PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) ON a reference made by Rama Jois, J, this writ petition is posted before for disposal. ( 2 ) IN the order of reference, the facts of the case, one of the principal points that arises for determination and the reasons for making the reference are succinctly set out and therefore a detailed narration of the facte is not really necessary. But in order to make our order self-contained, we first propose to notice the facts as emerging from the pleading and File nos. SWL 99 LLD 77, SWL 111 LLD 76 of the Karnataka Government secretariat and File No. IDA-5/cr-178/75-76 of the Office of the Labour commissioner made available by the learned Advocate General at our request and then deal with the contentions that arise for determination. ( 3 ) M/s. Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. , Bangalore, is a wholly owned Central Government Company engaged in the business of manufacture and supply of telephones in our Country and has on its rolls about 10,000 emplpyees. As a background, the petitioner has referred in derail to the dismissal of one Shri. V. V. Thyagaraja Iyer of the Cross-bar Division on 29-9-1973 for proved misconduct and various other details that are rot really necessary for determining the issues that arise before us and therefore it is not necessary to notice them in detail. ( 4 ) ON 6-12-1973, there was an unfortunate incident of stabbing one shri. Ajit Dutt, works Manager of the Cross-bar Division of the factory when he was proceeding from his house in the I. T. I, colony to the adjacent factory which in turn, led to industrial unrest and law and order problem in and around the factory. In the wake of that incident, respondents Nos. 2 to 14 and certain other, with whom we are not concerned, were challenged for various crriminal offences before the criminal courts. In the wake of that incident, respondents Nos. 2 to 14 and certain other, with whom we are not concerned, were challenged for various crriminal offences before the criminal courts. While the criminal proceedings were pending, on 18-12-1973 the petitioner, exercising the powers conferred on it by Standing order No. 17 (1) of the certified Standing Orders of the factory, terminated the services of respondent Nos 2 to 14; and their Labour Union respondent No. 15, moved the Government and other authorities functioning under the Industrial disputes Act of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to intervene on their behalf and make a reference under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Act to the appropriate Labour Court to adjudicate the validity of termination of respondent Nos. 2 to 14. In accordance with the usual practice in such matters, the claim of respondent Nos. 2 to 15 came up before the Assistant labour Commissioner and conciliation Officer, Bangalore Div. II, Bangalore, in the first instance for conciliation who true to his duties did his best to mediate and promote a settlement of the dispute between the parties. After hearing the parties on 20-4-1974, 3-6-1974, 15-6-1974, 20-7-1974, 4-6-1974 7-10-1974. 19-10-1974 15-11-1974, 2-12-1974, 20-12-1974, 15-1-1975, 18-3-1975, 31-3-1975, 28-4-1975 28-10-1975, 28-11-75 and on 6-12-1975, and considering the written representations filed by them, the conciliation officer by his report d/ 20-1-76 opined that the dispute deserved a reference under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Act to the Labour Court. But the Labour Commissioner in his report dated 23-2-1076 addressed to the government on a critical examination of the report of the conciliation officer, disagreed with his view and recommeded to the Government that the dispute did nott merit a reference to Adjudication. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that by the time Government had to examine, respondent nos. 2, 5 to 14 had been discharged by this Court, though an appeal filed by the State against that order of discharge was pending before the Supreme court. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that by the time Government had to examine, respondent nos. 2, 5 to 14 had been discharged by this Court, though an appeal filed by the State against that order of discharge was pending before the Supreme court. On an examination of the recommendations of the Labour commissioner, the conciliation Officer, further written representations filed by the management and Labour Union and after affording an opportunity of Oral hearing to both the parties having regard to the relevant considerations like (1) whether the action of the petitioner was prima facie legal, (2) whether an industrial dispute did exist or was apprehended and (3) whether it was expedient to make a reference or not, government decided that it was not a fit case to make a reference under s. 10 (1) (c) of the Act to the Labour Court. In examining the question as to whether a reference should be made or not Government, among others, has found that the decision Of this Court in criminal proceedings filed by respondent Nos. 2, 5, to 14 and the pendency of the appeal by the State before the Supreme Court had no bearing and the action of the petitioner- management had to be examined de-hors those proceedings. In pursuance of the decision taken by the Government on 27-5-1976, an endorsement bearing No. SWL 111 LLD 76 dated 28th May 1976 Exhibit U, was issued which reads thus:"endorsement sub: Industrial Dispute between the workmen and the management of I. T. I. Ltd. , bangalore: termination of 13 workmen under standing Order of the management i am directed to state that Government consider that the dispute under reference does not merit reference to the Labour Court for adjudication for the reason that the action taken by the management under the standing orders of the company in terminating the services of 13 workers in order yours faithfully, sd. K. Mylarappa, under Secretary to Government, Social Welfare and Labour Dept. "even though the said decision of the Government was against them, respondent Nos. 2 to 15 did not take any other legal proceeding available to them and allowed the matters to rest till 9-1-1977. K. Mylarappa, under Secretary to Government, Social Welfare and Labour Dept. "even though the said decision of the Government was against them, respondent Nos. 2 to 15 did not take any other legal proceeding available to them and allowed the matters to rest till 9-1-1977. ( 5 ) ON 10-1-1977, respondent No. 15 presented r addressed a memorandum to the Chief minister, Government of Karnataka, requesting him to intervene in the matter and prevail on the petitioner to reinstate respondent Nos. 2 to 14 or refer the matter to adjudication under the Act having regard to the favourable views expressed by the conciliation officer. In the said representation what has been prominently urged by respondent No. 15 is that in the case of another industry called 'mico' at the intervention of the Government at the ministerial level, the said Company had reinstated its employees and the claim of respondent Nos. 2 to 14 was similar to those employees. On the said representation, the Chief minister minuted as under :" Labour Commissioner this question has got to be taken up with the management. But if the management does not yield, then the cases will have to be referred to adjudication. Keep me informed of the action taken. Sd/ D. Devaraj Urs, chief Minister 10-1-77 "apparently on receipt of the said representation, the Labour Commissioner explored the possibility of reinstating respondent Nos;. 