( 1 ) UNDER the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1961 Act'), respondent No. 1 filed an application before the appointed date for conferment of occupancy rights in the lands specified in his application and detailed in para 1 of the writ petition, inter-alia pleading that he was in occupation of those lands as on 1-3-1974 as a tenant of the petitioner. Before the Land Tribunal the petitioner-landholder pleaded that respondent No. l was not her tenant and that he was work ng on the lands as her h red labourer. In support of their respective cases, the parties placed oral and documentary evidence before the Land Tribunal. Before the Land Tribunal recorded the evidence, it also inspected the lands and had drawn up its inspection report. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence placed be for it and the inspection notes, the Land Tribunal by its order dt. 25-8-1976 (EExhibit A') accepted the case of respondent No. 1 and has granted him occupancy rights in the lands in question. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challerred the said order of the Land Tribunal under art 226 of the Constitution. ( 2 ) ON 23-1-1976 the Land Tribunal ev dently on an application made by respondent No. 1, had granted an exparte order of temporary injunction, restraining the petitioner from interfering with the peaceful p session of lands by respondent No. 1. In WP. No. 2121 of 1976 which is still pending the petitioner challenged the sa d order of temporary injunction and also the constitutional validity of certain provisions of 'the 1981 Act'. In that writ petition, the petitioner sought for stay of the operation of the order of the Land Tribunal granting exparte temporaly injunction in favour of respondent No. 1 and the provisions of 'the 1961 Act' impugned therein. Cn 9-3-1976 M K. Srinivasa Iyengar J, granted an order of stay in the following terms :: wp. 3694 of 1977. " Emergent notice regarding rule returnable in a week. In the meantime further proceedings before the Tribunal stayed. Sd/-M. K. Srinivasa Iyengar, Judge, 9-3-1976"on 1-7-1976, B. Venkataswami, J, modified the exparte interim order granted on 9-3-1976 as under :- " Issue rule nisi. Interim stay of Exhibit 'a' only in so far as it concerns the grant of temporary injunction. " Emergent notice regarding rule returnable in a week. In the meantime further proceedings before the Tribunal stayed. Sd/-M. K. Srinivasa Iyengar, Judge, 9-3-1976"on 1-7-1976, B. Venkataswami, J, modified the exparte interim order granted on 9-3-1976 as under :- " Issue rule nisi. Interim stay of Exhibit 'a' only in so far as it concerns the grant of temporary injunction. The further proceedings before the Tribunal are not stayed. It is open to the Tribunal to consider the question of dissolution of injunction if and when it is applied for in response to Exhibit A. Sd|- B. Venkataswami, Judge 1-7-1s76" between 9-3-1976 and 1-7-1976, the Land Tribunal had inspected the lands and had also recorded the evidence of the parties placed before it. As the order of Venkataswami, J, expressly authorised the Land Tribunal to proceed with the enquiry and pass orders, the Land Tribunal, after recording further evidence and hearing oral and written arguments has pronounced its orders on 25-8-1976. In the forefront of his case, Shri P. Viswanatha Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that the proceedings conducted by the Land Tribunal like spot inspection and the evidence recorded between 9-3-1976 and 1-7-1976 were in express disregard of the interim order dated 9-3-1976 and the same was a nullity and therefore the order of the Land Tribunal has necessarily to be held as a nullity and the case remitted to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal. Shri B. V. Acharya, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 while refuting the contentions of Shri P. Viswanatha Shetty, urged that the interim order of stay was only with reference to the exparte order of temporary injunction that had been granted by the Tribunal and there was no stay of the main proceedings pending before the Tribunal. He also urged that there was considerable doubt about the true scope and ambit of the stay order dated 9-3-1976 isseued by this Court and the Tribunal evidently construing the order of this Court as not prohibiting it from recording evidence, has proceeded with the enquiry in which the petitioner has fully participated and at the highest what has happened was only an irregularity in the proceedings which has not occasioned any failure of justice to the petitioner. Shri P. Viswanatha Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, fairly stated before me that the petitioner or her husband except stating that the enquiry should not be conducted on 18-5-1976 as per exhibit E, did not take any further objection to the inspection of the lands by the members of the Tribunal, recording of evidence between 9-3-1976 and 1-7-1976 and she has participated in the proceedings at all stages without any demur. It is noteworthy that the petitioner during the very said period has examined three witnesses and her husband and power of attorney holder Raghunath Shetty and has produced a large number of documents in support of her case. It must be remembered that when the Land Tribunal recorded further evidence, heard oral and written arguments and