VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) BECAUSE a common, question of law arises for consideration in these two cases they are disposed of by this common :judgment. The as lessees in these two cases are different persons. M/s. C. G. Bagalkoti and Sons, a registered film of Dharwar is the assessee in, i. T. R. C. No. 31 of 1974. In respect of assessment year 1965-66, the assessee filed a return on 31-7-1968. In the course of the said assessment proceedings, the Income-tax Officer felt satisfied that the assessee had concealed the particulars of certain income derived by it during the previous year in question, and therefore initiated proceedings under sec. 271 (1) (c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, (hereinafter inferred to as the 'act' ). Since he was of the opinion that the minimum penalty imposable was more than rupees one thousand, he referred, the matter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. After hearing the assessee, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was of the opinion that penalty was leviable in accordance with the provisions of the Act as amended by Finance Act 6f 1968 which came into force on 1-4-1968 and levied-a penalty of Rs. 6,000 by his order dt 18-11-1971. The assesee took up the matter in appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the plea of the assessee that the penalty leviable in the instant case was the penalty which could have been imposed according to the provisions in force at the commencement of the assessment year itrcs 31 and 73 of 1974. and the provisions of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1968 were in-applicable to the case. Accordingly it reduced the quantum of penalty payable by the assessee. At the instanee of the Additional commissioner of the Income Tax, the Tribunal has. Deferred the following question of Law under Sec. 256 (1) of the Act for the opinion of this Court: " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstanceh of the case, the amendment to section 271 (1) (c) which is effective: from 1-4-1968 is applicable in this case for assessment year 1965-66 by virtue of the fact that return of income was filed after 1-4-1968 ?" ( 2 ) IN I. T. R. C. 73 of 1974, the assessee is S. Channiaiah (since deceased) represented by his legal representative Smt. Pramila. The assessment year in question is 1962-63. A return was filed in respect of the said assessment year by the astsessee on 10-7-68. In the course of the asse sment proceedings, the Income Tax Officer was satisfied that there was concealment of income by the assessee and he therefore, after initiating the proceedings under Sec. 271 (1) (c) of the Act, referred the matter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income, Tax, as the minimum penalty imposable exceeded Rupees one thousand. After hearing the asse see, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner passed an order on 24-7-1970 imposing a penalty of Rs. 3,51,682 in accordance with the provisions of the Act as amended, by the Finance Act, 1968. The assessee filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in, i. T. A. No. 3831/ Bang /1970-71. , The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the quantum of penalty had to be determined in accordance, with the law prevailing at the commencement of the relevant assessment year and not in accordance with the Act as amended by the Finance Act of 1968 even though the return had been filed subsequent to 1-4-1968. Accordingly, it allowed the appeal of the assessee in part and directed the peaalty to be levied in accordance with the law in force at the commencement ot the relevant assessment year i. e. 1962-63. The tribunal, however, did not go into the question as to the amount of income concealed by the aspessee since the determination thereof was according to it unnecessary in view of its decision on the question of applicability of the provisions of the Act which were in force on the date of the return. At the instance of the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore, Bangalore, the tribunal has referred the following, question of law which in substance is similar to the question referred in I. T. R. C. 31 of 1974: "whether on the facts and in the circumstances, of the case, the tribunal is night In law in holding that the amendment to Sec. 271, (1) (c) with effect from 1-4-68 applies to the assessment yeara 1968- 69 onwards and not to earlier assessment yeare Irrespective of the date of filing of the returnn ? " ( 3 ) IT is necessary at this stage to give a brief history of the law relating to imposition of penalty in the law of income-tax in India. The relevant part of Sec. 28 of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922, corresponding to S. 271 of the Act, immediaely prior to coming into force of the Act read as follows :"28. Penalty for concealment of income or improper distribution of profits- (1) If the Income Tax Officer, the Appellate Asst commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal, in the course of any proceedings under