JUDGMENT A.K. Sharma, M. - This appeal has been filed by Dori Lal, defendant appellant (District Hardoi), againt the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division the dated 8, 1974, whereby he upheld the judgment and decree of the learned trial court dated March 26, 1974 in a suit under section 176 of Z.A. and L.R. Act. The trial court decreed the suit of Dina and two others with costs. 2. Briefly the facts are that plaintiffs Deena, Shiv Raj and Raghuraj filed a suit under section 176 Z.A. and L.R. Act against Dori Lal, Nanhoo and Krishan Lal, (Gaon Sabha not contesting), in respect of several plots as given in the plaint claiming that the land was ancestral coming down from their grandfather, Munnoo, and that the shares devolved in accordance with the admitted pedigree as given in the plaint, i.e., th share to Deena, ?th share each to plaintiffs 2 and 3 and defendants 1 and 3, and th share to defendant No. 2. The land on the death of the grandfather devolved upon his two sons Bhoop, and Tika from whom the parties have inherited in their turn. Nanhoo and Deena are the sons of Tika while Shiv Raj and Raghuraj plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 and Dori Lal and Kishan Lal defendants Nos. 1 and 3 are sons of Bhoop. The plaintiff alleged that on the death of their grandfather, the name of one son Tika alone was recorded and the name of Bhoop was not recorded as he was a man of unsound mind. It is further alleged that on the death of Tika the names of his sons Deena and Nanhoo were entered but the name of Dori Lal, defendant No. 1 was also entered along with them in a representative capacity. During consolidation two applications were made by Dori Lal praying for the expunction of the the names of two outsiders and for entry of the names of his three brothers, Kishan Lal, Shiv Raj and Raghuraj; but there was a compromise settlement on the basis of which the Consolidation Officer passed an order. But while this order is recorded in the Khatauni, but it was not implemented in C.H. Form 23 and 45 and that these three names could not come on record along with that of Dori Lal. But while this order is recorded in the Khatauni, but it was not implemented in C.H. Form 23 and 45 and that these three names could not come on record along with that of Dori Lal. The plaintiffs alleged that they were all co-tenants and they should be given their due share. The defendants contested on the ground that the land was not ancestral but acquired by Tika and Dori alone and that after the death of Tika his share devolved on Deena plaintiff No. 1 and Nanhoo, defendant No. 2, and consequently the shares belonged to the two sons of Tika and to Dori in equal shares. Further they alleged that no dispute arose during consolidation proceedings and that proceedings relating to the two applications of Dori and the alleged compromise were fraudulent. They further alleged that section 49 of the C.H. Act barred the suit. Further they alleged that as the plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 were unrecorded, they had no right to file a suit for partition and they had first to seek a declaration of their co-tenancy rights, impleading the State Government also as a party. Nanhoo, defendant No. 2 support the case of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 3. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant referring to para 8 of the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner argued that it was a defective judgment, because it dealt with only two issues whereas the trial court had given its findings on as many as 8 issues. He said that plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 having no entry in their favour in the revenue records, could not have maintained a suit for partition and that the plaint ought to have been one for declaration of the rights of plaintiffs 2 and 3 as well as for partition. He, therefore, contended that the suit was not maintainable; and, further, as declaration of rights was necessarily involved, the State Government ought to have been a partly and that the suit as it stood, was clearly not maintainable. Learned counsel further referred to the bar of Section 49 C.H. Act and argued that if the order of the C.O. was not incorporated in C.H. 45, the remedy to the aggrieved party lay before the Consolidation authority itself and the matter could not be agitated after the close of the consolidation. Learned counsel further referred to the bar of Section 49 C.H. Act and argued that if the order of the C.O. was not incorporated in C.H. 45, the remedy to the aggrieved party lay before the Consolidation authority itself and the matter could not be agitated after the close of the consolidation. He cited a ruling in the unreported case of July, 1977, Singhal and Anr. v. The Board of Revenue, U.P. and others, a certified copy of which is on record in which it was held that the suit was not maintainable for executing the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), if it had not been given effect to in the consolidation records and that the revenue courts were not competent to entertain the matter. He referred to the observations of the learned Additional Commissioner in para 8 wherein he had stated that it was a question only of implementation or Amaldaramad of the order of the competent Consolidation authorities and that there did not appear to be any incorrectness or illegality in the judgment of the trial court. He said that this observation was contrary to the ruling cited above, and that, therefore, the judgment could not be upheld. He said that in C.H. Forms 23 and 45 the names of the sons of Tika and the name of Dori appear together consistently. He referred to the extract of Khatauni 1359 F. in which only those three names were recorded and there it is also recorded that the tenancy in the