Judgment NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, J. 1. The Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter to be referred to as the Board) and the State of Bihar are the appellants in this appeal which has been filed for setting aside a judgement and decree passed by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellants. The suit in question had been filed on their behalf against the sole defendant for realisation of Rs. 41,446.37 paise. 2. According to the case of the plaintiffs, the defendant, which is M/s. Gaya Cotton Jute Mills Ltd. (hereinafter to be referred to as the Mills), had a power house for supplying electricity. By a registered deed of lease-cum-mortgage dated 14-12-1951 (Ext. 5) the said Power House was taken over by the State Government, but it was agreed that it shall be run by the State Government and the electric energy required will be supplied to the Mills on payment of usual charges for which bills shall be presented by the State Government to the Mills in question from time to time. In clause 6 of the said deed, it had been agreed that, "bills will be presented on behalf of the State Government from month to month for energy supplied to the company and the amount covered by bills so presented shall be paid by the company within three months of presentation and in case of non-payment within the said period the company will be liable to pay interest at the rate of (six) per cent (per) annum, "over the current due......". The said clause further provided that if the entire amount of dues under different bills remained unpaid for a period of six months, then it shall be realised as a public demand by process of law and the State Government will be at liberty to take action under the provisions of Indian Electricity Act, 1910. It is the case of the plaintiffs that bills were presented from time to time and payments were also made by the Mills, but, later it was discovered that by mistake bills for incorrect amounts had been presented, and, as such, later a corrected revised bill was presented to the Company for Rupees 27,683/8/6 paise. It is the case of the plaintiffs that bills were presented from time to time and payments were also made by the Mills, but, later it was discovered that by mistake bills for incorrect amounts had been presented, and, as such, later a corrected revised bill was presented to the Company for Rupees 27,683/8/6 paise. The Mills, however, did not pay the said amount, giving case of action to the plaintiffs to file the suit in question for realisation of the aforesaid amount along with the interest till the date of suit, which comes to Rs. 41,446.37 paise. 3. The defendant-Mill disputed its liability to pay the said amount on several grounds, including that the said claim was barred by limitation. It was also asserted on its behalf that whatever bill was presented on behalf of the State Government from time to time had been paid by it and there was no occasion to submit a revised bill after a lapse of several years. 4. In support of the respective stands taken by the parties, oral and documentary evidence were adduced. Learned Additional Subordinate Judge, however, was of the opinion that the suit in question having been filed on 27-9-1962 in respect of the dues which were payable for the period between June 1950 to February 1955, was barred by limitation. He was also of the view that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that any such amount was due from the Mill. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid findings, the two appellants have challenged them before this Court. 5. Before I discuss the merit of the respective contentions, I may point out that in the agreement, referred to above, regarding taking over of the Power House belonging to the Mill, it was agreed to supply the electric energy to the Mill on payment of the charges for such supply. This agreement was entered into between the State Government and the Mill in question. Later, in accordance with Sec. 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Electricity Act), the Bihar State Electricity Board was constituted on 1-4-1958. This agreement was entered into between the State Government and the Mill in question. Later, in accordance with Sec. 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Electricity Act), the Bihar State Electricity Board was constituted on 1-4-1958. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 60 of the Electricity Act is as follows :- "All debts and obligations incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done by, with or for the State Government for any of the purposes of this Act before the first constitution of the Board shall be deemed to have been incurred, entered into or engaged to be done by, with or for the Board; and all suits or other legal proceedings instituted or which might but for the issue of the notification under Sub-Sec. (4) of Sec.1 have been instituted by or against the State Government may be continued or instituted by or against the Board." Sub-Section (4) of Sec.1 of the Electricity Act, which has been referred to in Sec. 60(1) authorises the different State Governments to notify different dates when the Act in question shall come in force. The effect of Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 60 is that after the Board was constituted, the debts which could have been realised by the State Government has to be realised by the Board. Perhaps, that is the reason that the suit in question was filed on behalf of the State Government as well as on behalf of the Board. The Board is a statutory corporate body and it has its own legal entity and in that sense it is neither an agent nor a Department of the State Government. Learned Additional Subordinate Judge, while holding that the suit in question was barred by limitation, pointed out that if the amount in question can be realised by the State Government, then the suit is not barred by limitation because under Article 149 of Limitation Act, 1908 , a period of 60 years has been provided for any suit by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government. He further pointed out that if it is held that in view of Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 60, on and after 1-4-1958 only the Board can file a suit for realisation of the dues in question, then the benefit of aforesaid Article 149 is not available to the Board because it is a statutory body and in such a suit the Board will not be deemed to be agent of the State Government; for Board, Article 116 of the old Limitation Act may be applicable which prescribes a period of six years only which had expired before the suit in question was filed. According to the learned Subordinate Judge, the State Government had no locus standi to file the