this Act, is satisfied that any person- (a) * * * (b) * * * (c) has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, he or it may direct that such per on shall pay by way of penalty, in the case referred to in clause (a), in addition to the amount of the income tax and super-tax, if any payable by him, a sum not exceeding one and half times that amount, and in the cases referred to in clauses (b) and (c), in addition to any tax payable by him, a sum not exceeding one and half times the amount of the income-tax and super-tax, if any, which would have been avoided if the income as returned by such person had been accepted as the correct income. " ( 4 ) THE relevant part of Sec. 271 of the Act which ca,me into force on 1-4-62, at the commencement of the Act read as follows :" 271. " ( 4 ) THE relevant part of Sec. 271 of the Act which ca,me into force on 1-4-62, at the commencement of the Act read as follows :" 271. Failure to furnish, returns, comply with notices, concealment of income etc.- (1) If the Income Tax Officer or the Appellate Asst Commr in the course of any proceedings under the Act, is satisfied that any person- (a) * * * (b) * * * (e) has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, he may direct that such person shall pay by way of penally,- (i) * * * (ii) * * * (iii) in the cases referred to in clause (c) in addition to any tax payable by him, a sum which shall not be lest than twenty per cent, but which shall not exceed one and half times of the amount of tax if any, which would have been avoided if the income as retuned, by such person had been accepted as the correct income. " ( 5 ) BY the Finance Act of 1964 which came into force on 1-4-64 the word "deliberately", in clause (c) of Sec. 271 (1) was omitted and a,n explanation was inserted at the end of Sec. 271 (i) which read as follows : where the total income returned by any per on is less "than 80 per cent of the total income (hereinafter in this Explanation referred to as the correct income) as assessed under Section 143 or 144 or sec. 147 (reduced by the expenditure incurned bona fide by him for the purpose of making or earning any income included in the total income but which has been disallowed as a deduction), such person shall, unles he proves that the failure to return the correct income did not actise from any fraud or any gross or wilful" neglect on his part, be deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income for purposes of clause (c) of this sub-section. ( 6 ) THE above provision was again amended by the Finance Act of 1968 which came into force on First April 1968 by sub tituting clause (iii) by the following new clause (iii ). ( 6 ) THE above provision was again amended by the Finance Act of 1968 which came into force on First April 1968 by sub tituting clause (iii) by the following new clause (iii ). "in the cases referred to in clause (c) in addition to any tax payable by him, a sum which shall not be less than, but which shall not exceed twice, the amount of the income in respect of which the particulars have been concealed, or inaccurate particulars have been furnished. " although the amendments made till the year 1968 are sufficient for the purpose of disposal of these cases in order to make the picture complete, we propose to get out the further amendment made to the above provision of law by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act 1975 which came into force on First April 1976. After the above amendment, Cl (iii)reads : " (iii) in the cases referred to in clause (c), in addition, to any tax payable by him, a sum which shall not exceed twice the amount of tax sought to be evaded by reason of the concealment of particulars of his income or the furnishing of inaccurate particulars of such income. . . . . . (The rest of the amendment made to clause (iii) is unnecesary" sec. 297 (2) (f) and (g) of the Act, however, provided that :. . " (2) Not with standing the repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) (hereinafter referred as the repealed Act),- (a) to (e) (f) Any proceeding for the imposition of a penalty in respect of any assessment completed before the 1st day of April, 1962, may be initiated and any such penalty may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed; (g) any proceeding for the imposition of a penalty in, respect of any assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1962, or any earlier year, which is completed on or after the 1st day of April, 1962, may be initiated and any such penalty may be impoued under this Act. " ( 7 ) THE question which arises for consideration in this case Delates to two principal points. " ( 7 ) THE question which arises for consideration in this case Delates to two principal points. If a person is found to have concealed, his income or has furnished inaccurate particulars giving rise to an action under Sec. 271 (1) (c) of the Act then (1) what should be the date on which he should be considered as having committed the act of concealment and, (2) whether the penalty imposable on him is governed by (i) the