JUDGMENT K. N. Singh, J. - This revision arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-opposite party against the defendant-applicant for recovery of arrears of rent and his ejectment from the premises in dispute, on the grounds as contemplated by Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 that the defendant-applicant was in default of payment of rent of more than three months and that he had made material alterations in the premises in question without permission. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal by the defendant, the lower revisional court affirmed the trial courts decree. Aggrieved, the defendant has preferred this revision under Section 115 C.P.C. 2. Briefly, facts giving rise to this revision are as follows. Lala Ram Narain Garg was the owner and landlord of the disputed premises which included a shop and a Chabutra situate in front of it in the city of Kanpur. In March, 1955, the shop and Chabutra were let out to the defendant under an allotment order issued under Section 7 (2) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on a rent of Rs. 15 per mensem. At the commencement of tenancy, Lala Ram Narain Garg permitted the defendant to construct a shop on the chabutra at his cost and the defendant agreed to pay enhanced rent from Rs. 15 to Rs. 100 per mensem. The defendant deposited a sum of Rs. 100 as security with the landlord. In pursuance to the agreement the defendant erected a shop on the chabutra. He continued to pay Rs. 100 per mensem as rent with effect from 1-4-1955. Lala Ram Narain Garg transferred the property in dispute to Smt. Shanti Devi, plaintiff-opposite party under a registered sale-deed executed on 26th May, 1966. The plaintiff-opposite party, filed suit for the defendants ejectment on two main grounds, firstly that the defendant was in arrears of rent for a period of more than three months and in spite of notice of demand, he had failed to pay the same, and secondly, the defendant had made material alterations in the premises by constructing a shop on the chabutra without permission. 3. The defendant contested the suit. He denied that he was a defaulter. 3. The defendant contested the suit. He denied that he was a defaulter. He asserted that he had remitted rent to the plaintiff, but on his refusal he had deposited the same in the court of Munsif (City), Kanpur in proceedings under Section 7-C of the Act. He further pleaded that at the time the premises in dispute were let out to him, Lala Ram Narain Garg had permitted him to construct the shop on the chabutra and in lieu thereof, the defendant had agreed to enhancement of rent from Rs. 15 to Rs. 100. The plaintiff who was transferee from Lala Ram Narain Garg was not entitled to maintain the suit for decree of ejectment on the ground of material alteration. In the alternative, the defendant further pleaded that the construction made by him did not amount to material alteration. 4. The trial court held that the defendant was not a defaulter as he had validly deposited rent under Section 7-C of the Act but it decreed the plaintiffs suit on the finding that the defendant had made material alterations in the disputed accommodation by raising constructions over the Chabutra without obtaining permission in writing from the erstwhile landlord. On revision by the defendant, the Additional District Judge affirmed the findings of the trial court. 5. Two questions arise for determination, firstly, whether the construction made by the defendant amounts to material alteration, and secondly, whether the plaintiff opposite party is entitled to eject the defendant for having made material alteration in 1955. The subordinate courts have answered both the questions against the defendant in decreeing the plaintiffs suit. Section 3 placed restriction on the landlords right to evict a tenant as no suit for tenants ejectment was maintainable without the permission of the District Magistrate except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) to Section 3 (1) of the Act. Under Section 3 (1) (c), landlord is entitled to maintain a suit for tenants eviction without obtaining permission if the tenant without the landlords permission in writing made or permitted to be made construction which in the opinion of the court has materially altered the accommodation. Section 3 (1) (c) is attracted only if the tenant makes material alteration in the tenanted accommodation without the landlords permission. Section 3 (1) (c) is attracted only if the tenant makes material alteration in the tenanted accommodation without the landlords permission. It does not envisage tenants eviction if the landlord enters into an agreement with the prospective tenant and in pursuance thereof the tenant makes material alteration in the accommodation to suit his convenience and the rent thereof is enhanced and the landlord continues to accept enhanced rent. Sec. 3 (1) (c) does not apply to a case where constructions or the material alterations are made by the tenant before the commencement of the tenancy. No doubt, permission of the landlord as contemplated by Section 3 (1) (c) of the Act must be in writing but an agreement for the construction or making material alteration in the accommodation, between the landlord and the tenant prior to the commencement of the tenancy need not be in writing as the parties may enter into oral agreement and in pursuance thereof construction may be made. In the instant case, both the courts have recorded findings that under an agreement with the erstwhile owner, the defendant had constructed the shop on chabutara at the commencement of the tenancy and he had agreed to the enhancement of the rent. On these findings, provision of Section 3 (1) (c) of the Act are not applicable. Moreover courts below have failed to record any finding that the defendant made any material alteration in the accommodation after the accommodation had been let out to him and the tenancy had commenced. In the absence of any such finding, Section 3 (c) does not apply. The finding as recorded by the courts below clearly shows that the construction of the disputed shop on the chabutara was a condition of the defendants tenancy. But for this agreement, the tenant would have continued to pay Rs. 15/- per mensem as rent instead he agreed to pay Rs. 100/- per mensem as rent as he was allowed to construct the shop on the