JUDGMENT : N.H. Bhatt, J. This is a petition by an employee of the Gujarat Electricity Board, the respondent No. 1 herein, challenging the order, Annexure-I, dated 27-5-1974, which he calls to be an Illegal order of dismissal or removal from service passed by the respondent No. 1's Chief Engineer. The impugned order, Annexure I, reads as follows : "Shri Atam Sugnomal Pohani, Junior Engineer, working under Ut SIC Circle now transferred to Ukai sub-station was ordered to resume his duties at Ukai but the R. P. A. D. letter was returned by postal authority with the remarks 'the party refused to accept the R.P.A.D, letter and, therefore, returned to the sender. Shri Pohani was relieved from Surat with effect from 30-3-1974 and he has not reported for duty at Ukai sub-station uptil now, and thereby he has overstayed unauthorisedly. Hence It is hereby ordered that Shri A. D. Pohani Jr. Engineer is deemed to have been discharged from the service of the board with effect from 31-3-1974. B. N. as per service regulation No. 113." 2. A few facts need to be stated. The petitioner had joined the services of the Board as a Technical Assistant against the post of a Deputy Engineer. He was initially asked to join as a Technical Assistant because by then the result of the qualifying examination at which he had appeared was not declared. On the result being declared in his favour, he was given the posting as a Deputy Engineer. The petitioner thereafter was confirmed in the post of the Deputy Engineer as per the order, Annexure B with effect from 31-1-1965. Then there was some departmental enquiry against him and he was reverted to the post of the Technical Assistant by an order dated 24-4-1969. This order was challenged by him by filing a suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Baroda and I was told at the bar that the said suit is still pending. He was then relieved from that post of a Technical Assistant, subsequently designated as that of a Junior Engineer, on 30 3-1974 on his being transferred to Ukai substation belonging to the respondent Board. The order of his transfer is Annexure D dated 29 3-1974 and the order of relief is Annexure-E dated 30-3-1974. The petitioner had not joined at Ukai and had made a representation dated 8-4-1974 against the order of transfer. The order of his transfer is Annexure D dated 29 3-1974 and the order of relief is Annexure-E dated 30-3-1974. The petitioner had not joined at Ukai and had made a representation dated 8-4-1974 against the order of transfer. The said representation is Annexure-F. He sought the cancellation of his transfer firstly on the ground that his mother aged about 70 was a cardiac patient, who could Dot be treated at Ukai where medical care was not available, and secondly on the ground that his litigation against the Board, that was pending in the court of the Civil Judge, Baroda, required to be attended to and his being at Ukai was likely to considerably hamper the smooth prosecution of that suit. This representation. Annexure-F dated 8-4-1974, was followed by another representation Annexure-G dared 9-5-1974, but he was given no reply. On 29-5-1974 the petitioner had filed another suit in the Baroda court challenging the order of his transfer. In n-ply to that suit, the Board filed its written statement dated 10-6-1974 referring to the impugned order, Annexure I, dated 27-5-1974. the petitioner, therefore, filed the present petition in this court, challenging the said order, Annexure I. 3. Mr. H. B. Shah, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, impugned the said order on the ground that virtually it was an order of dismissal or an order involving civil consequences for the petitioner and this order, having been passed without affording any opportunity to him to have his say against it violated the principles of natural justice and was consequently liable to be struck down as invalid, inoperative and non-est. As against that, the contention of the Board is that the said order is an order of discharge simpliciter, casting no aspersion or stigma on the petitioner, and that the said order was passed by virtue of the statutory authority of regulation No. 113, the Regulation that has got the force of law. As against that, the contention of the Board is that the said order is an order of discharge simpliciter, casting no aspersion or stigma on the petitioner, and that the said order was passed by virtue of the statutory authority of regulation No. 113, the Regulation that has got the force of law. The Board alternatively contended that the petitioner had an equally efficacious remedy at law in the form of an appeal and second appeal as provided by the Rules and lastly it was urged that, in view of the conduct of the petitioner, as appeared from the earlier proceedings produced by the petitioner himself on the record of this case and in view of the consistently recalcitrant attitude displayed by the petitioner, the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be granted to the petitioner. 4. The first and foremost question that would be required to be decided whether the impugned order quoted above in the initial part of this judgment is a penal order or whether it is an order of discharge simpliciter. This issue requires to be decided because there is a controversy between the two contending parties in respect of its character. Even a casual look at the order would go to show that the petitioner's services were treated as retrospectively terminated because of the circumstances eloquently stated in the order itself. The order says as follows : (1) The petitioner was transferred to Ukai; (2) he was relieved from Baroda on 30-3-74; (3) he did not report for duty at Ukai sub station, though he was expected to do so in the ordinary course; (4) he did rot do so even till the date of the passing of the order that is 27-5-74; (5) the petitioner was strong-beaded enough even to refuse the communication addressed by the Board to him under registered