law in force at the commencement of the relevant year of assessment in respect of which the return is filed or (ii) the law in force on the date on which the return is filed or (iii) the law in force on, the date on which the Income Tax Officer is satisfied that the assessee has concealed his income or (iv) the law in force on the date on which the order imposing penalty is passed. Whereas it is the contention urged by Sri Rajendra Babu, learned counsel for the department that an act which attracts penalty under sec. 271 (1) (c) should be deemed to have been, committed on the day on which the return is filed suppressing information regarding certain income attracting the liability to tax under the Act and that the penalty imposable should be determined in accordance with the law in force on the date on which the said act is committed, it is contended by Sri K srinvasan and G. Sarangan, learned Counsel for the assessees that when an act which attracts the imposition of penalty under Sec. 271 (1) (c) is committed, penalty can be impored only in accordance with the law in force at the commencement of the assessment year to which the return relates inrespective of the date of the return. ( 8 ) A large number of decisions have been cited before us by the learned counsel for the parties. 'before proceeding to consider them, we consider it proper to keep before us the warning administered by Lord halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem (1901 A. C. 495 at 506 ). ( 8 ) A large number of decisions have been cited before us by the learned counsel for the parties. 'before proceeding to consider them, we consider it proper to keep before us the warning administered by Lord halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem (1901 A. C. 495 at 506 ). In tha,t decision, the learned Lord observed"there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular fact of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a cage is only an authority for what it actually decides. entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proportion that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must, acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. " ( 9 ) THE principle underlying the above observations is besst illustrated by the two case cited before us by the learned counsel (1) C. A. Abraham v. Income-Tax Officer, Kottayam, and Another (41 I. T. R. page 425), and (2) jain Brother and Others v. Union of India and Others (77 I. T. R. page 107 ). It is contended by the learned counsel for the asuessees on the basis of the decision in the cage of C. A. Abraham, that the expression "assessment " found in the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 and also used in the Act should be considered as including within its scope proceedings relating to penalty also and that since the penalty imposable under the income tax law is merely an additional tax the logical conclusion should be that whenever penalty is levied, it should be done in accordance with the law in force at the commencement of the relevant assessment year to which the return relates. In support of this contention, the following observations made by the Supreme Court in C. A. Abraham's case are cited :"by section 28, the liability to pay additional tax which is designated penalty is imposed in view of the dishonest contumacious conduct of the assessee. This liability arises only if the Income-tax officer is satisfied about the existence Of the conditions which give him jurisdiction and the quantum thereof depends upon the circumstances of the case. The penalty is not uniform and its, imposition. depends upon the exercise of discretion by the taxing authorities but it is imposed as a part of the machinery for assessment of tax liability. " (underlining italics by us ). ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the above case in commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal I, and Another v. Anwar Ali (76 I. T. R. 696) and in the course of its decision it explained the above observations as follows :"the first point which falls for determination is whether imposition of penalty is in the nature of penal provision. The determination of the question of burden of proof will depend, largely on the penalty proceedings being penal in nature or being merely meant for impostition of an additional tax, the liability to pay such tax having been designated as penalty under Sec. 28. One line of argument which has prevailed particularly with the Allahabad High court in Lal Chand Gopal Dap case (48 I. T. R. 324) is that there was no e. 