ORDER C. Srivastava, J. - In the basic year the names of the respondents were entered in revenue records. The petitioners filed an objection under Section 9A(2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming co-tenancy rights on the ground that they being the daughters sons of Smt. Bhagwanti were entitled to co-tenancy rights. The objection of the petitioners was contested by the respondents on the ground that Smt. Kutra who is said to be the mother of the petitioner was not the daughter of Smt. Bhagwanti. In the alternative it was also pleaded that since the respondents were in adverse possession, the petitioners rights, if any, stood extinguished. The Consolidation Officer held that Smt. Kutra was the daughter of Smt. Bhagwanti. He also held that as the petitioners had never been in possession for the last 25 to 30 years, the respondents acquired rights on the basis of adverse possession. The petitioners filed an appeal but the same was dismissed. They then filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation who although dismissed the revision but affirmed the finding that the petitioners were the daughters sons of Smt. Bhagwanti. Aggrieved, the petitioners have come to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that once the consolidation authorities have found that the petitioners were the daughters sons of Smt. Bhagwanti, they became co-tenure-holders along with the respondents and as possession of one co-tenure-holder would be deemed to be the possession on behalf of all other co-tenure-holders, hence the respondents could not acquire any right on the basis of adverse possession. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on decisions in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 and Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai Ram, 1973 RD 183 . He had further urged that the respondents have not specifically pleaded for ouster of the petitioners but have pleaded only that they were in adverse possession. He had further urged that the respondents have not specifically pleaded for ouster of the petitioners but have pleaded only that they were in adverse possession. He has urged that even assuming that the respondents were in possession, they cannot acquire any right on the ground of adverse possession unless there was a finding that the respondents ousted the petitioners from possession and they themselves continued in possession for more than 12 years after 1358-F because the succession opened only after the deemed civil death of Smt. Bhagwanti which has been held to be the year 1950, i. e. 1357-58F. 3. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that there is a concurrent finding by all the three consolidation authorities that the petitioners were not in possession for more than 25 years which clearly shows that they were ousted from possession and the respondents acquired rights over the land in dispute on the basis of adverse possession. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on the decision in Ram Dass v. Board of Revenue, U. P., Allahabad, 1967 All LJ 92 : ( AIR 1967 All 481 ). He has further urged that the respondents could acquire title on the basis of adverse possession if it was found that they were in possession of the land in dispute for more than the period of 12 years, and as the finding recorded by all the three consolidation authorities is that the respondents have been in possession for more than 25 to 30 years, hence they would be deemed to be exclusive tenure-holders. The judgments of the consolidation authorities do not suffer from any manifest error of law. 4. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the approach of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in considering the question of adverse possession against a co-tenure-holder is not correct. After the concurrent finding of all the three authorities it is not in dispute that the petitioners are the daughters sons of Smt. Bhagwanti. It is also not in dispute that the succession would open only after 1950. After the concurrent finding of all the three authorities it is not in dispute that the petitioners are the daughters sons of Smt. Bhagwanti. It is also not in dispute that the succession would open only after 1950. Although the consolidation authorities recorded a finding that the respondents were in possession for more than 25 years which included possession of even the period prior to 1950, but the possession prior to 1950 was irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the controversy involved in the present case. The crucial question to be determined by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the present case was whether the petitioners were ousted from possession and whether after the ouster the respondents were in adverse possession for more than 12 years. None of the consolidation authorities has considered the question of ouster nor they have recorded a finding of adverse possession after 1950. Even assuming for a moment that the petitioners were not in possession prior to 1950, but as succession was not open by that time, it cannot be said that the respondents matured rights on the basis of prior possession. The rights of Smt. Bhagwanti continued until 1950, hence even if the respondents were in possession prior to 1950 it was wholly irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the present controversy as the possession would be deemed to be on behalf of Smt. Bhagwanti who continued to be tenure-holder till that time. It is a settled principle of law that possession of a co-tenant is possession on behalf of all other co-tenants. The controversy involved in the present proceedings was whether Smt. Kutra was the daughter of Smt. Bhagwanti or not. The respondents were seriously contesting that the petitioners had no right as they were not the daughters sons of Smt. Bhagwanti. Once all the three consolidation authorities have concurrently recorded the finding that they are daughters sons, the question of possession loses its importance unless ouster was specifically pleaded and proved by the respondents. There is no finding that the petitioners were ousted from possession and the respondents continued to be in possession for more than 12 years after the ouster of the petitioners. "Ouster" as defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary means; "a wrongful ejection or dispossession of a person from a freehold." 5. There is no finding that the petitioners were ousted from possession and the respondents continued to be in possession for more than 12 years after the ouster of the petitioners. "Ouster" as defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary means; "a wrongful ejection or dispossession of a person from a freehold." 5. The word "ouster" has also been defined in Strouds Judicial Dictionary as follows: "Ouster or dispossession is a wrong or injury that carries with it the Emotion of possession; for thereby the wrongdoer gets into the actual occupation of the land or hereditament, and obliges him that hath a right to seek his legal remedy in order to gain possession and damages for the injury sustained," 6. It has been held by the Supreme Court in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 , that (at p. 318): "Ouster of the non-possessing co-heir by the co-heir in possession who claims his possession to be adverse, should be made out. The possession of one co-heir is considered, in law, as possession of all the co-heirs. When one co-heir is found to be in possession of the properties it is presumed to be on the basis of joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other coheir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heirs title. It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does not necessarily mean that there must be an express demand by one and denial by the other. There are cases which have held that adverse possession and ouster can be inferred when one co-heir takes and maintains notorious exclusive possession in assertion of hostile title and continues in such possession for a very considerable time and the excluded heir takes no steps to vindicate his title." 7. It has further been held in the above case that possession of a co-tenant will be deemed to be possession on behalf of all other co-tenants. The aforesaid view has been further reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai Ram, 1973 RD 183 , referred to above. It has further been held in the above case that possession of a co-tenant will be deemed to be possession on behalf of all other co-tenants. The aforesaid view has been further reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai Ram, 1973 RD 183 , referred to above. In view of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court it is clear that the respondents could not acquire rights unless there was a finding to the effect that the petitioners were ousted from possession and further that the respondents continued to be in possession for more than 12 years after the ouster. It is also not in evidence nor there is any finding to show as to when the consolidation proceedings started and when notification under Section 4 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was published. Title has to be seen on the date of the notification and in case the respondents continued to be in possession for more than 12 years, after ousting the petitioners on the date of notification, only then it could be said that they matured rights on the basis of adverse possession. There is no finding to this effect by any of the three authorities. 8. The Deputy Director of Consolidation also did not examine the case from another aspect that the burden of proof of ouster and adverse possession was upon the respondents. In fact the respondents were all along litigating that the petitioners were not the daughters sons of Smt. Bhagwanti Once it has been found by all the three authorities that the petitioners are daughters sons of Smt. Bhagwanti, the burden lay upon the respondents to prove the plea of ouster and adverse possession for a period of more than 12 years. There is neither any material nor any finding to this effect. Without the aforesaid findings it cannot be said that the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is in accordance with law. The Deputy Director of Consolidation is the final authority on facts, hence he is required to examine the evidence on facts and law. In the present case he has not considered the material evidence nor recorded the findings on the real controversy involved. There is thus manifest error apparent on the face of the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 9. In the present case he has not considered the material evidence nor recorded the findings on the real controversy involved. There is thus manifest error apparent on the face of the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 9. The result is that this writ petition is allowed and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 20-10-72 is hereby quashed. The case is sent back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for deciding the revision afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.