post, whereby he was called upon to resume his duties at Ukai; (6) the petitioner had thus unauthorisedly overstayed; In view of these eloquently stated facts, it was urged that the petitioner's services were deemed or treated as having been terminated by way of punishment by virtue of the power conferred on the Board under Regulation No. 113. If this order Is presented by the petitioner to any prospective employer it would speak for itself. If this order Is presented by the petitioner to any prospective employer it would speak for itself. It would at once show that the petitioner was a person who had disobeyed the order of transfer who had without any permission overstayed and avoided his duty, that he bad cheek enough even to refuse the letter calling upon him to resume his duties at the place of transfer and that this services were put an end to retrospectively because of these circumstances. It, therefore, cannot do to say that this order ex-facie does not stigmatise the petitioner. Ex facie the order has to be interpreted as a penal order. 5. It is an admitted fact that no enquiry was held before this order bad come to be passed. What has been urged on behalf of the Board by their learned counsel Mr. Modi is that Regulation No. 113, which has the force of law as now held by a series of decision of the Supreme Court conferred a specific authority on the Board to terminate the services of an employee without recourse to the discipline and appeal Rules, which are on the modern lines found everywhere Mr. Modi therefore, emphasised that, when this statutory provision specifically did away with the following of the normal Rules, which implied the principles of natural justice, it should be assumed as a matter of necessary corollary that the authority at ting under Regulation No. 113 is absolved from the otherwise normal liability of complying with the minimal of the principles of natural justice. Regulation No. 113 reads as follows and it is quoted below prepared by Regulation No 112 :- "112 The period of overstay of leave or joining time without the specific prior sanction of the competent authority may be looked upon as a breach of discipline and may be dealt with accordingly. Such overstay or absence from duty without prior permission unless condoned by specific orders of the competent authority with the approval of the next higher authority, or the Chairman, as the case may be, shall be treated an extraordinary leave without pay and such period shall not count for increments. 113. The continued absence from duty or overstay, inspite of warning to return to duty shall render the employee liable to summarily discharge from service without the necessity of proceedings under the Gujarat Electricity Board, Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Procedure." 6. 113. The continued absence from duty or overstay, inspite of warning to return to duty shall render the employee liable to summarily discharge from service without the necessity of proceedings under the Gujarat Electricity Board, Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Procedure." 6. Mr. Sbah for the petitioner urged with reference to the discipline and appeal rules and the departmental manual of the Gujarat Electricity Board that discharge was treated by the Board throughout as a equivalent to removal. He particularly invited my attention to the various punishment provided in the Discipline and Appeal Rules of the Board The Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Procedure of the Beard mentioned in Chapter 8 of the Manual deal with various punishments in clause 9 thereof and in item (k) "discharge or removal" are placed together as almost equivalents. Mr. Shah also invited my attention to the Circular of the Board at page 66 of the record before me and urged that the Board treated non-assumption of duties by an overstaying employee after sanctioned leave or an employee continuously absenting himself without leave being sanctioned as a grave misconduct. He also invited my attention to the earlier proceedings culminating in a warning to the petitioner, being Annexure X, wherein the petitioner was found to have absented himself without permission of the competent authority for certain periods. Regulation No. 236 made by the Board also was brought to my notice wherein acts which are commonly and generally understood to be against the canons of good behaviour and discipline are specified as the acts of misconduct Obviously, this regulation No. 236 specifically states that the list is illustrative and not exhaustive. These references, therefore, clearly showed that the Board, both in practice and in accordance with its regulations, treated the behaviour attributed to the petitioner in the order, Annexure I, as an act of misconduct that would call for disciplinary action against him. As noted by me above, on earlier occasion he was actually departmental proceeded against. It, therefore, cannot do to say that this act is not treated as an act of misconduct and, therefore, any question of penalty as being out of scope. 6-2-1978. 7. Mr. As noted by me above, on earlier occasion he was actually departmental proceeded against. It, therefore, cannot do to say that this act is not treated as an act of misconduct and, therefore, any question of penalty as being out of scope. 6-2-1978. 