names of these three persons stands for the last 30 years starting 1330 F. He referred to the certified copy of the objection filed by Dori Lal on March 26, 1957 in respect of two plots Nos. 396 and 398 which were not concerned with the plaint but in which certain orders were passed and the records were accordingly corrected by the Consolidation Officer. This objection was the basis of case No. 41 under section 12 of the Consolidation Holdings Act. He referred to the other objection allegedly filed by Dori Lal on the same date (March 26, 1957), which curiously enough originated a case of the same number (41) as with the previous objection, a thing which was impossible under the procedure. He also pointed out that earlier objection related to Khata No. 167 and the second objection related to Khata No. 82. He also pointed out that earlier objection related to Khata No. 167 and the second objection related to Khata No. 82. He said that the plaint in the present suit was filed on November 6, 1971 (through drafted on October 27, 1971), while an application for certified copies of objections and C.O.'s order and the statements were made on August 4, 1971 (one application) and October 28, 1971 (rest) and copies were obtained on October 29, 1971. He meant to say that the plaint was filed after all these manipulations had been made, because for 11 years ever since 1957 the entries had been continuing undisturbed. He said that the fact that no suit was filed up to 11 years, also supports his contention that the suit was filed after the manipulations had been managed. He referred to the Khatauni of 1363F. and said that the entry made by the Lekhpal had no basis, because it was not in pursuance of any order of any court. Moreover, he said that the order could not have been entered into the pre-consolidation Khatauni but into C.H. Form 20, which was the clean Khatauni prepared by the consolidation authorities. He said that no C.H. Form contains their names. He also pointed out that the plots in dispute did not tally with those recorded in 1359 F. and were not properly identifiable. Lastly, he pointed with reference to para 26 that Dori Lal did not put his thumb impression but always signed in Urdu. 4-5. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that in 1301 F. settlement Khatauni the name of Munno only is found on this holding while in 1331 F. settlement Khatauni the name of Munno only is found on this holding while in 1331 F. settlement Khatauni the name of Tika alone is recorded as a statutory tenant. He then pointed out that in 1359 F. by when Tika had died, the names of Deena and Nanhoo sons of Tika and of Dori Lal son of Bhoop were recorded and that Dori Lal's name came to be recorded in a representative capacity. He said that Nanhoo, defendant No. son of Tika, had fully supported the case of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 3 During consolidation on report of the Asstt. He said that Nanhoo, defendant No. son of Tika, had fully supported the case of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 3 During consolidation on report of the Asstt. Consolidation Officer on an application dated March 26, 1957 made by Dori Lal the Consolidation Officer passed an order on March 30, 1957 (1364 F.) and this order was given effect to in 1363 F. Khatauni. He contended that this order was bound to be given effect to in the C.H. Forms 23 and 45 also and it was a mistake apparent on the face of the record of consolidation, if it was not so done. As to manipulations, he pointed out that no such question was raised of application, A.C.O.'s report and the C.O.'s order, filed in the trial court and that it was too late in the day to raise in the day to raise such a contention, particularly when defendant No. 3, the brother of the appellant had conceded the pleadings of the plaintiff-respondents and the appellant Dori Lal made no denials on this point. Rather, he pointed out, the fact was the C.O. passed the order on the application made by the appellant himself during consolidation on which the C.O.'s order was passed and that his statement existed in the consolidation record. He, therefore, said that there was no question of the application of the bar of Section 49, C.H. Act. He pointed out that under section 27 of the Act such mistakes of omission can be corrected and, whereas the order was entered in the remarks columns, the entries ought also to have been made. He then said that no other points than the ones dealt with by the learned Additional Commissioner in his judgment were argued before him, and other points could not be agitated in second appeal. As to the maintainability of the suit, he said that Dori, one of the plaintiffs who is co-tenant, is already on record and the suit for partition was maintainable, but more particularly, as the names of all the plaintiffs and defendant No. 3 were entered by the consolidation authority in the Khatauni and that it was a baseless contention that they were unrecorded and could not bring a suit for partition. He also pointed that no separate suits were instituted for each objection filed rather objections regarding a Khata relating to title were dealt with together. 6. He also pointed that no separate suits were instituted for each objection filed rather objections regarding a Khata relating to title were dealt with together. 