JUDGMENT.-The plaintiffs in O.S.No. 35 of 1964 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul are the appellants. The suit property is a house in Palani Town. It belonged to the father of the plaintiffs named Ramaswamy Iyer, having been purchased by him under a sale deed dated 7th July, 1919 (Ex.A.1). The said Ramaswamy Iyer leased out the southern portion of the suit house to the first defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.4. In or about 1940 the northern portion of the suit house was also leased out to the first defendant. He committed default in payment of the rents and, therefore, Ramaswamy Iyer instituted proceedings before the Rent Controller, who was at the relevant time the Sub-Collector, Dindigul, for eviction and obtained an order for eviction. That order was the subject of an appeal in C.M.A.No. 11 of 1951 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dindigul. The appeal was dismissed on 18th July, 1951. Ramaswamy Iyer thereafter applied under E.P.No. 520 of 1951 for obtaining delivery of possession in execution. At that time there was obstruction from one Pachiammal and her son, the second defendant. Ramaswamy Iyer was directed to file an application for removal of the obstruction. He, therefore, filed M.P.No. 514 of 1951, which was allowed on 13th March, 1952. Under the said order the delivery was to be effected by 9th April, 1952 after removing the obstruction of the second defendant and his mother. The second defendant and his mother filed O.S.No. 24 of 1952 on the file of the Sub-Court, Dindigul, to set aside the said order and declare their title to the property. The suit was dismissed with costs on 3rd March, 1953. The second defendant and his mother were thereafter not entitled to question the title of Ramaswamy Iyer. Ramaswamy Iyer filed E.P.No. 812 of 1952 in the Court of the District Munsif Palani, for delivery of possession. He, however, became unwell by the time the further proceedings could he taken and the execution petition itself -was dismissed on 6th June, 1953 for non-prosecution. Ramaswamy Iyer died on 29th January, 1954. He left behind his widow, the third plaintiff and his sons, plaintiffs 1 and 2. He, however, became unwell by the time the further proceedings could he taken and the execution petition itself -was dismissed on 6th June, 1953 for non-prosecution. Ramaswamy Iyer died on 29th January, 1954. He left behind his widow, the third plaintiff and his sons, plaintiffs 1 and 2. They brought the present suit alleging that the first defendant had trespassed into the suit property by about the end of 1954 and was thereafter residing therein with the assistance of the second defendant and his mother. 2. The first defendant filed a written statement,but thereafter remained ex parte. On his depth, the third defendant was brought on record. 3. The second defendant his written statement pointed out that the property was known as ‘Palkavadi Mattam’ founded by Kongu Vellalars of Kuthilupai village and belonged to that community. It was contended that Ramaswasmy Iyer, an influential person, had colluded with the first defendant to create false documents and that he never had possession of the suit property at any time. It was also contended that the present suit was barred by section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also by limitation. 4. The Court below went into the several issues framed in the suit and held that the plaintiffs or their predecessors not having been in possession of the suit property within 12 years prior to suit were not entitled to the relief of recovery of possession and that the claim was also barred by limitations. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, rejected the plea that the building belonged to Kongu Vellalar community. The plaintiffs have filed the appeal challenging the correctness of the conclusions that the suit was barred by limitation. The second defendant has filed a memorandum of cross-objections contesting the conclusions on the other issues. It is common ground that in case the plea of limitation is sustained then it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the cross-objections. It is, therefore, necessary to go into the question of limitation and then consider if necessary, the question raised in the cross-objections. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the suit was not barred by limitation, that in accordance with section 15, the period taken by the second defendant in the suit O.S. No. 24 of 1952 should be excluded and that,if so excluded, the suit will be within time. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the suit was not barred by limitation, that in accordance with section 15, the period taken by the second defendant in the suit O.S. No. 24 of 1952 should be excluded and that,if so excluded, the suit will be within time. The learned counsel for the respondents disputed these submissions and contended that when time began to run, there was no question of interruption, that section 15 of the limitation Act had no application and that the present suit was rightly held to be barred by limitation by the Court below. 