JUDGMENT : Deshpande, J. 1. In a motor accident dated 20th February, 1975, the Petitioner's son was killed. The vehicle causing the accident belonged to Respondent No. 1-- Poona Municipal Corporation and its driver was claimed to be negligent. On the date of the accident, however, the Motor Accident Tribunal was not in existence. The same was constituted by a Notification dated 25th March, 1976. The Petitioners made an application for compensation before the said Tribunal on 5th July, 1976. In the said application the Petitioners mentioned that though such an application was required to be made within six months of the accident, they could not so make the application as the Tribunal itself was not in existence at that time and was not constituted till 25th March, 1976. He also filed a separate application for condoning the delay. 2. The Tribunal, however, rejected this application for condo nation of the delay by an order dated 26th July, 1976. Consequently, he also rejected the claim made by the Petitioners for compensation by a separate order. The validity of these two orders is challenged in this Special Civil Application by the claimants. 3. Mr. Agarwal, the learned advocate appearing for the Poona Municipal Corporation raised a preliminary objection. Mr. Agarwal contends that against the Award u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the appeal to the High Court is competent. Mr. Jagdale, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, on the other hand contends that his application for compensation having been rejected on the ground of limitation, no award can be said to have been passed and no appeal, therefore, can be said to have been maintainable. In support of his contention he relies on a judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Zarin Rustomji Munshi Vs. Santubhai Manibhai Patel and Others, . The learned judge, no doubt, has upheld such contention and overruled the preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the Special Civil Application. Mr. Agarwal has not drawn our attention to any other case or any other provision of Law to justify any different view. We accordingly follow the view of the Gujarat High Court and overrule the preliminary objection of Mr. Agarwal. 4. Mr. Agarwal has not drawn our attention to any other case or any other provision of Law to justify any different view. We accordingly follow the view of the Gujarat High Court and overrule the preliminary objection of Mr. Agarwal. 4. The Tribunal observed that he would have allowed the application for condonation of delay but for the fact that such a claim could have been made against the Municipal Corporation only within six months of the occurrence of the accident and suit thereafter without notice to the Corporation and beyond the expiry of six months was not maintainable at all. According to the Tribunal, he would not be justified in condoning the delay when the claim had become time barred because of Section 487 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. 5. Mr. Jagdale on the other hand relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mrs. Khairunnissa A.K. Siddiki Vs. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, , The Division Bench held that Section 527 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, analogous Section 487 of the present Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, was applicable to the suits against the Municipal Corporations and not to the applications made u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Division Bench accordingly accepted the claim of the claimants for compensation as being within time though no notice of the claim was served on the Municipality before such application was made. Now Section 527 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and Section 487 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, consist of two parts. First part requires service of notice on the Municipality in respect of the cause of action in the suit, while the second part requires the claimant to institute the suit before the expiry of the six months from the date of the cause of action. It is true that the second aspect of the matter had not fallen for consideration in the case of Khairrunnissa supra. That, however, in our opinion, cannot make any difference. On the authority of this Division Bench, we shall have to hold that the claim for compensation u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not governed by Section 487 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. That, however, in our opinion, cannot make any difference. On the authority of this Division Bench, we shall have to hold that the claim for compensation u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not governed by Section 487 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. The learned trial judge also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Transport Manager Poona Municipal Transport and Undertaking v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation 69 B.L.R. 869, decided by K.K. Desai, J. The learned judge in that case was dealing with the question of limitation for the suit. We are not concerned in the present case with the suit but an application u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The ratio of this case, therefore, will not be applicable to the fact in the present case. 6. Mr. Agarwal, however, contends that even if the shorter limitation provided u/s 487 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 is held inapplicable to the applications for compensation to the Tribunal, such inapplicability would commence from the date of establishment of the Tribunal. A suit for such compensation being the only remedy available to the Petitioner till 25th March, 1976, Section 487 continued to apply to such claim and such claim must be deemed to have become time barred after expiry of six months from the date of accident on 20th February, 1975 because of Section 487. The Tribunal was right, so contends Mr. Agarwal, in holding that the time barred claim could not have been revived. The contention is attractive but fallacy lying thereunder would get exposed on a little more scrutiny. Once Section 487 is found to be inapplicable to the compensation proceedings before the Tribunal constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the circumstance that it was once applicable is wholly irrelevant. We are not concerned in this case when such a suit was filed and dismissed as time barred. The existence of the decree and not mere applicability of Section 487 would have created hurdle in the way of the Plaintiff. A litigant may deliberately choose not to file his suit within six months and wait till the establishment of such Tribunal, if he has reason to believe that one such is about to be established for the area in which the accident has taken place. A litigant may deliberately choose not to file his suit within six months and wait till the establishment of such Tribunal, if he has reason to believe that one such is about to be established for the area in which the accident has taken place. The choice cannot be said to have been prompted out of an anxiety to evade the provisions of Section 487 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, but to avail of the speedier and cheaper remedy available under the Special Act. It is pertinent in this context to note that Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been introduced in the Act by Amendment Act of 1956 and the Tribunal affording such speedier and cheaper remedy could have been established on any date before 25th March, 1976. It is an error to assume that the claim has become time barred on the hypothesis of what would have happened if the suit was filed. In fact, it could never have been held as time barred against the driver, the principal tort feasor, against whom suit within 2 years period of limitation could have been easily filed. The protection of shorter limitation of six months, no doubt is for the benefit of the Municipalities. But if the special enactment does not seek to extend it for claims covered by it, there is no reason why the same should be deemed to have been notionally in existence merely because the tribunal was not constituted. 7. The Tribunal was in an error in assuming that the claim has become time barred and therefore, the application for condonation of the delay was liable to be rejected. This, in our opinion, never can be the ground once the legislative policy in enacting Section 110 of the Act and making such claims triable only by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and laying down a special procedure and limitation, independently of the Limitation Act and the limitation conceived u/s 487 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, is borne in mind. 8. As indicated earlier, the Tribunal was inclined to condone the delay but for this assumed legal difficulty. We are also unable to see any reason why the delay could not have been condoned once application is found to have been made on 5th July, 1976 within 4 months of the Notification dated 25th March, 1976 constituting the Tribunal. 8. As indicated earlier, the Tribunal was inclined to condone the delay but for this assumed legal difficulty. We are also unable to see any reason why the delay could not have been condoned once application is found to have been made on 5th July, 1976 within 4 months of the Notification dated 25th March, 1976 constituting the Tribunal. The impugned Order is, therefore, liable to be quashed and the case is liable to be remanded to the Tribunal for disposal according to law. 9. Mr. Agarwal then contended that the Tribunal cannot be said to have jurisdiction to entertain any claim arising out of the accident taking place before the establishment of the Tribunal. This contention appears to us to be devoid to any substance. Once the Tribunal is constituted, it must be deemed to have jurisdiction to entertain all the claims arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act, without regard whether the accident took place after such constitution of the Tribunal or before its establishment. 10. Mr. Agarwal then contended that the impugned order was passed on 26th July, 1976, while the writ petition in this Court was filed on 18th December, 1976. In the absence of any explanation for this delay, the petition, according to Mr. Agarwal, is liable to be rejected. It is true that the Petitioner has not cared to explain the delay and we could have been justified in rejecting this application, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not feel justified in adopting that course. The Petitioner's claim for compensation is thrown out without any application of mind to its merits. The reasoning of the Trial Judge and the ratio in the cases cited might have misled the Petitioner. We are, therefore, inclined to take a lenient view and remand the case to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for disposal according to Law. 11. Rule made absolute and the impugned Order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is set aside. The case is remanded to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for disposal according to law. No order as to costs.