JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J. - These appeals arise out of the judgment and decrees dated 22nd of December, 1973, passed by the Civil and Sessions Judge, Basti. 2. The facts giving rise to these appeals, briefly stated are as under :- Rai Madhusudan Das and Rai Devindra Prasad were originally owners of the building situate in Gandhi Nagar Basti, which included six shops and one residential quarter. Akbar Ali, respondent, was tenant of shop no. 453 on a rental of Rs. 6/- per mensem, Trilok Singh, respondent, was tenant of shop no. 455 on a rental of Rs. 8/- per mensem. Zuber Ahmad was tenant of shop no. 457 on a rental of Rs. 6/- per mensem, Izhar Ali, respondent was tenant of shop no. 458 on a rental of Rs. 10/- per mensem and Jagdish Prasad was tenant of shop no. 459 on a rental of Rs. 8/- per mensem. Ram Naresh Singh, plaintiff-appellant no. 1, purchased the entire property consisting of the aforesaid shop from Madhusudan Das and Rai Devindra Prasad through a sale deed dated 16 December, 1961, and, thereafter, the aforesaid respondents began to pay rent to him. Sometime later, by an agreement between Ram Naresh Singh plaintiff-appellant No. 2, and the respondents the rent of the aforesaid shops were raised to Rs. 30/- per mensem with effect from 1.1.1963. Thereafter, plaintiff-appellant No. 2 obtained permission from the District Magistrate under Section 3 of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 to file suits for eviction of the respondents. In these proceedings the respondents denied the title of the plaintiff-appellant No. 2. Thereafter plaintiff-appellant No. 2 served a notice on the respondents demanding payment of arrears of rent and terminating their tenancy. The respondents not having complied with the aforesaid notice, plaintiff-appellant no. 2, along with Lal Devesh Bahadur Pal, plaintiff-appellant No. 1, filed suits for the eviction of the respondents and for recovery of arrears of rent. In the suits filed against Izhar Ali and Trilok Singh it was also alleged that they bad sub-let the premises in their tenancy to Ram Dhani and Iqbal Ahmad respectively. The suits so filed were Original Suit Nos. 412, 413, 414, 415 416 of 1966. 3. In the suits filed against Izhar Ali and Trilok Singh it was also alleged that they bad sub-let the premises in their tenancy to Ram Dhani and Iqbal Ahmad respectively. The suits so filed were Original Suit Nos. 412, 413, 414, 415 416 of 1966. 3. In the written statements filed by the respondents it was pleaded that the plaintiff appellants were not the owner landlords of the accommodation in their tenancy ; that the sale deed dated 16.12.1961 executed by Madhusudan Dass and Devindra Prasad in favour of plaintiff no. 2 was null and void as the property in question was endowed property ; that the respondents never accepted the plaintiff-appellant No. 2 as their landlord nor they ever agreed to the rent being enhanced to Rs. 30/- per mensem ; that the notices under Section 106 read with Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act were invalid; that the suit was bad for non-joinder of Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Davindra Prasad and that in any case the respondents were not in arrears of rent as they had deposited the amount outstanding against them in court under Section 7-C of the U.P. Act No. III of 1947. The allegation regarding sub-letting was denied by Izhar Ali and Trilok Singh, respondents. 4. The trial court consolidated all the five suits and disposed them of by a common judgment dated 23rd January, 1969. It was held by the trial Court that the rent of the accommodations in dispute was never Rs. 30/- per mensem, that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, that the respondents tenancy stood forfeited under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. In consequence of the last mentioned two conclusions the trial court decreed all the suits. 5. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment and decrees passed by the trial court, the defendant-respondents filed appeals in the court of the District Judge, Basti. At this stage plaintiff-appellant No. 1 moved an application for amendment which was allowed. The respondents then filed additional written statements and some additional issues were consequently remitted to the lower court for its findings in answer to those issues. The trial court held that Paras Nath Ji was a necessary party in the earlier suit no. At this stage plaintiff-appellant No. 1 moved an application for amendment which was allowed. The respondents then filed additional written statements and some additional issues were consequently remitted to the lower court for its findings