S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff filed the present suit against the defendant to recover a sum of Rs. 23 528 P. which consisted of the principal amount of Rs. 22 342 P. lent by the pontiff to defendant 1 firm and Rs. 1186- 35 P. as and by way of interest. Defendant 1 is the firm to which moneys were advanced by the plaintiff from time to time. Defendants 2 to 11 are the partners thereof. The suit was filed in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad as sum nary suit. After tale defendants entered their appearance in the suit the plaintiff took out a summons for judgment. At the hearing of the summons for judgment defendants 2 to 8 and 10 admitted the plaintiffs claim. Therefore decree on admission was passed against them. Defendants 1 9 and 11 contested tale suit. They were granted unconditional leave to defend the suit. In the written statement which they filed they raised three principal contentions. According to them the suit was barred by time defendants 2 to 8 and 10 had no authority to acknowledge the liability on behalf of defendant 1 firm and the suitdebt was not created for the business of diffident 1-firm. The learnedtrial Judge negatived the defence raised by the contesting defendants and passed in favour of the plaintiff decree for the entire amount. ( 2 ) IT is that decree which is challenged only by defendants 1 and 11 in this appeal. ( 3 ) THE first contention which has been raised by Mr. Amin who appears on behalf of the appealing defendants is that the plaintiffs claim Was barred by time. The accounts produced by the plaintiff (EXs. 81 82 83 84 and 85) show that the first amount which was advanced by the plaintiff to defendant 1-firm was on Bhadarva Vad 7 of Samwat Year 2013 which is equivalent to 16th September 1957. There are cash book entries at Exs. 76 77 78 79 and 80 which support the ledger entries Exs. 81 to 85. At Ex. 86 is the statement of account written down by defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1-firm at the end of Samwat Year 2015. It inter alia shows that a sum of Rs. 13 99. There are cash book entries at Exs. 76 77 78 79 and 80 which support the ledger entries Exs. 81 to 85. At Ex. 86 is the statement of account written down by defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1-firm at the end of Samwat Year 2015. It inter alia shows that a sum of Rs. 13 99. 08 P. was owed by defendant 1 to the plaintiff on Kartak Sud 1 of Samwat Year 2016 which is equivalent to 1st November 1959. At Ex. 87 is the statement of account written down by defendant 8 on behalf of the defendant 1-firm at the and of Samwat Year 2017. It inter alia shows that on Kartak Sud 1 of Samwat Year 2018 which is equivalent to 9th November 1961 a sum of Rs. 19 920 P. was due from defendant 1-firm. It was payable to the plaintiff. The transactions of money lending between the plaintiff and defendant 1 started on 16th September 1957. Defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1-firm by Ex. 86 acknowledged the liability of that firm in respect of the amount due and payable to the plaintiff on 1st November 1959. That acknowledgment was made within time. Therefor a fresh period of limitation started running from that date. The second acknowledgment was made on behalf of defendant 1 by defendant 8 on 9th November 1961. That acknowledgment was also made within the period of limitation from the last acknowledgment Ex. 86 A fresh period of limitation therefore started running from 9th November 1961. The present suit was filed on 3rd September 1964. Ex facie therefore the suit was filed within time. We may note that defendant 8 Chinubhai Sarabhai has in terms signed Ex. 86 and Ex. 87 on behalf of defendant 1-firm of Sarabhai Hathising. ( 4 ) MR. Amin has firstly tried to argue that Exs. 86 and 87 do not constitute the acknowledgments of liability. We are not impressed by that argument. Ex. 86 in terms states that a sum of Rs 13 99 P. was payable by defendant 1-firm to tale plaintiff. The Gujarati expression which has been used in Ex. 86 is Baki Deva. Similarly in Ex 87 it was stated on behalf of defendant firm that Rs. 19 920 P. were Baki Deva by defendant 1-firm to the plaintiff. Ex. 86 in terms states that a sum of Rs 13 99 P. was payable by defendant 1-firm to tale plaintiff. The Gujarati expression which has been used in Ex. 86 is Baki Deva. Similarly in Ex 87 it was stated on behalf of defendant firm that Rs. 19 920 P. were Baki Deva by defendant 1-firm to the plaintiff. We have no doubt in our mind that the expression Baki Deva constitutes an acknowledgment of liability. Literally translated it means the balance which is owed. Such an expression may not constitute a fresh promise to pay withal the manning of sec. 25 of the Contract Act and therefore if on the date on which the debt was acknowledged it was beyond time Exs. 86 or 87 probably would not have helped the plaintiff. In the instant case if they constitute the acknowledgments of liability they are sufficient for the plaintiff to establish his claim. We have no doubt in our mind that they certainly constitute an acknowledgment of liability. That the expression Baki Deva unequivocally constitutes an acknowledgment of liability is not required to be supported by any decision. The words themselves are clear enough. However the three decisions of the High Court of Bombay lend support to the view which we are expressing. ( 5 ) IN Amritlal Mansuk v. Maniklal Jetha and another 