JUDGMENT - C.T. DIGHE, J.:---This State of Maharashtra has come in appeal, against the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 22nd Court, Andheri, Bombay, dated 8-10-1975, by which the respondent Munshikumar Aroara was acquitted of the charge under section 7(i) read with section 2(i)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, read with section 16 of the same Act. 2. The Criminal Application is for condoning the delay of 65 days in presenting this appeal. 3. The matter related to the taking of a sample of turmeric powder from Hotel Radio Punjab, situated in Nadiadwala building S.V. Road, Andheri, where the respondent was found selling goods. 4. As far as pre-requisite order for condonation of delay is concerned, the State makes out a case that after the delivery of the judgement on 8-10-1975 a certified copy of the judgment was applied for on 13-10-1975. Since it did not bear any Court fee stamp another application was filed. That application was made on 4-12-1975. The copy was received on 15-1-1976. The time for filing the appeal expired on 18-2-1976. The appeal has been preferred on 23-4-1976. The delay of 65 days in sought to be condoned on the ground that the Joint Commissioner of Food Drugs Administration put up the proposal to the Commissioner for orders on 7-2-1976. Then it is said that the typing section was over-loaded with work and the orders from the Commissioner were received on 29-3-1976. Even thereafter a month was taken up for actual filling of the appeal. This all makes unhappy reading. No person from the typing section or the man in charge of the work is examined to speak about the over-loading. None from the Commissioners office has made any affidavit saying that the matter could not have been disposed of earlier. 5. It is only the Drug Inspector, who has made a solemn affirmation regarding the facts stated in the application. One cannot therefore, appreciate whether the Joint Commissioner and the Commissioner of Food Drugs Administration have really realised their responsibility to be quick and to be in time to observe the norms of procedure which are equally applicable to an ordinary citizen or to a Government Department. I do wish that hereafter the Court must be taken in full confidence for demonstrating the inability without casually mentioning it through the mouth of a third unconcerned person. I do wish that hereafter the Court must be taken in full confidence for demonstrating the inability without casually mentioning it through the mouth of a third unconcerned person. As regards the application in hand, upon hearing Mr. Damle, for the State, I feel a lenient view should be taken in this case, of course, remaining hopeful, that this causal attitude would not be repeated and hence I condone the delay caused in filing the appeal. 6. As regards the appeal proper, I do not think that the submission of the State could be accepted. From the judgment delivered by the learned trial Magistrate, it seems that he has relied upon the unreported judgment of this High Court in (Vithal Kallappa Shetty v. The State of Maharashtra)1, Criminal Appeal No. 1032/73 and 1033/73, decided on 17/20-3-75, Padhye, J. 1975 U.C.R. Bom. 350, holding that turmeric or chilly powder could not be covered by the items "spices". If that is so, the residuary items foot not specified would apply in which case the sample taken and the quantity sent to the Public Analyst, does not satisfy the rules. As is laid down in (Rajaladas G. Pamnani v. State of Maharashtra)2, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 189, that any non-compliance with the quality to be supplied causes not only infraction of the provisions but also injustice. 7. The learned trial Magistrate was bound by the authority in Cri. Appeal No. 1032/73 and 1033/73, and if that is so, the judgment could not be looked upon as erroneous. We need not in this particular case go into the question whether the judgment referred to by the trial Court needs further scrutiny. There is another good point urged on behalf of the respondent by Mr. Ganatra the learned Counsel for the defence and I think, the acquittal can be maintained on that count. This being the order of acquittal, Mr. Ganatra is entitled to canvass any point by which the acquittal can be supported. The point pressed for my consideration is that a Food Inspector has no authority to take a sample when the article was not stored for sale and hence the prosecution is in valid. 8. For this purpose we must understand that the premises visited by the Food Inspector were a hotel. The Food Inspector in his deposition says that it was an eating house and selling cooked or prepared food only. 8. For this purpose we must understand that the premises visited by the Food Inspector were a hotel. The Food Inspector in his deposition says that it was an eating house and selling cooked or prepared food only. He is specific that the turmeric powder was not for sale. He adds, he went into the kitchen-cum store-room and says that the powder was used for preparation of foodstuffs. 