Judgment 1. This application by Bhola Singh, under Ss. 397 and 401 of the Cr. P. C. 1973, is directed against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge affirming the conviction of the petitioner under Sec.3 of the Bihar Gift Goods (Sale, Purchase and Unlawful Possession) Act and the sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment under the said section as held by the trial court. 2. In order to appreciate the points involved in this case, it will be necessary to state some relevant facts. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, was that in the evening of 6th June, 1968 Ghandrama Singh (P. W. 2) of village Birna Police Station Rajpur informed the police at Dhansoi outpost that one Rang Bahadur Singh of his village, who was a teacher in Gajadhara School was planning to dispose of in black market foodstuffs supplied under the Care Programme. On receipt of the information, constable Ram Sohag Singh (P. W. 4) in the absence of the Assistant Sub Inspector, started towards Kauan Khoch bridge at about 8 p.m. He saw a Tamtam going towards the village Birna. He went near the Tamtam and stopped it. In the meantime Radha Kishun, Maula, Ramprabesh Singh and others also arrived on hulla. There were two persons on the tamtam. The tamtam driver managed to run away leaving his tamtam. The other persons on the tamtam gave out his name as Bhola Singh (the petitioner) of village Birna. He also gave out the name of the tamtam driver as Awadh Sah of the same village. P., W. 4 found in all eight paper bags on the tamtam. Those bags contained foodstuffs supplied from U.S.A. On the cover of the bags the following were found written:- "Blended Food Product ... Donated by the people of America etc." The petitioner confessed before the witnesses that the foodstuffs belonged to him. The petitioner stated before P. W. 4 and other witnesses that the said foodstuffs belonged to him. P. W. 4 then took the petitioner to the Dhansohi outpost together with the articles and the Tamtam. The Assistant Sub-Inspector, who had returned by that time seized the articles together with the Tamtam and the horse. On weighment corn meal (Delia) in seven bags each weighing 25 seers and one small bag weighing 8 seers were found. P. W. 4 submitted a written report (Ext. The Assistant Sub-Inspector, who had returned by that time seized the articles together with the Tamtam and the horse. On weighment corn meal (Delia) in seven bags each weighing 25 seers and one small bag weighing 8 seers were found. P. W. 4 submitted a written report (Ext. 2) to the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, who forwarded the same to Rajpur Police Station, where a formal first information report (Ext. 1) was drawn up. Charge was submitted against the petitioner along with the driver of the Tamtam, namely, Awadh Sah. The petitioner along with the other accused had pleaded not guilty of the charge and stated that they were falsely implicated. The trial court, however, convicted the petitioner and the said Awadh Sah in the said Section of the Act mentioned above. 4. It appears that the petitioner alone preferred an appeal against his conviction and the sentence and Awadh Sah did not prefer any appeal. The appellate court also affirmed his conviction and sentence. Hence this revision. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has assailed the conviction and the sentence of the petitioner on two grounds: (i) Both the courts have erred in holding that the petitioner has committed any offences under Sec.3 of the Bihar Gift Goods (Sale, Purchase and Unlawful Possession) Act without examining as to whether such Act existed or not. (ii) It was expected that the courts below ought to have seen the Act at least before passing the order of sentence and conviction imposed against the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has not denied this fact. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the statements in para 12 of the application before this Court shows that after inquiry from the Department of Supply and Relief, Government of Bihar he has learnt that there was no Act namely, Bihar Gift Goods (Sale, Purchase etc.) Act, but only there were two Ordinances, namely, Bihar Gift Goods (Sale, Purchase and Unlawful Possession) Ordinance, 1967, being Ordinance No, XVIII of 1967 which was superseded by similar Ordinance being Ordinance No. IV of 1968 published in the Official Gazette on 7th of May, 1968. He pointed out that the conviction of the petitioner was recorded on 11th November, 1971 which is the date of the Judgment of the trial court. 7. He pointed out that the conviction of the petitioner was recorded on 11th November, 1971 which is the date of the Judgment of the trial court. 7. It may be recalled that in the instant case, he submitted that the occurrence took place on 6th June, 1968 according to the prosecution itself. Therefore as alleged at that point of time i. e. in 1968, the Ordinance was applicable to the petitioner. Learned counsel in this regard further submitted that it is well known that the life of an Ordinance is only six months and the said Ordinance No. 4 of 1968 came into force on the 7th May, 1968. The period of six months expired on 7th November, 1968. In this connection he referred to Art. 213 (2) of the Constitution of India. But as pointed out earlier, the conviction, under Sec.3 of the said Ordinance, of the petitioner was made by the trial court by its judgment dated 11th November, 1971, when the said Ordinance was no more in existence, nor the life of the Ordinance was continued by subsequent Ordinance or by an Act, In that background of facts and circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following two points for consideration by this Court. (i) Whether the petitioner could have been convicted under the provisions of the said Ordinance of 1968 which being a temporary statute after expiration of the period of Ordinance. (ii) Whether the petitioner had committed any offence on the facts alleged and proved by the prosecution. It will be convenient to deal with point No. 2 first. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard has referred to an unreported judgment dated the 26th July, 1974 in Criminal Revision No. 311 of 1972 (Pat); Noor Mohammad V/s. The State of Bihar. Where Uday Sinha, J, has observed at p. 4 as follows:- The next submission, however, of the learned counsel for the petitioner has much substance and must be accepted. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no evidence in the case that the milk powder alleged to have been seized from the possession of the petitioner is covered by the expression gift goods as defined in Cl. 2 (1) of the Ordinance. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no evidence in the case that the milk powder alleged to have been seized from the possession of the petitioner is covered by the expression gift goods as defined in Cl. 2 (1) of the Ordinance. Sec.3 of the said Ordinance makes sale or purchase or possession of gift goods punishable, but in order to bring home a conviction for being in unlawful possession of gift goods it must further be proved that gift goods had been supplied by way of gift by any Government or Organisation to any State Government or the Central Government or to any Organisation or any person on behalf of such Government. In the present case the prosecution case is, and the evidence is, that the milk powder were gifts of the people of United States of America. Gift from the people of America Is quite different from a gift by the Government of United States of America and will not be covered by the expression "by any Government or Organisation." There is no evidence in this case to show that the milk powder had been gifted by the United States, any Government or any particular Organisation. The people of United States of America are neither Government nor any Organisation. It may well be that the milk powder had been given by the Government of United States of America or of any American Philanthropic Organisation, but in the absence of any claim or evidence that they had been gifted by American Government or any American Organisation, the requirements of Sec.2 (1) of the Ordinance are not fulfilled and, therefore, the ingredients of the offence have not been established. The fact that the accused never challenged the impugned articles to be the gift goods, does not make any difference in the situation. The prosecution has to prove its case and every ingredient of the offence must be established by the prosecution itself. The ingredients in regard to the goods being the gift goods not having been satisfactory, the conviction is unsustainable. 9 In view of the above observation, in my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. 10. Now I turn to consider point No. 1. This point was also urged before Uday Sinha. The ingredients in regard to the goods being the gift goods not having been satisfactory, the conviction is unsustainable. 9 In view of the above observation, in my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. 10. Now I turn to consider point No. 1. This point was also urged before Uday Sinha. J. but his Lordship was pleased to hold against the petitioner and according to his Lordship, even if the life of the Ordinance was over, the conviction could be maintained. Before him Keshavan Madhava Menon V/s. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 was referred. His Lordship at p. 3 observed: "Having considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the decision referred to above, I am of the view that there is no substance in the submission and must be rejected. No exception can be taken to the proposition of law advanced by the petitioner but the learned counsel has failed to take note of the fact that the proposition laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court applies only in respect of temporary statutes. In this regard the decision is explicit that the proposition applies in respect of temporary statutes only. A temporary statute is one, the duration of which is laid down by the statute itself. Where the statute (Act or Ordinance) does not lay down the duration of the statute, it cannot be said to be a temporary statute. If the statute is not temporary, any contravention of the statute will not cease to be an offence and the person contravening will be liable for the offence even after the statute has lapsed, I may point out that the present Ordinance does not prescribe its duration and, therefore, it was not temporary statute. It is another matter that the statute in question is an Ordinance. But merely because it is an Ordinance, the life of which is limited to six months or till the next sitting of the Legislature, the duration of an Ordinance cannot be said to be fixed by the lapse of the Ordinance by expiry of six months or its not having been extended by further Ordinance. But merely because it is an Ordinance, the life of which is limited to six months or till the next sitting of the Legislature, the duration of an Ordinance cannot be said to be fixed by the lapse of the Ordinance by expiry of six months or its not having been extended by further Ordinance. It is only a contingency upon which the Ordinance comes to an end, that is, no duration of the Ordinance is fixed by the Ordinance itself and in that view of the matter, the Ordinance cannot be said to be a temporary statute and, therefore, actions taken under the aforesaid Ordinance and the conviction recorded thereunder, cannot be said to be illegal. ............ ......" 