10 Bombay High Court Reports 375 Mr. Justice Melvill held that a Thamkhata written down by the defendant constituted an acknowledgment of liability. In Ranchhoddas Nathubhai and others v. Jeychand Khushalchand and another ILR (1884) 8 Bom. 405 the expression Baki Deva came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay. Chief Justice Sergeant delivering the opinion of the Court stated that the Gujarati words Baki Deva which are of common use in balancing accounts import no more than the English words balance due from which an unwritten contract may be inferred though they do not themselves amount to a written promise to pay. In Chunilal Ratanchand Gujarati v. Laxman Govind Dube 23 Bom L. R. 606 the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover a certain amount on Ruzukhata which was the account made up after taking into consideration the payments made and interest charged and signed by the defendant. A Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay consisting of Sir Normal Macleod Kt. Chief Justice and Mr. A Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay consisting of Sir Normal Macleod Kt. Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Shah took the view that through the Ruzukhata signed by the defendant constituted an acknowledgment of liability it did not constitute a fresh promise to pay. In the instant case we are not concerned with the plaintiffs right to recover a time barred debt by virtue of Exs. 86 and 87. The debt which defendant 1 incurred was very much within time when on behalf of defendant 1-firm defendant 8 wrote down and signed Ex. 86 and it was also within time when defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1 wrote down Ex. 87 and signed it. Therefore two statements of accounts Exs. 86 and 87 which clearly amount to acknowledgments of liability by defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1-firm save the present suit from bar of limitation. ( 6 ) THE second argument which has been raised by Mr. Amin is that Exs. 80 and 87 do not show the dates on which they were written and that therefore they cannot constitute the acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Sec. 19 of the repealed Limitation Act (Sec. 18 of tale new Limitation Act ). In 1959 and 1960 when Exs. 86 and 87 were written and signed on behalf of defendant 1-firm the repealed Limitation Act was in force. We may therefore usefully refer to sec. 19 thereof. sub-sec (1) thereof inter alia provided for the effect of acknowledgment in writing. sub-sec (2) on which Mr. Amin relied provided that where the writing containing the acknowledgment is indited oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. It has been argued by Mr. Amin that there is no oral evidence to show when Exs. 86 and 87 were written. The submission which he has made is quite correct. But in the instant case no oral evidence in this behalf necessary. Ex. 86 in terms mentions the date Kartak Sud 1 of Samwat Year 2016 which is equivalent to 1st of November 1959. Ex. 87 in terms shows Kartak Sud 1 of Samwat Year 2018 which is equivalent to 9th of November 1961. Indeed these two dates have been shown in Exs. Ex. 86 in terms mentions the date Kartak Sud 1 of Samwat Year 2016 which is equivalent to 1st of November 1959. Ex. 87 in terms shows Kartak Sud 1 of Samwat Year 2018 which is equivalent to 9th of November 1961. Indeed these two dates have been shown in Exs. 86 and 87 in the context of the dates on which the accounts shown in those two statements were made. In normal course of human behaviour these two statements could not have been written before those dates. They could have been written either on those two dates or on any subsequent dates. If we therefore take those very dates as the dates on which they were written and signed (they are the earliest dates which can be assumed in favour of the contesting defendants) we find that those two acknowledgments were made within time. ( 7 ) MR. Amin has however tried to argue that it is quite probable that Exs. 86 and 87 might not have been written and signed on the dates shown therein but might have been signed later and antedated. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out. Defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1-firm could have written and signal those amounts at a much later date and sent them to the plaintiff. It is equally possible that he might have written them after the original debt had become time barred. If that was so the claim made by the plaintiff would not survive the bar of limitation. However what Mr. Amin has submitted to us is a mere conjecture. It is nothing but a guesswork. The allegation that Exs. 86 and 87 were written long after the respective dates shown therein all were ante dated was required to be proved by the contesting defendants. The burden of proof lay squarely upon them. On behalf of tale contesting defendants defendant 11 Anubhai Sarabhai alone gave evidence. His deposition appears at Ex. 93. He has not stated anything in his evidence in this behalf. Therefore the argument which Mr. Amin has raised on behalf of the contesting defendants before us has no foundation whatsoever. He was trying to build up a castle in the air. Taking into account the contents of Exs. His deposition appears at Ex. 93. He has not stated anything in his evidence in this behalf. Therefore the argument which Mr. Amin has raised on behalf of the contesting defendants before us has no foundation