Short Note : 1. The petitioners have filed this revision petition against an order dated 29-5-1976 passed by the Second Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore, in Criminal case No. 1188/96 whereby two applications, filed by them. one under section 181, Cr.P.C., 1973, challenging the jurisdiction of the Court and the other under section 317, Cr.P.C, 1973, claiming exemption from personal attendance in the Court have been dismissed. Held: An interlocutory order has not been defined. No single general test for finality can be led down as final or interlocutory nature of an order has to be considered in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. A judgment or an order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. However, generally speaking, a judgment or an order which determines the principal matter in question is termed as final. But an order, which did not finally settle the controversy at rest and kept the action alive, is not final. It has been held so in Mohanlal Maganlal v. State of Gujarat, (AIR 1968 S.C. 738.) 2. Interlocutory orders passed without jurisdiction, which constitute nullities, can be interfered with in revision under section 401, Cr.P.C., and in appropriate cases under section 482 Cr.P.C., which inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution in order to give effect to an order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. 3. Section 397 (2), Cr.P.C., nowhere provides that interlocutory orders cannot be interfered with even if permitted under other provisions of the Code as has been held in Chhanendra and others v. State of M.P. (1976 Cr.Law Reporter Note 115 supra). The purpose of section 397 of the new Code is to keep such an order outsides the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for it can always challenge it in due course if the final order goes against it. The purpose of section 397 of the new Code is to keep such an order outsides the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. This is not likely to prejudice the aggrieved party for it can always challenge it in due course if the final order goes against it. But in a case where the jurisdiction of the Court is challenged, it is the duty of that Court to consider and decide that question first as, in case it is found later that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the whole proceedings would be vitiated and the result would be a nullity. I am, therefore, of opinion that in such a case where the trial Court has failed to consider the question of jurisdiction in an appropriate manner, the High Court can certainly interfere with the same in its revisional jurisdiction as, in a way, that may bring finality to the matter in so far as the question of initial jurisdiction is concerned. 4. As regards the question of dispensing with the personal attendance of the petitioners, the order passed by the trial Court is certainly of an interlocutory nature and the learned Magistrate has exercised its discretion properly with which, in my opinion, no interference is called for at this stage. I am, therefore, unable to agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that as they are represented by counsel, their personal attendance be dispensed with. This submission is, therefore, rejected, and the order of the learned Magistrate refusing to grant exemption from personal appearance to the petitioners, excluding accused No 2 Smt. Wiranwali Kaker, is maintained. 1976 Cr.L.J. 815, 1976 Cr.L.J. 1974, 1975 Cr. L. J. 1923 and 1976 Cr. L. R. Note 158 referred to; 1976 Cr. L. J. 215, 1976 Cr. L. J 1825 and 1976 Cr. L. J. 1901 distinguished; AIR 1968 SC 733 , AIR 1976 SC 1947 and 1976 Cr. L. R.Note 115 relied on. Revision partly allowed.