ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts in brief are these : The notice under Section 10 (2) was issued to the petitioner and he filed objections. The objections were decided by the prescribed Authority. Thereafter an appeal was filed in the appellate court below and the appeal was heard and decided by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Jalaun at his camp, Orai. The appeal was partly allowed the petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof I have heard Shri Yatindra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. Counsel's contention is that the prescribed Authority and the appellate court below were in error in holding that the petitioner had not succeeded in proving the fact that he had given in adoption his son Rajendra Singh to Deena. The petitioners' claim was that the said son had been given in adoption in the year 1970 and, therefore, on 8th June, 1973, the said son was not a member of the family. Now, the factum of adoption was sought to be proved with the aid of oral evidence and on the basis of the entries in consolidation proceedings. Further, the statement of the Lekhpal was also sought to be utilised. Counsel's contention is that these were relevant pieces of evidence and the authorities below were not justified in rejecting them on their own whimsicality. I have considered these contentions but, in my opinion, in the writ jurisdiction I cannot interfere with the finding recorded by the prescribed Authority and affirmed by the appellate court. It should be seen that the question is a pure question of fact. Whether in 1970 really the adopting took place or not was the controversy. The appellate court emphasised and, in my opinion, it was entitled to emphasise, that there was no documentary evidence regarding the proof of adoption. Whenever a controversy about adoption arises in a Court, it is entitled to emphasise the point that there is no deed of adoption. Counsel contended that in law it is not obligatory that there should be such a deed. Whenever a controversy about adoption arises in a Court, it is entitled to emphasise the point that there is no deed of adoption. Counsel contended that in law it is not obligatory that there should be such a deed. This is correct Still, even though it is not obligatory, in assessing the evidence on the record and in arriving at its conclusion, the court is entitled to consider that there is no deed of adoption in the picture. The appellate court thereafter emphasised the point that this Rajendra Singh had passed the High School examination and the Intermediate Examination and in such circumstances if really adoption had taken place in 1970, it should have been possible to have brought on the record documents in the shape of High School certificate or the Intermediate certificate which could have proved the contention of the petitioner and the appellate court says that I am entitled to draw adverse inference from the non-production of such documents. It has seemed to me that the approach of the appellate court cannot be said to be such as may invite the application of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. It is well-known that irrespective of whether the finding recorded by the authorities below is correct or incorrect, this Court has a limited jurisdiction in these fields. 3. So far as the statement of the Lekhpal is concerned, the appellate court has given its reason for not accepting that statement. So far as the consolidation documents are concerned, it has to be seen that they came into existence long after 1970 and, in my opinion, it is open to a court in the discharge of its functions, while appraising evidence, to put its own value on the probative nature of individual pieces of evidence and this Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot say that the probative value put on a particular piece of evidence has been wrongly put. 4. In my view, this petition is misconceived and it is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.