JUDGMENT.-The main question arising for my consideration in this appeal filed by the first defendant against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Erode in O.S. No. 294 of 1969. involves the interpretation to be put on Exhibit A-5 will executed by Arthanari Gounder. It is therefore unnecessary for me to state the entire facts of the case, but only refer to such of the facts as are necessary for determination of the question arising for decision in the appeal. 2. In or about the year 1930 Arthanari Gounder was under sentence of death. having been found guilty of murder. At the relevant time his mother Karuppayee Ammal, his two sisters Karuppayee Ammal alias Sinnu and Valli Ammal were alive. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 and the second defendant in the present suit are the children of Valli Ammal. Arthanari Gounder’s father Arumuga had a brother by name Palani and he had two daughters Muthakkal and Kali Ammal. Arthanari Gounder executed Exhibit A-5 registered will dated 19th February, 1930. Under the will the testator had provided that his mother Karuppayee Ammal should enjoy the properties for her lifetime. He gave her power under the will to borrow up to the extent of Rs.5,000 on the security of the properties and sell such portion of the properties as was necessary to discharge the debts. He further directed that the properties that remained after the lifetime of Karuppayee Ammal should be taken by his two sisters Karuppayee Ammal alias Sinnu viz., the appellant herein and Valli Ammal in equal shares. The will contained a further direction that his mother Karuppayee Ammal should maintain and conduct the marriage of his uncle Palani’s daughters Muthakkal and Kaliammal, Admittedly, Valli Ammal the sister of Arthanari predeceased Karuppayee Ammal, the mother leaving behind her plaintiffs 1 to 3 and the second defendant. 3. Plaintiffs-respondents filed the suit for partition and separate possession of 3/8th share in the suit properties on the basis that under the terms of Exhibit A-5 will Karuppayee Ammal, the mother got only a limited estate and the remainder vested in the first defendant and Valli Ammal in equal shares on the date of the death of the testator. 3. Plaintiffs-respondents filed the suit for partition and separate possession of 3/8th share in the suit properties on the basis that under the terms of Exhibit A-5 will Karuppayee Ammal, the mother got only a limited estate and the remainder vested in the first defendant and Valli Ammal in equal shares on the date of the death of the testator. The suit was resisted by the first defendant on the ground that under Exhibit A-5 will Karuppayee Ammal got an absolute estate and therefore Valli Ammal having predeceased the mother the first defendant alone was entitled to the suit property. 4. The trial Court held that under Exhibit A-5 will Karuppayee Ammal, the mother got only a life estate and that the remainder vested in both Valli Ammal and the first defendant as on the date of death of the testator and that consequently on Valli Ammal’s death her daughter inherited her share of the suit properties and she was competent to execute Exhibit A-4 settlement deed in favour of the plaintiffs. In this view, the trial Court passed a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiffs as prayed for. 5. Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami on behalf of the appellant submitted that the only point for determination in the appeal was whether under Exhibit A-5 Karuppayee Ammal got an absolute estate or whether she secured only a life estate with Karuppayee Ammal alias Sinnu and Valli Ammal taking the vested remainder as on the date of death of the testator. The learned counsel submitted that if I agreed with the view taken by the trial Court then the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court would have to be confirmed, but on the other hand, if I agreed with his submission that the mother of Arthanari Gounder got an absolute estate and therefore Valli Ammal having predeceased the mother did not take any right at all under the will, then the suit for partition filed by the plaintiffs-respondents claiming under Valli Ammal would have only to be dismissed and that I need not trouble myself with the other facts canvassed in the trial Court. 6. In interpreting a will the Court should read the will as a whole and consider all the clauses and circumstances and find out the meaning of any clause and the intention of the testator and give effect to it as far as the law permits. 6. In interpreting a will the Court should read the will as a whole and consider all the clauses and circumstances and find out the meaning of any clause and the intention of the testator and give effect to it as far as the law permits. The general rule of construction is first to ascertain by an examination of the entire will what is the natural and grammatical meaning of the language used by the testator. The construction of the will is to be made upon the entire instrument and all its parts are to be construed in relation to each other and so as, if possible to form one consistent whole. The intention of the testator must be gathered from the language used by the testator throughout the whole instrument. The meaning of any clause is to be collected from the whole will and all parts of the will are to be construed from the entire instrument. In Sakezada Mohammed Kanigarh Shah v. Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb and others1, the Supreme Court has stated the law thus: “The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the Courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor’s document, it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee.” In Narayana Doss v. Arumughathammal2, it is stated thus: “The Courts should not be astute in discovering repugnant provisions in a will merely because of a slight inconsistency between portions of the testamentary instrument. As far as possible a harmonious construction of all the provisions in the will should be arrived at, as otherwise, the brushing aside of a particular clause on the ground of its repugnancy to another, may result in creating a will which was never contemplated by the testator.” In Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain3, it was observed thus: “Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary in-struments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. What is to be done where this happens? It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given. It is clear, however, that an attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible e.g., where an absolute title is given in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.” 7. In this context, it has also to be borne in mind that the Court has to remember the words of Knight-Bruce, L.J., said long ago, “one testator’s nonsense is no guide to another testator’s nonsense.” Therefore, precedents laid down on the basis of the language of other wills may not be of much relevance for construing Exhibit A-5 will except to the extent that those precedents lay down general principles of construction. 8. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami contends as follows. The very first sentence in. Exhibit A-5 will would show that the testator had not used any words of limitation. According to learned counsel the words: do not contain say words of limitation and therefore it must be taken that the testator intended to confer an absolute estate. 8. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami contends as follows. The very first sentence in. Exhibit A-5 will would show that the testator had not used any words of limitation. According to learned counsel the words: do not contain say words of limitation and therefore it must be taken that the testator intended to confer an absolute estate. If this contention of his were right, the learned counsel further submits that the subsequent clause in the will which directs that the residue of the estate should go to his sisters Karuppayee Ammal alias Sinnu and Valli Ammal would be void as being repugnant to the absolute estate already conferred on the mother. Learned counsel seeks support for his argument from the further direction in the will empowering the mother to incur debts to the extent of Rs.5,000 and to discharge those debts by alienating the properties. He also refers to the direction that the mother should maintain and conduct the marriage of his nieces Muthakkal and Kali Ammal. In the submission of learned counsel for the appellant unless the intention of the testator was to give an absolute estate to Karuppayee he could not and would not have given a power of disposal over the properties to the mother. Learned counsel argues that the gift over is so indefinite and so uncertain as one might not know what would be the extent of the property that might be sold by the mother to discharge the debts and consequently the property would not have vested on the date of death of the testator on Valli Ammal and the first defendant as there was no knowing as to what would be the property that would be left an residue at the time of death of the mother. 9. Per contra, Mr. Sivamani, learned counsel for the respondent would contend that a reading of the whole will would make it clear that what the testator intended was only to confer a limited estate on his mother Karuppayee and a vested remainder to his sisters, the first defendant and deceased Valli Ammal. Mr. Sivamani contended that the will must be construed as conferring a limited estate or a life estate on the mother with a power of disposal. The language of the will did not in any way postpone the vesting of the vested remainder to any future date. Mr. Mr. Sivamani contended that the will must be construed as conferring a limited estate or a life estate on the mother with a power of disposal. The language of the will did not in any way postpone the vesting of the vested remainder to any future date. Mr. Sivamani, further contends that if on a reading of the entire will the Courts comes to the conclusion that the intention of the testator was to give the mother only a life estate then there could not be a vacuum or interregnum so far as the vested remainder was concerned and it had to vest somewhere and in the instant case it got immediately vested in the first defendant and deceased Valli Ammal on the date of death of the testator. Consequently, Valli Ammal got a heritable estate in respect of half of the properties which was left behind by Karuppayee the mother and that consequently the second defendant and under her the plaintiffs could claim the suit properties. 