6. The only question is whether section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies and whether the suit is within time. Section 15 (1) runs as follows:- “15 (1). In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order the day on which it was issued or made’ and the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.” In order that this provision could apply, the institution of any suit or execution application should have been stayed by injunction or order. If it had been so stayed the time of the continuance of the injunction or order will be excluded. In the present case the proceedings which are relied on to bring the case within the scope of section 15 of the Limitation Act, is O.S. No. 24 of 1952. It was filed on 21st March, 1952. It may be remembered that on I3th March, 1952, E.A.No. 514 of 1951, in E.P.No. 520 of 1951 was disposed of by the learned District Munsif of Palani. In the application there was a prayer for delivery of the property mentioned in the order of the Rent Controller, Dindigul after the removal of the obstruction offered by the second defendant and his mother. That application was allowed and delivery was ordered on 9th April, 1952. The second defendant in the present suit and his mother, who were the respondents to the said application were, however, referred to a civil suit to establish their title. It was in pursuance thereof they filed O.S. No. 24 of 1952. That application was allowed and delivery was ordered on 9th April, 1952. The second defendant in the present suit and his mother, who were the respondents to the said application were, however, referred to a civil suit to establish their title. It was in pursuance thereof they filed O.S. No. 24 of 1952. They filed also I.A.No. 118 of 1952 and there was an interim stay of E.P.No. 520 of 1951 on the same date viz.,2lst March, 1952. This interim stay was made absolute on 2nd August, 1952. On 3rd March, 1953, O.S. No. 24 of 1952 was disposed of. The claim put forward by the appellants is that the period between 13th March, 1952 and 3rd March, 1953 should be excluded under the provisions of section 15 of the Limitation Act. The prayer in the suit as well as in the application for stay was only in respect of the execution proceedings arising out of the order of the Rent. Controller, Dindigul in M.B.A. No. 112 of 1960 in which he had ordered the eviction of the defendants from the property. A reference to Exhibit A- 39 and A- 40 being the orders granting the interim stay and the order making it absolute respectively, will show that there was no injunction or order staying any suit. The prayer as regards the execution of the decree would not have stood in the way of the plaintiffs as the heirs of Ramaswamy Iyer raking necessary proceedings for declaration of title. The scope of section 15 has been anlaysed in several cases. It is enough to refer to a few of them. 7. In Mullapudi Satya Narayana Brahmam and other v. Maganti Seethayya1, there was a promissory note executed in favour of M. Seethayya on 5th September, 1918. The promisor filed a suit for declaration that it was obtained by fraud and undue influence and was not supported by consideration. The learned District Munsif upheld this contention and passed a decree as prayed for. On appeal this decree was reversed and the suit was dismissed. The appellate decree was passed in December, 1921. "Within three years of that decree the plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of the amount due under the promissory note. To get over the plea of limitation, as the suit had. On appeal this decree was reversed and the suit was dismissed. The appellate decree was passed in December, 1921. "Within three years of that decree the plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of the amount due under the promissory note. To get over the plea of limitation, as the suit had. been filed more than 3 years after the execution of the promissory note it was contended that the period of limitation must be considered to have been in suspension during the pendency of the suit by the promissor viz., 25th September, 1918, the date of the institution to 9th. December, 1921 the date of the appellate decree. There was, however, no prayer for an injunction in the suit by the promisor. The Court also had not granted any such injunction. It was held on these facts that the plaintiff was not entitled to a deduction of the period of the pendency of the earlier suit and that the present suit for recovery of the money due under the promissory note was barred. 8. In Narayan Jivangouda v. Puttabai2the Privy Council had to consider a case on the following facts. On 23rd February, 1970 the defendant in that case took possession of certain property claimed by the plaintiff as his own.. To establish his title, the defendant brought a suit against the plaintiff and obtained a temporary injunction of 25th November, 1920, restraining the plaintiff from obstructing his possession, which was later turned into a permanent injunction. The injunction was dissolved by the Privy Council on 10th November, 1932. On 25th November, 1932, the plaintiff sued to recover possession of the property and claimed to deduct from the period of limitation, the period from 25th November, 1920 to 10th November, 1932, under section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Privy Council speaking through Sir Madhavan Nair, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any deduction if time, under section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, because there was nothing in the injunction to support the contention of the plaintiff that he was prevented from instituting the suit for possession in 1920 or at any time before the expiry of the period of limitation, and that, therefore, the suit was barred by limitation. 9. This decision was applied by the Supreme Court in Sirajul Haq Khan and others v. The Sunni Central Board of Wakf, U.P. and others1. 