'eential difference between tax and penalty because the liability for payment of both was imposed as a part of the machinery of assessment and the penalty was merely an additional tax imposed in certain circumstances on account of the assessee's conduct. The justification of this view was founded on certain observation in c. A. Abraham v. Income Tax Offices, Kottayam (41 I. T. R. 425 ). It is true that penalty proceedings under Section 28 are included in the expression " assesment " and the true nature of penalty has been held to be additional tax. But one of the principal objeicts in enacting section 28 is to provide a deterrent against recurreince of default on, the part of the assesses. It is true that penalty proceedings under Section 28 are included in the expression " assesment " and the true nature of penalty has been held to be additional tax. But one of the principal objeicts in enacting section 28 is to provide a deterrent against recurreince of default on, the part of the assesses. The section is penal in the sense that its consequences are intended to be an effective deterrent which will put a stop to practices which the legislature consider to be against the public interest. It is significant that in G. A. Abraham's case this court was not called upon to determine whether penalty proceedings were penal or of quasi-penal nature and the observation I made with regard to penalty being an additional tax were made in a different context and for a different purpose. It appears to have been taken an settled by now in the sales tax law that an order imposing penalty is the result of quasi-criminal proceedings (Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa) (25 S. T. C. 211 ).- In England also it has never been doubted that such proceedings are penal in character: Fattorini (Thomas) (Lanchshire) Ltd. v. Inland Revenue commissioners. " ( 11 ) SIMILARLY, it has to be borne in mind that the observations made in the case of Jain Brothes V. Union of India were made with special reference to the facts of that case. The relevant assessment year in that case was 1960-61 and the power to impose penalty under the Act which came into force on 1st April, 1962 was derived by the special provisions contained in clause (g) of sub section (2) of Sec. 297 of the Act. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that in the matter of imposition of penalty in respect of the, assessment year preceding April 1st, 1962, the crucial date was the date on which the assessment ' proceedings were completed. The Supreme Court has not laid down in that case that in; respect of cases not governed by the special provisions contained in clause (g) of S. 297 (2) of the Act, the crucial date, would be the date of completion of the assessment proceedings. We have therefore to examine the case before us independently of the observations made in the case of c. A. Abraham and in the case of Jain Brothers. We have therefore to examine the case before us independently of the observations made in the case of c. A. Abraham and in the case of Jain Brothers. ( 12 ) IT is now well settled that the proceedings under See. 271 (1) (c) are penal in character. It is the bapic concept of law that an act would be an offence attracting a penalty only when the law in force when the act is committed declares that such an act would be an offence and that ordinarily the penalty imposiable for committing such an act would be in accordance with the law in force on the date of its commission. The offence of concealment of particulars of income or furni thing of inaccurate; particulars of such income is committed, when a return is filed. The mere non-filing of a return may not be considered either concealment of income which is liable to tax or furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding it. (vide s. Santhosh Nadar vs. First Addl. I. T. O. 46 I. T. R. 411 ). It has to be noted here that the observation made in the case of commissioner of income-Tax, Ahmedabad v. Gokuldas Harivallabdas (34 I. T. R. 98) have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal I, and Another v. Anwar Ali (76 I. T. R. 696) as follows :"as has been rightly observed by Chaagla C. J. in Commesonerof Income-Tax v. Gokuldas Harivallbhadas (34 I. T. R. 98) the gist of the offence under Sec. 28 (1) (c ). is that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished, inaccurate particulars of such income and, therefore, the department must establish that the receipt of the amount in dispute constitutes the income of the assessee. " ( 13 ) THE relevant date for purposes, of determining whether a person, has committed an act which attraction penalty under Sec. 271 (1) (c) is the date on which a return in which information regarding his income liable to tax is withheld is filed or the date when inaccurate particulars are given by him and the year of asessment in respect of which the return is filed or inaccurate particulars are furnished would have no relevance. ( 14 ) THE next question is that if an act which attracts the imposition of penalty under Sec. 271 (1)) (c) is committed whether penalty should be imposed in accordance with the law prevailing a,t the time when such act is committed or in accordance with the law prevailing at the commencement of the assessment year in relation to which the return, it filed or in- accurate particulars are furnished or in accordance with the law in force on the date of satisfaction of the assessing authority that the act of conrealment has been committed or the date on which the order