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1978 DIGILAW 118 (PAT)

Sarla Devi Agrawala v. State of Bihar

1978-05-08

MANORANJAN PRASAD, N.P.SINGH

body1978
JUDGMENT: Nagendra Pd. Singh, J. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, Kodarma in purported exercise of the powers conferred on him by sub-section (5) of Section 20 of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act), has directed issuance of distress warrant against the petitioner of this writ application. From the statement made in the main writ application and different supplementary affidavits, which were filed during the pendency of the writ application, it appears that M/s Christian Mica Industries Ltd. Respondent no. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the 'said company') is a public limited company having its registered office at Calcutta, which carries on business of Mica in the districts of Hazaribag and Giridih. The said company had employed several employees. On 12.10.77, the respondent-Labour Superintendent, acting as Inspector under the aforesaid Act, filed application under section 20 of the Act for a direction to the comp1ny as well as several other persons named therein to pay the different amounts, which have not been paid to the employees of the said company. Towards the end or that application, the names of different employees with the amount which is payable to them has been mentioned. According to the said application the Company and the persons mentioned therein who have been described as the persons connected with the management of the said company have failed to pay minimum wages to the employees aforesaid, in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, which had given the cause of action for filing the application in question. The petitioner has also been named as one of the person connected with the management of the said company and her name appears against sl. no. 5. 2. The relevant portion of Section 20 is as follows (1) The appropriate Government may by notification in the official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region. no. 5. 2. The relevant portion of Section 20 is as follows (1) The appropriate Government may by notification in the official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region. or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner, any other officer with experience as Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under section 14 to employees employed or paid in that area. (3) When any application under sub• section (2) is entertained, the Authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry if any as it may consider necessary, may without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under this Act, and the Authority may direct :-- (i) in the case of a claim arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount of such excess: (ii) in any other case, the payment of the amount due to the employee, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit, not exceeding ten rupees, and the Authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess or the amount due is paid by the employer to the employee before the disposal of the application. (5) Any amount directed to be paid under this section may be recovered- (a) if the Authority is a Magistrate, by the Authority as if it were a fine imposed by the Authority as a Magistrate, or (b) if the Authority is not a Magistrate, by any Magistrate 'to whom the Authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were a fine impose d by such Magistrate. 3. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, Kodarma has been appointed as the Authority under the Act. On the application aforesaid the Sub-divisional Magistrate passed an order dated 15.12.1977 directing the company to pay the dues of the workmen as mentioned in the aforesaid petition on or before 5.1.78. It was also ordered that if the company failed to pay within the stipulated period the amount will be recovered as provided under Section 20 (5) (a) of the Act. A copy of this order is annexure-1 to the writ application. Perhaps the amount as directed was not paid by the company aforesaid. The aforesaid Labour Superintendent informed the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate (herein after referred to as the 'Authority') about the same who passed the following orders :- "Issue process against the O. P. for realisation- of the awarded amount u/s 421 of the Cr. P.C. as provided u/s 20 (5) of the Minimum Wages Act," A copy of the aforesaid order is annexure-2 to the writ application. Pursuance to this order distress warrants were issued against several persons who had been named as opposite party in the application under Section 20 including this petitioner. The order sheet dated 31.1.78 is as follows ;- "Five Distress warrants issued against (1) Mahesh Chandra Agrawala (2) Ratan Kumar Agrawala (3) Ramanand Agrawala (4) Sajan Kumar Agrawala and (5) Smt. Sarla Devi Agrawala have been returned by the Chief Metropaliton Magistrate, Calcutta with intimation that it may be sent to S.P. 24 Pargana for execution" According to the petitioner having learnt about the said distress warrant the present writ application has been filed. The main grievances which have been made on behalf of the petitioner is that the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, who had been appointed an authority within the meaning of the' Act' had no jurisdiction to pass the aforesaid order dated 15.12.77 directing the company to pay the dues of the workers because the said authority was not duly constituted in accordance with the requirement of the Act. According to the learned counsel as the main order itself was without jurisdiction there is no question of execution of that order in accordance with the provisions of Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was also submitted that in any view of the matter for the default of the Company, distress warrant cannot be issued against the petitioner. I propose to first deal with the submission made on behalf of the petitioner about the jurisdiction of the authority to pass an order under section 20 of the Act directing the Company to pay the amount which bas been found to be due to the workmen. 