9. This decision was applied by the Supreme Court in Sirajul Haq Khan and others v. The Sunni Central Board of Wakf, U.P. and others1. That was a case in which the Central Board of Wakf took into management certain properties of a Darga Sharif. On 18th October, 1946 three of the five members of the Managing Committee of the Darga Sherif, had brought the suit, out of which the appeal to the Supreme Court arose, for a declaration that the Darga properties did not constitute a Wakf. There was an earlier suit in which a decree had been passed against the trustees of the Darga Sherif. On 16th October, 1941. The decree directed the trustees not to interfere with the affairs of the Darga as members of the Committee. On appeal this decree was set aside on 7th March, 1946. Dealing with the plea relating to the exclusion of this period Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, observed at page 1302 as follows: “It is plain that, for excluding time under this section, it must be shown that the institution of the suit in question had been stayed by an injunction or order; in other words, the section requires an order or an injunction which stays the institution of the suit. And so in cases falling under section 15, the party instituting the suit would by such institution be in contempt of Court. If an express ‘order or injunction is produced by a party that clearly meets the requirements of section 15. Whether the requirements of section 15 would be satisfied by the production of an order or injunction which by necessary implication stays the institution of the suit is open to argument. We are, however, prepared to assume in the present case that section 15 would apply even to cases where the institution of the suit is stayed by necessary implication of the order passed or injunction issued in the previous litigation. But, in our opinion, there would be no justification for extending the application if the subsequent suit would be inconsistent with the spirit or substance of the order passed in the previous litigation. But, in our opinion, there would be no justification for extending the application if the subsequent suit would be inconsistent with the spirit or substance of the order passed in the previous litigation. It is true that rules of limitation are to some extent arbitrary and may frequently lead to hardship, but there can be no doubt that, in construing provisions of limitation, equitable considerations are immaterial and irrelevant, and in applying them effect must be given to the strict grammatical meaning of the words used by them Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey2.” There is also a later decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnappa Chettiar and others v. Nachiappa Chettiar and others3. That was a case in which an execution petition was not filed because of certain composition proceedings which were going on for a period of three years. The question was whether section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act would apply so as to exclude the time taken under the composition proceedings. It was held that section 15 was restricted in its application to a case where the execution of a decree had been stayed by an injunction or an order, that the Limitation Act was a piece of adjective or procedural law and not of substantive law and that the rules of procedure could not be extended by analogy or reference to proceedings to which they did not expressly apply. 10. The result of these authorities is to establish that in order to apply section 15 there must be an injunction or an order staying the execution of the suit. Having regard to Exhibits A-39 and A-40 on the facts herein, there was absolutely no such injunction against the filing of any suit. The plaintiffs could have taken their own proceedings for declaration of their title to the property. They did not do so. The stay granted as against the execution proceedings in the eviction matter cannot have the effect of staying any such suit. The test in such cases is whether if a party filed a suit, he would be in contempt of Court. There was no such likelihood in the present case. The plaintiff cannot also contend that any suit if filed would only be infructuous or futile in the face of the proceedings in O.S. No. 24 of 1952. The test in such cases is whether if a party filed a suit, he would be in contempt of Court. There was no such likelihood in the present case. The plaintiff cannot also contend that any suit if filed would only be infructuous or futile in the face of the proceedings in O.S. No. 24 of 1952. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Narayan Jivangouda v. Puttabai1, the institution of a suit can never be said to be futile, if it would thereby prevent the running of limitation. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that it was not obligatory on him to file such a suit as against the second defendant, who had no title to the property. He relied for this purpose on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hanuman Pershad v. Roop Narain and another2. In that case a suit was filed by a landlord against his tenant in 1941. The sub-tenant was also impleaded. The suit was for arrears of rent. The tenant denied that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the plaintiff. The sub-tenant claimed that he had been in adverse possession for a long time and that neither the plaintiff nor the tenant had anything to do with it. The suit was ultimately decreed in 1943. A decree for arrears of rent was passed against the tenant. There was no decree as against the sub-tenant on the ground that he was in occupation only with the permission of the tenant. The tenant himself was paying the rent upto 1963 when the landlord filed an ejection suit for non-payment of the rent against the tenant. In execution, the landlord sought to eject the sub-tenant, who had all along been claiming adverse title. Subsequently the sub-tenant filed a suit for a declaration that he was the owner of the house in dispute by adverse possession. It was held that the possession of the sub-tenant was not adverse to the landlord