2 to 14 by discussing the matter with the General Manager of the petitioner company on 21-2-77. In their discussion, the General Manager does not appear to have agreed to reinstate respondent NOS. 2 to 14 and appears to have stuck to the original stand that had been taken by the management in the e'arlier proceedings. On 23-2-77 the Labour Commr made a report to Govt appraising the steps taken by him to implement the decision of the Chief minister and to take action in accordance with the decision of the Chief minister. In that report, we do not find any new circumstances brought to the notice of the Govt by the Labour Commr except the efforts made by him to implement the directions of the Chief Minister and his failure in that behalf. On an examination of that report, the Deputy Secretary to govt, Labour Dept, pointed out there was no change in the circumstances of the case. On an examination of that report, the Deputy Secretary to govt, Labour Dept, pointed out there was no change in the circumstances of the case. On an examination of the papers in File No. SWL 99 LLD 77 apart from the Various notes and orders that has no bearing, it appears the Chief Minister in the discussions he had with the Secretary to Govt, labour Dept, stuck to his earlier stand and directed him to refer the dispute for adjudication. On 6-4-77 the Secretary made a note as under : " I discussed with Chief Minister a few days ago and he asked me to refer the dispute for adjudication. For perusal before issue of orders. Sd. . . . . . 6-4-77" on 13-7-77 the Chief Secretary, to whom the file was marked before the matter was ordered to be placed before the Minister for Labour opined as under : "the Managing Director, Shri I. K. Gupta, feels that this is likely to affect the discipline adversely and that production would suffer. He may be heard and then a decision taken. Sd G. V. K. Rao, chief Secretary, 13-4-77 " on 23-7-77, the Minister for Labour minuted as under : " C. M. may decide. " sd C. N. Patil, minister for Labour 23-7-77 " finally on 28-7-77 the Chief Minister minuted as under : - ' ' " The matter be referred to adjudication. Sd D. Devaraj Urs, chief Minister, 28-7-77. " in pursuance of the minute of the Chief Minister, an order bearing NO. SWL 99 LLD 77 d/ 2nd/4th August, 1977 was issued by the Govt (Ext. W), the validity of which is challenged by the petitioner before us. That order reads thus : govt of Karnataka Karnataka Govt Secretariat, Vidhana Soudha, no. SWL. 99 LLD 77 Bangalore, d 2nd/4th Aug 77 order whereas the Govt of Karnataka are of the opinion that an Industrial dispute exists between the workmen and the management of Indian telephone Industries Ltd, Doorvaninagar, Bangalore 560. 016 on the points noted below : " And whereas the Govt of Karnataka consider it desirable to refer the dispute for adjudication. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-sec (1) of Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central act NO. 016 on the points noted below : " And whereas the Govt of Karnataka consider it desirable to refer the dispute for adjudication. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-sec (1) of Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central act NO. 14 of 1947), the Govt of Karnataka hereby refer the said dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court at Bangalore. Points of dispute i. Are the management of Indian Telephone Industries Ltd, doorvaninagar, Bangalore-16, justified in terminating the service of the following 13 workmen with effect from 19-12-1973-" ( 6 ) FOR examining the principal legal contention of the petitioner that the order is violative of the principle of audi alteram partem, it is useful to notice a few more facts and record a finding thereon. ( 7 ) AMONG others, the petitioner has pleaded that the Govt before deciding to refer the dispute to the Labour Court had not afforded an opportunity of hearing, hearing understood as filing of written representations or an oral hearing and has decided the matter only on a consideration of the written and oral representations of respondent Nos. 2 to 15 and not of the petitioner. In its return, respondent-1 does not dispute this factual assertion of the petitioner. In their return, respondents 2 to 14 have averred that respondent-15 accompanied by respondents 2 to 14 met the Chief Minister and explained to him the decision of the Supreme court in Criminal Appeal No. 345/346 d/ 3rd March, 1977 since reported in AIR 1977 SC, page 1489 and the report of the conciliation officer which was in favour of making a reference to the Labour Court which is not denred either by the Chief Minister or by any other officer and we have no reason to disbelieve this assertion of respondents 2 to 14. In File No. SWL 99 LLD 77, the Secretary to the Govt, Labour Dept, in his note dated 14-3-77 haa noted that one Shri Ramadasappa met him and explained to him that there was an understanding between the management under which standing order No. 7 (1) should be applied. In his note d/17-1-77 the Chief Secretary records that the Managing Director, Shri I. K. Gupta feels that a reference is likely to affect the discipline adversely and that production would suffer. In his note d/17-1-77 the Chief Secretary records that the Managing Director, Shri I. K. Gupta feels that a reference is likely to affect the discipline adversely and that production would suffer. Any one reading this note would get the imprestion that the Chief Secretary would have discussed the matter with the managing Director. But as to what exactly that took place between the chief Secretary and the Managing Director we do not have the benefit of an affidavit or any verified statement filed by any of them explaining what really transpired between them. One can only guess that the Chief secretary before recording his note might have