JUDGMENT M. P. Saxena, J. 1. THIS is a defendant's revision application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and order dated 1-11-1974 passed by the District Judge, Buland-shahr setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge Small Causes, Bulandshahr. 2. THE plaintiff opposite party is the owner of a wooden stall which was let out to the defendant-revisionist on a monthly rent of Rs. 90/-. According to the plaintiff, it was constructed in 1964 and was not governed by the provisions of U. P. Act XVII of 1972. The defendant fell in arrears of rent from 1st of November 1970 and a notice of demand and to quit was served on him on 4th November, 1970, but in vain. Hence he filed a suit for the eviction of the defendant from the disputed shop and for the recovery of arrears of rent. The defendant contested that suit on the ground that the shop was constructed in the year 1956 and was governed by the provisions of U. P. Act XXX of 1972. He challenged the validity of the notice and claimed the benefit of Section 39 of the new Act. 3. THE learned Judge Small Causes Court came to the conclusion that the shop was a building within the meaning of this expression under the U. P. Act XIII of 1972, that the notice to quit was valid and that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the new Act. Accordingly the suit for ejectment was dismissed and as regards rent, it was directed that the plaintiff shall withdraw the amount already deposited in court. The plaintiff filed a revision application under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. Since the learned trial court had not recorded a clear finding as to when the disputed shop was constructed an issue on this point was remitted to his court for finding. The learned trial court gave his finding that the shop was constructed in the year 1964. The learned counsels for the parties gave their statement before the revisional court that for purposes of revision the construction may be deemed to have been completed towards the end of the year 1964. The learned trial court gave his finding that the shop was constructed in the year 1964. The learned counsels for the parties gave their statement before the revisional court that for purposes of revision the construction may be deemed to have been completed towards the end of the year 1964. The judgment in revision was given on 1-11-1974 and the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that if the shop was completed in the latter part of 1964, it had not become 10 years old upto the date of the judgment and provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 were not applicable to it. He further held that benefit of Section 39 of the new Act was not available to the defendant. The revision application was allowed and the suit for ejectment of the defendant from the disputed shop and for the recovery of Rs. 900 as arrears of rent and damages and pendentilite and future damages at the rate of Rs. 90 per month was decreed. It was further ordered that the amount already deposited by the defendant will be adjusted towards the decretal amount. It is against this order that the defendant has filed the present revision application. 4. SO far as the question whether the wooden shop falls within the definition of the word 'building' as defined in Section 3 (1) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 is concerned, the said section defines 'building' as follows: " "Building" means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes- (i) any land including any garden, garages, out houses appurtenant to such building, (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building, (iii) any fittings or fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment there of". The definition of 'building' in this Act is similar to the definition of 'accommodation' given under U. P. Act III of 1947. Under the old Act the question had arisen whether a shop with wooden structure and tin-shed will be regarded as accommodation or not. In Laxmi Das v. R. C. and E. O., A. I. R. 1953 Allahabad 458 it was held that it will be an accommodation within the meaning of the word 'accommodation' in that Act. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that a wooden shop with roofed structure will be regarded as building under the new Act also. In Laxmi Das v. R. C. and E. O., A. I. R. 1953 Allahabad 458 it was held that it will be an accommodation within the meaning of the word 'accommodation' in that Act. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that a wooden shop with roofed structure will be regarded as building under the new Act also. The crucial point for consideration in this revision is whether the revisionist is entitled to the benefit of Section 39/40 of the Act. Section 39 lays down: "In any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of commencement of this Act, where the tenant within one month from such date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in the court before which the suit is pending, the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum and the landlord's full costs of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to subsection (1) or in clauses (b) to (g) of subsection (2) of Section 20, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary: Provided that a tenant the rent payable by whom does not exceed twenty five rupees per month need not deposit any interest as aforesaid." Section 40 says : "Where an appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply is pending on the date of commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 39, which shall mutatis mutandis apply.'' 5. THERE is no controversy that when the, suit was filed the shop was not governed by the provisions of the old Act. On 1-11-1974 the learned counsel for both sides made a statement in the lower revisional court (paper No. 59-A1) that the shop be deemed to have been completed in the later part of the year 1964. No date or month of completion was given. On 1-11-1974 the learned counsel for both sides made a statement in the lower revisional court (paper No. 59-A1) that the shop be deemed to have been completed in the later part of the year 1964. No date or month of completion was given. Section 2 (2) Explanation 1 of the U. P. Act XIII of 1972 lays down as to when a building will be deemed to have been completed. It says that it shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in the case of a building subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment the date on which it is actually occupied. In the instant case no evidence of these facts was adduced and the learned counsel for the parties chose to give a simple statement that the shop should be deemed to have been completed in the latter part of the year 1964. On the basis of such vague statement the shop can be deemed to have been completed on the 31st of December, 1974. 