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1978 DIGILAW 1040 (ALL)

Rahim Uddin v. Ramzano

1978-10-27

K.N.SINGH

body1978
JUDGMENT K. N. Singh, J. This is defendant's revision under section 115 C. P. C. against the judgment and decree of the courts below decreeing the plaintiff opposite party's suit for defendants ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. On the findings recorded by the courts below, it is clear that the defendant was tenant in a building of which plaintiffopposite party is the landlord. The defendant executed a rent note in favour of the plaintiffopposite party undertaking to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 47.50 per mensem. In the rent at the rate note, the defendant admitted that the building in question was constructed in 1969. Relying upon the rent note executed by the defendant, the courts below rejected the defendant's contention that the building was a very old construction and that the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable to the same. On these findings, the plaintiff's suit was decreed. Hence this revision. Learned counsel for the defendant urged that under section 20 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of the 1972 a restriction has been raised on the right of the landlord to file a suit for ejectment of tenant. The plaintiff could not file a suit unless he proved, to the satisfaction of the court, that the building in question was not subject to the provisions of the Act. It is contended that the burden to prove that the period of 10 years had not expired from the date of the construction of the shop squarely lay on the plaintiff and not on the defendant and since the plaintiffopposite party failed to produce evidence as contemplated by Explanation to section 2(2) of the Act, the plaintiff's suit was liable to be dismissed. The courts below exceeded their jurisdiction in decreeing the plaintiffopposite party's suit. This question relating to burden of proof was neither raised before the revisional court nor before this court in the memorandum of revision. During the course of argument, this question has been raised for the first time but even otherwise I have considered the question, but I find no merit in the contention. Under the general law, it is always open to a landlord to determine tenancy of a lessee and file suit for his ejectment. During the course of argument, this question has been raised for the first time but even otherwise I have considered the question, but I find no merit in the contention. Under the general law, it is always open to a landlord to determine tenancy of a lessee and file suit for his ejectment. The Rent Control Legislation as contained in the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 and the U. P. Urban Buildings (Ragulation of Rent, Letting and Eviction) Act, 1972 have placed restrictions on the landlords right to file suit for ejectment of a tenant. The landlord has no unrestricted right to eject a tenant. The provisions contained in the said Acts are intended to protect a tenant from eviction. Those provisions do not constitute a general law applicable to all the building let out by the landlords to the tenants. Sections land 2 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are applicable to the buildings situate within urban area if the provisions of the Act is made applicable to those areas under notification issued by the State Government. Further, no building situate in an urban area is subject to the provisions of the Act if 10 years have not elapsed from the date of construction of the building. Section 20(1) lays down that no suit for eviction of a tenant shall be filed except on the grounds mentioned in section 20(2) of the Act,. These provisions are designed to protect a tenant from ejectment. If a landlord filed a suit for ejectment against a tenant and if latter claims benefit of section 20(4) of the Act, on the ground that he has deposited the entire rent and other amounts due from him and that he has absolved himself from the liability of ejectment, the material question which would arise for the court to decide is whether the tenant is entitled to claim protection of section 20(4) of the Act. In such a case burden lay on the tenant to prove that he is entitled to the protection of section 20(4) of the Act. The question of burden proof should be decided on principle that if no evidence is produced in support of the assertion made by the party concerned, who would fail. Burden would lie on that party who may have been making that assertoin. The question of burden proof should be decided on principle that if no evidence is produced in support of the assertion made by the party concerned, who would fail. Burden would lie on that party who may have been making that assertoin. In the instant case, defendanttenant claimed benefit of protection of section 20(4) of the Act and if no evidence was produced his assertion was bound to fail. Therefore, burden lay on the defendant to prove that the building in question was subject to the provisions of the Act. In the circumstances, I find no merit in the defendant's contention that the court below committed error of jurisdiction in decreeing the plaintiff's suit. Learned counsel then urged that in his testimony before the trial court, the plaintiffopposite party had admitted that the shop in question had been constructed 17 or 18 years ago at the time when mosque was constructed. On a perusal of the statement of the plaintiffopposite party I find that no such admission was made. If the plaintiff's entire statement is read, it would be clear that he asserted that the mosque had been constructed 1.7 or 18 years ago while the building in dispute was constructed 7 or 8 years thereafter. There was no admission made by the opposite party as suggested by the learned counsel. The finding recorded by the courts below clearly show that the defendant was not entitled to the protection of section 20(4) of the Act as the building in question was not subject to the provisions of the Act when the suit was filed. In the result, revision fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Interim order shall stand discharged.