contacted the Managing director informally. But his later note clearly suggests that the Govt should take a decision in the matter only after hearing the Managing director. ( 8 ) IN its return, on the basis of which the case was argued before rama Jois, J, respondent No. 1 did not deny the factual averments made by the petitioner on the denial of opportunity of hearing before making the impugned order of reference. But on 2-3-1978 respondent No. 1 filed an additional statement of objections without the leave of the Court verified by one Shri Manoharan, Under Secretary to the Government in the labour Department stating that on the representations filed by respondent No. 15, the Labour Commissioner, called for the General Manager of the petitioner, discussed with him and then made a report to Government. Shri. Soli Sorabji, learned counsel for the petitioner, took strong objection to the manner in which respondent No. 1 has filed its additional statement of Objections. In answer to the additional Statement of Objections the petitioner, on 6-3-1978 has filed a reply verified by one Shri. Thomas Kora, General Manager of the petitioner Company. In the reply it is averred that the General Manager had met the Labour Commissioner on 21-2-77 in connection with labour situation prevailing after the lifting of the lock out earlier declared. On that occasion, the Labour Commissicner enquired about the possibility of reinstating the services of respondent Nos. 2 to 14 to which he answered in the negative and stated the reasons for the same. On that occasion, the Labour Commissicner enquired about the possibility of reinstating the services of respondent Nos. 2 to 14 to which he answered in the negative and stated the reasons for the same. In the reply it is specifically averred that the General manager at no time was informed or apprised of the fact that a representation was made by the workmen nor the contents thereof were disclosed to him nor was a copy of the same furnished. In his note dated 21-2-77 or in his report dated 23-2-77 to Government, the Labour Commissioner has not recorded as to what all transpired between him and the General manager. Shri. Manohara who has filed the verification affidavit in support of the additional statement of objections does not claim to be present at the time of the discussion between the Labour Commissioner and the general Manager and his source of information is only the records which do not establish the assertion made by respondent No. 1 in its additional statement of objections. In the absence of an affidavit by the Labour commissioner explaining as to what happened on 21-2-1977 between him and the General Manager of the petitioner company, we have no reason to disbelieve as to what has been stated by the petitioner in its reply to the additional statement of objections filed by respondent No. 1. In the above state of pleadings and records, we have no alternative but to hold that the government before deciding to refer the dispute had not provided an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by hearing we mean by filing written representations or an opportunity Of oral hearing and the decision of the Government was based solely on affording an opportunity of hearing to respondent Nos. 2 to 15. ( 9 ) SHRI. Soli Sorabji urged that the order impugned in the writ petition which has 'civil consequences' on -the petitioner without affording an opportunity of hearing either by filing written representations, consideration of those written representations or an opportunity of oral hearing before actually deciding to refer the dispute was in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem and was therefore liable to be struck down. In support of his contention, he strongly relied on the recent ruling of our supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, CA. 1297/77 d/ 2-12-1977. In support of his contention, he strongly relied on the recent ruling of our supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, CA. 1297/77 d/ 2-12-1977. A. K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others, AIR. 1970 SC. 150= (1970) 1 SCR 457 , of the Madras high Court in K. Abdul Salam and Co. V. State of Tamil Nadu, (1973) 43 FJR. 180. and a division Bench ruling of the same Court in Tiruchy Steel Rolling Mills ltd. , v. S. Gnanascmbandan, (1974) 46 FJR 158. Shri. R, N. Byra Reddy. learned Advocate general appearing for respondent No. 1, Shri. H. B. Datar, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 14,, and Shri. N. Santosh Hegde, learned counsel for respondent No. 15, strenuously contended that the principle of audi alteram partem, one of the two important principles of natural justice had no application to a decision under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Act and therefore the impugned order was legal and valid. ( 10 ) BEFORE we examine the contention of Shri. Soli Sorabji on the principles decided in Mohinder Singh Gill's case and its application to the facts of the case, it is necessary to notice and deal with a few contentions urged by the learned counsel for the respondents against their application. ( 11 ) SHRI. R. N. Byra Reddy, learned Advocate General for respondent No. 1, contended that whatever has been stated or decided in Mohinder singh Gill's case by the Supreme Court on the principles of audi alteram partem was only obiter and had no binding effect. In support of his submission, Shri. R. N. Byra Reddy strongly relied on the following passage : "an obiter binds none, not even the author, and obliteration of findings rendered in supererogation must allay the appellant's 'apprehensions. " ( 12 ) WHILE dismissing the writ petition of Mohinder Singh Gill challenging the cancellation of election to Ferozbad Constituency as barred under Art. 329 of the Constitution, the High Court of Delhi appears to have examined the validity of the action of the Election Commission and has expressed itself on the principles that should govern such cases. In that context, the Supreme Court made the above observations and pointed out that the High Court should not have proceeded to enunciate the principles that should govern such cases. In that context, the Supreme Court made the above observations and pointed out that the High Court should not have proceeded to enunciate the principles that should govern such cases. In that very para, the Supreme Court has pointed out that such a role could be more appropriately performed by having regard to the pre-eminent position it occupied under our Constitution and the requirements of Article 141 of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the bar of Article 329 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court speaking through V. R. Krishna Iyer J, with whom M. H. Beg CJ and p. N. Bhagavathi J, agreed constituting the majority of the Constitution bench, examined in depth the scope and ambit of 'civil consequences' and the application of the principle of audi alteram partem to administrative proceedings and has declared the law which is binding on us. It is settled law that considered obiter dicta of the Supreme Court is binding on all the Subordinate Courts in the Country. In our view what has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) is not mere obiter. Assuming that what has been decided therein is only obiter, we are of the view that even if it is considered obiter dicta the same is binding on us. We therefore reject the first contention urged by Shri r. N. Byra Reddy for not following the principles enunciated in Mohinder singh Gili's case (1 ). ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents next contended that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in examining the validity of an order made by the Election Commission made under Art. 324 of the constitution, should be confined only to cases arising under Art. 324 of the Contitution and cannot have universal application to cases arising under other statutes like the Industrial Disputes Act. Undoubtedly in mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) the Supreme Court waa considering the validity of a Notification issued under Article 324 of the constitution. But to say that the principles enunciated or the ratio decidendi or rule of law laid down by the Supreme Court on the meaning of the term 'civil consequences' and the extent and scope of audi alteram partem is not applicable to other cases cannot be accepted having regard to the true nature of the law of precedents recognised in English jurisprudence and applied in our Country. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned Counsels for the respondents. ( 14 ) LEARNED Counsels for the respondents strenuously contended that the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, AIR. 1953 SC. 53. ; our High court in B. K. Vasudeva Rao v. State of Mysore, (1963) 2 Myslj. 230. and in Writ Appeal no. 164 of 1974, directed against the order of Venkataramiah J, in WP no. 3814 of 1973 reported in 1974 (2) Karlj. 30 , has either expressly or impliedly held that one of the two principles of natural justice viz, audi alteram partem had no application to a proceeding before the appropriate govt under Sec. 10 of the Act and therefore, it is not permissible for us to apply the principles enunciated in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) and in any event sitting as a Division Bench of this Court we cannot take a view contrary to the one already expressed by other Division Benches of this Court. ( 15 ) WE have carefully read the judgment of the Supreme Court in sarathy's case (5 ). In that case the Supreme Court has had no occasion to examine the applicability of the principles of audi alteram partem and therefore that case cannot be held as an authority for upholding the contention of the learned Counsel's for the respondents that the principle of audi alteram has no application to a proceeding under Sec. 10 of the Act. In no other case that has been brought to our notice, the Supreme Court has considered the applicability of the principle of audi alteram partem to a proceeding under Sec. 10 of the Act and has held to the contrary. We therefore hold that there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsels for the respondents that the Supreme Court had ruled that the principle Of audi alteram partem has no application to a proceeding under Section 10 of the Act. ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsels for the respondents. contended that the principle enunciated by a Division bench of this Court in Vasudeva Rao's case (6) had been approved by our Supreme Court in Western india Match co, Ltd v. WIMCO Workers Union, AIR. 1970 SC. 1205. ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsels for the respondents. contended that the principle enunciated by a Division bench of this Court in Vasudeva Rao's case (6) had been approved by our Supreme Court in Western india Match co, Ltd v. WIMCO Workers Union, AIR. 1970 SC. 1205. , which according to them has held that the principles of natural justice has no application to a decision reached by the Govt under Sec. 10 of the Act and therefore it is not open for us to apply the rule or the ratio decided in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1 ). In support of his contention, Shri H. B. Datar, learned Counsel for respondents 2 to 14 strongly relied on the following passage in Vasudeva Rao's case (6):" It is hardly open to doubt that, as the power under Sec. 10 (1) has been conferred upon Govt in the interests of Industrial peace, the amplitude of the power cannot be curtailed by the importation of other principles unless there is any warrant for them in the statute itself. "in Vasudeva Rao's case (6), this Court was examining the power of the govt to make a reference under Sec. 10 of the Act having once refused to make a reference under that provision. In WIMCO's case (8) also our Supreme court while considering a similar question has noticed Vasudeva rao's case and has expressed its approval to the principle decided in vasudeva Rao's case (6) and also several other cases of other HCs. In Vasudeva Rao's cose (6), whether the principle of audi alteram partem is applicable to a situation as has arisen before us, evidently having regard to the law as it stood then, was not even suggested and therefore was never considered and dealt by this Court. In our view, the sentence in Vasudeva rao's case (6) viz, "that the amplitude of the power cannot be curtailed by importation of other principles unless there is any warrant for them in the statute itself" cannot be read as this Court! having examined and expressed itself that the principle of audi alteram partem is inapplicable in all situations. In our view, the sentence in Vasudeva rao's case (6) viz, "that the amplitude of the power cannot be curtailed by importation of other principles unless there is any warrant for them in the statute itself" cannot be read as this Court! having examined and expressed itself that the principle of audi alteram partem is inapplicable in all situations. We must also remember that Vasuceva Rao's case (6) was decided prior to Krapak's case (2), which itself made a significant departure in the application of the principles of natural justice before administrative authorities which to our mind has been further explained of extended in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) by our Supreme Court. In our view, it will be wrong to hold that Vasudeva Rao's case (6) should be considered as an authority to exclude the principle of audi alteram partem. ( 17 ) LEARNED Counsels for the respondents finally contended that the principle enunciated by Venkataramiah J, in Management of Kirloskar electric Co v. The Workmen, (1974) 2 Karlj. 