10. The point for consideration is which of these contentions should be accepted. The problem is not easy to be solved but with the help of decided cases on the subject. Before considering the precedents on the question let me extract the very language used by Arthanari Gounder in the will: On a reading of the will there is no doubt that Arthanari intended only to give a life estate to his mother. That would be clear from the facts that when he refers to the estate to be taken by the mother he used the words At the same time, while conferring the estate on his two sisters he used the words: Therefore, the testator was aware of the distinction between an estate which should enure for a lifetime of a person and an absolute estate. In this context, Mr. Narayanaswami referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Tiruchendur Sri Subramaniaswami Temple V. Ramaswami Pillai1 , wherein the testator has stated in the will as follows: "I have bequeathed to my son Pichai Pillai, the right to all my properties and moneys, etc., and he shall solely enjoy them. In this context, Mr. Narayanaswami referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Tiruchendur Sri Subramaniaswami Temple V. Ramaswami Pillai1 , wherein the testator has stated in the will as follows: "I have bequeathed to my son Pichai Pillai, the right to all my properties and moneys, etc., and he shall solely enjoy them. If he or his son has no child, the said properties shall pass to Subramaniaswami at Tiruchendur." In that context, the Privy Counsel held that the latter provision for the devolution of the property in case the son should die without issue, was not in any way intended to limit the character of the absolute estate clearly indicated in the will and that the latter provision was void as being repugnant. In my opinion, the language used in the will that was interpreted by the Privy Council is entirely different from the language used in Exhibit A-5, and therefore the Privy Council’s decision cannot be taken to be a safe guide in interpreting Exhibit A-5 will. 11. In the well known case in Williams v. Pounder2a testator, by his will, gave his residue to his wife absolutely. By a codicil he revoked this gift, and, after making a specific gift, gave his residue to his wife ‘for her own absolute use and benefit and disposal’; but, without prejudice to the absolute power of disposal by his wife of all the said residue, in case at her decease any part thereof should ‘remain undisposed of ‘by her, he gave the same to two other persons equally as tenants in-common, subject to the payment by them of his wife’s debts and funeral expenses. In that case Kay, J. held thus: "If by the codicil he meant her to take absolutely there was no use in referring to ‘disposal’. The reference to a power of disposal shows that he did not intend her to have such an estate as would enable her to dispose of the subject-matter without the assistance of that power. Then by the later words he treats the former as having conferred upon her a power of disposal. If the Court were to construe this to be an absolute gift to the wife, all the words after ‘absolute use and benefit and disposal’ would be rendered void and ineffective. Then by the later words he treats the former as having conferred upon her a power of disposal. If the Court were to construe this to be an absolute gift to the wife, all the words after ‘absolute use and benefit and disposal’ would be rendered void and ineffective. The rule is to construe a will ut res magis valeat quam pereat, and to give effect so far as possible to all the words used by the testator." 12. In S.M. Hara Kumari Dasi v. Mohim Chandra Sarkar3the facts were these. A will addressed by the testator to his wife was to this effect. "You are my legally married wife and entitled to the property to be left by me. Should I on a sudden die.. you shall under this will become possessor of my properties etc., and perform my sradh at a suitable cost; and for the benefit of my soul you shall purchase a house..and establish a Mahadev in it and perform its sheba and services, etc., and you shall fix a suitable allowance as pronami for my spiritual guide. You will have the right and power to alienate by gift or sale all the aforesaid, movable and immovable properties. My daughter Sreemutty Hara Kumari shall become entitled to and possess of whatever properties will remain after your d1eath and she shall enjoy the same keeping up and maintaining the aforesaid shebas etc., The said daughter shall have the same rights in the aforesaid properties as you have, and he to whom my said daughter may willingly give away those properties shall possess the same and enjoy them keeping up and maintaining the sheba, etc. It was contended by the appellant before the Calcutta High Court that the widow took only a life estate with a power — one which in England would be regarded as a power of appointment to alienate by gift or sale the property passing by the will. This argument was accepted and it was held that giving effect to all the words of the will, the widow took for life, with a power of alienation, but to the extent to which such power was not exercised, the daughter similarly took the property. 13. This argument was accepted and it was held that giving effect to all the words of the will, the widow took for life, with a power of alienation, but to the extent to which such power was not exercised, the daughter similarly took the property. 13. In Mafatlal Motilal v. Kanialal Trikamlal1a Hindu testator in disposing of his self-acquired property by will excluded his son, but bequeathed it to the son’s wife as follows: " If I die then my son’s wife Ganga Bai is the owner of the above mentioned immovable and movable properties... The said Ganga shall during her lifetime spend and use and enjoy out of my property and as to whatever property may have remained over after her decease her two daughters are the owners thereof." 