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1978 DIGILAW 112 (GUJ)

BHALCHANDRA GOPALRAV TAMBEKAR v. DAKOR TOWN MUNICIPALITY

1978-09-12

S.H.SHETH

body1978
S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) ISSUES arise out of pleadings and not de hors them. It is the duty of the trial Court to see what are the rival contentions raised by the parties And what issues arise for trial between them. Merely because amendment incorporated in paragraph 26a of the written statement was allowed it was absolutely irrelevant in my opinion it does not mean that an issue must necessarily be raised. Firstly an irrelevant amendment does not give rise to an issue. Secondly the issue must have bearing on the pleadings apart from the fact whether a particular pleading is relevant or irrelevant. ( 2 ) THE issue which the learned trial Judge has referred to the competent authority is as under: Whether the suit land is a Dharod land under the Devasthan Inams Abolition Act? When he framed this issue he did not notice the definition of Devasthan inam given in sec. 7 (6) and the definition of Devasthan land given in sec. 2 (7) of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolish Act 1969 Devasthan inam has been defined by sec. 2 (6) in the following terms:". . . . an inam consisting of a grant or recognition as a grant (a) of a village portion of a village or land whether such grant be (i) of soil with or without exemption from payment of land revenue or (ii) assignment of the whole of the land revenue or the village portion of the village or as the case may be and or of a share of such land revenue or (iii) of total or partial exemption from payment of land revenue in respect of any land. It is not necessary for the purpose of this judgment to reproduce clause (b) of sub-sec. (6) of sec. 2 which deals with Inams in the form of cash allowance or allowance in kind. Therefore a land can be called a Devasthan inam land only if there is a grant thereof to its grantee by the State or if it has been recognized by the State as a grant to its grantee. In the instant case there are no pleadings whatsoever to show that the suit land was granted by the State either to the present plaintiff or to its predecessor-in-title the father of the Manager of the present plaintiff. In the instant case there are no pleadings whatsoever to show that the suit land was granted by the State either to the present plaintiff or to its predecessor-in-title the father of the Manager of the present plaintiff. Next there are no pleadings to show that the suit land is Devasthan land within the meaning of that expression given in sec. 2 (7) of the said Act. Devasthan land has been defined as a village portion of a village or land held under a Devasthan inam. Therefore the expressions Devasthan land and Devasthan inam are interlinked. There cannot be a Devasthan land or Devasthan inam unless there is grant thereof by the State to its grantee or the recognition by the State of its grant to the grantee. In the instant case there are no pleadings whatsoever to give rise even to a doubt that the suit land is a Devasthan inam land. Therefore the learned trial Judge was in error in so far as he failed to notice what is Devasthan inam and what is Devasthan land within the meaning of those expressions given in Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 He ought not to have raised Issue No. 1b in the form in which he did giving rise to a lot of uncalled for mischief. 9 Sec. 20 which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court provides as follows: No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled decided or dealt with by the officer authorised under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 or sec. 25 or the Collector the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in appeal of the State Government its appeal or revision or in exercise of their powers of control. therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred only in respect of questions which are required to be settled decided or dealt with by the authorised officer by or under the said Act. Therefore if there is a question which is required by the Act to be settled decided or dealt with by the special forum created by the said Act obviously the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. Therefore if there is a question which is required by the Act to be settled decided or dealt with by the special forum created by the said Act obviously the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. Similarly if there is a question which arises under the Act and which is required to be settled decided or dealt with then it must be settled decided or dealt with by the officer authorised under the said Act. Sec. 4 gives an indication of what arises under the Act. Sub-sec. (1) thereof provides as follows:if any question arises (a) whether any village portion of a village or land is held under a Devasthan inam or (b) whether any Devasthan inam consists of (i) merely a total or partial exemption from payment of land revenue or (ii) assignment of soil with or without exemption from payment of land revenue or (iii) assignment of land revenue of a village portion of village or land or a share in such land revenue or (c) whether any person is an inamdar authorised holder unauthorised holder or inferior holder the State Government shall after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard and holding a formal inquiry decide the question: provided that the State Government may authorised any officer (hereinafter in this section referred to as the authorised officer) to decide in the like manner questions arising under clause (a) (b) or (c ). The other sub-sections of sec. 4 are not relevant for the purpose of the present judgment. ( 3 ) THE question which arises in the present suit relates to the title which the plaintiff claims to the suit land as against the title which the Dakor Municipality claims to it because the Municipality has contended that under the law under which it is constituted the lands have vested in it. A question of title to a land-assuming that it is a Devasthan inam land-between two tidal claimants is not a question which arises under the said Act. Sub-sec. (4) provides for something which is foreign to the controversy which arises in the present suit. Therefore neither Sec. 4 nor sec. 20 has any application to the instant case. A question of title to a land-assuming that it is a Devasthan inam land-between two tidal claimants is not a question which arises under the said Act. Sub-sec. (4) provides for something which is foreign to the controversy which arises in the present suit. Therefore neither Sec. 4 nor sec. 20 has any application to the instant case. It is inconceivable for me to imagine that the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act 1969 will oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide a pure and simple dispute relating to the title to a land between the two persons and confer jurisdiction upon some specially constituted forum. Firstly therefore no controversy as to whether the suit land is a Devasthan inam or Devasthan land arises out of the pleadings of the present suit. Assuming however that the suit land is Devasthan inam the controversy between the parties is not one which falls under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 4 and therefore the ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court provided by sec. 20 does not come into operation. ( 4 ) NEXT the claim which the Municipality has made is that under the law under which it is constituted the suit land has vested in it. What has been argued in support of the impugned order is that the State Government is a necessary parts because with the abolition of the Devasthan inam the suit land is vested in the State Government. Assuming that the suit land has vested in the State Government it is difficult to imagine how the Municipality can raise this plea as against its original plea that the land has vested in it. It cannot set the simultaneously the title to the suit land in it as well as in the State Government. It appears to me therefore that the pleadings which were incorporated in the written statement originally and by the amendment were incorporated without giving any thought to them. All that probably the Municipality wanted to do was to create as much mischief as possible and to prolong the proceedings to an unending terminus. It is necessary to put down this mischief and to see that the suit is tried in an appropriate manner. Application allowed. .