30 . viz, that the principle of audi alteram parten, has no application to a decision reached by the Govt under S. 10 (1) of the Act has been affirmed in WA. No. 164 of 1974 decided on 29th July, 1975 by a Division Bench of this Court and therefore it was not permissible for us sitting as a Division Bench to take a contrary view and if we still doubted the correctness of the principles enunciated in Kirloskar Electric co's case (9) either by the learned Single Judge or by the Division Bench, the only course that is open to us is to make a reference to a Full Bench of our High Court. ( 18 ) IN Kirloskar Electric Company's case (9) it is true Venkataramiah j, after referring to the contention urged by the management in that case and the decision of our Supreme Court in Kraipak's case (2) has expressly held that the principles enunciated in Kraipak's case (2) are inapplicable to a proceeding under S. 10 (1) even when it decides to make a reference after having once refused to make a reference. As to how far the views expressed by Venkataramiah J, on the 'civil consequences' and the application of the audi alteram partem to a case before us, are correct will be dealt by us at a later stage. As to how far the views expressed by Venkataramiah J, on the 'civil consequences' and the application of the audi alteram partem to a case before us, are correct will be dealt by us at a later stage. But at this stage, it is enough to state that we fiad it difficult to agree with the views expressed by Venkatar'amiah J, On both the questions. ( 19 ) IN WANo. 164 of 1974 the Division Bench of this Court while affirming the decision of Venkataramiah J, in Our considered view, has decided the case primarily on the facts of the case without considering it necessary to examine the principles enunciated by Venkataramiah J. We are of the view, the Division Bench on the very peculiar facts of that case viz. that first the Order of the Govt refusing to make a reference had been quashed by this Court and the Govt had been directed to re-consider the matter by a mandamus, on the basis of which the reference made by Government thereon was construed as if the reference was made by the Government for the first time, has affirmed the decision of Venkataramiah J. We are of the view, the Division Bench has not laid down that the principle of audi alteram partem has no application to a case where the Government once refuses to make a reference and then makes a reference after affording an opportunity to only one of the parties and not to both the parties as has happened in the case before us. In our view, the decision of the Division Bench in appeal cannot be read as suggested. by the learned Counsels for the respondents and therefore we hold that there is no justification to refer the questions that arise for our determination toa Full Bench of our High Court. ( 20 ) SHRI Soli Sorabji, learned Solicitor General, does not dispute either the power of Government to make a reference on a reconsideration of the matter notwithstanding its earlier refusal to make a reference or the nature of the power exercised by Government in making a reference viz. , that the power exercised is administrative and is not judicial or quasi judicial, which principles are firmly established in WIMCO's case (7) and c. P. Sarathy's case (5 ). , that the power exercised is administrative and is not judicial or quasi judicial, which principles are firmly established in WIMCO's case (7) and c. P. Sarathy's case (5 ). But he strenuously contended that the impugned order has 'civil consequences' on the petitioner and therefore his client was entitled to an opportunity of hearing before the Government decided to make a reference to the Labour Court. Learned counsels for the respondents with equal vehemence contended that an order of reference under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Act has no 'civil consequences' and therefore the petitioner was not entitled to an opportunity of hearing. ( 21 ) IN State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, AIE 1967 SC. 1269, the Supreme Court in examining the action of the Government to modify an earlier accepted date of birth of a civil servant and ordering her retirement without notice, held that such an action would have 'civil consequences' and therefore the' civil servant was entitled to an opportunity of hearing. In Binapani Dei's case (10), the Supreme Court did not define the meaning of the term 'civil consequences'. But in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1), the Supreme court, on a review of all the authorities, has examined the meaning of the term 'civil consequences' and has held thus: "but what is a civil consequence let us ask ourselves by passin verbal booby traps? 'civil Consequences' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, materlal deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. " pcoceeding further, the Supreme Court has noticed with approval the definition contained in Black Law Dictionary (4th Edition) which reads thus :"'civil' is defined by Black (Law Dictionary, 4% Edn.) at page 311 : Ordinarily, pertaining Or appropriate to a member of Civites Of free political community; natural or proper to a citizen. Also, relating to the community, or of the Government of the citizens and subjects of a State. The word is derived frort the Latin civil is, a citizen. . . in law, it has various significations. "'civil Rights' are such as belong to every citizen of the State or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organisation or administration of Government. The word is derived frort the Latin civil is, a citizen. . . in law, it has various significations. "'civil Rights' are such as belong to every citizen of the State or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organisation or administration of Government. They include the rights of property, marriage protection by the laws, (freedom of contract) trial by jury, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . Or, as otherwise defined, civil rights are rights appertaining to a person in virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Right capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. Also a term applied to certain rights secured to citizens of the United States by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution, and