JUDGMENT SATISH CHANDRA, C. J. 1. M/s. Raza Textiles Limited, Rampur was running a branch known as M/s. Jwala Fabrics Shankha where mosquote netting and hosiery goods were manufactured This branch was closed down with effect from 1st of July, 1967. Compensation as required to be paid under the Industrial Disputes Act was paid to the workmen. Nearly two years later, this branch was re-started. The Management of the concern issued notices requiring all the past workers to rejoin. As some of the ex-workmen were not reemployed, they raised an Industrial Dispute, which was referred by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal held that in the totality of circumstances, it seems that the employers have kept the workmen concerned out of employment without justification. It was also found that the workmen of a Factory which was closed down were also entitled to the benefit of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. On these findings the Company was directed to re-employ the workmen and to pay them compensation as mentioned in the award. 2. THE Company filed a writ petition in this Court. A learned single Judge held that Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act was not applicable to a case of closure. It was also found that it was not disputed between the parties that the closure of the branch in 1967 was genuine. On these findings the writ petition was allowed and the award of the Industrial Tribunal was quashed. Aggrieved, the workmen have now come up in appeal. The circumstances, in which Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act is applicable or otherwise has been the subject-matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in the case Anakapalle Corporative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v/s. Workmen and others(1963 6 FLR I=1950-67 4 SCLJ 2457= AIR 1963 SC 1489 ). Relying upon its earlier decision in Hari Prasad Shiv Shankar v. A.D. Divelkar (1950-67 6 SCLJ 36= AIR 1957 SC 121 ), the Court held that the word 'retrenchment' means the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicated by way of disciplinary action and does not include termination of services of all workmen on a bona fide closure of Industry. It is true that in that case the question arose on transfer of the business, but, in our opinion, it will equally apply to the closing down of the business because in both the situations the common factor is the termination of the services of all the employees or workmen together and not individually. Section 25-H when it gives preference to a retrenched workman indicates that preference will be available to those workmen who were retrenched individually. It does not seem to apply to a case where either because of transfer of business or closure the services of all the workmen are terminated. This is the only possible view because the definition of word 'retrenchment' occurring in Section 2-00 of the Act does not specifically include the case either of transfer of business or of a closure of an Industry. We are, however, satisfied that the decision of the Supreme Court is equally applicable to the case of a closure. In the writ petition Sri J. N. Tewari, appearing for the workmen, did not dispute that the closure of the branch in 1967 was genuine. We are hence unable to entertain the plea raised in the present appeal that the closure was mala fide with a view to get rid of certain workmen. 3. FOR the appellants reliance was placed upon State Bank of India v/s. Shri N. Sundara Money ( AIR 1976 SC 1111 ). That was not a case either of closure or of transfer. That was a case in respect of an individual workmen. That is a distinguishing feature. Reliance was placed upon Jagdish Majhi v/s. Bidi Mazdoor Union (1968 LIC 1543). There the finding was that the closure was mala fide but here the finding is that the closure was genuine. Similarly, the decision in The Management of Radio Foundation Engineering Ltd. and another v/s. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1970 Patna 295) is equally in applicable. There it was emphasized that closure means the closure of business and not pretentious closure. We, therefore, are not satisfied that the finding of the learned Single Judge that Section 25-H was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case is incorrect. 4. IT was then argued that the finding of the Tribunal was bassed upon a letter of the Labour Commissioner, which contained an admission of the Management. We, therefore, are not satisfied that the finding of the learned Single Judge that Section 25-H was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case is incorrect. 4. IT was then argued that the finding of the Tribunal was bassed upon a letter of the Labour Commissioner, which contained an admission of the Management. The learned single Judge has not set aside that finding and hence the award could not be interfered with. The submission is misconceived. In addition to the plea that section 25-H of the Act was not applicable, the Management, had taken the plea that the aggrieved workmen had never reported for duty before them. It was this plea which was negatived by the Tribunal inter alia on the basis of the Labour Commissioner's letter in which certain statements made on behalf of the employer were recorded. The ultimate finding was that in the totality of the circumstances it seems that the employers have kept the workmen concerned out of employment without justification and that their contention that the workmen did not approach the employers for re-employment was not acceptable. Therefore, there is no finding based on any admission which will sustain the award inspite of the setting aside of the finding on the legal question that Section 25-H of the Act was not applicable. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.