JUDGMENT P.N. Bakshi, J. 1. THE applicant has been convicted under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and has been sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. His conviction and sentence were confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge, Basti. Hence this revision. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also perused the impugned order and the record of the case. According to the case of the prosecution on 14th December, 1975, Food Inspector Satendra Pratap Narain Singh reached the shop of the accused-applicant and after disclosing his identity took from him a sample of mustard oil, in three separate phials from the tin containing the mustard oil. One such phial was sent to the Public Analyst. The report of the Public Analyst disclosed that the sample contained 55.22% linseed. After obtaining the necessary sanction from the District Medical Officer of Health, Basti the applicant was prosecuted and convicted as above. A number of points have been raised in this revision. The first point argued was that sanction to prosecute has not been given by the competent authority. I have perused the order granting sanction. Sanction has been given by the District Medical Officer of Health, Basti. Nothing has been shown to me to challenge the power of the District Medical Officer of Health, Basti to grant sanction in the instant case. In my opinion, he is the proper authority to grant sanction. This submission has no legs to stand upon. 3. THE next submission is that the sanctioning authority has not applied his mind to the facts of the case, because the order granting sanction is typewritten and has merely been signed by the District Medical Officer of Health, Basti. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that this does not indicate an application of the mind of the sanctioning authority. There is no force in this submission also. The order granting sanction shows that the papers submitted by the Food Inspector Khallabad-cum-Chief Food Inspector Basti had been perused by the District Medical Officer of Health, Basti. He was of the opinion that it was a fit case for prosecuting the applicant. As such he accorded sanction. Under the signatures of the District Medical Officer of Health, Basti date has also been given. He was of the opinion that it was a fit case for prosecuting the applicant. As such he accorded sanction. Under the signatures of the District Medical Officer of Health, Basti date has also been given. At one place correction has also been made and signed by the Distt. Medical Officer of Health. All these circumstances indicate that the competent authority had applied his mind to the facts of the case. Merely because the order of sanction is a typed document is no ground for holding that the sanction was granted blindfolded without the application of mind of the competent authority. This objection of the applicant is hence not tenable. 4. IN this very connection counsel for the State has urged that under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, only written consent of the authority concerned is required. He submits that there is difference between 'written consent' and 'sanction'. 'Written consent' according to him does not necessarily in ply the application of mind by a person in authority. It is merely a permission to prosecute. As such the argument is that sanction is not required under the P.F. A. Act as in the case of several other offences where under different enactments the word 'sanction' has been specifically used. In support of his submission learned counsel has relied upon a single Judge decision of the Bombay High Court- State of Maharashtra v. Janardan Ram- Chandra Narwankar, 1978 CrLJ 811 . In para 54 of the aforesaid judgment the learned Judge has made the following observations: "Besides, it must be remembered, that under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act only consent of the Commissioner is necessary and not sanction. There is obvious difference between 'consent' and 'sanction'. 'Consent' implies mere concurrence or agreement whereas 'sanction' confers authority on the person in whose favour sanction is granted. Therefore, the considerations applicable in the case of 'sanction' would, in my opinion, not be applicable to a case where mere consent is required." With all due respect,, I do not agree with the observations of the learned Judge to the effect that the considerations which apply in the case of sanction would not apply in the case where mere written consent is required. It is true that consent implies concurrence or agreement, whereas 'sanction' confers authority on the person in whose favour sanction is accorded. It is true that consent implies concurrence or agreement, whereas 'sanction' confers authority on the person in whose favour sanction is accorded. To be more precise, in Food Adulteration cases written consent is granted by the District Medical Officer of Health to prosecute an accused for an offence under the Act. If the word 'sanction' had been used instead of 'written consent' that also would have meant approval for prosecution of the accused for an offence under this Act Whether it is written consent or sanction in either case, it is an official act of a superior by which he grants permission for the prosecution of an accused for an offence under the Act. In the Imperial Dictionary of the English Language, by John Ogilvie, LL. D. New Edition 1904, Vol. Ill, at page 766 sanction' has been defined as an official act of a superior by which he ratifies and gives validity to the act of some other person or body. To give sanction means to ratify; to confirm ; to give validity or authority to; to approve of and to give countenance to. All these actions cannot be done without the application of mind by the authority concerned to the facts of the case. 5. IN Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Baldwin's Century Edition 1948, 'consent' has been explained thus : ' 'Consent' supposes a physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious, determined and free use of these powers'. 