in answer to those issues. The trial court held that Paras Nath Ji was a necessary party in the earlier suit no. 29 of 1960 of the court of the Civil Judge, Gorakhpur ; that Rai Madhusudan Dass had no authority to admit the plaintiffs claim in that suit; that the appointment of guardian of Paras Nath Ji was necessary under the law in suit No. 29 of 1960 and that Suit No. 29 of 1960 was filed by the plaintiffs of that suit in collusion with Rai Madhusudan Dass. 6. After taking into account the findings recorded by the trial court and the contentions raised on either side, the lower appellate court held that the plaintiff-appellant No. 2 did not derive any title on the basis of the sale deed dated 16th December, 1961 executed by Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Devindra Prasad in his favour and that the property in dispute continued to be the property of Paras Nath Ji; that respondents never accepted the plaintiff appellant No. 2 as their landlords nor did they ever pay any rent to him and that the respondents were tenants of Paras Nath Ji. In consequence of these conclusions the lower appellate court allowed all the appeals, set aside the judgment and decrees passed by the trial court and dismissed all the five suits vide its judgment dated 23rd of December, 1963. It is against that judgment and decree that the present appeals are directed. 7. Second Appeal No. 641 of 1972 arises out of suit No. 412 of 1966 which was filed against Akbar Ali respondent ; Second Appeal No. 645 of 1974 arises out of suit no. 413 of 1966 filed against Zuber Ahmad, respondent Second Appeal No. 644 of 1974 arises out of suit No. 414 of 1966 filed against Jagdish Prasad respondent ; Second Appeal No. 643 of 1974 arises out of suit No. 415 of 1966 filed against Izhar Ali, respondent and Ram Dhani and Second Appeal No. 642 of 1974 arises out of Suit No. 416 of 1966 filed against Triloki Singh and Iqbal Ahmad. Since all these appeals arise out of the same judgment, I propose to dispose of all of them by this common judgment. 8. Before I deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the either side it would be appropriate to mention some facts about which there does not appear to be any dispute between the parties. 9. The property in dispute originally belonged to Rai Abhinandan Prasad who bad established a temple of Paras Nath Ji in his residential house situate in Mohalla Zaidpur, Gorakhpur. Rai Madhusudan Dass, son of Rai Bahadur Abhinandan Prasad and Rai Devindra Prasad son of Rai Saheb Rai Murari Lal executed a trust deed on 21st of September, 1942 dedicating some property including the property in dispute, to the idol of Parasuath Ji Maharai and creating a trust for its management. In 1960 Rai Jitendra Prasad son of Rai Madhusudan Dass, Rai Virendra Prasad, Rai Ravindra Prasad, Rai Dipendra Prasad, son of Rai Divendra Prasad and Rai Kishva Dev Prasad son of Rai Jinendra Prasad filed suit no. 29 of 1960 impleading Paras Nath Ji Brijman Mandir Nandan Bhawan, Paras Nath Ji trust through Rai Madhusudan Dass, and six others pleading that the property in dispute being the joint family property, Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Divendra Prasad had no right to execute the waqf deed dated 21st September, 1942 and praying that the said waqf deed be adjudged void. That suit was decreed on the basis of a compromise entered into between the parties. It was thereafter that Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Divendra Prasad executed the sale deed dated 16.12.1961 thereby transferring the property in dispute to Ram Naresh Singh. 10. In the context of the aforesaid facts learned counsel for the appellants has raised the following contentions before me : (i) That by the trust deed dated 21st September, 1942, Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Divendra Prasad created a private trust which was revocable at their will and, consequently, the compromise decree passed in suit No. 29 of 1960, by which the trust deed dated 21st September, 1942, was adjudged void, was a valid decree. (ii) that in any case there was no complete dedication of property by the trust deed dated 21st September, 1942, and, consequently, Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Devindra Prasad continued to be the owners of the property in dispute though the trust deed executed by them created a charge on that property. (iii) that the position of a deity being different than that of a minor, it was not necessary to appoint a guardian-ad-litem for the deity in suit No. 29 of 1960 and that, in any case, the decree passed in suit No. 29 of 1960 was not void but voidable on the option of the deity and that decree passed in that