4. According to the petitioner after coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') any dispute which involves the appreciation or shifting of evidence or formulation of any decision which exposes any person to any punishment or penalty should be decided only by a Judicial Magistrate. As the question of determining the liability of the employer under the provisions of the Act involves appreciation or shifting of the evidence, that should have been decided only by a Judicial Magistrate and not by the Executive Magistrate as has been done in this case. In this connection our attention was drawn to subsection (4) of Section 3 of the Code which Is as follows :- "Where, under any law, other than this Code, the functions exercisable by a Magistrate relate to matters (a) which involve the appreciation or shifting of evidence or the formulation of any decision which exposes any person to any punishment or penalty or detention in custody pending investigation, inquiry or trial or would have the effect of sending him for trial before any Court, they shall subject to the provisions of this Code, be exercisable by a Judicial Magistrate: or (b) which are administrative or executive in nature such as the granting of a licence, the suspension or cancellation of a licence, sanctioning a prosecution or with draw in, from a prosecution they shall, subject as aforesaid be exercisable by an Executive Magistrate." According to the learned counsel the word 'Magistrate' used in sub-section (1) of Section 20 has to be read as, Judicial Magistrate and not Executive Magistrate. On the face of it, this argument appears to be attractive, but on scrutiny it is without any substance Sub-section (1) of Section 20, which has already been quoted above, on a plain reading vests power on the appropriate Government to appoint any commissioner for Workmen's compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising function as a Labour Commissioner or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a civil court or a stipendiary magistrate to be an authority to bear and decide the case arising out of the payment of minimum wages. As such, the appropriate Government is not bound only to appoint a Magistrate to decide a claim under the provisions of the Act. For that purpose any officer of the State Government not below the certain ranks as indicated in that subsection or even an officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil court can as well be appointed an authority under sub section (1) of Section 20 to decide such dispute. If it is held that the Magistrate referred to in sub section (1) of Section 20 necessarily means a Judicial Magistrate then v hat will happen if an Executive Officer named therein is appointed as authority. In my view if it is held that only Judicial Magistrate can bear such application then it will lead to an anamolous position. Apart from that, Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure says in clear and unmistakable terms that "nothing contained in that Code, shall in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force." The Act in question is a special law regarding the payment of minimum wages and it prescribes a special jurisdiction for the purpose of adjudication of any such claim and confers powers on such authority. In my opinion in view of section 5 of the Code it cannot be said that the Magistrate referred under subsection (1) of Section 20 must be read to mean a judicial Magistrate. In my opinion in view of section 5 of the Code it cannot be said that the Magistrate referred under subsection (1) of Section 20 must be read to mean a judicial Magistrate. In my view the authority which is constituted by the appropriate Government in exercise of power conferred on it by sub-section (1) of Section 20 is a creature of this special Act, on whom the power has been vested in accordance with the provisions of that Act. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the Sub-divisional Magistrate in question was duly appointed in accordance with the requirement of sub-section (1) of Section 20. 5. It was then submitted that even if the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate may have power to pass order determining the liability under the Act still he had no jurisdiction to issue distress warrant against the petitioner. This argument proceeds, as already indicated above, on the basis that the learned Magistrate bas held by aforesaid order dated 15.12.77, that it was the company which was liable to pay the dues to the workers and has issued direction to the company to pay the dues. Apart from that it was urged that the workers in question being the employees of the company which is a corporate body, distress warrants can not be issued to its shareholders, or directors for realisation of the dues of the company. In my opinion, there is substance in this contention. The Sub-divisional Magistrate as authority under the Act has directed the company to pay the dues of the workers in the following terms;- "As such u/s 20 (3) of the Minimum Wages Act, the court hereby directs the Company to pay the dues of the workers as mentioned in the petition