6. I have also gone through the record of the case. 7. Certain points may be disposed of before I come to the crucial issue. The question of identifiability of plots cannot be raised in second appeal when it was never made an issue ever since suit was filed. I am satisfied from the evidence on record that the land in dispute is specific and is continuing since the time of Munnoo, the common ancestor, except for the deduction for common purposes made out of its area during consolidation. C.H. Form 41, which gives the list of old and new plots places the matter beyond controversy. As regards separate suits for each separate objections, I find that in Rule 25 of the Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954, sub-rule (c) (ii) requires the A.C.O. to get separate files opened not for each objection, but for each of the categories of objections mentioned in sub-Clause (i) of this sub-Rule. There is, however, substance in the argument that correction could not have been ordered by the C.O. to be made in the Khatauni of 1363 F., but should have been entered in C.H. Form 20 which was still current for consolidation. 8. The crucial point is whether the plaintiff can claim partition on the basis of the order of the Consolidation Officer dated March 30, 1957, through it was not incorporated in C.H. Forms 23 and 15. The yet unreported in C.H. Forms 23 and 15. The yet unreported ruling of the Hon'ble High Court, Allahabad, (Satish Chandra, J.) in Surendra Kumar Singhal and another v. Board of Revenue and others decided on July 7, 1977 is very relevant to this case and is as follows:- "In may opinion the suit is not maintainable. The plaintiff's grievance was that the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) had not been given effect to in the consolidation records. There is no averment that the plaintiffs ever applied for the requisite correction. They could have asked the Settlement Officer to pass suitable directions. They could have also gone to the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision if they had any grievance on that score. There is no averment that the plaintiffs ever applied for the requisite correction. They could have asked the Settlement Officer to pass suitable directions. They could have also gone to the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision if they had any grievance on that score. But neither did the plaintiffs adopt any proceedings nor was there any allegation in the plaint explaining the omission or that the consolidation authorities refused to do the needful in spite of plaintiff's attempt. Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit, the relief wherein, in substance, is to do something which could be done by appropriate proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Even though the suit was ostensibly for division of a holding but it was also for a declaration of a title in substance, the present suit is virtually for execution of the order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). That cannot be done by regular revenue courts. If the plaintiff had applied before the consolidation authorities, the defendants would also have been heard and various pleas taken in this suit to challenge the validity of the orders passed by the Civil Judge or the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) would have been gone into. The defendants case is that the Settlement Officer passed the order behind their back. This could also have been looked into. In my opinion, it was not open to the regular courts to go into the disputes in question because of the bar of section 49." In the instant case it was not the S.O.(C)'s order, but, lower down, the order of the C.O. The aggrieved parties had full opportunity to have the order of the C.O. implemented during Consolidation. They did not do so. In the light of the ruling cited above in detail, the plaintiff-respondents could not have validly prayed for correction of the Consolidation record, virtually asking that the order of the C.O. should be executed in the course of the partition proceedings. I hold that the question of title of the plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 and of defendant No. 3 was not upheld during consolidation and only the title of the two sons of Tika (Dina aid Nankoo) and of defendant No. 1 (Dori) was upheld as co-tenants. I hold that the question of title of the plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 and of defendant No. 3 was not upheld during consolidation and only the title of the two sons of Tika (Dina aid Nankoo) and of defendant No. 1 (Dori) was upheld as co-tenants. Not only there was no move to question C.H. 23 or have any correction made in C.H. 45 during consolidation to have the C.O.'s order implemented, but also for years after Consolidation the Khatauni carried the names of the three persons only, as mentioned above. There is, therefore, no going behind the determination of title during Consolidation. The case is not one of correction at all. The learned Courts below fell into the grievous error of thinking that only the C.O.'s order had to implemented, without considering that the law of consolidation enjoins upon parties to have their rights determined and recorded or record corrected and if they do not do so, during consolidation they have no right to come up afterwards at leisure. The conceding of the plaint case by defendants 2 and 3 in their written statement is of no consequence. No rights can be created in that fashion. 9. The argument that partition can be claimed, because Dina, one of the plaintiffs, is already on record and the names of all the plaintiffs and defendant No. 3 were ordered to be recorded by the C.O. and were actually entered in a Khatauni, is of no avail in the light of the above discussions. The final disposition of the title of the Co-tenure-holders done by the Consolidation Authorities is the only valid basis for partition. The Khatauni of 1359 F. bore only 3 names with a standing of thirty years and only these three names were entered on the land in dispute during consolidation and continued as such thereafter. 10. I, therefore, find that the appeal has force and must succeed. The appeal is allowed and the orders of the learned courts below are hereby set aside. 11. Under the circumstances of this case, there is no order as to costs.