute, Patna. Later, he was appointed to the post of Inspector, Weights and Measures, in the year 1906. In the year 1968, he was posted at Sasaram Sub-division. On 26-7-1968 on the basis of a first information report lodged against the petitioner alleging therein that he has taken a bribe of Rs. 300/-, a case under S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was registered by the police. The petitioner was taken in custody on 26-7-1968 itself in connection with the aforesaid case. However, he was released on bail on 20-8-1968. According to the petitioner, after being released from custody, he joined his duties on 21-8-1968. An order dated 1-8-1968 issued under the signature of the Chief Inspector, Weights and Measures, Bihar suspending the petitioner with effect from 26-7-1968, under Rule 99 of the Bihar Service Code (hereinafter to be referred to as the said Service Code) was served on the petitioner on 30-8-1968. A copy of that order is annexure-4 to the writ application. The petitioner filed representations before the authorities concerned for withdrawing the order of suspension. Copies of such representations are annexures 5 to 7 of the writ application. In those representations a grievance was made that in the eye of law the petitioner was not under suspension in view of the fact that he had already been released on bail. It is his case that in spite of requests being made, he was not allowed to join. Ultimately, he filed the present writ application on 23-12-1975 for quashing the aforesaid order dated 1-8-1968 (annexure-4 to the writ application). This writ application was admitted by this Court on 10-3-1976. It is his case that in spite of requests being made, he was not allowed to join. Ultimately, he filed the present writ application on 23-12-1975 for quashing the aforesaid order dated 1-8-1968 (annexure-4 to the writ application). This writ application was admitted by this Court on 10-3-1976. As one of the grievances made in the writ application was that since there was no order under R. 100 of the said Service Code, the petitioner will not be deemed to be under suspension after his release from jail, at the time of admission, this Court passed an order saying that the admission of the application, however, will not be construed as a bar to the Government passing appropriate orders in the case in accordance with the rules. It is the admitted position that on 13-4-1976 an order under R. 100 of the said Service Code was passed by the Director of Agriculture, Bihar purporting to suspend the petitioner with effect from the date on which he was released on bail. According to the petitioner, both the aforesaid orders are illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed by this Court. 2. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents setting out the circumstances under which the aforesaid two orders, dated 1-8-1968 and 13-4-1976, have been passed putting the petitioner under suspension. A copy of the order dated 13-4-1976 is annexure-A to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. The petitioner was allowed to amend the prayer portion of the writ application and to challenge the validity of this order dated 13-4-1976 (annexure-A to the counter-affidavit) passed during the pendency of the writ application. 3. Mr. Radha Raman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has urged that any order passed under R. 99 of the Service Code cannot remain in force after the person concerned is released from custody, and as in the instant case, the petitioner was admittedly released from custody on 20-8-1968, the order dated 1-8-1968 will be deemed to have spent its force on that date. 4. 4. The relevant portion of R. 99 of the Service Code is as follows: "A servant of Government against whom proceedings have been taken either for his arrest for debt or on a criminal charge or who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention should be considered as under suspension for any periods during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment, and not allowed to draw any pay and allowances (other than any subsistence grant that may be granted in accordance with the principles laid down in R. 96) or such periods, until the termination of the proceedings taken against him or until he is released from detention and allowed to rejoin his duties, as the case may be......" According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in view of this rule a Government servant, against whom proceedings have been taken on a criminal charge, is to be considered as under suspension only till he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment, but once he is released from custody, the order of suspension comes to its end and cannot continue beyond that date. If the authorities concerned want to put such a Government servant, against whom a proceeding for criminal charge is pending, under suspension, then a specific order under R. 100 of the Service Code is to be passed, otherwise the order of suspension will ipso facto cease to operate. R. 100 of the Service Code is as follows : "A Government servant against whom a criminal charge or a proceeding for arrest for debt is pending should also be placed under suspension by the issue of specific orders to this effect during periods when he is not actually detained in custody or imprisoned (e.g. while released on bail) if the charge made or proceedings taken against him is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as such or involves moral turpitude. In regard to his pay and allowances, the provisions of rule 99 shall apply." 5. In regard to his pay and allowances, the provisions of rule 99 shall apply." 