JUDGMENT A.K. Sharma, M. - The following issue has been referred to this Bench for decision: "Whether the proceedings before an Assistant Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division or a Tahsildar under Section 122-A, read with section 128(2)(k) and Rule 110-A, sub-rules (2) are judicial proceedings and the Board has jurisdiction to interfere under section 333 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act." 2. We have heard the learned counsels for parties. 3. I appears that during the consolidation operations, one Ram Prasad was declared to be Bhumidhar and Chak was carved out in his name. Before the finalisation of the consolidation operations, Ram Prasad died. On his death, one Smt. Laungshree claimed to be the daughter of the deceased and applied for mutation. The opposite parties claimed themselves to be the sons of the second daughter of the deceased, Ram Prasad. Gaon Sabha claimed that Ram Prasad had died heir less. In reconciliation proceedings, mutation was ordered in favour of the two contending opposite parties. The Gaon Sabha filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, who set aside the order passed in reconciliation proceeding and remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer for decision on merits. Thereafter, One Smt. Mithana also applied for mutation of her name, styling herself to be the sister of the deceased. In the meanwhile, a revision application was filed against the order of remand before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and on its being dismissed, a writ petition was preferred to the Hon'ble High Court which was also dismissed. Thereafter, the Consolidation Officer took up the case, but before it could be concluded, the Pradhan on the basis of resolution dated October 3, 1972, admitting relationship of the opposite parties 2 and 4 and 6 applied to the Sub-divisional Officer under Rule 110-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules to enter into a compromise. Gurdeen and others objected to it. The learned S.D.O., however, granting the permission to the Pradhan to file a compromise on behalf of the Gaon Sabha. Against this order, revision was preferred before the learned Additional Commissioner, who held that the order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer was an executive order and recommended to the Board that the revision be dismissed. The learned Single Member who heard the revision has referred the aforesaid issue to the Bench. 4. Against this order, revision was preferred before the learned Additional Commissioner, who held that the order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer was an executive order and recommended to the Board that the revision be dismissed. The learned Single Member who heard the revision has referred the aforesaid issue to the Bench. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that the Sub-Divisional Officer is admittedly a court sub ordinate to the Board and and any order passed by it is revisable by the Board. He has stated that the order passed by the trial court amounts to proceedings decided and hence a revision lies. According to him, if there is a lis between the parties, which is determined, it will amount to a judicial order. He has said that the learned S.D.O, on the report of Naib Tahsildar, at first refused to grant permission and later on he reviewed his own order and granted the permission. He has pleaded that the S.D.O. got evidence recorded and decided the application in a judicial manner and his order cannot be termed as administrative' or 'executive' order. In support of his argument, he has referred to the provisions of Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act AND submitted that this court is empowered to call for the record. He argued that the granting of permission is no doubt at the discretion of the S.D.O. but the grant of permission is not a purely executive matter. He has added that the revisionist is interested only in safeguarding the interest of the Gaon Sabha and he has nothing to gain for himself. 5. The learned counsel of the opposite parties has submitted in reply that permission of the S.D.O. does not amount to a decision of a case. According to him, the S.D.O. discharges two types of functions i.e. executive and judicial, and that judicial orders only would be covered by the provisions by Section 333. He has contended that the matter regarding grant of permission does not involve a lis or dispute between the parties and there arises no question of any determination of dispute between the parties. He has contended that the proceedings under Rule 110-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules are not judicial proceedings nor does the S.D.O. act as a court while disposing of those proceedings. He has contended that the proceedings under Rule 110-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules are not judicial proceedings nor does the S.D.O. act as a court while disposing of those proceedings. He has therefore, urged that the view taken by the learned Additional Commissioner was correct. 6. We have carefully considered the arguments so ably advanced by learned counsels of both the sides. We are of the view that the Assist. Collector in-charge of the Sub-division or the Tahsildar acting under Rule 110-A, sub-rule (2) of the Z.A. and L.R. Rules is acting in his executive capacity and not judicial capacity, and the sub-rule places a safeguard that the suit or proceeding in question should not be pending in their court. The matter for decision relating to whether the claim of an opposite party should be admitted, or a compromise entered into, or a suit or proceedings withdrawn by the Gaon Sabha should have the previous permission in writing given by the Asstt. Collector in-charge of a Sub-division or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, and the order contain this permission will bear duly the seal of his office. Without this seal the order will not consider authentic and the penal Lawyer or the court will not take cognizance of it and call for a fresh order. It is obvious that the matter is for the Gaon Sabha to take before the Asstt. Collector in-charge of the Sub-division or the Tahsildar and he will look into the propriety of the proposal and accord the permission in the manner prescribed if he was satisfied. There are no other parties involved and the Sub-divisional Officer or the Tahsildar acting under this rule act in exercise of his powers of superintendence and control. They are not required to issue notice or call parties or frame issues. It is an executive matter and, as in all such a matter, the decision has to be reasonable, equitable just and in accordance with public policy. 7. The order containing the permission has to be submitted in the court where the proceedings are pending and it is only when it is submitted there that it becomes part of the judicial proceedings. It is to be noted that even the panel lawyer will not take notice of the order if it is not accompanied with the seal of the office. It is to be noted that even the panel lawyer will not take notice of the order if it is not accompanied with the seal of the office. The adjudicating court can order for a fresh order of the S.D.O. or the Tahsildar, if it is found defective. All this shows that the order is executive in nature. 8. The order containing the said permission after being submitted in the adjudicating court, cannot itself be the order of the adjudicating court concerning it that could be the subject of a revision. 9. We, therefore, answer the reference holding that the Assistant Collector in-charge of a Sub-division of the Tahsildar acting under sub-rule (2) of Rule 110-A is not acting in his judicial but in his executive capacity and the proceedings before him are not judicial proceedings and do not invoke interference under Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act.