7. Mr. Modi, however, in this connection contended that Regulation No. 113 itself did awry with the compliance of the principles of natural justice and he, therefore, urged that the order of discharge was quite proper and valid it is difficult to interpret regulation No. 113 in the manner Mr. Modi wants me to do. All that Regulation No. 113 does is to make an employee liable to be discharged summarily without following the elaborate procedure laid down in the Gujarat Electricity Board (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, but that does not completely take away the minimal compliance with the 'principles of natural justice. Even in summary proceedings, it is possible to follow the rules of natural justice and it, therefore, cannot do to say that summary procedure provided in Regulation No. 113 by necessary implication takes away the requirement of compliance with the principles of natural justice. As a matter of general proposition of law, it is to be stated that any order involving civil consequences and sought to be passed by a public authority in exercise of statutory powers is to be passed in compliance with the principles of natural justice. Even if the non-compliance with such principles is permissible in the society where the rule of law prevails, this is to be provided for expressly. Unless it is shown that compliance with these principles is necessarily taken away, it is to be assumed as matter of general proposition that natural justice has got a place in the picture. Interpreting Regulation No. 113, I, therefore, find that, though this regulation confers on the authority the power to summarily discharge an employee, it does not clothe him with the power to pass an order of discharge with a stigma attached to it in total disregard of the general principles of natural justice. Interpreting Regulation No. 113, I, therefore, find that, though this regulation confers on the authority the power to summarily discharge an employee, it does not clothe him with the power to pass an order of discharge with a stigma attached to it in total disregard of the general principles of natural justice. I, therefore, reiterate that even while acting under regulation No. 113 if the authority in effect does not pass the order of discharge, but passed the order of dismissal or removal from service, this summary power is to be exercised after complying with the spirit of the principles of natural justice It, therefore, cannot do to say that acting under Regulation No. 113, the Board was not bound to comply with those principles. This reasoning of mine gets support from a string of authorities starting from the case of State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269 and reaching its culmination in the case of A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150. 8. Mr. Modi had invited my attention to a few earlier authorities and hid tiled to show that principles of natural justice could not be imprisoned in a straight jacket formula. As far as the broad enunciation of the principle goes, it is beyond the pale of any controversy. However, in view of the latest legal position now settled by a series of judgments of the Supreme Court, it cannot be alleged that wherever there is an order, administrative or quasi-judicial in character but involving civil consequences for a citizen, the spirit of she principles of natural justice must be maintained. In other words, the persons sought to be visited with civil prejudicial consequences must have at least an opportunity to have their say heard before the adverse decision is arrived at. 9. In this connection Mr. Modi, however, urged that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, alleged issuance of a notice inviting objections and comments would be an exercise in futility because the facts were completely admitted. He urged that the petitioner bad taken it into his head not to report for duty at the place of transfer, thinking of some ill conceived privileges of public servants and that he stubbornly stuck to that, foolish attitude of his. Mr. He urged that the petitioner bad taken it into his head not to report for duty at the place of transfer, thinking of some ill conceived privileges of public servants and that he stubbornly stuck to that, foolish attitude of his. Mr. Modi, therefore, implored that, when nothing possible could be said by the petitioner against the intended action, the procedure is not to be followed as an idle ritual. The argument, though attractive, does not hold much water. Regulation No. 112 itself shows that a man who has overstayed the period of leave or joining time without the specific prior sanction of the competent authority is to be looked upon as a violator of the rule of discipline and it secondly provides that such a person will be deemed to have been on extra ordinary leave without pay with future adverse consequences, namely, such period of extraordinary leave without pay is not to be counted for the purpose of increments it, therefore, cannot do to show that, in all cases of such overstay after leave or joining time, it must of necessity result into an order of summary discharge contemplated by Regulation No. 113. At the instance of this petitioner himself, p. 56 of this record shows, such a lapse on the part of the petitioner was treated as an act of indiscipline and was suitably dealt with departmentally, though it did not visit him with the summary discharge contemplated under Regulation No. 113. If there is a wide range of discretion even in the matter of visiting an employee with punishment, or dire consequences in a given set of facts, an employee may have some circumstances to be placed for consideration at least by way of mitigating the quantum and nature of punishment. It, therefore, cannot do to say that here is a case where the only possible alternative for the Board was to have recourse to Regulation No. 113 of the Beard. 10. Mr. Modi had then referred to some decisions of the Supreme Court where the labour courts' orders substaining the order of punishment without recourse to the principles of natural justice at the time of enquiry had come to be sustained. The law relating to industrial disputes cannot be bodily lifted to the casts of public servants in all cases. 