imposing penalty is passed. The law in force either on the date of satisfaction, of the a Sessing authority that an act of concealment has been committed Or on the date on. which the order -imposing penalty is passed, in irrelevant. The following observations made by the Supreme Court in Jain Brothers' case. " It is obviou. for the imposition of penalty it is not the apsess- ment year or the date of the filing of the return which is important but the satisfaction of the, Income-tax authorities that a default has been committed by the assent see which would, attract the provisions relating to penalty. Whatever the stage at which the satisfaction is reached the scheme of Secs. 274 (1) and 275 of the Act of 1961 is that the order imponding penalty must be made after the completion of the assessment. The crucial date, therefore for purposes of penalty, is the date of such completion. " are applicable only to a case to which S. 297 (2) (g) of the Act is attracted and not to others. These causes are not governed by the principle enunciated in Jain Brothers' case, ( 15 ) IN C. I. T. Patiala v. Bhan Singh Boota Singh (95 I. T. R. , 562) the high Court of Punjab and Haryana held that where the assessee had filed return for the assessment year 1963-64 on April 9, 1964 in which he had concealed some income which was liable to income-tax, penalty was leviable in accordance with the provisions contained in the Explanation which was added by the Finance Act, 1964, which came into force on april, 1, 1964, as the return had been filed subsequent to the coming into force of the Explanation. ( 16 ) IN C. I. T. , Kerala v. K. Ahmed (95 I. T. R. 599) a Full Bench of the kerala High Court held that to a case of concealment made in the return filed on September 8, 1966, in respect of the assessment year 1963-64, the explanation introduced with effect from 1-4-1964 was attracted. In Rajputana Stores v. Inspection Asst. Commissioner of Income-Tax, dibrugarh Range (99 I. T. R. , 499) the Gauhati High Court held that on its plain wording the Explanation applied to any income returned by the assessee after it came into force irnepective of whether the income related to a period prior to 1964 or thereafter. To the same effect is the view expressed by the Gauhati High Court in f. C. Agarwal v. CIT, Assam etc. (102 ITR. 408 ). In CIT v. Dataram Satpal (99 ITR. 507) the Allahabad, High court held that in the case of concealment or of furnishing inaccurate particulars, the date of such a default would be the date on which the return was filed irrespective of the assessment year to which it related, and on a plain reading of the amended provisions of Sec. 271, it was clear that anyone who, filed an incorrect return after April, 1, 1964, was liable to be dealt with according to the amended provision regardless of the year to which the return related. In that case the assessment year was 1963-64 and a return was filed on October 13, 1964. It was held that the explanation which came into force on April 1, 1964, was applicable to the case. The same High Court in c. I. T. Lucknow v. Ram Achal Ram seqak (106 ITR. 144) hed that the crucial date for determining the applicability of the Explanation was the date of filing of the return and ast the return had been filed before the Explanation came into force, the case had to be dealt with without reference to the Explanation. The above principle is followed by the High Court of Allahabad in Addl. C. I. T. Lucknow v. Krishna Subh Karan (108 I. T. R. , 271) and in Addl. C. I. T. v. Jiwan Lal Shah (109 I. T. R. , 474 ). ( 17 ) IN cit Krrala v. India Sea Foods (109 ITR. The above principle is followed by the High Court of Allahabad in Addl. C. I. T. Lucknow v. Krishna Subh Karan (108 I. T. R. , 271) and in Addl. C. I. T. v. Jiwan Lal Shah (109 I. T. R. , 474 ). ( 17 ) IN cit Krrala v. India Sea Foods (109 ITR. 596) the High Court of Kerala, where the question for consideration was similar to the question before us, held that the Appellate Tribunal was not right in holding that the penalty imposable under Sec. 271 (1) (c) of the Act for the concealment of income was to be computed in accordance with the law as it stood on the first day of April of the assessment year to which the return related. In Addl. C. I. T. , Andhra Pradesh v. Medisetty Ramarao (108 I. T. R. 318), the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the law applicable to the mode or manner of levying penalty was the law which was in force as on the date of commission of offence or contravention of a particular provision of the statute and not as it stood as on the date of detection. The concealment of income under the Act should be deemed to have been committed on the date when the return was filed by the assessed concealing a particular income and that the law applicable for levy of penalty for; concealment of income under Sec. 271 (1) (c) was the law as, it stood when the return was filed by the assessee, and the date of satisfaction of the Income tax Officer or the Appellate Ast. Commissioner as to the concealment of income had no