JUDGMENT The petitioner is the plaintiff. He instituted the suit in question against the defendant opposite parties for a declaration of title to the disputed land and for a further declaration that opposite party no. 1 was not his bargadar and also for an order that the order of the Junior Land Reforms Officer dated the 28th of September 1973 was without jurisdiction. 2. The learned Munsif considered the objection raised by the defendant, opposite party no. 1, and made a reference to the Bhagchas Officer in accordance with the provisions of section 21(3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. Being aggrieved by this order, the plaintiff filed the present application. 3. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order in question cannot be sustained. The principal defendant filed a collusive application under section 19B of West Bengal Act X of 1956 before the J.L.R.O claiming barga right to the disputed land and an illegal order was passed against him by the J.L.R.O. It has thus been contended that since there was a previous adjudication between the parties by the J.L.R.O. in regard to the disputed land, the Civil Court had no business to make a further reference to the Bhagchas Officer on the same point. The cases of (1) Sudarshan Ghosh v. Janakinath Pandit, AIR 1976 Cat. 252 : 1976 (1) CLJ 415 , and (2) Chapala Bala Adhikary v. Manoranjan Das and others., 1975 (2) CLJ 447 have been referred to. 4. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 has contended that the Division Bench decision in Sudarshan Ghosh v. Janakinath Pandit (Supra) was on a different point and the Single Bench decision in the case of Chapala Bala Adhikary v. Manoranjan Das and others, (supra) is also not authority for the proposition advanced on behalf of the petitioner because the observation made in that case is merely an obiter. 5. It may be briefly indicated that Sudarshan Ghosh v. Janakinath Pandit, was decided before section 18(2) was amended in June 1975. In that view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the decision of that case. A very important amendment was made at that time and that matter will be briefly referred to subsequently. 6. 5. It may be briefly indicated that Sudarshan Ghosh v. Janakinath Pandit, was decided before section 18(2) was amended in June 1975. In that view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the decision of that case. A very important amendment was made at that time and that matter will be briefly referred to subsequently. 6. Section 18(2) of the Act clearly lays down that if in deciding any dispute referred to in sub-section (1) or otherwise any question arises as to whether a person is a bargadar or not and to whom the share of the produce is deliverable, such question shall by determined by the officer or authority mentioned in Sub-section (1). The expression "or otherwise" was first introduced in that sub-section by the amending Act of 1974 and thereby the scope of the section was very much widened. It is true that the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents opposite party laid emphasis on the point that the previous decision of the J.L.R.O turned on the provisions of section 19B of the Act because the question of restoration of land to the bargadar arose. But it may be pointed out that section 18(1)(b) of the Act says that every dispute between the bargadar and a person whose land he cultivates in respect of termination of cultivation by a bargadar shall be determined by the Bhagchas Officer or the competent authority. In view of the amendment made to sub-section (2) of section 18 in 1974, the question of termination will thus also be covered and in such a case reference may be made by the Civil Court to the Bhagchas Officer within the meaning of section 21(3) of the Act. This question was considered in detail by a Single Bench of this Court in Chapala Bala Adhikary's case. It appears from page 454 of that report that there may be also cases where the officers or authorities under section 18(1) had finally adjudicated the question whether a person was a bargadar or not and in that event any question within the meaning of section 21(3) cannot again arise in a subsequently instituted suit or proceeding in a civil or criminal court. 7. It has already been determined by J.L.R.O. that defendant No. 1 was a bargadar. 7. It has already been determined by J.L.R.O. that defendant No. 1 was a bargadar. So in view of the frame of the suit, namely, that the declaration made by the J.L.R.O. that the defendant opposite party No. 1 was not a bargadar, could not again be referred by the Civil Court to the Bhagchas Officer in accordance with the provisions of section 21 (3) of the Act. In that view of the matter the contention put forward on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 cannot be sustained. It is therefore held that the learned Munsif acted illegally in making such a reference and that he should determine the suit according to law. 8. The Rule is therefore made absolute. The order appealed against is hereby set aside. There will be no order as to costs. 9. The observations made in the Judgment are without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties to this Rule. Let the records go down as early as possible.