filed by the petitioner by or before 5.1.1978 positively. If the Company fails to pay within the stipulated period, i. e. 5.1.1978 the amount will be recovered as provided u/s 20 (5) (a) of the Minimum Wages Act." In such a situation, for realisation of the dues distress warrant should not have been issued against this petitioner. The amount in question can be only realised by taking steps against the company and assets thereof wherever it may be. It is well established that the directors or the shareholders of a company are not liable for legal liability incurred by such limited company. The amount in question can be only realised by taking steps against the company and assets thereof wherever it may be. It is well established that the directors or the shareholders of a company are not liable for legal liability incurred by such limited company. This aspect of the matter was examined in the well known case of Saloman V. Saloman & Co. Ltd1. and such companies have always been treated as separate legal entities from their Directors and shareholders. In case of M. P. Agrawalla and another v. Union of India and others2 Ramaswami C. J. as be then was observed as fellows ;- "It is well established that a limited company has separate legal personality from that of its directors who cannot, therefore, be made liable for the legal liability incurred by the limited company. The principle of the independent corporate existence of a Company has been explained and emphasised by the House of Lords in the case of Saloman V. Saloman & Co. Ltd." The same view was expressed by a Bench of this court in Bejai Singh Dugar. V. Certificate Officer, Bhagalpur and ors3 where it was pointed out that the execution of a certificate against the Managing Director of any company or for the matter of that any authority of the company for the dues of the company, cannot be resorted to. It was observed that "it can be realised only by seizing the assets of the company and not by putting in prison the managing director or any other officer of the Company." The principle is well settled because no individual associated with an incorporated company can be held liable for the dues of the company which is a legal person having its own rights and liabilities. 6. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondent -State could not challenge this proposition of law which is well settled but he however urged that the petitioner should file a show cause before the authority concerned instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this court. In my opinion, this objection cannot be entertained. The writ application having been admitted by this Court and the order passed for issuing his tress warrant against the petitioner being patently illegal and without jurisdiction, it will not be proper exercise of discretion to with hold the relief which the petitioner is entitled. In my opinion, this objection cannot be entertained. The writ application having been admitted by this Court and the order passed for issuing his tress warrant against the petitioner being patently illegal and without jurisdiction, it will not be proper exercise of discretion to with hold the relief which the petitioner is entitled. As I have already pointed out that in this case it is an admitted position that distress warrant, pas been directed to be issued against the petitioner for realisation of the dues which was payable by the company to its works. For that no coercive Step can be taken against the petitioner, who is perhaps a shareholder or director of that company. 7. For realisation of dues in question, the authority is proceeding in accordance with section 421 of the Code which makes provision for levy of fine. The relevant portion of sub-section (1) of Section 421 is as followst- "When an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing the sentence may take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the following ways, that is to say, it may" (a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the offender: (b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter." From this sub-section (i) of Section 421 also it Is apparent that for realisation of amount any immovable property belonging to the offender can only be attached or sold or a warrant can be issued to the Collector of the district authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter. The words, offender or 'defaulter' has to be read .to mean the person from whom it is to be realised. In the instant case, the authority had determined that it was the company which was liable to pay the amount and had also directed the company to make the payments to the workers in question and as such the step under Section 421 of the Code can be taken only against the company for realisation of the dues to the worker. It is however, made clear that the authority In exercise of power under sub-section (5) of Section 20 can take steps in accordance with Section 421 of the Code by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the company or authorise the Collector of the district to realise the amount as arrear of land revenue from the movable or immovable property belonging to the company wherever they may be. 8. Accordingly the prayer of the petitioner to quash the order dated 15.12.1977 (Annexure-1), holding that the company was liable to pay the' dues in question is rejected. The order dated 31.1.1978 (Annexure-10 to the supplementary affidavit) and the order dated 16.1.1978 (Annexure-2) so far as they relate to the petitioner are quashed. The writ application is allowed in part but in the circumstance of' the case, there will be no order as to cost. M. Prasad. J. I agree. Application allowed in part.