14. At the date of the will, Ganga had two daughters, but one of them died and a third daughter was born to her before the death of the testator. It was held on a construction of the will that Ganga took under the will an estate for life with a power of disposal in her lifetime, and that the daughter, who was the survivor of the two named in the will, took a vested interest in the whole residue which was both heritable and transferable. This, case is almost on all fours with the instant case. Scott, C.J., stated the law thus: " The first question arising in this part of the will is whether Ganga took an absolute or a some less interest and the second if she did not take absolutely whether of her two surviving daughters one or both took vested remainders. On the first point we think the widow took for life with a power of disposal in her life-time as in In re, Pounder.2In that case a testator by his will gave his residue to his wife absolutely. On the first point we think the widow took for life with a power of disposal in her life-time as in In re, Pounder.2In that case a testator by his will gave his residue to his wife absolutely. By a codicil he revoked this gift and after making a specific gift gave his residue to his wife ‘for her own absolute use and benefit and disposal’ but without prejudice to the absolute power of disposal by his wife of all the said residue; in case after her decease any part thereof should ‘remain undisposed of by her he gave the same to two other persons equally as tenants in common: It was held that the wife took a life interest with a power of disposition by act inter vives but not by will." The same conclusion follows where the gift over in remainder follows a gift for the widow’s sole and separate use and benefit in the same testamentary document as in Constable v. Bull3 . It is necessary to state that in this case out of the two daughters Chanchal and Dahi who were alive on the date of the execution of the will Dahi died after the execution of the will and before the testator’s death. It was held that the other daughter Chanchal took a vested remainder in the residue of the properties. 15. The will which came up for interpretation before a Bench of this Court in Manumallaswami v. Chinna Narayanaswami4was in the following terms: "After my death my wife Andalamma shall have the power of gift and sale in all my movable property, which should remain unsold and undisposed of by me by gift in my life-time. My wife Andalamma should have power to adopt any boy she would like, if she feels inclined to make an adoption, with power to give him such property as she should like; she has power to make such adoptions till my family is perpetuated. If she does not like to make an adoption my sister’s sons, viz., (1) Bondada Manumallaswami; and (2) Jibu Raghavayya’s son Venkateswara Row, should after her lifetime, enjoy in equal moieties with power of gift and sale, they, their sons, grandsons etc., in succession (i.e. from generation to generation) such of the property which my wife should not have disposed of by gift or sale in her life-time". In interpreting this will Waller, J., stated as follows: " The widow could dispose of the property in her lifetime, but had no power to dispose of it by will and, if any property remained at her death, the will of the testator was to settle its destination. The rule in such cases is that, if the intention of the testator as represented by his words, was to confer an absolute estate that estate cannot be cut down by anything that follows. If however the intention is doubtful, the addition of a gift over may be evidence that his intention was to confer no more than a limited interest. Here the worst that can be said is that his intention, as conveyed by the language of the gift, was not clear and the gift-over showed that intention was to confer no more than a limited estate. If the will is construed in this way that the intention was to give the wife a limited estate, with a power of disposal inter vivos and to give over what she did not dispose of, every word of the will becomes effective. That is in accordance with the first rule of construction of testamentary dispositions and it has, as Joyce, J., observed in the case already cited, ‘the not unimportant merit of effectuating the obvious and expressed desire of the testator." In Anantha Sayana v Kondappa1on the language of the will in that case the learned Judge held that Chinnammal took an absolute estate. However, dealing with the contention of Mr. Rajah Iyer that either the estate conferred under a will must be an absolute estate or life estate and to construe a disposition as a life estate with absolute power of appointment is tantamount to construing the disposition as an absolute estate, the learned Judge stated the law thus: " There is considerable force in the argument of Mr. Rajah Iyer but the law does make a distinction between an absolute estate and a life estate with a power of appointment. In the one case what is interest conferred is capable not only of disposition by the donee but capable of transmission to his heirs and in the case of the other, that is, a life estate with a power of appointment, what is conferred is not property but power. In the one case what is interest conferred is capable not only of disposition by the donee but capable of transmission to his heirs and in the case of the other, that is, a life estate with a power of appointment, what is conferred is not property but power. The distinction between a power of appointment over property and property has always been well recognized ; vide Ex part Gilchrist2 .) 