'Consent to' means approve of. 6. IN the Imperial Dictionary aforesaid 'consent' means to grant; to allow ; to assent to a voluntary accordance with what is done or proposed to be done by another ; a yielding of the mind or will to that which is proposed. All these various definitions of 'consent' indicate a voluntary application of the mind for the purposes of approving an action which is proposed to be taken for the prosecution of the accused for an offence. In the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt at page 455 consent' has been defined as-'an act of reason accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good or evil on either side. Consent supposes three things-a physical power, a mental power, and a free and serious use of them. This definition is very explicit. In the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt at page 455 consent' has been defined as-'an act of reason accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good or evil on either side. Consent supposes three things-a physical power, a mental power, and a free and serious use of them. This definition is very explicit. It indicates the application of mind, a free act of the mind, a balancing of pros and cons by the mind and a final act of decision by a mental process of balancing the good and the evil. 7. WHENEVER a fetter is placed upon the prosecution of a delinquent the object is to prevent vexatious action or malicious prosecution. The authority concerned, therefore, has to concentrate its mind on the question whether the prosecution is justified from the circumstances of the case and is not a mere harassment and unnecessary torture to the citizen to my mind, It is difficult, nay impossible, to draw a distinction between the expressions 'written consent' and 'sanction' for the simple reason that in either case the authority concerned has to consider the facts of the case and only when it feels satisfied on a consideration thereof that the prosecution of an accused for an offence would serve the ends of justice then written permission or sanction is accorded. It would defeat the provisions of the Act and the intention of the framers thereof, if we read the word 'written consent' in a loose and haphazard manner to mean mechanical appendage of signature on the form of sanction without consideration of the facts of the case to justify prosecution. 8. I therefore do not find any reasonable basis for drawing a distinction whether it is sanction or written consent. In either case it is an act of the mind of the sanctioning or consenting authority which is the basis and which balances the good and evil before giving its approval to the action proposed to be taken for prosecuting the accused for an offence. It is next argued by the applicant's counsel that Section 11 of the Act provides the procedure to be followed by the Food Inspector while taking sample. After giving a notice in writing of his intention of taking a sample for analysis, he may purchase a sample for this purpose. It is next argued by the applicant's counsel that Section 11 of the Act provides the procedure to be followed by the Food Inspector while taking sample. After giving a notice in writing of his intention of taking a sample for analysis, he may purchase a sample for this purpose. Under Section 11 (1) (b) of the Act he has to divide the sample then and there into three parts, mark it, seal it and then take the signature or the thumb impression of the person from whom the sample had been taken in such a manner, as may be prescribed. Where such person refused to sign or put his thumb impression, the Food Inspector shall call upon one or more witnesses and take his or their signature or thumb impression, as the case may be. The argument which has been advanced is that the Food Inspector is authorised to take one sample as a whole from an article of food which he suspects being adulterated and that whole sample has to be divided in three parts and packed in three separate phials, so that each phial represents the entire sample taken from the suspected adulterated article of food. In the instant case the three phials were dipped separately each time in the mustard oil and, therefore, there has been no compliance with the requirements of law, as laid down above. I am unable to appreciate this argument. Whether the sample is taken once and divided into three parts from a tin of mustard oil or three phials are dipped in the same mustard oil one after the other and samples are taken separately, is of no consequence because under Section 7 of the Act, if food sold to the Inspector is proved to be adulterated it is of no consequence whether it