pronounced its orders, there was no stay in operation. Even if I were to remit the case to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal, the result would not in any way be different. A remand to the Tribunal assuming that the Land Tribunal was not well advised in Inspecting the lands and recording considerable or all the evidence, would only add to the agony and unnecessary costs to both the parties without any real benefit to any of them. Such a course instead of advancing justice would occasion failure of justice to both the parties. I, therefore, reject the contention of Shri P. Viswanatha Shetty. ( 3 ) SHRI P. Viswanatha Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the order of the Land Tribunal is vitiated by reason of personal bias of respondent No. 3, a member of the Land Tribunal who has participated in the proceedings and decided the case. In sub-para (e) of para 4 of the writ petition, the petitioner has averred that respondent no. 3 was a candidate for the Karnataka Legislative Assembly during the year 1957 and 1962 from Bramhavar Constituency and that her husband and other family members had opposed his candidature and had supported his rival candidate who had contested oh Congress party ticket and therefore he has been nursing a grievance against the petitioner, her husband and other family members. 3 was a candidate for the Karnataka Legislative Assembly during the year 1957 and 1962 from Bramhavar Constituency and that her husband and other family members had opposed his candidature and had supported his rival candidate who had contested oh Congress party ticket and therefore he has been nursing a grievance against the petitioner, her husband and other family members. In his return, respondent No. 3 has asserted that when the elections in 1957 and 1962 were held to Bramhavar constituency, Yadthari village where the petitioner, her husband and other members of her family are living, was not part of Bramhavar Constituency and therefore the petitioner, her husband and the other members of her family either opposing him or supporting his rival candidate would hot arise. In the subsequent elections held in the year 1967, respondent no. 3 states that he did not contest the elections. In clear and emphatic terms, respondent No. 3 has denied the allegations of personal bias attributed by the petitioner against him. In answer to the assertions made by respondent No. 3, the petitioner has not filed any reply and has not produced any material before this Court to accept her plea of personal bias by respondent No. 3. Shri P. Viswanatha Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, did not dispute the fact that Yadthadi village was not part of Bhamhavar Constituency when elections were held in the years 1957 and 1962. When the village in which the petitioner and her husband reside are not part of the Constituency, in the normal circumstances to say that they have worked against respondent no. 3 and therefore he is out to wreak vengeance against them is somewhat difficult to accept and act. It is well to remember that respondent No. 3 is also in the position of a Judge. In my view, the petitioner without any justification and material has alleged bias by respondent no. 3 believing any stick is a good stick to void the order of the Land tribunal. I, therefore, hold that there is no substance in the plea of bias made by the petitioner against respondent No. 3. In my view, the petitioner without any justification and material has alleged bias by respondent no. 3 believing any stick is a good stick to void the order of the Land tribunal. I, therefore, hold that there is no substance in the plea of bias made by the petitioner against respondent No. 3. ( 4 ) SHRI P. Viswanatha Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, next contended that the Land Tribunal had ignored the legal presumption arising under Sec. 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1964 Act") in respect of the entries found in the RTC records and had rejected them on ideological bias and therefore the order of the Land Tribunal is vitiated. In support of his contention, Shri p. Viswanatha Shetty, strongly relied on the ruling of this Court in Laxmi Shedthi v. Land Tribunal, Udupi, WA. 549/76 dt. 8-11-1977. It is true that the Land tribunal has to bear in mind the legal presumption under Sec. 133 of the 1964 Act and cannot reject the entries on ideological prejudices or bias. But the question is whether there has been any such infirmity in the order of the Land Tribunal. A reading of the order of the Land Tribunal would show that it has kept before it the legal presumption available under Sec. 133 of the 1964 Act and had rejected the entries found in the rtc records having regard to the evidence placed before it. It has not rejected the entries on ideological bias as contended by Sri P. Viswanatha shetty. In recording its finding that the entries in the RTC records did not truly reflect the state of facts, the Land Tribunal has relied on the evidence of one Ram Marakal and the evidence of other witnesses which according to it established that respondent No. 1 was the tenant of the lands in question and was in actual possession and that the Record of Rights had been introduced in the District of South Kanara from 1967-68 and in many a case such entries did not correctly reflect the true state of