10. Mr. Modi had then referred to some decisions of the Supreme Court where the labour courts' orders substaining the order of punishment without recourse to the principles of natural justice at the time of enquiry had come to be sustained. The law relating to industrial disputes cannot be bodily lifted to the casts of public servants in all cases. Industrial law has its own development where industrial peace is the summum bonum of ail adjudications. Even if there be full exoneration of an employee, the industrial court may decline to reinstate an employee and may instead award him some compensation. In the normal civil law, this may not be the necessary course to be adopted by the court of law. The High Court's powers under Article 226 of the Constitution may be a different matter, but as far as the ordinary courts of law are concerned, they have to carry the conclusions to their logical limits. Pressing into service, therefore, of the labour disputes cannot be of much avail to the Board in the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order, Annexure I, though alleged to be couched in the language of innocent discharge, is ex-facie an order of dismissal on account of the express acts of indiscipline or rather the express act of breach of discipline, if the terminology of Regulation No. 112. is to be employed, and this order, Annexure I, will be required to be declared as violating the law and, therefore, not a legal and valid one. 12. This brings me to the next question as to the exact prayer that is to be granted to the petitioner. As held by me above, the order in question is to be treated as an invalid order. Ordinarily, this court would give a further declaration that the petitioner is on that account entitled to be reinstated and to all ancillary benefits. It was, however, vehemently urged by Mr. Modi for the Electricity Board that this court should retrain from granting the further relief in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. Ordinarily, this court would give a further declaration that the petitioner is on that account entitled to be reinstated and to all ancillary benefits. It was, however, vehemently urged by Mr. Modi for the Electricity Board that this court should retrain from granting the further relief in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. It can-not be disputed that reinstatement is not a matter of course, particularly at the hands of an authority like the High Court, exercising its powers under section 226 of the Constitution, Where granting of any relief is a matter of sound discretion, of course to be exercised on sound judicial principles that can be examined and reassessed by the higher authorities, if the occasion comes for that authority to do so. Mr. Modi urged that the petitioner was obsessed with some wrong and inflated notions about the rights of public servants. He urged that the petitioner thought that it was within his discretion or power to join or not to join the place of transfer. He stated that this petitioner, in the face of his conduct at the root of this impugned order and his past conduct as has been amply borne out by the record produced in this case, does not deserve to be retained in public service, where vital public interests are involved The petitioner was asked to report for duty at Ukai. As his representations show, he was in no mood to comply with the order of transfer. He therefore, ex-parte decided that he would flout the order of transfer and what are the reason that emboldened him to take this sort of ex-parte course? He firstly stated that his mother was a cardiac patient, who would require at any time and immediately the medical care and attention, which was absent at Ukai Assuming that his mother was that much ill and assuming that such an expert's help could not be bad at Ukai, would It be a ground for a public servant not to comply with the order of transfer and continue his absence from duty for inordinately long period. If he was so faithful to his mother he should have kept his family either at Surat or at Baroda to attend to his mother or, if after joining the duty at Ukai there was imperious call of duty to his mother, he could have sought for leave. If he was so faithful to his mother he should have kept his family either at Surat or at Baroda to attend to his mother or, if after joining the duty at Ukai there was imperious call of duty to his mother, he could have sought for leave. Nothing of the sort was done by him. Ho abrogated to himself the absolute right of joining or not joining the duty on his transfer. What was the second reason that he impudently adduced for not joining? He had filed a civil suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Baroda against the Board and he stated that he was required to attend the Baroda court of and on in order to mind that litigation Is this, by any yardstick of common sense a reason for him not to report for duty at Ukai? This is absolutely silty on the face of it. His past conduct shows that he has got some false notion of the assumed prerogatives or powers of public servants. He seems to be thinking that these public offices are created so that he and other people like him may earn their livelihood and advance their personal causes This is something absurd and it is desired that such people are rudely awakened so that the health and standards of public services are duly maintained. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the conduct of this petitioner was high handed and he did not deserve in any way reinstatement. I, therefore, do net want to exercise my judicial discretion in passing the order of reinstatement, though complying with the requirements of law, I do declare that the impugned order of the termination of his services is unsustainable. I think that this is one of those cases where the court should put its foot down and see that the beligerent and recalcitrant employees of public bodies learn the lesson, which is much needed to be learnt by all such public servants these days I, therefore, refrain from parsing the order of reinstatement. 13. The result is that the petition is partly allowed. The impugned order, Annexure I. is declared to be invalid, but I refuse to pass the further order of reinstatement as prayed for by the petitioner Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs Petition partly allowed.