represents the entire stock in the possession of the accused. In my opinion, it would be sufficient compliance of the law if a sample is taken from the suspected adulterated article of food and divided into three pans or three times three separate phials are dipped in the same article of food and properly marked and sealed in accordance with law. Counsel for the applicant has relied upon a case of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Babu Lal v. The State, reported in 1976 Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases, page 69 in support of his submission. Counsel for the applicant has relied upon a case of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Babu Lal v. The State, reported in 1976 Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases, page 69 in support of his submission. I have very carefully perused this decision. The facts of that case were no doubt similar to the facts of the instant case, inasmuch as 125 gms. of groundnut oil had been filled in three times in three different bottles from the canister by the accused applicant. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the Food Inspector should collect the whole bulk of the sample in one container and then divide it in three equal parts. It was observed ; "The purpose for making such a provision in the law is that each part of the sample should represent the whole bulk of the total sample obtained from the vendor." I find myself unable to subscribe to that view. When three bottles are dipped in the same canister of the groundnut oil it cannot be said that each one of them does not represent the whole bulk of the ground nut oil contained therein. 9. MOREOVER, the Supreme Court has held in State of Kerala v. Alaserry Mohammed, 1978 ACrR 300 at page 307 as follows ; "We may now briefly deal with some of the submissions made on behalf of the respondents in support of the decision of this court in Pamanni's case. It was argued with reference to Methods in Food Analysis, second edition by Maynard A. Joslyn, that the sample must be a representative sample. It is with that view that the quantity was prescribed in Rule 22 and should not be permitted to be tampered with in any manner. We are not impressed by this argument at all. A representative sample has got a different connotation, meaning and purpose in commercial transactions. If for instance, an average price is to be fixed for a huge quantity of, say, wheat lying in bulk in different storages, then samples must be taken from all the storages to make them a representative sample of the entire quantity for the fixation of the average price. If for instance, an average price is to be fixed for a huge quantity of, say, wheat lying in bulk in different storages, then samples must be taken from all the storages to make them a representative sample of the entire quantity for the fixation of the average price. Taking sample from one storage will not be sufficient In our statute the ingredient of the offence is, as mentioned in the 7th section of the Act, manufacturing for sale, storing, selling or distributing any adulterated food if the food sold to the inspector is proved to be adulterated, it is immaterial whether the sample purchased by him is a representative sample or not of the entire stock in possession of the person. A person who stores or sells such sample is liable to be punished under Section 16 (1) 'a) (i) of the Act." I, therefore, do not find any force even in this contention of the applicant's counsel. 10. COUNSEL for the applicant has also urged that even if it is assumed that the article of food was adulterated yet in the absence of any proof that it was injurious to health, the applicant cannot be convicted. He has relied upon certain observations made by me in my earlier decision in Criminal Revision No. 1537 of 1978 R. L. Gupta vs. State. Unfortunately that decision appears to have been misreported in the press, which has led to this confusion. In that case suji was the article alleged to have,been adulterated. I was considering the effect of Section 2 (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Under that section even if the article of food was insect infested, it could not be held adulterated, unless it was otherwise unfit for human consumption. It was in that connection that I have made observation that if the article of food did not prescribe to the standard it would not be an offence unless it is further proved that is was unfit for human consumption. This observation of mine was based upon a decision of the Supreme Court-Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal, reported in 1976 CrLJ 336 wherein it was held that there must be a finding that the insects living or dead made it unfit for human consumption. This argument is not at all tenable. This observation of mine was based upon a decision of the Supreme Court-Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal, reported in 1976 CrLJ 336 wherein it was held that there must be a finding that the insects living or dead made it unfit for human consumption. This argument is not at all tenable. It is next argued that under Section 10 (7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, it is incumbent upon the Food Inspector to call one or more persons to be present at the time when the sample is taken and to take his or their signatures in proof thereof. The argument