facts. In my view, the Tribunal has kept before it the Iegal presumption available under Sec. 133 of the 1964 Act but has rejected the entries on the legal evidence placed before it, which it was entitled to and therefore the order of the Land Tribunal is not vitiated as contended by Shri P. Viswanatha shetty. ( 5 ) SHRI P. Viswanatha Shetty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the order of the Land Tribunal is vitiated as it has relied on irrelevant material. According to Shri Viswanatha Shetty any document that has come into existence after 1-3-1974 is an irrelevant material and cannot be relied upon by the Land Tribunal to decide whether the lands were tenanted on 1-3-1974 or not. In my view, this contention of shri Viswanatha Shetty is not supported by any legal principle or authority. In order to decide whether a person is a tenant or not as on 1-3-1974 it cannot be said in absolute terms that the documents that have come into existence after 1-3-1974 are totally irrelevant. As to what value should be attached to those documents is a matter entirely for the facts finding authority to decide. In Laxmi Shedthi's case (l) this court has not accepted * similar contention urged by Sri Viswanatha shetty Apart from the above, the finding of the Tribunal is not based solely on the documents that have come into existence after 1-3-1974. Even the petitioner herself had produced a number of documents that have come into existence after 1-3-1974 and has relied on them before the land Tribunal. In relying on documents that have come into existence after 1-3-1974, I do not think that the Land Tribunal has committed any illegality. ( 6 ) SHRI P. Viswanatha Shetty vehemently contended that the Land tribunal had merely paraphrased the evidence placed before it and has recorded its findings without a critical appraisal of the evidence placed before it and therefore the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the case remitted to the Land Tri for fresh disposal. In the impugned order the land Tri after noticing the respective cases of the parties and the evidence of the witnesses, has critically examined the evidence of every one of the witnesses and the documents placed before it and has taken into consi- oeration all the relevant circumstances and has recorded its findings. In the impugned order the land Tri after noticing the respective cases of the parties and the evidence of the witnesses, has critically examined the evidence of every one of the witnesses and the documents placed before it and has taken into consi- oeration all the relevant circumstances and has recorded its findings. It has evaluated the evidence of each witness. It has given reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence of every one of the witnesses. In order to show that there is absolutely no merit in this contention of Shri p. Viswanatha Shetty, it is useful to extract as to what has been said by the Land Tribunal on the evidence of one Shri Gidunaika uncle of respondent No. 1, who is the star witness for the petitioner before the Land tribunal. This is what the Land Tribunal has to say about his evidence: * * * anyone reading the above discussion of the Land Tribunal, cannot say that there has been no critical appraisal of the evidence placed before it by the Land Tribunal. In respect of the other witnesses also, the Land tribunal has adopted the same pattern. In the guise of examining whether the Tribunal has critically evaluated the evidence or not, it is not open to me to re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at a different conclusion. I ,therefore, hold that there is no substance in the criticism of shri Viswanatha Shetty that there has been no critical appraisal of the evidence placed before it and the Land Tribunal has recorded its findings without any evaluation of the evidence. ( 7 ) LASTLY Shri P. Viswanatha Shetty contended that as respondent no. 1 had claimed occupancy rights for different and distinct lands, the land Tribunal should have found with reference to each land whether the same had been tenanted or not and in the absence of such a finding its order is vitiated. It is not the case of Shri Viswanatha Shetty that the petitioner had urged any specific and different contention in respect of each land. Before the Land Tribunal, the only case urged by the petitioner was that respondent No. 1 was a hired labourer and was not her tenant. She had not pleaded that in respect of any particular land that respondent No. 1 was not her tenant. Before the Land Tribunal, the only case urged by the petitioner was that respondent No. 1 was a hired labourer and was not her tenant. She had not pleaded that in respect of any particular land that respondent No. 1 was not her tenant. In case there was any such contention, undoubtedly the Land Tribunal was required to examine that case and decide it. In the face of a general contention and in the absence of a specific contention with reference to any particular piece of land i do not see any merit in the contention of Shri Viswanatha Shetty. ( 8 ) ALL the contentions urged by Shri P. Viswanatha Shetty against the impugned order fail. I, therefore, hold that there is no merit in this writ petition and the rule is liable to be discharged. ( 9 ) RULE discharged with costs of respondent No. 1. Advocate's fee Rs. 250. 00. --- *** --- .