by various acts of ongress made in pursuance thereof. " in another para the Supreme Court observed at Page 883 as follows : " Interest and rights are generous conceptions in this jurisdiction, not narrow orthodoxies as in traditional systems. " ( 22 ) FROM the enunciation made by the Supreme Court in Mohinder singh Gili's case (1), the term 'civil consequences' has a very comprehensive meaning and there is no warrant to place a restricted meaning on that term at all. In the light of the above enunciation, we have now to ascertain whether the impugned order has 'civil consequences' on the petitioner. ( 23 ) ON the refusal of the Government to make a reference, the petitioner was entitled to legitimately expect that the dispute raised by respondent NOS. 2 to 15 had terminated and make its own arrangements to fill up the vacant posts which according to the petitioner, has also been done on the various dates mentioned in the affidavit dated 6-2-1978 of Shri. H. R. Alva, personnel Manager of the petitioner-Company. Apart from the fact that there has been no denial of the assertion of Shri. H. R. Alva, we have no reason to disbelieve what has been stated by Shri. H. R. Alva in his affidavit. In these circumstances, no argument is necessary to accept the plea of the petitioner that its legitimate expectation to act and hold to the earlier order of Government has been affected by the impugned order of the Government. In these circumstances, no argument is necessary to accept the plea of the petitioner that its legitimate expectation to act and hold to the earlier order of Government has been affected by the impugned order of the Government. Secondly, by reason of the reference, the petitioner is exposed to defending the proceedings before the Labour Court and other Courts which necessarily involves Lime and money. Lastly, on a reference under S. 10 (1) of the Act, the petitioner is exposed to various constraints and proceedings before the Criminal Courts also. On these facts, an order of reference made by the Government after having once rejected to make a reference, will undoubtedly have 'civil consequences' on the petitioner. In our opinion, the views expressed by Venkataramiah, j, in Kirloskar Coy's case that an order of reference will not have, 'civil consequences' is not in accord with the views expressed by our Supreme court, in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) and has therefore to be held as. not tound and correct. Even otherwise, with respect we find it difficult to agree with the views expressed by Venkataramiah J, in Kirlaskar company's case that an order of reference made by the Government after having once refused to m'ake a reference will not have 'civil consequences'. We are also of the view that the acceptance of the contention of the respondents that in making a reference, Government has not decided anything but has only indicated a forum would amount to really begging the question and is unsound. ( 24 ) WE have earlier held that Govt before making the impugned order of reference which has 'civil consequences' on 'the petitioner had not provided an opportunity of hearing either by filing written representations or an oral hearing to the petitioner and that the Govt had provided such an opportunity only to respondent Nos. 2 to 15. We should also remember that on the first occasion when Govt refused to make a reference, Govt, as a matter of fact, has provided an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and respondent Nos. 2 to 15. It is not the case of respondent-1 or the other respondents that the circumstances of the case or the urgency of the matter compelled the Govt to deny that opportunity of hearing to the petitioner while providing such an opportunity to respondent Nos. 2 to 15. 2 to 15. It is not the case of respondent-1 or the other respondents that the circumstances of the case or the urgency of the matter compelled the Govt to deny that opportunity of hearing to the petitioner while providing such an opportunity to respondent Nos. 2 to 15. An examination of the events adverted to by us earlier, would undoubtedly exclude any imperative and unavoidable urgency for taking a decision without providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is on these facts and circumstances, we have to examine whether on principle or authority the claim of the petitioner for an opportunity of hearing is well founded or not and not on any theoretical considerations for the acceptance of which, learned Counsel for the respondents strenuously contended before us. ( 25 ) IN England, the ruling of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC, 40. is considered to be an important landmark in the development of the principles of natural justice and its application before administrative authorities. Wade and Phillips in their Constitutional Law (7th Edn) at page 661 observe that the narrowing in the scope of natural justice was antsted by the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin (11 ). After the decision of the House of Lords in Ridge's case (11), English Courts have consistently attempted to apply the principles of audi alteram partem before the administrative authorities Or where the power to be exercised is only administrative in character to many a situation which was earlier considered to be inconceivable. We consider it unnecessary to refer to and examine the various English decisions in detail as our Supreme Court in Knaipak's case (2) and Mohinder Singh Gll's csse (1) has examined them and has approved them, ( 26 ) IN our Country, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case (2) decided on 29-4-1969 is one such case. In Kraipak's case (2), the supreme Court while examining the validity of selections made to the initial constitution of the Indian Forest Service, has given a new dimension and content to the principles of natural justice in their application before the authorities exercising administrative powers. In para 14 of the report, the Supreme Court has pointed out that in the application of the natural justice, public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. In para 14 of the report, the Supreme Court has pointed out that in the application of the natural justice, public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. In another para of the report, the Supreme Court has held thus:"20. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) whether the rules of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. "on the dichotomy that existed earlier between administrative and quasijudicial functions vis-a-vis the doctrine of natural justice and the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case (2), the Supreme court in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) has held thus : " The dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial function vis-a-vis the doctrine of natural justice is presumably absorescent after kraipak's, ( 1970 1 SCR 457 ) in India and Schmidt ( (1969) 2 ch. 149) in England. Kraipak marks the watershed, if we may say so, in the application of natural justice to administrative proceedings. " our learned brother Rama Jois J, in the order of reference has set out several important and relevant passages in Kraipak's case (2), and Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) to ascertain the ratio decidendi of those cases and therefore we do not consider it necessary to reproduce those passages in our order once again. " our learned brother Rama Jois J, in the order of reference has set out several important and relevant passages in Kraipak's case (2), and Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) to ascertain the ratio decidendi of those cases and therefore we do not consider it necessary to reproduce those passages in our order once again. ( 27 ) IN Kraipak's case (2) itself our Supreme Court in the context of examining whether one of the important principles of natural justice viz, nemo Judex in casu sua (that no man shall be a Judge in his own cause) lias ruled that the other important principle of natural justice viz, the principle of audi alteram partem is also applicable to adminstrative proceedings. In Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1), our Supreme Court on a review of all its earlier rulings, the rulings of the English Courts, opinions of eminent jurists, has ruled that the second important principle of natural justice viz, the principle of audi alteran partem applies before Govts and all Other authorities exercising administrative powers when their decisions will have 'civil consequences' on a citizen or a party and therefore such a citizen or a party is entitled to an opportunity of pre-hearing if the circumstances justify a pre-hearing and the same cannot be excluded on various considerations like delay and Other factors that are generally pleaded for the exclusion of the said principle. As to the necessity or a requilement of an opportunity of hearing, the authority has no Option, but as to the manner and extent of that opportunity that depends, on the circumstances of each case, the nature of enquiry and various other faqtors. In enunciating the principle, the Supreme Court has pointed out, that the same was in the interest of fair play, good administration and the rule of jaw envisaged by our Constitution. In enunciating the principle, the Supreme Court has pointed out, that the same was in the interest of fair play, good administration and the rule of jaw envisaged by our Constitution. In the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case (2), and Mohinder Singh Gili's case (1), we hold that the Govt before deciding to make a reference on the facts and circumstances of the case, was bound to provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner either by filing written representations or by providing an opportunity of oral hearing and by its failure to provide such an opportunity has committed a manifest illegality apparent on the face of the record resulting in substantial failure of justice to the petitioner. ( 28 ) WE have upheld the claim of the petitioner for an opportunity of hearing on the ratio in Kraipak's case (2) and Mohinder Singh Gili's case (1) of the Supreme Court and therefore a detailed examination of the views expressed by Venkataramiah J, in Kirloskar Electric Coy's case (9) which has occasioned a reference of this writ petition to a Divn Bench or the rulings of the various other High Courts is not really necessary. But, as the learned Counsel for the parties have relied on several rulings, we consider it necessary to briefly indicate our views on those rulings also. ( 29 ) IN Kirloskar Etectric Coy's case (9), Venkataramiah J, on the facts of that case Has ruled that a reference under Sec. 10 (1) (c) of the act to a Labour Court does not occasion any 'civil consequences' to the management that had challenged the order of reference and was also not' entitled to an opportunity of hearing. We have earlier pointed out that the views expressed by Venkataramiah J, on the 'civil consequences' is not in accord with the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in mohinder Singh Gilis case (1 ). We are also of the opinion that the views of the Venkataramiah J' if read as excluding the application of the principles of audi alteram partem to the facts and circumstances of the case, is opposed to the principles enunciated by our Supreme Court in Mohinder singh Gili's case (1) and is therefore not sound. Even otherwise, with respect we disagree with the views expressed by Venkataramiah J, to the contrary. Even otherwise, with respect we disagree with the views expressed by Venkataramiah J, to the contrary. In sricrishna Hute Mills, Eluru v. Govt of AP, (1977) 1 L and 1c. 988. ; B. N. Elias and Co (P) Ltd v. G. P. Mukherjee, AIR. 1959 Cal. 339. and Goodyear (I) Ltd, Jaipur v. Indusirial Tribunal, Jaipur, (1968) 2 LLJ. 682. the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, calcutta and Rajasthan respectively, have taken a view similar to the view expressed by Venkataramiah J, in Kirloskar Electric Coy's case (9 ). Firstly, the view expressed in all these decisons rendered earlier to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill's case (1) in our view, is no longer good law. Secondly, the grounds on which we have differed with the views expressed by Venkataramiah J, hold good to the views expressed in these cases also. ( 30 ) SHRI Soli Sorabji, learned Solicitor General, strongly relied on the ruling of Ramaprasad Rao J, as he then was in K. Abdul Salam and Co v. State of T. N. (3) of Madras High Court and a Division Bench ruling of the same Court in Tiruchy Steel Rolling Mills Ltd v. S. Gnanasambandan (4) which has approved the principle enunciated by Ramaprasad Rao, j, in Abdul Salam's case (3 ). In Abdul Salams case (3), the facts were simlar to the one that has arisen before us. On the basis of the principles enunciated in Kraipak's case (2), Ramaprasad Rao J, has upheld a similar claim made by the petitioner in that case. We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed by Ramaprasad Rao J, in Abdul Salam's case (3) also approved by a Division Bench in Tiruchy Steel Rolling Mill's case (4 ). But on the view expressed by ramaprasad Rao J, that the principle of audi alteram partem would be inapplicable to a case where the Govt suo motu changes