VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) SINCE common questions of law and fact arise for consideration in these petitions under Sec. 55 of the Karnataka Agricultural Income Tax act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'),. they are disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) THERE was a firm by name Mjs Kuttinkhan Estate, Malandur post, Chickamagalur, which was an assessee under the provisions of the act. The relevant years of assessment are 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69. Until 9-1-1966, there were eight partners in that firm by name Mr. S. B. P. Rebello and his wife Mrs". E. A. Rebello, Mr. J. M. J. Rebello and his wife Mrs. R. Rebello, Mr. E. L. J. Rebello and his wife C. M. Rebello, Mr. R. P. A. Rebello and Mr. R. T. A. Rebello. Mr. RTA. Rebello was the managing partner of that firm. Mr. . JMJ. Rebello died on 9-1-1966. With effect from 10-1-1966, there were ten members in the firm consisting of seven surviving members of the firm and three minors who were admitted to the benefits of the partnership. The assessment of the firm as well as its members in respect of the years 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69 were completed by the Agricultural Income Tax Officer, Chickmagalur. On a scrutiny of the said assessment orders, the 'commr of Agricultural income Tax noticed in the cases of Mr. SBP. Rebello and his wife Mrs. EA. Rebello, Mr. JMJ. Rebello and his wife Mrs. R. Rebello and Mr. ELJ. Rebello and his wife Mrs. CM. Rebello until 9-1-1966 and in the cases of mr. SBP. Rebello and his wife EA. Rebello and Mr. ELJ. Rebello and his wife C. M. Rebello in respect of the period subsequent to 10-1-1966 in the assessment year 1966-67 and in the assessment years 1967-68 and 1968-69. on account of non-compliance with the provisions of Sec. 11 (2) (a) (i) of the Act, which required the Agricultural Income Tax Officer while computing the total agricultural income of an individual for purposes of assessment under the Act, to include so much of the agricultural income of a wife of an indiviudal as arises directly or indirectly from the membership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner, the interests of the Revenue had been prejudicially affected. He, therefore, issued a notice under Sec. 35 (1) of the Act which conferred the power of revision on him, addressed to Mr. RTA. Rebello, the Managing Partner of the firm, calling upon him to show cause as to why the assessment of the individuals concerned should not be revised. Copies of the said notice were sent to Mrs. EA. Rebello, Mrs. R. Rebello, Mr. SBP. Rebello, mra. CM. Rebello and Mr. ELJ. Rebello. The notice set out in detail the reason for taking action under S. 35 (1) of the Act. The notices which were dt. 21st December 1972 and which called upon them to appear before the commissioner on 6-1-1973 were received by all the individuals to whom they were addressed. Each one of them wrote a letter dt. 30-12-1972 to the Commr of Agricultural Income Tax requesting him to adjourn the case to a date in February 1973. On 8-1-1973, the Commr sent fresh notices to all of them informing them 'that the cases had been adjourned to 22-1-1973. Those notices also were served on all the individuals concerned. Here again, it should be mentioned 'that the notices were addressed to Mr. RTA. Rebello and copies of the same were sent to five other persons referred to above. On 12-1-1973, Mr. RTA. Rebello apparently purporting to act on behalf of himself and Mr. SEP. Rebello mr. ELJ. Rebello and Mrs. R. Rebello, wrote a letter to the Commr. of. Agricultural Income Tax asking for a further adjournment to a date in February 1973. The adjournment sought for was refused by the Commissioner and that fact was intimated to Mr. RTA. Rebello through a telegram dated 20-1-1973. On the date of hearing i. e. , 22-1-1973, none of the persons to whom notices had been issued appeared before the Commr. The Commr proceeded to pass an order under S. 35 of the Act, on the basis of the material available on the record seating aside the orders of assessment in question and directing the Agricultural income Tax Officer to make fresh assessments in respect of the assessment years in question, in accordance with the provisions of S. 11 (2) (a) (i) of the Act. Aggrieved by the said orders of the Commr, the petitioners have filed the above petitions questioning its correctness. ( 3 ) TWO questions of law were formulated by Sri SP. Aggrieved by the said orders of the Commr, the petitioners have filed the above petitions questioning its correctness. ( 3 ) TWO questions of law were formulated by Sri SP. Bhat in support of these petitions. The first ques tion relates to the validity of notices issued to the petitioners and the second one relates to - the question whether they had been afforded a reasonable opportunity by the Commr before he passed the impugned orders. ( 4 ) IT was argued that the notices which were issued to the petitioners which alone could constitute the foundation of the proceedings before the Commr of Agricultural Income Tax being defective in law inasmuch as they were not directly addressed to the individual assessees concerned but addressed to Mr. RTA. Rebello, Managing Partner of the firm and copied to them, the orders passed by the Commr were unsustainable in law. ( 5 ) IN support of the above contention, reliance was placed by Sri s. P. Bhat on the decision of the Supreme Court in Commr of Inome Tax, gujarat II v. Kurban Hussain Ibrahimji, (1971) 82 ITR, 821. which was a case in which sec. 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 arose for consideration. In that case, the Income Tax Officer having issued a notice stating ithat he had reason to believe that the income of the assesssee for the year ending 31st march, 1949 had escaped assessment, proceeded to make a re-assessment in respect of the income of the assessment year ending 31st March 1950. The supreme Court held that it was not open to the Income Tax Officer to make a re-assessment in respect of the year 1949-50 when the assessee had been told that action was being taken in respect of the income of the! year 1948-49. The cases before us bear no analogy to the cases which arose under Sec. 34 of the income Tax Act, 1922 where It had always been held that the notice alone would be the foundation of any proceedings taken thereunder. The cases before us are cases arising under Sec. 35 (1) of the Act, which is in pari materia with the provisions of S. 33b of the Income Tax Act, 1922. In Commissioner of Income Tax, WB v. Electro House, 1972 82 ITR. 824. The cases before us are cases arising under Sec. 35 (1) of the Act, which is in pari materia with the provisions of S. 33b of the Income Tax Act, 1922. In Commissioner of Income Tax, WB v. Electro House, 1972 82 ITR. 824. (which is the very next case reported in the said volume), the Supreme Court has explained the difference between Sec. 34 and Sec. 33b of the Income tax Act. 1922. While doing so, the Supreme Court has observed that the only ques'. ion which would arise for consideration under Sec. 33b would be whether the assessee had a reasonable opportunity to make his representation before his assessment is revised by the Commissioner and not whether the notice issued satisfied all the requirements attributable to notices under Sec. 34 of the income Tax Act, 1922. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the latter case apply with equal force to cases arising under Sec. 35 of the Act, where again the only question which would arise for consideration is whether the assessee concerned has been given reasonable opportunity to make his repi-esentation before his assessment is revised by the Commissioner. ( 6 ) ON the facts placed before us, we are satisfied that the petitioners in these cases had been given reasonable opportunity by the Commissioner befor he passed his orders under Sec. 35 of the Act. If they have not availed of that opportunity, they will have to blame themselves. We are satisfied that the petitioners were not at all taken by surprise because the notices clearly set out the reasons for issuing them and the proposed action. The fact that the notices were addressed to the Managing Partner of the firm and copies of them were sent to the petitioners is not sufficient to hold that the petitioners had been denied reasonable opportunity on the facts and circumstances of these cases. ( 7 ) WE are, therefore, of the opinion that both the questions of law urged before us have to be answered against ithe petitioners. There is no merit in these petitions. They are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100. 00 in each petition. --- *** --- .