9. Mr. Ganatra, the learned Counsel, relied upon the case of (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narian Tandan)3, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 621, where it is laid down in paragraph 14 as follows :--- "From a conjoint reading of the above referred provisions, it will be clear that the broad scheme of the Act is to prohibit and penalise the sale, or import manufacture, storage or distribution for sale of any adulterated article of food. The terms "store" and "Distribute" take their colour from the context and the collocation of words in which they occur in sections 7 and 16. "Storage" or "distribution" of an adulterated article of food for a purpose other than for sale does not fall within the mischief of this section. That his is the right construction of the terms "store and "distribute" in section 16(1) will be further clear from a reference to section 10. Under that section the Food Inspector, whom the Act assigns a pivotal position for the enforcement of its provisions, is authorised to take samples of an article of good only from particular persons including in specified course of business activity. The immediate or ultimate end of such activity is the sale of an article of food. The section does not given a blanket power to the Food Inspector to take samples of an article of food from a person who is not covered by any of the sub-clauses of sub-section (1)(a) or sub-section (2). The three sub-clauses of sub-section (1)(a) apply to a person who answers the description of a seller or conveyer, deliverer, actual or potential, of an article of food to a purchaser or consignee or his consignee after delivery of such an article to him. Sub-section (2) further makes it clear that sample can be taken only of that article of food which is "manufactured", "stored" or exposed to sale. Sub-section (2) further makes it clear that sample can be taken only of that article of food which is "manufactured", "stored" or exposed to sale. It follows that if an article of food is not intended for sale and is in the possession of a person who does not fulfil the character of a seller, conveyer, deliverer, consignee, manufacturer or store for sale such as is referred in sub-sections (1)(a) and (2) of the section, the Food Inspector will not be competent under the law to take a sample and on such sample being found adulterated, to validly launch prosecution thereon. In short, the expression "store" in section 7 means "storing for sale" and consequently storing of an adulterated article of food for purposes other than for sale would not constitute an offence under section 16(1)(a)". 10. Mr. Damle for the State was critical of this finding, saying that a narrower interpretation has been put by the Supreme Court. In this connection he relied upon an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in (The Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation v. Cherukattil Gopalan and another)4, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1725, that a sale of a food article to Food Inspector for analysis amounts to a sale within the meaning of the Act. 11. Although according to the definition contained in section 2(xiii) a sale for analysis, is a sale of any article of food, that has to be looked into, in conjunction with sections 7 and 10 of the Act. According to section 7 there is prohibition against any person to manufacture for sale etc. of adulterated and misbranded article of food. The prohibition covers the storing or distribution. But the main idea is of giving delivery to others by way of sale etc. 12. Upon this background when we go to the powers of the Food Inspector, section 10 empowers a Food Inspector to take samples of any article of food and to the extent relevant. It may be noted that such power can be exercised if any person is selling such article. Sub-section (2) of section 10 empowers the Food Inspector to enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured, or stored for sale, or exposed or exhibited for sale. It may be noted that such power can be exercised if any person is selling such article. Sub-section (2) of section 10 empowers the Food Inspector to enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured, or stored for sale, or exposed or exhibited for sale. The underlying idea therefore, is a sale not only to the Food Inspector by way of taking a sample for analysis but storing or keeping the article for sale to others. 13. If Mr. Dample wants us to be convinced that mere taking of a sample for analysis is to be looked upon as a sale then a Food Inspector can enter any private kitchen, take sample for analysis and the man who knows nothing about the article being adulterated and had not stored the article for sale, could be proceeded under the P.F.A. Act. That could never be looked upon as the intention of the Act. Hence the argument put forward by Mr. Damle seeking to differentiate the ratio in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 621 (supra), cannot be accepted. As stated in that authority storing an adulterated article of food for purposes other than for sale would not constitute an offence under section 16(1)(a) of the P.F. Act. 14. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 621 (supra) has been followed by Gauhatti High Court in (Manindra Narayan Sen Gupta v. State of Assam)5, 1977 Cri.L.J. 1102, and also by our High Court in (H.T. Jadhav v. Ramniklal s/o. Thakersee and another)6, Cri. Appeal No. 800 of 1975, decided on 29-3-77, 1977 U.C.R. Bom. 359. 15. Relying upon the Supreme Court judgment the State cannot maintain its stand for convicting the accused. Consequently the following order is passed. Appeal is dismissed. Bail-bond stands cancelled. -----