Ashok Kumar v. I Additional District Judge, Nainital
1978-11-16
K.C.AGARWAL
body1978
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This writ petition is directed against a judgment of the First Additional District Judge Nainital dated 20-5-1976. 2. The dispute is with regard to a building situated at Nainital commonly known as "Waverly Quarters" and also known as "Hotel Waldrof". According to the petitioners, this had been let out to Kesar Singh on an annual rent of Rs. 14,000/-. Kesar Singh fell in arrears of rent. Consequently, suit no. 27 of 1972 was filed by the petitioners against him for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent. During the pendency of the suit, on 5-4-73, the petitioners filed an application for release under section 16 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the ground that the building was required by them for their personal occupation. On 9-5-1973, the suit was decreed. After the suit was decreed, a report was submitted by the Inspector on 21-5-1973. As the premises was not vacant on 21st May, 1973, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer directed the Inspector to submit another report after the premises has fallen vacant. In the meantime on 5th May, 1973 Harbans Singh, respondent No. 3 also filed an application for allotment. In execution of the decree obtained in suit No. 27 of 1972, the petitioners succeeded in getting possession of the premises on 15th June, 1973. Thereafter, the petitioners filed an application reminding the authorities for passing an order on the release application. Another report was obtained from the Rent Control Inspector. Before any final order could be passed on the application for release, made by the petitioners, respondent No. 3 filed an objection to the release application. The objection was dismissed on 23-11-1973 with the finding that as a release is a matter between the landlord and the District authorities, the respondent No. 3 had no right to file an objection to the same. Finally, on 8th January, 1974 a release order was made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in favour of the petitioners. Against the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal to the District Judge. The appeal was accepted and the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 18th January, 1974 was set aside.
Finally, on 8th January, 1974 a release order was made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in favour of the petitioners. Against the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal to the District Judge. The appeal was accepted and the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 18th January, 1974 was set aside. While allowing the appeal the learned Additional District Judge directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to give an opportunity to respondent No. 3 to be heard in support of his case. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 3. The main question that arises for determination in this writ petition is whether the order of remand, made by the First Additional District Judge, was justified in law. For this purpose, it is important to notice the case of respondent No. 3. The same was that he was a partner of the firm consisting of himself and Keshar Singh and that this firm was doing business in the premises in dispute. The respondent No. 3 had also claimed that he had become a tenant of the premises along with Keshar Singh and as suit was not filed against him, he was not bound by the decree given in that suit. In this connection he also asserted that he was entitled to continue in possession despite the decree obtained by the petitioners in suit no. 27 of 1972. 4. Shri Radha Krishna, counsel for the petitioner, controverted the aforesaid allegations of respondent No. 3 and urged that respondent No. 3 was not a tenant of the premises and that the premises had been let out to Keshar Singh against whom the suit had been filed and the decree had been obtained. He further contended that Harbans Singh, respondent No. 3 had subsequently set up himself to defeat the decree which had been obtained by the petitioners against Shri Keshar Singh. He contended that liarbaas Singh had never been admitted as a tenant by the petitioners and that he could not claim any right on that basis. 5. It is, however, not necessary for me to express any opinion on the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties.
He contended that liarbaas Singh had never been admitted as a tenant by the petitioners and that he could not claim any right on that basis. 5. It is, however, not necessary for me to express any opinion on the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. I may only point out that an objection had been filed by respondent No. 3 to the release application on the ground that since he was a sitting tenant and that the premises was not vacant, the premises could not be released in favour of the petitioners. The order deciding the objection dated 23rd November, 1973 since was not appealable under section 18 of the Act the correctness of the said order could be challenged by the respondent No. 3 in the appeal which had been filed by him against the release order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 18th January, 1974. It cannot be denied that respondent No. 3 had not been heard in support objection which had been disposed of on 23rd November, 1973. That being so, the learned Additional District Judge cannot be held to be incorrect in remanding the matter back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for deciding the objection of respondent No. 3. 6. The next question that arises for decision is whether the release order made in favour of the petitioners was valid. The validity of this release order had been challenged by respondent No. 3 on the ground that since the said respondent was in possession the premises was not vacant. This controversy also requires to be gone into. 7. The next submission made by the learned counsel was that there were co-sharers more than the one the application for release made for the benefit of one could not be granted. The submission had been rightly repelled by the court below. It is now a settled law that an application for release can be filed by some of the landlords for satisfying their own need and it is not necessary that all of them must requires the premises for purposes of occupation. In Kanta Goyal v. B.P. Pathak, 1977(1) R.C.J. 735 , the Supreme Court was called upon to consider this question.
In Kanta Goyal v. B.P. Pathak, 1977(1) R.C.J. 735 , the Supreme Court was called upon to consider this question. Holding that a co-owner is as much owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property, the Supreme Court held that the law has been put beyond doubt that the absence of the other co-owners on record did not disentitled the co-owners applying for eviction of the tenant. This controversy is, therefore, concluded and will not be permitted to be reopened by the Prescribed Authority. 8. Sri Radha Krishna, counsel appearing for the petitioners also pointed out that under the impugned order of the First Additional District Judge the petitioners have been required to handover the possession of the premises to respondent No. 3. I do not find any such direction in the order. However, for the purposes of clearing the doubt I wish to mention that the petitioners are not required to handover the possession of the premises to respondent No. 3 till the proceedings are decided by the Prescribed Authority. 9. Sri K.P. Agrawal, counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3, however, contended that as Rule 13 has now been amended and under the amended rule the respondent No. 3 had acquired a right to challenge the bona fide requirement of the premises by the petitioners this Court may give a direction to the Prescribed Authority to consider the objection of respondent No. 3 against the release application filed by the petitioners. I am not called upon to go into this controversy. If the law has been amended and the amendment has retrospective effect, the consequences which Mr. K.P. Agrawal has argued has got to follow. 10. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.