Judgment Anil K. Sen, J. These are the seven appeals preferred by the Union of India and the authorities of the Railway Protection Force under clause 15 of the Letters Patent directed against the common judgment and order dated December 16, 1976, passed by Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J. thereby disposing of the seven writ petitions. These seven writ petitions were moved on behalf of the petitioners-respondents disputing the validity of orders of dismissal passed against them respectively by the Deputy Chief Security Officer, Eastern Railway, Calcutta, Such order of dismissal in each case was passed not after holding a proper enquiry under Rules 44, 45 and 46 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, but under the special procedure prescribed by Rule 47 of such Rules. 2. The facts are not in dispute. The seven petitioners were members of the Railway Protection Force. They were put on duty at the Dum Dum South Yard from the midnight of 24/25.1.76. Some superior officers of the Railway Protection Force including the Security Officer himself and the Assistant Security Officer went out on a surprise night check and they themselves found the petitioners engaged in such a way as would definitely go to show that they were themselves involved in removal of rice from a goods train. One of the petitioners was found to be in possession of wagon cutting knife, four of them moving about in a suspicious manner near about a bush wherefrom the pilferred rice was recovered and two others were found absent from the place of duty but were found rather guarding the officers coming on check duty. That apart, various amounts of cash money with a recorded account were recovered from one or other of these petitioners which would establish their involvement. When they were interrogated, they were found to' be rude and in-disciplined. In such circumstances, a report was submitted on January 30, 1976, by the Assistant Security Officer, Sealdah, incorporating all these facts and recommending that disciplinary action should be taken against them. When they were interrogated, they were found to' be rude and in-disciplined. In such circumstances, a report was submitted on January 30, 1976, by the Assistant Security Officer, Sealdah, incorporating all these facts and recommending that disciplinary action should be taken against them. This report went on further to state "It may be mentioned here that because of the turbulent mood of these RPF staff and because of the reign of terror created by them in that area nobody would dare to depose against them, if disciplinary enquiry is started against them, and as such, it is not reasonably practicable to hold a fair and impartial enquiry under the normal RPF Rules viz. Rules 44, 45 and 46 of RPF Rules 1959." There is no dispute that proceeding on this report the Deputy Chief Security Officer passed the impugned seven orders of dismissal from service in respect of the seven petitioners. It would appear from the orders of dismissal that after reciting the misconduct alleged against each of them the order proceeds to recite in each case. "Whereas the undersigned is satisfied that he is guilty of serious misconduct as narrated above and whereas the retention of................(the particular petitioner named as such).... in the government service is not desirable in public interest, and whereas the circumstances of the case are such that it is not reasonably practicable to hold any enquiry under normal Rules viz. Rules 44, 45 and 46 of the RPF Rules, 1959, Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred upon me under Rule 47 of the Rules 1959, the undersigned do hereby dismiss..... .... (the particular petitioner named as such) .... from service with immediate effect." 3. These orders were challenged in the respective writ petitions and the only ground taken was that recourse to Rule 47 was not bona fide taken and the petitioners could not have been lawfully dismissed from service under the provisions of Rule 47. The learned judge in the trial court accepted this contention and held that even on the report of the Assistant Security Officer, as all the witnesses, who could establish the guilt in case a proper enquiry was held, would be the officers themselves, it could not have been bona fide stated that no enquiry was reasonably practicable. The learned judge in the trial court accepted this contention and held that even on the report of the Assistant Security Officer, as all the witnesses, who could establish the guilt in case a proper enquiry was held, would be the officers themselves, it could not have been bona fide stated that no enquiry was reasonably practicable. According to the learned judge, the facts constituting the foundation for adopting the special procedure laid down in Rule 47 being not in existence, the orders cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the learned judge allowed the writ petitions and quashed the orders of dismissal but gave liberty to the authorities to start a disciplinary proceeding against each of the petitioners. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the said order the present appellants have preferred these seven appeals. In our view, these appeals should not have been filed at all and are thoroughly unworthy appeals even on the undisputed facts established before the learned trial judge. Rule 47 provides as follows:- "47. Special procedure in certain cases :-Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 44, 45 and 46, where a penalty is imposed on a member of the Force (a) on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge or (b) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said Rules, the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit." Since the dismissal in the present case is not based on any conviction of any of the petitioners on any criminal charge, obviously, recourse was taken to the second part of Rule 47. But the second part enjoins that the disciplinary authority must himself be satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure of holding a regular enquiry under the Rules. Now in the present case the disciplinary authority is the Deputy Chief Security Officer. He has merely recorded a satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold any enquiry under the normal Rules namely, Rules 44, 45 and 46 of the Rules. He has, however, not recorded his own reasons for such satisfaction except for referring to the circumstances of the case. He has merely recorded a satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold any enquiry under the normal Rules namely, Rules 44, 45 and 46 of the Rules. He has, however, not recorded his own reasons for such satisfaction except for referring to the circumstances of the case. We have pointed out the circumstances which can be found from the report of the Assistant Security Officer. If those are the circumstances which the disciplinary authority adopted as the reasons for being satisfied that it will not be reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry, we cannot but agree with the learned judge in the trial court that the satisfaction was a sham one. The report of the Assistant Security Officer well establishes the fact that all the misconduct for which these people are being penalised, were committed in presence of a number of superior officers including the Security Officer himself and the Assistant Security Officer who made the report. They were, as a matter of fact the only witnesses of the activities of the petitioners which are considered to be acts of misconduct. If that is so, there was bona fides in the suggestion that nobody would appear to depose in case a disciplinary enquiry is held. 5. Such being the position, we agree with the learned judge in the trial court and hold that the impugned orders of dismissal in exercise of powers under Rule 47 of the Rules cannot be sustained. They cannot be sustained first of all for the reason that recourse to such Rule was not taken in a bona fide manner; secondly, circumstances, which could justify adopting the special procedure, do not factually exist in the present case so that the jurisdiction under Rule 47 could not have been invoked and thirdly, Rule 47 itself was not complied with when the disciplinary authority failed to record its own reasons for the satisfaction that it would not have been reasonably practicable to hold a regular enquiry as against these people. In this view, we find no merit in these appeals and dismiss the same without any order as to costs in any of them. All interim orders are vacated. B.C. Chakrabarti, J.- I agree. Appeal dismissed.