5. The scope of the aforesaid two rules has been examined in the case of B. C. Ghosh V/s. Chief Conservator of Forests, Bihar (C.W.J.C. No. 1463 of 1969, decided on 15-6-1970) : (reported in ILR (1971) 50 Pat 135) in which a Bench of this Court presided over by Honble the Chief Justice Misra and Mr. Justice K. B. N. Singh (as he then was) on construction of the two rules came to the conclusion that once a person taken in custody on a criminal charge is released from custody, the order under R. 99 ceases to operate and he has to be put under suspension by a specific order of suspension under R. 100. The same view was expressed in the case of Maheshwar Prasad Sinha V/s. Commr. of Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi (C.W.J.C. No. 1351 of 1970, decided on 1-5-1972) by a Bench of this Court presided over by Honble the Chief Justice U. N. Sinha and Mr. Justice Akbar Husain saying that an order under Rule 99 cannot be operative after the Government servant concerned is released from custody. In the case of Raja Lall V/s. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C. No. 257 of 1972, decided on 2-4-1973) (Pat) Honble the Chief Justice Untwalia (as he then was) and Mr. Justice S. Sarwar Ali in agreement with the aforesaid two judgments observed as follows: "In the circumstances, it is clear that the suspension order passed against the petitioner under Rule 99 of the B. S.Code (Bihar Service Code) remained operative during the period and for the period of his detention in custody and not beyond that." 6. Learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondent-State, however, pointed out that in the aforesaid judgments only part of R. 99 was taken into consideration, and, as such, the point at issue needs reconsideration by a larger Bench. According to the learned Government Pleader R. 99 applies under three contingencies, (i) when a proceeding has been taken for arrest for debt, (ii) when a proceeding has been taken on a criminal. charge (iii) when the person concerned is under preventive detention. According to the learned Government Pleader R. 99 applies under three contingencies, (i) when a proceeding has been taken for arrest for debt, (ii) when a proceeding has been taken on a criminal. charge (iii) when the person concerned is under preventive detention. Then such a Government servant should be considered as under suspension for the periods during which (i) he is detained in custody, (ii) he is undergoing imprisonment, (iii) until termination of the proceeding taken against him, and (iv) until he is released from detention i.e., from preventive detention. Learned Government Pleader has submitted that in view of the language of rule 99, in certain circumstances, a Government servant can be considered to be under suspension until the termination of the proceeding, which will mean termination of the proceedings taken on a criminal charge. In such a situation, according to him, it cannot be said that power under R. 99 is co-extensive upto the day of release from custody only; it can extend even upto the termination of the proceedings taken against him on a criminal charge, and in the instant case admittedly as the criminal proceeding has not been terminated, the order under R. 99 cannot be held to be invalid. No doubt, at a first impression this argument looks attractive, but I shall immediately show that if R. 99 is read along with R. 100, it is difficult to come to this conclusion. R. 100 empowers the authorities concerned to put a Government servant, against whom a criminal charge or a proceeding for arrest for debt is pending, under suspension "during period when he is not actually detained in custody or imprisoned (e.g. while released on bail)". If it is held that the order under R. 99 can remain in force till the proceeding which has been taken on a criminal charge is terminated, then there was no necessity of making a specific provision to cover that very situation under R. 100 when such person is not actually detained in custody. If R. 99 is interpreted to cover even that period, then, in my view. If R. 99 is interpreted to cover even that period, then, in my view. R. 100 will be redundant It is well-settled principle of construction that different sections or different rules should not be interpreted in a manner which may result in one of the sections or the rules being held to be redundant, and in such a situation Courts have also construed such sections and rules in a harmonious manner so as to give justification for their existence. In my opinion, applying the aforesaid principle the two rules have to be interpreted to mean that under R. 99 a Government servant is to be considered as under suspension only for the period during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment. After he is released from custody, then in order to put him under suspension, a specific order under R. 100 has to be passed. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by this Court in the aforesaid three judgments, and I do not consider it necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The result will be that it has to be held that the order of suspension passed on 1-8-1968 against the petitioner will be operative only upto 19-8-1968, i.e., till he was in custody. 7. Now the next question which remains to be answered is as to whether the aforesaid order under R. 100 (annexure-A to the counter-affidavit) passed during the pendency of the writ application saying that the petitioner will be deemed to be under suspension since the date on which he was released on bail can be interpreted to mean that even if this period is not covered by the order under R. 99, now it will be covered by the latter order and the petitioner will be deemed to be under suspension even during this period. 