chabutara, 6. Learned counsel for the defendant urged that the shop as constructed on the chabutara was temporary in nature, it could be removed at any time without doing any damages to the chabutara, as it consists of tin shed having shutters to cover it from the sides. The construction of the shop does not amount to any material alteration as envisaged by Section 3 (1) (c) of the Act. The construction of the shop does not amount to any material alteration as envisaged by Section 3 (1) (c) of the Act. What construction will amount to material alteration depends on facts and circumstances of each case. Material alteration, however, means substantial change in the form and structure of the building let out to a tenant. This question has been the subject of debate in a number of cases. In Dr. Jai Gopal Gupta v. Budh Mai, (1969 All LJ 477) a Division Bench of this court held that construction of a room on a portion of courtyard without laying any foundation did not amount to material alteration as the construction is temporary structure. In Sardar Bahadur Mathur v. Kali Prasad Gupta (1961 All LJ 137) enclosure of verandah and a tin shed by walls and converting the same into a room did not amount to material alteration of the accommodation entitling landlord to eject the tenant. 7. In Man Mohan Das Shah v. Bishun Das ( AIR 1967 SC 643 ) : (1966 All LJ 1053), Supreme Court held that the question whether the construction made by a tenant amounts to material alteration would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression 'material alteration was held to mean important alterations such as those which materially or substantially change the front or structure of the premises. In Sita Ram v. Johri Mai (1972 All LJ 301) : ( AIR 1972 All 317 ) a Full Bench of this court held that the expression "material alteration in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations such as those which materially or substantially change the structure of the premises. The Bench observed that nature of the construction, permanent or temporary, does not affect the question whether the construction materially altered the accommodation or not. The Full Bench did not approve the observations of the Division Bench in Dr, Jai Gopal Guptas case (1969 All LJ 477) and held that the mere fact that the constructions could be removed without causing any damage to the property does not alter the situation as almost any construction, permanent or I temporary, could be removed. In the instant case, the defendant had made constructions on the chabutara which was in front of the shop let out to him. In the instant case, the defendant had made constructions on the chabutara which was in front of the shop let out to him. Even if the construction is made of tin shed and shutters and no foundation was dug the position remains the same as the construction has materially changed the front and structure of the shop let out to him. In my opinion, the findings of the court below that the construction in dispute amounted to material alteration within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (c) of the Act does not suffer from any error. 8. Learned counsel for the defendant urged that the construction in question was made by the defendant with the permission and knowledge of the erstwhile landlord and for eleven years he had been accepting enhanced rent and as such, he had waived his right to eject the defendant on the ground of material alteration since the plaintiff is the transferee from the erstwhile landlord, he cannot eject the defendant under Section 3 (1) (c) of the Act as that right stood already waived by erstwhile owner. The plaintiff could not and did not acquire any better right than that enjoyed by the transferor. Under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act on the transfer of property leased out to a tenant, the transferee in the absence of any contract to the contrary acquires all the rights of erstwhile landlord. The transferee, however, does not acquire any greater or different right than those held by the transferor. Section 3 (1) (c) of the 1947 Act confers right on a landlord to evict a tenant without obtaining permission from the District Magistrate if the tenant makes material alterations in the building without the written permission of the landlord Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 3 of 1947 Act are based on the principles laid down under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act which amongst other things lay down that a tenant shall not erect any permanent structure on the leased property without the lessors consent and if the lessee makes construction in breach of that provision, his tenancy shall be liable to be determined by forfeiture under Sec. Ill (g) of the said Act. Section 112 lays down that forfeiture is waived by the lessor by acceptance of rent or by any other act on his part showing intention to treat the lease as subsisting. The principle of waiver as laid down in the Transfer of Property Act applies to cases falling under Section 3 (1) (c) of the 1947 Act. The question whether the landlord waived the forfeiture of tenancy is essentially a question of fact. It may be proved by positive or circumstantial evidence. In the instant case, there is positive evidence on record and both the courts have held that the construction in question was made with the permission of the erstwhile landlord and that he had continued to accept rent of the construction in question. Findings of fact as recorded by the courts below clearly show that the erstwhile landlord had waived his right to eject the defendant under Section 3 (1) (c) of the 1947 Act on the ground of his having made material alterations in the tenanted shop. 9. The question then arises whether the transferee-landlord, namely, the plaintiff-opposite party is also bound by the waiver of his rights by the erstwhile landlord. Breach of a term of a lease not to erect any structure is not a continuing breach. Since the erstwhile landlord waived his right to forfeit the lease by accepting rent he consented for the subsistence of the lease, therefore, waiver of his right to eject the tenant was complete (See AIR 1950 Cal 256 ). 