suit in question and the suit on behalf of the Board was barred by limitation. Learned counsel appearing for the Board, in view of Sec. 60(1) of the Electricity Act, could not urge that even after the constitution of the Board, it was open to the State Government to file a suit for realisation of any amount which was due to it. From a plain reading of that Section it is apparent that after the constitution of the Board, it is the Board which is entitled to realise any dues which may be payable to the State Government in respect of the energy supplied by it to different consumers prior to the constitution of the Board. As such, I am also of the view, that the State Government had no locus standi to institute the suit in question, and in that view of the matter, there is no question of applicability of Article 149 of the Limitation Act. 6. Now the question is as to whether the Board can realise the amount aforesaid. Learned counsel appearing for the Board made a vain attempt to submit that Article 149 of the Limitation Act will also be applicable to the Board. This cannot be accepted because the Board being a statutory authority can by no stretch of imagination be held either an agent of the State Government or a department of the Government. Any such suit filed on its behalf has to be treated as a suit filed on behalf of any other person and the provisions of Limitation Act applicable to persons other than State Government, are applicable. Any such suit filed on its behalf has to be treated as a suit filed on behalf of any other person and the provisions of Limitation Act applicable to persons other than State Government, are applicable. As such, the suit should have been filed within six years from the date when the amounts became due. I have already pointed out that the amounts which are being claimed on behalf of the Board were payable during the period June, 1950 up to February, 1955. The six years period expired some time in February, 1961. The result is that when the suit was filed on 27-9-1962, the claim had become barred. 7. However, in the year 1966, by Act 30 of 1966, the Electricity (Supply) Act was amended. Apart from other amendments, a new Sec. 60-A was added, which is as follows :- "60A. Where the right to recover any amount due to the State Government for or in connection with the consumption of electricity is vested in the Board and the period of limitation to enforce such right has expired before the constitution of the Board, or within three years of its constitution, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or any other law for the time being in force relating to limitation of action, the Board may institute a suit for the recovery of such amount - (i) where it has been constituted before the commencement of the Electricity (Supply) Amendment Act, 1966, within three years of such commencement; and (ii) where it has been constituted after such commencement, within three years of its constitution." This Section provides that where the period of limitation to enforce the right to recover any amount due to the State Government has expired before constitution of the Board or within three pears of its constitution then notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, the Board may institute a suit for recovery of such amount within three years of the commencement of the aforesaid Amending Act. In other words, if any claim or amount became barred by limitation within three years of the constitution of the Board, then in view of clause (i) of Sec. 60-A, the suit could be instituted within three years of the coming into force of the aforesaid Amending Act (Act 30 of 1966). The relevant provision of this Act came in force sometime in September, 1966. The relevant provision of this Act came in force sometime in September, 1966. According to the Board, after the introduction of Sec. 60-A, a suit for realisation of any amount can be filed within three years from September, 1966, even in respect of claims which were barred by limitation within three years of the constitution of the Board, i.e., within three years from 1-4-1958. In the present case, admittedly the claim was barred in respect of the amount in question on different dates between 1st April, 1958 and February, 1961, which will be within three years of the constitution of the Board, as required by Sec. 60-A, then the suit in respect of such barred claims could have been filed within three years from September, 1966. Learned Subordinate Judge, however, has taken the view that S.60-A cannot revive the right of the Board to recover the amount in question which had been barred by limitation before the aforesaid Section came in force so as to affect the right of the defendant will retrospectively. In my opinion, learned Subordinate Judge has not appreciated the scope of the retrospective legislation. Sec. 60-A has a non obstante clause which means notwithstanding anything in the Limitation Act the said Section has to prevail; this is the command of the Parliament which has ample power to pass a retrospective legislation so as to affect even rights of the parties which had become final under the then existing law. Reference in this connection may be made to an observation of Chagla C.J. (as he then was) in the case of Abdul Majid Haji Mahomed V/s. P.R. Nayak, AIR 1951 Bom 440 where it was observed in connection with an Ordinance which was brought in force and which Purported to affect certain rights which had become final. It was observed (at p. 447) :- "The language used in Sec. 58 is both striking and significant. It does not merely provide that the orders passed under the Ordinance shall be deemed to be orders passed under the Act, but it provides that the orders passed under the Ordinance shall be deemed to be orders under this Act as if this Act were in force on the day on which certain things were done or action was taken. Therefore the object of this Section is, as it were, to antedate this Act so as to bring it into force on the day on which a particular order was passed which is being challenged." In the case of State of Bombay V/s. Pandurang Vinayak, AIR 1953 SC 244 it was observed in connection with a deeming clause :- "When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion." Reference was also made to oft-quoted observation of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. V/s. Finsbury Borough Council, (1952) AC 109 :- "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it......... The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle, when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." The powers of Parliament to affect rights which have attained finality have always been recognised, except if it is found to be ultra vires for some other reasons. I am of the opinion that in view of the