whatsoever. He was trying to build up a castle in the air. Taking into account the contents of Exs. 86 and 87 we are of the opinion that they were written down and signed by defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1-firm on the dates shown in those two documents and that therefore there were valid and subsisting acknowledgments of debt on behalf of defendant 1-firm in favour of the plaintiff. He has in this connection invited our attention to the decision of the High Court of Madras in V. Adikesavel Naidu v. V. K. R. Krishnaswami Mudaliar and other (1965) 2 Madras Law Journal Reports 516. The learned single Judge who decided that case has observed that in cases where there is an acknowledgment of liability in writing but the date is not specified oral evidence may be given of the date when such acknowledgment was made. However he has further observed that it is for the plaintiff to make out that his claim is within time and it is for him to let in evidence to show that the acknowledgment was made within three years of the original date or the date of any subsequent acknowledgment. He has further observed that there is no presumption that in the absence of any evidence as to the exact date of the endorsement it should be taken as made within three years of the prior endorsement. What Mr. Amin has emphasised with reference to this decision is that the plaintiff must lead evidence to show the dates on which Exs. 86 and 87 were written and that those cannot be a presumption in favour of the plaintiff in that behalf. It is wrong to say that we are presuming in favour of the plaintiff the dates of those two documents. Indeed the plaintiff has not led any oral evidence on this asp ct but Exs. 86 and 87 themselves bear the dates which we are entitled to take into account. The first contention raised by Mr. Amin therefore fails and is rejected. Indeed the plaintiff has not led any oral evidence on this asp ct but Exs. 86 and 87 themselves bear the dates which we are entitled to take into account. The first contention raised by Mr. Amin therefore fails and is rejected. ( 8 ) THE next contention which he has raised is that defendant 8 who wrote and signed Exs 86 and 87 on behalf of defendant 1-firm had no authority to acknowledge the debt. The case of the contesting defendants on this aspect is much weaker. They have not produced in the Court the partnership deed. If they lead done so the document would have shown the authority of each of the partners of defendant 1-firm. In this context Mr. Amin has invited our attention to the averment made by the plaintiff in paragraph 5 of the plaint Ex. 1. They show that disputes had arisen amongst the partners of defendant 1-firm and that defendant In had filed Civil Suit No. 1080 of 1963 in the City Civil Court at Bombay for dissolution of partnership and for taking accounts of the partnership business. They further show that suit was stayed under sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act and that tale disputes between the parties were referred to tale arbitration of Shri G. A. Thakkar Advocate. These averment made by the plaintiff only show that the disputes had arisen between the partners of defendant 1-firm. They do not show that in 1959 and in 1961 when defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1-firm wrote down and signed Exs. 86 and 87 he had no authority to acknowledge the debt which defendant 1-firm. owed to the plaintiff. Sec. 18 of the Partnership Act provides that subject to the provisions of the said Act a partner i agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm. A firm always operates through its partners one or more. Each partner is the agent of the film Therefore a partner has got the authority to do all acts which are necessary to be done for the benefit of the partnership firm in portlier to keep its business running. Sec. 19 provides that subject to the provisions of sec. 22 the act of a partner which is done to carry on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by the firm binds the firm Sub-sec. Sec. 19 provides that subject to the provisions of sec. 22 the act of a partner which is done to carry on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by the firm binds the firm Sub-sec. (2) which lays down exceptions to the implied authority of a partner does not lay down that a partner cannot acknowledge the subsisting debt of the firm in favour of its creditor. It indeed inter alia provides that a partner cannot compromise or relinquish a claim or a portion of a claim be the firm. nor can he admit any liability in a suit or proceeding against the firm. Acknowledgment of the liability of defendant 1-firm in respect of subsisting debt made by defendant 8 on behalf of defendant 1-firm neither amounts to compromising or relinquishing a claim or a portionhereof nor does it amount to admission of any liability in a suit or proceeding as against the firm. the Exs. 8 and 87 were written and sighted long before the suit was filed. In our opinion. Therefor the contesting defendants have signally failed to show that defendant 8 had no authority to ackno- wledge on behalf of defendant 1-firm the subsisting debt in favour of the plaintiff. The law did not pr vent defendant 8 from doing it. The second contention which has been raised by Mr. Amin is therefore without any substance and is rejected. . . . . . . . . . . . [the rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] appeal dismissed. .