its mind without anybody prompting them to do so, we should not be taken to have concuried with the same as we are not called upon to consider such a situation in the present case before us. ( 31 ) SHRI Soli Sorabji, learned Solicitor General, next contended that the decision of the Govt to refer the dispute without the application of the mind is based on irrelevant consideration's and on irrelevant material and therefore the order of reference is liable to be quashed. In elaborating his contention, Shri Soli Sorabji pointed out, that the Govt lias not satisfied itselfas to whether an industrial dispute existed or is apprehended and that even if an industrial dispute exisits or is apprehended, it had not satisfied itself as to whether it was expedient to refer the dispute for adjudication of the Labour Court at all. In support of his contention, Shri Soli sorabji strongly relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bombay union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR. 1964 SC. 1817. Learned Counsel for the respondents strenuously contended that the decision of the Govt is based on relevant consideration and material and the satisfaction of the Govt is not open to challenge under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsels for the respondents contended that the petitioner had not challenged the existence of an industrial dispute and therefore the order of reference was justified for which reason this Court cannot examine the contention of the petitioner. ( 32 ) WE will first take up the second contention of the respondents as in our view, if there is merit in that contention, we cannot really adjudicate the contention urged by Shri Soli Sorabji for the petitioner. ( 33 ) IN the petition the petitioner has seriously disputed the existence of an industrial dispute or an apprehended indusrial dispute. On the other hand, it is the csse of the petitioner that with the termination of respondents 2 to 14, industrial amity and peace have been restored and efficiency in cross-bar section has increased. In no part of the pleading, the petitioner has admitted the existence of an industrial dispute or apprehended industrial dispute: In paras 24 and 25 Of the petition, the petitioner has specifically pleaded that the decision of the Govt has been arrived at without the application of mind and is based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations. In no part of the pleading, the petitioner has admitted the existence of an industrial dispute or apprehended industrial dispute: In paras 24 and 25 Of the petition, the petitioner has specifically pleaded that the decision of the Govt has been arrived at without the application of mind and is based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations. In these circumstances, it would be wrong to hold that the petitioner had admitted the existence of an industrial dispute or an apprehended industrial dispute and its pleadings do not justify the examination of the contention urged by Shri Soli Sorabji before us. We, therefore, reject this contention of the learned Counsels for the respondents. ( 34 ) A decision of the Govt whether an industrial disptute exists or industrial dispute is apprehended and if one exists or is apprehended whether it is expedient to make a reference or not so long as its decision is based on relevant considerations and material, is final and is not open to examination by this Court as if it is an appeal. However, if the decision of the Govt is based on no material or even it there is material if the govt has not applied its mind to such material or if it has based its decision on irrelevant and extraneous considerations or left out Of considerations that are relevant, this Court, in exercise of its powers under art. 226 can undoubtedly interfere with such a decision of the Govt (vide state of Bombay v. K. P. Krixhnan, AIR. I960 3c. 1223. and Bombay Union of Journalists v. State o/ Bombay (15) It is in the light of these principles, we have to examine whether the impugned order of reference is sustainable or nt. ( 35 ) EARLIER we have pointed out that Govt, on an examination of the relevant material and considerations, had refused to make a reference on 27-5-76 and thereafter on 10-1-77 initiative for making a reference came from respondent-15. In its representation d 10-1-77 addressed to the Chief minister, the only new or additional factor that was pleaded by respondent-15 is that on the intervention of Govt, the management of MICO had reinstated the services of certain employees and the case of respondents 2 to 14 was analogous to the case of MICO employees. In its representation d 10-1-77 addressed to the Chief minister, the only new or additional factor that was pleaded by respondent-15 is that on the intervention of Govt, the management of MICO had reinstated the services of certain employees and the case of respondents 2 to 14 was analogous to the case of MICO employees. On that representation, the Chief Minister directed the Labour Commissoner to pursuade the management of the petitioner-Company to reinstate respondents 2 to 14 failing which to make a reference under the Act. In the report dated 23-2-77 of the Labour Commr or in any of the notings or minutes, Govt has not even addressed itself to ascertain whether an industrial dispute ex is or is apprehended and if so whether it was expedient to refer the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication. AS we are able to see, the one and the only factor that can be said to have weighed with the Govt to refer the dispute to the Labour Court is the refusal of the management to agree for reinstatement of the employees that had been terminated viz, respondents 2 to 14 and not any other factor that is relevant to Sec. 10 of the Act. In these circumstances, we have no alternative but to hold that the decision of the Govt to refer the dispute has been arrived at without the application of the mind to the relevant factors and relevant material and is therefore liable to be interfered with under Art. 226 of the Constn. ( 36 ) IN our view, the decision of the Govt to refer the dispute is manifestly illegal and has occasioned substantial failure of justice to the petitioner and is therefore liable to be interfered with under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We, therefore, quash the impugned order of reference by issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus and direct the Presiding officer, Labour Cpurt, Bangalore-respondent-16, not to adjudicate the reference made to it by Government. ( 37 ) RULE made absolute. Petitioner is entitled to its costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250. --- *** --- .