suit could not be assailed collaterally in the present suits filed by the plaintiff-appellant No. 2 against the respondents on the basis of the relationship of the landlord and tenant alleged to be existing between them. 11. Taking up the first point, the question as to whether the waqf deed dated 21st September, 1942 created a private or a public endowment should rest on the interpretation of the deed itself. It is first stated therein that Rai Abhinandan Prasad established idols of Paras Nath Ji and other Tirathankars in this residential house situate in mohalla Gatepur, for workship by the members of his family and that he wanted to dedicate the property in dispute and the adjoining constructions to that temple, but he died before he could do so. It is further stated that the executant's viz. Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Devindra Prasad, accordingly, in order to fulfil the wish of Rai Abhinandan Prasad, dedicated the property to the said temple of Paras Nath Ji and created a trust for the same. The trust deed thereafter prescribes the terms and conditions of the trust. In Clause (i) thereof is stated that the nature of the trust would be that of a private endowment, in subsequent clauses it is mentioned that the trustees would be from the family of Rai Abhinandan Prasad and failing that from the family of Rai Bahadur Bhagat Dass till some member of the family of Rai Abhinandan Prasad was available to resume the office of the trustee. According to clause (8) of the trust deed, the income accruing from the trust was to be spent over the temple of Paras Nath Ji and that if there was any residue, it would be open to the trustees to spend the same for it would be open to the trustees to spend the same for providing meals to any Sadhu or any Brahmin or any poor person who may happen to come to the temple of Paras Nath Ji. The trust deed then states that the ancestors of the executant's had also built two temples and a Dharamshala and it was open to the trustees to render such assistance to those temples and dharamshala as may be needed. It is, however, immediately thereafter clarified that no person shall have a vested right on that account and that the trustees were merely granted an option that, if they liked, they could also incur expenses over those temples and dharamshala, but there would be no such obligation on the-trustees. It is no doubt mentioned in the same sequence in the trust deed 'aur yah waqf' iz bena par public kaha ja sakega." Reading from the context, however, it is apparent that the aforesaid sentence should have read as follows :- "Aur na yah waqf is bena per public kaha ja sakega." It appears that the word na has been left out. In any case as already stated by me, reading the aforesaid sentence in the context in which it finds place in the trust deed there remains not an iota of doubt that what was intended to be said was that the endowment will not be called to be a public merely because the trustees were given the option to incur some expenditure over the temple and the dharamshala built by the ancestors of the executant's of the trust-deed. It does not appear from any part of the trust deed that the public in general was made the beneficiary of the endowment. In the contrary, it is apparent that the beneficiaries in the trust deed were the members of the family of Abhinandan Prasad as the property in dispute was dedicated to the temple of Paras Nath Ji which belonged to the family of Rai Madhusudan Dass and not to the public in general. In the contrary, it is apparent that the beneficiaries in the trust deed were the members of the family of Abhinandan Prasad as the property in dispute was dedicated to the temple of Paras Nath Ji which belonged to the family of Rai Madhusudan Dass and not to the public in general. The income from the property was to be spent first of all over the temple and thereafter, if the trustees so liked, on feeding of such poor people as may happen to come to that temple. The only other relevant provision in the trust deed was for providing maintenance to such temple members of the family of Rai Abhinandan Prasad who became widows or did not have the means to maintain themselves and for the marriages of such daughters of the family, whose guardians did not have sufficient resources to discharge that liability. I, accordingly, accept that the endowment created by the trust deed dated 21st September 1942 was an endowment of a private nature. 12. The question that then arises for consideration is whether a private trust is revocable on the option of those who create it. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that a private trust is revocable and reference in this connection was made by him to a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Konwar Durga Nath v. Ram Chandra, (4 Indian Appeals 52). It was observed therein :- "Where the temple is a public temple, the dedication may be such that the family itself could not put an end to it, but in the case of a family idol the consensus of the whole family might give the estate shape of another direction." The aforesaid decision has been noticed by Justice B.K. Mukherjee in Tagore Law Lectures as compiled in the book 'Hindu law of Religious and Charitable Trusts' (3rd edition, at page 150 and he has remarked : "The observation therefore is an obiter dictum pure and simple, and as the property was not found to be Debutter, the question did not arise at all for decision......It may be, that in making this observation their Lordships had in mind the ordinary principle of the law of private trust which obtains in England. The point does not seem to have been argued or discussed before the Judicial Committee, and had that been done there can be no doubt that their Lordships would have at once appreciated that there is considerable difficulty in applying this principle to a family Debutter in Hindu Law. In the first place, even if property is dedicated to a family deity, the endowment is a religious and charitable trust in the property sense of the term, and as the law of perpetuity or remoteness cannot affect such dedication, there is no reason by the other incidents of private trust should be applied to it. In the second place, the deity itself is a juridical Personal in Hindu Law and the dedicated property vests in it absolutely. The property cannot therefore be taken away from the deity or diverted to other purposes without the consent of the idol. The consent of the beneficiaries who are not the donee's is really immaterial and cannot make a gift revocable which is irrevocable in law. (Underlining is by me). The case of Kanwar Doorga Nath v. Ram Chandra, (supra) was also considered in the case of Sukumur Bose v. Abani Kumar, AIR 1956 Cal. 308 and the Calcutta High Court, on a review of the authorities, held that it was not open to the members of a family, even when there is a consensus of all of them, to put an end to an endowment in favour of a family idol. Referring to the observations of Sir Montague Smith in the aforesaid case decided by the Privy Council the High Court of Calcutta said that they did not constitute good law. 13. In view of the opinion expressed by Justice B.K. Mukerjee in the Tagore Law Lectures, as incorporated in the aforementioned book, and in view of the aforesaid decision of the High Court of Calcutta, it cannot be accepted that the endowment in the present case was a revocable endowment. 14. Further, even assuming on the basis of the decision of Kunwar Doorga Nath v. Ram Chandra (Supra) that the consensus of the whole family can convert debutter into secular estate consent must be expressed by all the beneficiaries which, in the case of a family idol includes all the members of the family both male and female who are interested in the worship to the deity. Learned counsel for the appellants could not refer me to any evidence on record to show that when suit no. 29 of 1960 was filed there was no other member in the family except those who were made parties in the suit. 15. I, accordingly hold that the endowment created by Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Devindra Prasad dated 21st September, 1942 could not be revoked I also feel that the decree passed in suit No. 29 of 1960 could even otherwise not effect the revocation thereof as it is not shown that all the members of the family, who were living on the date of the institution of the suit had been impleaded in it. 16. This takes me to the second contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, namely, that the trust deed dated 21st September 1942 did not make complete dedication of the property but only created a charge for Sewa Puja of the idol and hence Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Devindra Prasad continued to be the owners of the property. I have given my most anxious thoughts to the contention raised, but I regret my inability to accept the same. I have already made a reference to the relevant clauses of the trust deed. A perusal thereof makes it clear that the entire property specified in the waqf deed, including the property in dispute, was dedicated to Paras Nath Ji, Birajman Mandir Mohalla Zaidpur. Gorakhpur, and a trust was created to manage the same. Though a provision was made that, so far as possible members of the family of Rai Abhinandan Prasad will be the trustees and the entire income was to be spent for the purposes