relevance for the levy of penalty. ( 18 ) IN Addl. C. I. T. , v. Dr. Khaja Khutabuddinkhan (1977 Tax Law reporter, 1266) the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that penalty had to be levied in the light of the law that existed at the time at which the offence came to be committed. Accordingly, where the assessee had filed the original return on 28-11-1968, it was held that the offence which attracted penalty was committed on 28-11-1968 and that penalty should be levied as per the provisions of Sec. 271 (1) (c) as was in force from 1-4-1968, even though the assessment year was 1967-68. Accordingly, where the assessee had filed the original return on 28-11-1968, it was held that the offence which attracted penalty was committed on 28-11-1968 and that penalty should be levied as per the provisions of Sec. 271 (1) (c) as was in force from 1-4-1968, even though the assessment year was 1967-68. ( 19 ) IN CIT v. Ramchand Kundanlal Saraf (98 ITR 474) the High Court of madhya Pradesh held that where the return had been filed before April 1, 1968, and it had been found that in the return the a sessee had concealed certain income, the penalty for such concealment of incomei would be leviable in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 271 of the Act as they stood prior to the amendment and not after the amendment, even where the penalty proceedings had been initiated after the amendment came into force. ( 20 ) TWO principles emerge from the foregoing decisions: (1) the act of concealment which attracts provisions ot Sec. 271 (1) (c) is committed on the date on which the return is filed, and (2) that the quantum of penalty imposable is governed by the law in force on the date on which the act of concealment takes place. It is also seen in some of the decisions referred to above that the case of C. A. Abraham and the case of Jain Bros have been distinguished and, are held to be not relevant for the purpose of determining the questions in issue. ( 21 ) WE have to notice at this stage a decision of the Orissa High Court in CIT , Orissa v. K. C. Beher (103 ITR 479 ). The assessment year in that case was 1960-61. The a sessee filed his return on August 23, 1965. The ito who made the assessment found that there was an undisclosed income of R 20,000 and initiated penalty proceedings under Sec. 271 (1) (c) of the Act. The question for consideration before the Court was whether the Explanation which was added to Sec. 271 (1) by the Finance Act, 1964, governed the determination of the liability of the assessee. The ito who made the assessment found that there was an undisclosed income of R 20,000 and initiated penalty proceedings under Sec. 271 (1) (c) of the Act. The question for consideration before the Court was whether the Explanation which was added to Sec. 271 (1) by the Finance Act, 1964, governed the determination of the liability of the assessee. The High court of Orisa held, following the decision in the case of Jain Bros, that as the assesment order had been made on December 20, 1965, and the ito could have satisfied himself that the amount constituted concealed income only by that date, the relevant law governing the imposition of penalty was the law in force as on December 20, 1965 and therefore, the explanation was attracted. The decision in this case apparently proceeds on the basis of the decision in the case of Jain Bros which, in our opinion for the reasons already given is not applicable to the case on hand. ( 22 ) ON a consideration of the submissions made before us and the deci sions referred to above, we are of the view that a concealment of income which attracts Sec. 271 (1) (c), in the absence of any other statutory provisions compelling the court to take a contrary view takes place when the return is filed and that the quantum of penalty imposable, in respect of such concealment would be the quantum of the penalty imposable under the relevant provisions of law as in force on the date on which the act of concealment is committed. It follows that the view taken by the tribunal that the quantum of penalty imposable under Sec. 271 (1) (c) would be the penalty which is imposable under the law in force at the commencement of the relevant assessment year to which the return related is erroneous. ( 23 ) IN these two cases the returns are actually filed after 1-4-68. The penalty that is leviable should therefore be in accordance with the law in force on the date on which the returns were filed i. e. the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 1968. The questions referred to us are answered accordingly. ( 24 ) IN ITRC No. 73 of 1974 Sri Srinivasan submitted that the Tribunal, in view of the decision rendered by it had not gone into the question of the extent of concealment. The questions referred to us are answered accordingly. ( 24 ) IN ITRC No. 73 of 1974 Sri Srinivasan submitted that the Tribunal, in view of the decision rendered by it had not gone into the question of the extent of concealment. This question has to be gone into by the Tribunal here after. --- *** --- .