JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - These two writ petitions arise from a judgment of the Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated April 12, 1977. 2. The dispute in this case is with regard to shop No. 13/20 Chauk, Allahabad. The shop belonged to Narottam Das Tandon. It had been let out to a tenant. That tenant vacated the premises and thereafter the same was allotted to the petitioner on May, 18, 1963. The petitioner is carrying on the business of selling biscuits, lemon drops etc. In that premises. On 22.9.1971, the premises was purchased by Ajai Kumar Jain, the petitioner. In 1974, he filed an application for release of the shop on the ground of his personal requirement. In the said application, the landlord alleged that he was previously a partner of the firm M/s. Our Prasad Hiralal but after he became major, on November 21, 1972, he retired from the firm. The landlord asserted that since he intended to start his own business, the premises was required by him. In paragraph 9 of the application the landlord also contended that he had no egress and ingress for going to the upper portion of the houses in which he was residing with his family members. The egress and ingress was through a very narrow staircase about 18 inches wide and this was also located inside the shop of M/s. Gur Prasad Hiralal. The landlord claimed that so long as the shop of M/s. Gur Prasad Hiralal was open between 9.30 A.M. and 7.30 P.M. the landlord could get access to his residential portion but after the shop was closed the landlord had no access for going to the upper portion. 3. The application was contested by the tenant, who, inter alia, mentioned in the written statement that the business of M/s. Gur Prasad and Hiralal was an ancestral business and that the entire episode about its conversion into a partnership business and the subsequent withdrawal of respondent No. 3 therefrom was a vague and collusive transaction only with a view to make out a case for the ejectment of the petitioner. It was also stated by the tenant that there was no bonafide need of the landlord either for residential or business purpose. The tenant claimed that the landlord lived with his family members at 26 Mahajani Tola in a big and comfortable house. 4. It was also stated by the tenant that there was no bonafide need of the landlord either for residential or business purpose. The tenant claimed that the landlord lived with his family members at 26 Mahajani Tola in a big and comfortable house. 4. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties exchanged affidavits and filed documentary evidence. On 22.1.1977 the Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord holding that the need of the landlord was bonafide. Against the aforesaid order the tenant preferred an appeal. The appeal was partly allowed. The operative portion of the appeal is as under ; "The appeal is partly allowed so as to leave a portion of the disputed premises in possession of the tenant after releasing 3 feet of space in the disputed premises for the stair-case and show case, as mentioned in paragraph 12 of the application of the land- lord." As the tenant felt that the order passed by the appellate authority was vague and incapable of being implemented he filed a review application. The review application was also rejected. As the tenant was aggrieved he filed writ petition no. 1244 of 1977. Writ petition No. 936 of 1977 had been preferred by the landlord against the order of the appellate authority allowing the appeal of the tenant partly to the extent indicated above. 5. Both these writ petitions were consolidated. As the two writ petitions can be disposed of by a common judgment, I propose to do so. 6. Shri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the landlord contended that the need of the landlord was not properly appreciated and the appellate authority wrongly held that he did not require the premises for his occupation. In this connection he pointed only that since the appellate authority did not hold that the need of the landlord was bonafide, the appeal, filed by the tenant, could not be allowed. It cannot, be denied that the appellate authority did not record any finding about the requirement of the landlord for business purposes. It could not allow the appeal of the tenant without holding that the need of the landlord was not bonafide. 7. Sri D. S. Sinha, counsel appearing for the tenant contended that the judgment of the appellate authority was liable to be set aside on two grounds. It could not allow the appeal of the tenant without holding that the need of the landlord was not bonafide. 7. Sri D. S. Sinha, counsel appearing for the tenant contended that the judgment of the appellate authority was liable to be set aside on two grounds. The first submission made by him was that as the need of the tenant was not compared with that of the landlord, the finding of the appellate authority directing the tenant to release 34' space was incorrect. It was also urged that the landlord did not require the area allowed by the appellate authority. 8. After addition of the fourth proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 it became incumbent on the appellate authority to consider the comparative hardship of the parties and to record as to which of the two sides was likely to suffer greater hardship. The appellate authority committed a manifest error in not giving a finding. 9. It was, however, pointed out by Shri Bharat Ji Agarwal, counsel appearing for the landlord that as the application had been allowed only with respect to part of the premises let out to the tenant, the proviso (iv) did not apply. I am unable to accept the submission. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 no doubt permits an authority to pass an order of release in respect of a part of the premises. But the release of a portion of a premises to a tenant does not dispense with the requirement of considering the question of comparative hardship. There is nothing in Section 21 which could show that the hardship has not to be considered. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the appellate authority is wrong. 10. As I am setting aside the judgment of the appellate authority, it is not necessary for me to deal with the various controversies raised by the learned counsel for the parties. In fact, these controversies cannot be decided properly without going into the evidence. This will be done in the appeal. As the matter is pending for the last several years it appears appropriate to direct the appellate authority to decide the appeal within three months from today. 11. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and orders of the Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated 12.4.1977 and 20.5.1977 are quashed. As the matter is pending for the last several years it appears appropriate to direct the appellate authority to decide the appeal within three months from today. 11. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and orders of the Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated 12.4.1977 and 20.5.1977 are quashed. He is directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs. 12. Writ petition allowed. case remanded to appellate authority.