language of Sec. 60-A itself it is difficult to hold that suits in respect of claims which had become barred cannot be instituted thereafter. The purpose of Sec. 60-A itself appears to give a new lease of life to such suits which other vise would not have been entertained. In view of this new provision, it was open to the Board to file suit for realisation of the amounts in question within three years from the coming into force of the said Amending Act. If this is the legal position, then I am not able to appreciate as to how merely because the suit was pending when the said Amending Act came into force, the benefit of that provision shall not be available to the Board. If this is the legal position, then I am not able to appreciate as to how merely because the suit was pending when the said Amending Act came into force, the benefit of that provision shall not be available to the Board. It was urged on behalf of the defendant-Mill that if the suit would have been taken up for hearing some day prior to September, 1966, then, in usual course, it would have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. That is a different matter. But, once it remained pending and Sec. 60-A extended the period of limitation for such suits, in my opinion, it cannot be held that benefit of this Section is not available to the plaintiffs who had instituted the suit prior to coming into force of Sec. 60-A. It is just a consequence of retrospective provision under Sec. 60-A, and while deciding this, the court should not allow ones imagination to boggle. Accordingly, I hold that the suit, which was filed on behalf of the Board, will not be deemed to be barred by limitation. 8. This takes me to the next question as to whether the Board has been able to substantiate its claim. I have already pointed out that the learned Subordinate Judge has recorded a finding against the Board on this issue. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has placed different materials on the record. From the plaint itself it appears that the defendant has made payments in respect of bills which had been presented to it from time to time. The claim, which is in dispute, was made several years after, on the basis, that the bills had been submitted for lesser amounts due to mistake. In what respect this mistake had occurred is not clear from the records of the case. In this connection I may refer to a letter dated 8-8-1960 (Ext. 3/a) addressed by the Board to the defendant before institution of the suit. While saying that an amount of Rs. 27,683/8/6 was outstanding and payable by the Mill on account of energy charges, it has not been mentioned as to under what head that amount was due. In that connection only this was mentioned :- "The difference is due to wrong method and principles adopted by the company in calculating and fixing actual cost of production." In my opinion, this is absolutely vague. In that connection only this was mentioned :- "The difference is due to wrong method and principles adopted by the company in calculating and fixing actual cost of production." In my opinion, this is absolutely vague. Even at the trial, the witnesses, who have been examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, have simply proved certain accounts. Even the original account books and papers were not before the court. Learned Subordinate Judge has painted out that from the evidence of those witnesses, it is not clear as to why the amount claimed for, remained unpaid. Learned counsel who appeared before us for the appellants also could not explain the exact nature of the demand and as to how this mistake was discovered after several years. He conceded that this could have been explained by an Electrical Officer whose services are not available for the present. In such a situation, I find it difficult to reverse the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on this issue. The initial onus of proving the claim made on behalf of the plaintiffs was on them. The onus will be all the more heavy on them because admittedly the defendant has made payments in respect of the bills which had been submitted to it from time to time. This amount is said to be due in respect of which demand could not be made earlier. In such a situation, the board was required to substantiate its claim to the satisfaction of the court which they have failed to do. Apart from that I have not been able to appreciate as to how this claim is being made after several years, in view of the specific condition regarding the adjustment of accounts made in the aforesaid deed of lease-cum mortgage (Ext. 5), the relevant portion of which is as follows :- "Adjustment of accounts, and on account of the bills payable by the company for energy supplied as above on the basis of actual cost of production and administration and supervision charges as aforesaid shall be paid in each year as soon as the cost of production for the previous year is actually worked out and difference, if any, shall be adjusted in accounts by the State Government in the following year by debit or credit, as the case may be. And difference arising about working or fixing of actual cost of production as aforesaid shall be arbitrated by an Electrical Officer serving under the Union Government of India whose service may be spared by the Union Government at the request of either party." According to this term, a period was fixed within which the accounts had to be adjusted. If there was any difference on that account, such dispute had to be referred to the named Arbitrator for arbitration. The State Government or the Board should have adjusted the accounts each year as soon as the cost of production for previous year is actually worked out and difference, if any, should have been adjusted in accounts by the State Government in the following year by debit or credit. Learned counsel could not point out as to why such step was not taken. Any way, as I have already held above, the claim having not been substantiated, the Board is not entitled to the decree prayed for. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. B.P.JHA, J. 10 I agree with the judgement of my learned Brother. The simple question in this case is : Whether the Board can submit a revised bill of Rs. 27,683/8/6 pies after a lapse of so many years. The answer must be given in the negative in view of clause 6 of the lease-cum-mortgage bond, dated 14-12 -1951 (Ext. 5), Clause 6 of the lease-cum-mortgage bond clearly prescribes the mode of presentation of the bills and the way in which payment is to be made by the defendant-Mill. In view of the fact that there is no clause in the mortgage bond to furnish a revised bill, and as such it is contrary to Cl.6 of the mortgage bond. Hence, I hold that on this ground the suit of the Board must be dismissed.