16. No two ideas can well be more distinct the one from the other than those of property and power as Fry L.J., points out in the same case at p. 531. Both in England and in India it is well settled that it is open to a person to make a disposition of the property either inter vivos or by will so as to confer a life estate with a power of appointment. In re, Stringer Shaw v. Ford3In re. Sanford; Sanford v. Sanford4 Sarada Sundari v. N. Krishto4and Har Kumari’s case6 ." In Beni Madho v. Harihar Prasad7the question raised for decision by the Judge was whether under the Indian law it was permissible for a testator to confer upon the legatee a life estate coupled with a power of alienation under certain circumstances. The learned Judges answered this question stating that there was nothing in the laws of India which prevented the grant of the right to alienation to a person to whom a life estate is also granted in certain properties. 17. Ramamurti, J., in Jabamalai Mariammal v. Madalaimuthu Thevar8has observed thus: “An examination of some of the cases referred to in the above statements of the law shows that in several cases, Courts have adopted an intermediate construction of construing a prior absolute gift as an estate for life with a power of appointment by deed or will and the subsequent limitation or bequest taking effect in case the power of appointment had not been exercised. Even though for practical purposes, there is no distinction between an absolute estate and a life estate coupled with a power of appointment by will or deed, it is settled law that the two ideas are two distinct conceptions and that it is quite competent to a testator to confer a life-estate with a power of appointment by a deed or will following it up by an independent or subsequent bequest, in case the first legatee dies without exercising the power of appointment.” The learned Judge has quoted the following state of law in Williams on Wills, Vol. 1, page 495 at page 496: “A gift over in default of disposition by an absolute owner is void. An absolute gift of property followed by a gift of so much of that property as the first donee shall not have disposed of is an absolute gift in the first instance and the gift over is void. The main difficulty in these cases is that what is apparently an absolute gift in the first instance may by reason of subsequent provisions in the will be held to be cut down to a life interest, and the following are examples of such cases. The gift is to cut down (i) where the gift at the death of the first donee of what remains of the estate can be construed as a gift over of the residue after payment of debts; (ii) if such an expression appears in a codicil so that an intention is shown to vary the absolute interest given by the will, the first donee will take a life interest, with a power of disposition either inter vivos or by will only or generally; (iii) where there is a doubt as to what interest the first donee takes raised by inconsistent provisions in the will such as a restriction or alienation, or a gift over on the donee disposing or failing to dispose of the property.” This question again came up for consideration before Varadarajan, J., in Nataraja Mudaliar v. Panduranga Mudaliar1. The recital in the settlement deed which came up for interpretation was to the following effect: It was contended before the learned Judge that the clause providing for respondent taking absolutely such of the properties covered by the settlement deed as were undisposed of at the time of the settlor’s death is repugnant to the earlier clause conferring an absolute estate on the settlee in respect of the properties mentioned in the settlement deed and has therefore to be ignored, as void. On the other hand, it was contended for the opposite side that the settlement deed has to be read as a whole and that if it is done so, it will be clear that what had been intended by the settlor was that his wife Thillaikannu Ammal should no doubt enjoy the properties mentioned in the settlement deed with absolute rights and that the respondent who is no other than Nagarathna Mudaliar’s sister’s grandson, should perform the ceremonies of himself and his wife and take absolutely such of the properties covered by the settlement deed as remained undisposed of by the settlee. After a detailed consideration the learned Judge held that the settlee had only a right to enjoy the properties with absolute powers of disposal during her lifetime under the settlement deed and that the clause providing for the respondent becoming entitled to such of those properties as remained undisposed of by her at the time of her death is not repugnant and void and would only show that the settlor intended that the settlee should only have such limited right and not have the absolute right of taking the properties to be enjoyed by her from generation to generation. 18. The following statement of law is found in Theobald on Wills, Thirteenth Edition, paragraph 1312: "A gift without words of limitation may be cut down to a life interest ; if the same property is disposed of at the death of the first taker. 