is that in the instant case this rule was not complied with. The Food Inspector is a corrupt officer and he has maliciously and vexaciously implicated the applicant, who refused to provide him illegal gratification. I shall now test this argument. Under Section 10 (7) of the Act it is no doubt mentioned that the Food Inspector shall call one or more persons when he takes a sample of food. The Supreme Court has interpreted this expression in a number of cases. According to the view of the Supreme Court, the one or more persons contemplated in this section must be independent persons. This safeguard has been put by the Act in order to protect against the excesses or resort to unfair means by the Food Inspector. But the Supreme Court has also held that if the Food Inspector calls one or more persons from the locality for the purpose of evidencing the taking of the sample and they refuse to come and to witness the same in that case it would be deemed that there has been sufficient compliance of the law. The testimony of the Food Inspector alone can be accepted even without any corroboration. The trial will not be vitiated for non-compliance of Section 10 (7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, but yet at the same time the Supreme Court has observed in Babu Lal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 S. C. 1977 that these provisions have been enacted to safeguard against resort to unfair excesses and unfair means either by police officer or Food Inspector under the Act. This being the object it is in the interest of the prosecuting authority concerned to comply with the provisions of the Act, the non-compliance of which may in some cases result in the testimony of the Food Inspector being rejected. In other words what the Supreme Court has laid down is that if these safeguards are not observed it may be difficult in some cases to place reliance upon the uncorroborated testimony of the Food Inspector alone. With this principle in view it is necessary to analyse the evidence on the record, 11. I have very minutely read the statement of P. W. 1 Sri S. P. Narain singh. Form 6 issued under Rule 12 of the Act is Ex. Ka. 1 on the record. It has been signed by the Food Inspector. No date has been given on this form. In other words from this form it cannot be said on what date the alleged sample was taken by the Food Inspector. The Food Inspector had said that behind Ex. Ka. 1 he has not taken the thumb impression of any person, but I find from a perusal thereof that there is a thumb impression behind it of one Tirath son of Hub Lal. The Food Inspector has further stated that he cannot say whose thumb impression- has been appended at the back of Ex. Ka-1. He has next vouched that behind Ex. Ka-1 he has written the name of Birju- ram, Safai Naik in his handwriting. But there is no signature of Birju on this note. He has then stated that Tirath has written his name and address himself behind Ex. Ka-1, but he cannot say whether any person by the name of Tirath son of Hublal lives in Gram Devtapur or not. This statement is highly unsatisfactory. Form 6 appears to be a very suspicious and doubtful document. There is no date on this form 6. There is no signature of Birju- ram Safai Naik thereon. Regarding Tirathram whose thumb impression exists it is not known whether he lives in village Devtapur or not. He has not been produced in evidence. Thus there is no satisfactory evidence on the record to indicate that one or more witnesses of the locality were called to witness the taking of the sample. Hence it is clear that the Food Inspector has not even complied with the law substantially. He has not been produced in evidence. Thus there is no satisfactory evidence on the record to indicate that one or more witnesses of the locality were called to witness the taking of the sample. Hence it is clear that the Food Inspector has not even complied with the law substantially. In cross-examination the Food Inspector has admitted that a case under the Corruption Act Is pending against htm in the Sessions Court and that he has been released on bail. It was suggested to him that he wanted a monthly allowance to be fixed by the accused, which the latter refused to concede and, therefore, the accused has been falsely implicated. Thus the antecedents of the Food Inspector are very dubious and no reliance can be placed upon his testimony. In this back-ground of facts this Court is fully justified in holding that the taking of the sample from the shop of the applicant as alleged by the Food Inspector does not appear to be worthy of credence. As observed above, the Supreme Court has held that when there is no substantial compliance of law under Section 10 (7) of the Act the testimony of the Food Inspector is liable to be rejected. In the instant case there are sufficient circumstances to justify a rejection of his testimony. On the question of fact, therefore, I am of the opinion that the findings of the Court below is perverse, f am not satisfied that the sample had been taken from the shop of the accused applicant. As such the conviction of the applicant cannot be allowed to stand, 12. THIS application in revision is accordingly allowed. The conviction of the applicant and the sentence imposed thereunder are set aside. The applicant is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are hereby discharged. Revision allowed.