10. In Janardan Swarup v. Devi Prasad ( AIR 1959 All 33 ) : (1958 All LJ 573) suit for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of unauthorised alterations made by the tenant was dismissed on the finding that the landlord had waived his right not only by acceptance of rent which became due since the forfeiture but also by his other subsequent action which included accepting enhanced rent for the altered building. The Bench held that the landlord must be deemed to have waived his right to forfeit the lease and eject the tenant. Waiver once made, cannot be revoked by the successor-in-interest. (See The King v. Paulson, AIR 1920 PC 190 ). Since the erstwhile landlord had waived his right to eject the defendant, the plaintiff-opposite party could not maintain suit for defendants ejectment on the ground of material alterations made in 1955. 11. Waiver once made, cannot be revoked by the successor-in-interest. (See The King v. Paulson, AIR 1920 PC 190 ). Since the erstwhile landlord had waived his right to eject the defendant, the plaintiff-opposite party could not maintain suit for defendants ejectment on the ground of material alterations made in 1955. 11. Learned counsel for the plaintiff urged that the right which came into being in favour of the erstwhile landlord on account of material alteration made by a tenant was a right in respect of the property and on the sale of the property, the transferee-landlord was entitled to avail the right to eject a tenant on the ground of material alteration. In support of his contention, he relied on Ram Murti Gupta v. Suresh Chandra (1973 All LJ 722): ( AIR 1973 All 582 ), In Ram Murti Guptas case, the question of waiver was neither raised nor considered. In that case, subordinate court had recorded no finding that material alterations had been made by the tenant with the consent of the erstwhile landlord or that he had been accepting enhanced rent in lieu of the construction made by the tenant. Learned counsel then placed reliance on J. R. Sethi v. D. D. Jain ( AIR 1972 SC 1727 ). In that case, Supreme Court held that a lessor is not debarred from determining the lease or filing suit for ejectment of a tenant merely because the lessee had made construction to the knowledge of the lessor. The facts and circumstances as available in the present case were not involved in J. R. Sethis case. In that case, plea of estoppel was raised and no plea of waiver as contemplated by Section 112 of the Transfer of Property Act was raised or considered. In the instant case, since the erstwhile landlord had waived his right to eject the defendant-applicant under Section 3 (1) (c) of the 1947 Act, the plaintiff-opposite party could not exercise that right on transfer of the property to her. 12. The erstwhile landlord ceased to have any right to eject the defendant-applicant on the date he transferred the property, to the plaintiff-opposite party, therefore, the latter could not acquire any right to eject the defendant-applicant. If the defendant had made any material alteration without permission of the opposite party, he was entitled to eject the defendant. 12. The erstwhile landlord ceased to have any right to eject the defendant-applicant on the date he transferred the property, to the plaintiff-opposite party, therefore, the latter could not acquire any right to eject the defendant-applicant. If the defendant had made any material alteration without permission of the opposite party, he was entitled to eject the defendant. But the suit in question out of which the present proceedings have arisen is based on the ground of material alteration made by the defendant in 1955 while the plaintiff-opposite party acquired the property in question in 1966. Admittedly, the defendant did not make any material alteration after 1966. I am, therefore, of the opinion that on the transfer of the property in question, the plaintiff-opposite party did not acquire any right to eject the defendant-applicant under Section 3 (1) (c) of the Act. 13. The plaintiff-opposite partys suit is barred by limitation also. The disputed material alteration was made in March/April, 1955 whereas the suit in question was filed in 1968 after 13 years. Under the Indian Limitation Act, a suit to recover possession from a tenant by the landlord could be filed within a period of twelve years. Even if the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his suit for the defendants ejectment under Sec. 3 (1) (c) of the U. P. Act No. Ill of 1&47, he could not get any relief as it was barred by time. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party urged that since the plea of limitation was not raised by the defendant in the courts below, it is not open to this court to entertain this plea in the present proceedings. I find no merit in the contention. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1953 lays down that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the instant case, therefore, Section 3 is applicable. Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act confers jurisdiction on court to dismiss a suit or set aside a decree if on the admitted facts, the suit is barred by limitation. Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the instant case, therefore, Section 3 is applicable. Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act confers jurisdiction on court to dismiss a suit or set aside a decree if on the admitted facts, the suit is barred by limitation. It is the duty of the court to consider the question of limitation even if the point may not have been raised by the parties (See AIR 1964 SC 1336 and AIR 1954 SC 907). The court, however, must be sure that on the facts established on the evidence on record, the suit is barred and only thereafter it can exercise jurisdiction in a case even if plea of limitation has not been set up as a defence (See AIR 1935 PC 85 : (1935 All LJ 578) and AIR 1935 All 946: (1935 All LJ 1029) (FB)). In the instant case, on the admitted facts as well as on the findings recorded by the courts below, material alteration was made in 1955 whereas the suit in question was filed in 1968. The plaintiffs suit was barred by time and he is, therefore, not entitled to the decree of ejectment against the defendant. 14. For the reasons stated above, I allow the revision and set aside the decree of the courts below and dismiss the plaintiffs suit. Plaintiff opposite party is entitled to withdraw the amount which may have been deposited by the defendant in the court below. Parties shall bear their own costs.