18. The following statement of law is found in Theobald on Wills, Thirteenth Edition, paragraph 1312: "A gift without words of limitation may be cut down to a life interest ; if the same property is disposed of at the death of the first taker. And words indicating that the property is to be enjoyed by some one else after the death of the first taker may have the same effect......Similarly, where the testator’s whole property is given to a person absolutely, followed by a gift of the residue at his decease, the first gift may be cut: down to a life interest." At paragraph 1313 it is stated as follows: " If on the other hand the true construction is that what in the first instance appeared to be an absolute interest is cut down to a life interest, then the use of such expression as " whatever remains ‘will not prevent the intention from taking effect, and the legatee will take either for life simply or for life with a power of disposition, if there is anything in the will to support that construction ". 19. Now analysing the terms of the will executed by Arthanari, the following things appear to be clear. Arthanari did make a distinction between a limited estate and an absolute estate when he stated in the first portion of the will that his mother Karuppayee Ammal should enjoy the property for her lifetime and again in the later portion while making a gift over to his two sisters he stated that they should enjoy the property with absolute power of disposal and from generation to generation. Again, the very fact that he gave a restricted power of disposal to his mother viz., to incumber the property to the extent of Rs. 5,000 and to dispose of so much of the property as was necessary to discharge those debts, would show that he did not intend to confer any absolute power of disposition on his mother Karuppayee Ammal. If his intention was to give an absolute estate to his mother there was no necessity on his part to giver her a right to incur debts on the security of the property and to dispose of the property to discharge those debts. If that were his intention, the clause in the will would become superfluous. If his intention was to give an absolute estate to his mother there was no necessity on his part to giver her a right to incur debts on the security of the property and to dispose of the property to discharge those debts. If that were his intention, the clause in the will would become superfluous. On the other hand, the very fact that he gave his mother a power of disposition and that too a restricted power of disposition would show that the mother derived a right of disposal only under the power granted by the will. No doubt, I was first impressed with the argument advanced by Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami which appeared to be attractive. But, on a further consideration I am unable to accept his submissions. If I am to accept the contention of Mr. Narayanaswami and hold that Karuppayee Ammal mother of Arthanari got an absolute estate even under the very first clause I would have to give no effect at all to the subsequent clause in the will. This would be remaking a will on behalf of Arthanari in the place of Exhibit A-5. Apart from this in my view, the first clause itself does not yield to the interpretation sought to be put upon it by Mr. Narayanaswami that it amounts to an absolute gift without any limitation. The language in the will which the Privy Council had to construe in Tiruchendur Sri Subramaniaswami Temple v. Ramaswami Pillai1, was different. 20. When once I hold that under Exhibit A-5 what Arthanari intended was not to confer an absolute estate on his mother Karuppayee but only to confer on her a life estate with a power of disposal to the extent of borrowing money upto Rs. 5,000 on the security of the property and to dispose of the property to discharge those debts, the vested remainder must vest and did vest in Karuppayee Ammal alias Sinnu and Valliammal on the date of death of the testator. 21. In Somasundaram v. Rajammal1, Justice Ratnavel Pandian, speaking for the Bench held that there cannot be a vacuum or interregnum where there is a life estate followed by an absolute estate because the residue must vest somewhere. Again in Ram Mohan v. Lalitha Raghuraman2, the principle laid down in Somasundaram v. Rajammal1, has been reiterated. 21. In Somasundaram v. Rajammal1, Justice Ratnavel Pandian, speaking for the Bench held that there cannot be a vacuum or interregnum where there is a life estate followed by an absolute estate because the residue must vest somewhere. Again in Ram Mohan v. Lalitha Raghuraman2, the principle laid down in Somasundaram v. Rajammal1, has been reiterated. Following these two decisions when once it is held that Karuppayee Ammal would get only a life interest under Exhibit A-5, the proprietary interest in the property vested in both the first defendant and the deceased Valli Ammal from the date of death of the testator and only their right of enjoyment of the property was postponed till the death of Karuppayee Ammal, the mother. 22. In the result, I hold that under Exhibit A-5 Karuppayee Ammal the mother of Arthanari took only a limited estate with a power of disposal and that the proprietary interest vested in the first defendant and Valliammal in equal shares on the date of death of Arthanari in 1930. Consequently, Valli Ammal obtained a heritable interest in respect of one-half of the property which on her death (even though she predeceased Karuppayee Ammal) devolved on her daughter the second defendant who was in turn competent to execute the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiffs. This conclusion of mine is in agreement with the interpretation put on the will by the trial Court. It therefore follows that the preliminary decree for partition and separate possession passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of 3/8 the share of the properties is correct. I therefore confirm the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.