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the view taken by Uday Sinha, J. is contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court which are relevant to the instant case. Therefore, according to him it was a judgment per in curiam. He submitted that it appears that various other decisions of the Supreme Court were not placed before his Lordship. He has referred also to Section 7 of the 1968 Ordinance which reads thus:- "Repeal and saving:- (1) The Bihar Gift Goods (Sale, Purchase and Unlawful Possession) Ordinance 1967 (Bihar Ordinance No. XVIII of 1967), is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under any of the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of powers conferred by or under this Ordinance, as if this Ordinance was in force on the day on which such thing or action was done or taken." He submitted that had there been any other Ordinance or an Act with similar repeal and saving provisions, it would not have been open to the petitioner to raise this contention, but in the instant case, he reiterated that on behalf of the State nothing has been produced to show that there was any other Act or Ordinance contrary to the statement made by the petitioner in para 12 of his petition. Learned counsel then referred to S. Kri-shnan V/s. The State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 301 and he drew my attention at p. 304 (of AIR): (at p. 1106 of Cri LJ) wherein it was observed:- "...............The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires (Craies on Statutes, Edn. 4, p. 347). Preventive detention which would but for the Act authorising it, be a continuing wrong, cannot, therefore, be continued beyond the expiry of the Act itself............" Reliance was also placed on State of Punjab V/s. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, 1955 0 CrLJ 254 , where their Lordships were considering Inter alia the provisions contained under East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Ordinance (7 of 1948) vis-a-vis the provisions contained under Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Their Lordships observed that the consequences laid down in Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. It had no application, where a statute automatically expires by efflux of time. The Ordinance 7 of 1948 was undoubtedly a temporary statute but the period during which it was to continue had not expired when the Repealing Act 12 of 1948 was passed. Reference was also made to Gopi Chand V/s. Delhi Administration, 1959 0 CrLJ 782 . Learned counsel has also invited my attention to para 14 of the judgment, the relevant portion of which reads thus:- "Then it is urged that the Act which came into force on March 29, 1949, was due to expire and did expire on August 14, 1951, and so the proceedings taken against the appellant under the summons procedure after the expiration of the temporary Act were invalid. It is argued that, in dealing with this point, it would not be permissible to invoke the provisions of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act because the said Section deals with the effect of repeal of permanent statutes. This argument no doubt is well founded. It is argued that, in dealing with this point, it would not be permissible to invoke the provisions of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act because the said Section deals with the effect of repeal of permanent statutes. This argument no doubt is well founded. As Craies has observed "as a general rule, unless it contains some special provisions to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect." This principle has been accepted by this Court in Krishnan V/s. State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 301 . "The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is," observed Patanjali Sastri J., "that, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires." It is true that the Legislature can and often enough does avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, and the effect of such a saving provision is in some respects similar to the effect of the provisions of Section and of the General Clauses Act............" Learned counsel has also referred to State of Orissa V/s. Bhupendra Kumar, AIR 1962 SC 945 and he has placed before me paragraph 21 of the same, the relevant portion of which is to this effect:- "In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the general rule about the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act on which Mr. Chetty relies is inflexible and admits of no exceptions. It is true for instance that offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires. If a prosecution has not ended before that day, as a result of the termination of the Act, it will ipso facto terminate. But is that an inflexible and universal rule. In our opinion, what the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act would be must depend upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and upon their character whether the said right and liability are enduring or not. But is that an inflexible and universal rule. In our opinion, what the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act would be must depend upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and upon their character whether the said right and liability are enduring or not. As observed by Parker, B. in the case of Steavenson V/s. Oliver, 1841 151 ER 1024: "There is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed; the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) become as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former, the extent of restrictions imposed, and the duration of the provisions, are matters of construction." In view of the above decisions of the Supreme Court I respectfully differ from the view taken by Uday Sinha, J. in Noor Mohammad V/s. The State of Bihar. Cri. Revn. No. 311 of 1972 D/- 26-7-1974 (Pat)) (supra). 12 In the instant case, it may be noticed that learned counsel on behalf of the State has not been able to produce before me any material to show that the Ordinance of 1968 was continued by any saving clause in any other Act or Ordinance. Therefore, if there was no Ordinance at all when the order of conviction was made, it would be difficult to uphold the conviction on that ground also. His Lordship has observed in the latter case which I have just referred if a prosecution has not ended before that day as a result of the termination of the Act it would ipso facto terminate. If the said Ordinance was not continued beyond six months as stated by the petitioner, the prosecution of the petitioner for the offence under Sec.3 of the Ordinance would also terminate. 13. In the result, the application of the petitioner is allowed and the conviction and the sentence imposed upon him are set aside.