merely because of the landlord’s failure to bring a suit for eviction against the sub-tenant or the licensee. It was held that there was no obligation on the landlord to file a suit after he had obtained a decree against the tenant and the tenant started paying rent and the licensee acceded and allowed the rent being paid. It was held that there was no obligation on the landlord to file a suit after he had obtained a decree against the tenant and the tenant started paying rent and the licensee acceded and allowed the rent being paid. In that case the subtenant was none other than the brother of the tenant. It was held that it was impossible to believe that the sub-tenant did not know that the tenant was paying the rent. It is difficult to find any relevance of this citation to the case on hand. The second defendant in the present case and his mother were not claiming any interest through the first defendant, though there were some allegations that the mother of the second defendant was a concubine of the first defendant and that the second defendant and his mother had been set up by the first defendant. Still there is no evidence in these proceedings to show that they derived any title from the first defendant. They are not in the position of subtenants or licensees from the first defendant. They had been putting forward their own claims to this property on behalf of Kongu Vellalar community. On these facts the Supreme Court’s decision cited above has no application. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants drew my attention to a decision in Md. Abdul Kadar v. Md. Thassin Md. Mustaffa3. It was pronounced in that case that it was open to an auction-purchaser to file any number of applications for delivery of property and the fact that one application under Order 21, and rule 95 became infructuous or was dismissed owing to his failure to apply under Order 21, rule 97, Civil Procedure Code, within limitation for removal of the obstruction caused by some person, was not a bar to the maintainability of another application for delivery. This is not a case where there is any question as to whether successive applications for delivery of possession could be made. The present question is whether the suit is within the period of limitation. 13. It is axiomatic that the period of limitation once it has started running is not interrupted. In the present case there was an assertion of hostile title by the second defendant and his mother even in the year 1951 when they set up title adverse to Ramasamy Iyer. 13. It is axiomatic that the period of limitation once it has started running is not interrupted. In the present case there was an assertion of hostile title by the second defendant and his mother even in the year 1951 when they set up title adverse to Ramasamy Iyer. Thus, the assertion of hostile title would start from that time. On 13th March, 1952 an order was passed directing them to deliver possession. At any rate, from that date if not from 1951, they could not remain in the property with any sembalance of any right. Their possession since then was adverse. The present suit has been filed only on 20th March, 1964. Either computed from 1951 or from 13th March, 1952, the present suit is beyond the period of limitation. The Court below acted rightly in dismissing the suit. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on a Full Bench decision in Thondam Annamalai Mudali v. Tiruttani Ramasami Mudali and others1. In execution of a money decree certain immovable property was attached on 18th September, 1921. On 26th September, 1921, the judgment debtor’s widow sold the property. On 7th January, 1922, the property was sold in execution proceedings and a stranger became the auction-purchaser. On 1st March, 1932, the stranger, auction purchaser, filed a suit for possession. The suit was resisted by the purchaser from the judgment-debtor’s widow, who contended that section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was a bar to the institution of the suit. It was held that the stranger who purchased the property at the Court auction held in execution of a money decree was not a representative of the decree-holder. It was pointed out that a stranger who purchased the property at a Court auction was not entitled to apply for possession as against the judgment-debtor or his representative in interest under section 47 and that when the judgment-debtor or any one at his instigation resisted or obstructed the auction-purchaser, the auction-purchaser must proceed in accordance with the provisions of Order 21, rule 97. It was also held that the aggrieved party’s remedy in such a case was by way of suit. That principle would apply only to cases where the obstruction is from the judgment-debtor or anyone at his instigation. This is not such a case, as the second defendant set up title on behalf of a third party. It was also held that the aggrieved party’s remedy in such a case was by way of suit. That principle would apply only to cases where the obstruction is from the judgment-debtor or anyone at his instigation. This is not such a case, as the second defendant set up title on behalf of a third party. The question whether the plaintiffs could have proceeded under Order 21, rule 97 is also irrelevant, as I am now concerned only with a suit and not any application under Order 21, rule 97. If the plaintiffs could file a suit now, they could have filed it in time. This contention is wholly alien to the question of limitation. It is unnecessary to go into these aspects further. In this view it is unnecessary to go also into the memorandum of cross-objections. 15. The appeal is dismissed. The memorandum of cross-objections is also dismissed. No order as to costs, in both.