6. IN order to claim the benefit of Section 40 the tenant was liable to deposit the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's full costs of the suit. It had to be done within one month from the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e., when the Act became applicable to this building. In the instant case the shop became 10 years old on 31st of December, 1974 and the defendant-revisionist was liable to deposit the aforesaid amount by 30th of January, 1975. Admittedly the rent was in arrears from 1-11-1970 and upto 31st of December, 1974, Rs.4,500 fell due at the rate of Rs. 90 per month. Rs. 180 are said to have accrued as interest and Rs. 380 were the costs. IN this manner the defendant revisionist was liable to deposit Rs. 4960 by 30th of January, 1975. He is proved to have made the following deposits :- 1.Rs. 2,540 on 14-8-1972 vide Ex. A-1. 2.Rs. 90 per month. Rs. 180 are said to have accrued as interest and Rs. 380 were the costs. IN this manner the defendant revisionist was liable to deposit Rs. 4960 by 30th of January, 1975. He is proved to have made the following deposits :- 1.Rs. 2,540 on 14-8-1972 vide Ex. A-1. 2.Rs. 200 on 13-8-1972 vide Ex. A-2. 3.Rs. 270 on 30-8-1973 vide Ex. A-3. 4.Rs. 270 on 19-8-1973 vide Ex. A-4. 5.Rs. 180 on 9-8-1874. 6.Rs. 16 on 11-11-1974. 7.Rs. 180 on 28-11-1974. 8.Rs. 90 on 27-11-1974. 9.Rs. 90 again on 3-1-1975. 10.Rs. 1350 on 8-1-1975. 11.Rs. 150 on 13-1-1975. 12.Rs. 540 under Section 7-C of the old Act. IN this manner a sum of Rs. 5876 was deposited by the defendant-revisionist before 30th of January 1975. It was in excess of the amount the defendant-revisionist was liable to deposit. There is no controversy about the amounts deposited. The learned counsel for the opposite party has raised only two objections. His first objection is that the statement (Paper No. 59-A1) was made by the learned counsel for the parties for the purposes of disposal of the revision in the lower revisional court and cannot be used in this Court. It has absolutely no force because when counsel for the parties make a statement about any fact involved in the case it is for all the stages in the case and not for any particular stage. His second objection is that Section 40 read with Section 39 contemplates deposit in the court where the case is pending and not in any other court. According to him, some of the deposits during the pendency of this revision were made in the trial court and they cannot be taken advantage of by the revisionist. He has also urged that the benefit of deposit under Section 7-C cannot be claimed because Sections 39 or 40 does not contemplate it. Even this contention has no force because if the tenant has previously deposited any amount under the orders of the court that cannot be said to be due for the purposes of Section 39 or Section 40. As held in the case of Smt. Mathura Devi v. Kailash Chandra Bhatia, C. R. No. 958 of 1976 dated 5-4-1977 (Alld.) Sections 39/40 should not be construed in a too literal sense otherwise the whole object of the Legislature would be reduced to a nullity. As held in the case of Smt. Mathura Devi v. Kailash Chandra Bhatia, C. R. No. 958 of 1976 dated 5-4-1977 (Alld.) Sections 39/40 should not be construed in a too literal sense otherwise the whole object of the Legislature would be reduced to a nullity. Section 39 is in the nature of beneficial legislation and is intended for the protection of all the tenants. To apply beneficial legislation in a restricted sense or in a very literal perspective would not be in consonance with the purposes of the Act. The real intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 39 appears to be to have the entire amount of rent, damages and interest etc. which are actually outstanding against the defendant, deposited in court. Therefore, if the deposit has already been made under orders of the court which fully or partly satisfies the claim of the plaintiff its repetition wouid reduce the provision to a mere ritual and would defeat the object of the Legislature inasmuch as many a tenant might find it well-nigh impossible to make the deposit twice. The Legislature could not have possibly intended such a situation while enacting those provisions for the benefit of the tenant. Therefore, the deposit made under Section 7-C of the old Act was strictly in accordance with the requirement of law and partly discharged the defendant's liability for rent etc. The deposits after the filing of the present revision application on 25-11-1974 were made in accordance with the order of this Court. The defendant-revisionist was directed to deposit the decretal amount and future-damages in the trial court. Therefore, these deposits were made under orders of the Court and will be deemed to be in conformity with Sections 39/40. The entire purpose of the Act is that the rent, damages, interests and costs should be available to the landlord and he may withdraw them without any difficulty. Therefore, when deposits after filing this revision were made in the trial court under orders of this Court they can easily be withdrawn by the landlord. I am, therefore, in judgment that the defendant-revisionist has deposited full amount contemplated by Section 39/40 and he is entitled to its benefit. 7. THE revision application is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge, Bulandshahr on 1-11-1974 are set aside. I am, therefore, in judgment that the defendant-revisionist has deposited full amount contemplated by Section 39/40 and he is entitled to its benefit. 7. THE revision application is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge, Bulandshahr on 1-11-1974 are set aside. The amounts deposited in the trial court or under Section 7-C of the old Act shall be withdrawn by the plaintiff-respondent. Costs easy. Revision allowed.