specified in the waqf deed no right was reserved for the family of Rai Abhinandan Prasad to transfer or, in any other manner, deal with the property as personal property. It is true that the purposes of the trust specified in the deed include providing maintenance to the widows in the family and giving financial assistance for the marriages of such daughters in the family whose parents do not have the re sources to discharge that liability. On that basis, however it cannot be said that the dedication was not absolute but partial. Therefore, without dilating any further on the subject. On that basis, however it cannot be said that the dedication was not absolute but partial. Therefore, without dilating any further on the subject. I hold that by the trust deed dated 21st September 1942, Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Devindra Prasad made a complete dedication of the property to the idol of Paras Nath Ji Maharaj. 17. Yet another contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants was that the decree passed in suit no. 29 of 1960 was not void but voidable on the option of the deity and hence the decree passed in that suit could not be assailed collaterally in the suits out of which these appeals have arisen. I am once again unable to agree. 18. There can be not an iota of doubt that the relief asked for in Suit no. 29 of 1960 was adverse to the interest of the deity and deity was, therefore, a necessary party. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Vishvanath v. Radha V. Ballabh, AIR 1967 SC 1044 (Para 10), the position of deity is that of a minor. The deity can, therefore, sue or be sued only through a next friend or a guardian-ad-litem. A perusal of the plaint of suit no. 29 of 1960 would show that, even though Paras Nath Ji Maharaj was impleaded as defendant No. 1 in the case, he was not impleaded through any next friend or guardian-ad-litem. The fact that Paras Nath Ji Trust was also impleaded as a party (as defendant no. 2) through Rai Madhusudan Dass could not obviate the necessity of the deity being impleaded through a next friend or a guardian-ad-litem. Learned counsel for the appellants stressed that, since Rai Madhusudan Dass, who was the Shiba it, had been impleaded as a defendant in his individual capacity as well as Secretary of the Trust, the omission to mention him as the next friend of the deity should be of no consequence and it should be presumed that he represented himself as well as the deity. There is more than one reason for which this argument cannot be accepted. In the first instance, since it is not mentioned against the name of Paras Nath Ji Maharaj, defendant No. 1, that he was impleaded through Rai Madhusudan Dass, it cannot be accepted that he represented himself as well as the deity. There is more than one reason for which this argument cannot be accepted. In the first instance, since it is not mentioned against the name of Paras Nath Ji Maharaj, defendant No. 1, that he was impleaded through Rai Madhusudan Dass, it cannot be accepted that he represented himself as well as the deity. That apart, the interest of Rai Madhusudan Dass, as remarked by the lower appellate court in the suit, was adverse to the deity inasmuch as he was agreeable to the trust deed being cancelled. It is worthy of notice in this connection that on the same date on which the suit was filed it ended in a compromise and a decree was passed on the basis of that compromise adjudging the trust to be void. Rai Madhusudan Dass could not, therefore, properly represent the deity. The decree passed in suit no. 29 of 1960 was, therefore, not voidable but void. That apart, once I have come to the conclusion that the trust deed was not revocable, whether the decree in suit no. 29 of 1960 was passed on the basis of a compromise or otherwise and whether or not the deity was properly represented, the decree passed therein could be of no consequence. 19. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is also, therefore, rejected. 20. To sum up, since Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Devindra Prasad executed a trust deed dedicating the entire property specified in the waqf deed, including the property in dispute, to the idol of Paras Nath Ji Maharaj, and since the endowment was not revocable, the compromise decree passed in suit No. 29 of 1960 was of no effect and the property in dispute continued to be the waqf property. Hence the sale deed executed by Rai Madhusudan Dass and Rai Devindra Prasad on 16.12.1961 failed to convey any interest or title in the property in dispute to Ram Naresh Singh, plaintiff-appellant No. 2. 21. These appeals, accordingly, fail and are hereby dismissed with costs.