JUDGMENT : K.C. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This is a tenant's writ petition filed against a judgment of the III Additional District Judge, Aligarh dated 26-8-1977 allowing an appeal of the landlords. 2. An application u/s 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by Sri Anand Bihari Lal, father of Respondents 2/2 to 2/5 and husband of Respondent No. 2/1. The application was founded on the allegations that Anand Bihari Lal had retired from service and that he was previously residing at Brindaban but since he had shifted permanently to Aligarh he wanted to live there with his family. He claimed that house No. 11/70 situated in Mohalla Jaiganj, Aligarh did not have sufficient accommodation and that his family members were facing a lot of difficulty. Anand Bihari Lal had also asserted that one of his sons, Gaur Chandra Sinha was a practising Advocate and a separate room was required for being used by him as his Chamber. The application was contested by the tenant. He denied that any additional accommodation was required by Anand Bihari Lal or his family members. He claimed that accommodation already in his possession was sufficient for his requirement. 3. The Prescribed Authority found that the need of the landlord was not bonafide and held that the accommodation in house No. 11/70 Mohalla Jaiganj was sufficient for the purposes of Anand Bihari Lal and his family members who were only 8 in number. 4. Against the aforesaid judgment, the landlord filed an appeal. During the pendency of this appeal Ahand Bihari Lal died. Thereafter, his heirs and legal representatives were impleaded as parties. The learned Additional District Judge held that the need of the landlords was genuine and allowed the application. Against the said order, the present writ petition was filed. 5. As already noted above, the application was filed by Anand Bihari Lal. On his death the application filed toy the deceased could be prosecuted by his heirs and legal representatives. Subsection (7) of Section 21 provides that if during the pendency of an application under Clause (a) of Section 21(1) the landlord dies, his legal representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such application and further on the basis of their own need in substitution of the deceased. 6. Subsection (7) of Section 21 provides that if during the pendency of an application under Clause (a) of Section 21(1) the landlord dies, his legal representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such application and further on the basis of their own need in substitution of the deceased. 6. In the present case, it is not known as to whether after the death of Anand Bihari Lal the application filed u/s 21(1)(a) was amended. The court below, however, considered the need of the family members of the deceased Anand Bihari Lal and having held that their need was genuine, allowed the application. It may be noted that Anand Bihari Lal had two sons viz. Gopal Chand and Brijesh Chand. Brijesh Chand was admittedly posted outside Aligarh. The Court below holding that the need of the family of Anand Bihari Lal was genuine took into account the need of Brijesh Chand. In taking into account the need of Brijesh Chand, he observed: "It is pointed out that one of the sons of Anand Bihari Lal is a Railway Engineer employed at Etawah and that his two sons live with him. It is added that this branch can have no necessity for residence at Aligarh. This argument does not stand to reason. When they are co-owners in house No. 11/70 they are entitled for 1/2 share. They are entitled to visit their ancestral place on the selected occasions. Consequently, they cannot be totally excluded while considering the need of accommodation." 7. The above observation would indicate that the learned Additional District Judge thought that as Brijesh Chand has 1/2 share in the property his requirement in the premises in question has to be released in his favour. What is required to be seen in proceedings u/s 21(1)(a) is whether a landlord filing an application requires the premises for his occupation. Merely because Brijesh Chand had a share in the property that could not be a ground for holding that he required the premises for his occupation. Brijesh Chand was posted outside Aligarh, accordingly, the court below committed an error in taking into account the need of Brijesh Chand and in holding on its basis that the premises in question was required by the heirs and the legal representatives of Anand Bihari Lal. Brijesh Chand was posted outside Aligarh, accordingly, the court below committed an error in taking into account the need of Brijesh Chand and in holding on its basis that the premises in question was required by the heirs and the legal representatives of Anand Bihari Lal. It may be true that Brijesh Chand might have been visiting his fathers' place but that would be only of a casual nature and that could not be the sole basis for holding that the need of the landlord was bonafide. For meeting the need of such a casual nature, the consideration would be different than one what is required to be taken into account when a premises is needed by a landlord for his permanent residence. The learned Additional District Judge should have maintained a distinction between the two types of user. That having not been done, the judgment of the District Judge is vitiated. 8. Another aspect of the matter which weighed greatly with the learned Additional District Judge was the requirement of the premises by Gaur Chand Sinha. Gaur Chand Sinha was practicing at Aligarh and the view of the court below was that a separate room was required for his use. It however, appears that subsequent to the decision of the appeal, Gaur Chand Sinha joined the U.P. Judicial service and that he no longer practices at Aligarh. Consequently, the need of Gaur Chand Sinha has extinguished. Therefore, the order of the Additional District Judge cannot be sustained on the ground as well. 9. Sri B.C. Kandpal, counsel appearing for the Respondents placed reliance on Section 12(1)(b) of the Act and urged that as the Petitioner had been transferred to Agra the premises would be deemed to be vacant and accordingly the principle of the aforesaid section should be applied to the facts of the present case as well. I am unable to subscribe to the submission made by the learned Counsel for the Respondents. A case of a 'deemed vacancy' stands on a footing different than the one where an application u/s 21 is filed by a landlord for eviction of a tenant. For succeeding in an application u/s 21(1)(a), a landlord is bound to prove that he bonafide requires the premises for his occupation. If he does not prove his requirement, then application will fail. For succeeding in an application u/s 21(1)(a), a landlord is bound to prove that he bonafide requires the premises for his occupation. If he does not prove his requirement, then application will fail. In considering the question of bonafide requirement, my view is that the fact that a tenant is liable to be evicted on the grounds stated in Section 12(1)(b) is not a proper and relevant consideration. If the landlord would have started proceedings u/s 12 read with Section 16, that would have been different. 10. Since I am remanding the case back to the District Judge for deciding the appeal afresh, it appears appropriate that the landlords be also permitted to bring fresh evidence on record to prove their need. 11. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the Additional District Judge dated 26-8-1977 is set aside and the case is sent back to him for deciding the appeal afresh. There shall be no order as to the costs.