8. Learned Government Pleader has submitted that the power under R. 100 is very wide and a person against whom a criminal charge is pending can be put under suspension, although he may not have been taken in custody. Similarly, he can be put under suspension after he has been released from custody during the pendency of a criminal charge. There is no difficulty in accepting this submission. But, the point is as to whether the power under R. 100 can be exercised retrospectively. Similarly, he can be put under suspension after he has been released from custody during the pendency of a criminal charge. There is no difficulty in accepting this submission. But, the point is as to whether the power under R. 100 can be exercised retrospectively. What is the basic idea behind the order of suspension was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of the Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi V/s. Hotel Workers Union ( AIR 1959 SC 1342 ); where it was pointed out when power to suspend is granted either in the contract of employment or in the Statute or in the Rules framed thereunder, suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant, is not bound to render services and the master is not bound to pay. What will happen if factually the servant concerend has actually rendered service and master has actually paid ? Can in such a situation what has actually happened be undone by passing a retrospective order of suspension ? In my opinion, if it is held that under Rule 100 a Government servant can be put under suspension retrospectively, it will lead to an anomalous position, Although the Government servant concerned might have actually worked, but by passing a retrospective order it will be deemed that during that period he has not worked at all. This aspect of the matter was examined by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Hemanta Kumar Bhattacharjee V/s. S. N. Mukherjee ( AIR 1954 Cal 340 ). In that case rules 1 and 2 of the Fundamental Rules were considered, which are more or less similar to rules 99 and 100 of the Service Code. In that connection it was observed (at p. 313): "Thus, the basic idea underlying the root word suspend and all its derivatives is that a person, while holding an office and performing its functions or holding a position or privilage, should ba interrupted in doing so and debarred for the time being from further functioning in the office or holding the position or privilege. He is intercepted in the exercise of his functions or his enjoyment of the privilege and put aside, as it were, for a time, excluded during the period from his functions or privileges. He is intercepted in the exercise of his functions or his enjoyment of the privilege and put aside, as it were, for a time, excluded during the period from his functions or privileges. Such being the concept of a suspension order, suspension with retrospective effect is a contradiction in terms. The antecedent period which an order of suspension with retrospective effect might be intended to. cover, would ordinarily be a period during which the person concerned had already performed the duties of his office or held the relevant position. There can be no meaning in suspending a man from working during a period when the period is past and he has already worked or suspending a man from occupying a position or holding a privilege in the past when he has already occupied or held it." It has been acknowledged on all counts that on the basis of a deeming clause, Legislature can bid to imagine certain things which actually, on the relevant date did not exist, but that is not to be presumed while construing orders which are purely executive in nature, Rule 100 has simply vested power in the authorities concerned to pass an order suspending a Government servant. It does not say in express term that such orders can be passed retrospectively as well. In my opinion, unless the Rules specifically provide, this cannot be done by purporting to pass an order under R. 100 of the Service Code. My this view is also supported by the judgments in the case of Satkari Chatterji V/s. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta ( AIR 1965 Cal 13 ) and Sisir Kumar Chattopadhyaya V/s. State of West Bengal (1973) 2 Serv LR 277 (Cal), In such a situation, it is difficult to accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondent-State that the respondent- Director of Agriculture was well within his power in passing the aforesaid order dated 13-4-1976 (Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit) putting the petitioner under suspension since the date he was released from custody. In my view, that order will be operative only since 13-4-1976 when the order in question was passed. 9 Accordingly, this application is allowed in part. The petitioner will not be deemed to be under suspension between the period from 20-8-1968 upto 12-4-1976. He will, however, be deemed to be under suspension from 13-4-1976. In my view, that order will be operative only since 13-4-1976 when the order in question was passed. 9 Accordingly, this application is allowed in part. The petitioner will not be deemed to be under suspension between the period from 20-8-1968 upto 12-4-1976. He will, however, be deemed to be under suspension from 13-4-1976. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that once it is held that the peitioner was not under suspension between 20-8-1968 and 12-4-1976, then he is entitled for full pay during this period. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in the aforeaid Bench decision of this Court in Maheshwar Prasad Sinhas case (CWJC No. 1351 of 1970 D/- 1-5-1972 (Pat)) (supra) where it was held that in such a situation the petitioner concerned will be entitled for full pay during the period when he was held to be not under suspension. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs. S.K.CHAUDHURI, J. 10 I agree.