JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition is directed against a judgment of the District Judge, Dehradun dated 7-6-77. 2. The dispute in this case is with regard to house No. 1-D Akhara Mohalla, Debra Dun. This premises belongs to one Vijay Kumar Jain. 3. On 12-1-1976 an application was filed by Rishipal Agarwal, respondent 3 for allotment of this premises on the ground that the same was vacant. Respondent 3 alleged that he required the premises for his own occupation. Thereupon after enquiry, vacancy was declared. Thereafter, on 29-5-1976 the premises was allotted to Shyam Swarup Garg, who was the original petitioner of this writ. Against the aforesaid order, respondent 3 preferred an appeal. His appeal was subsequently converted into a revision on 10-8-1976 the District Judge allowed the revision finding that as compliance of Rule 11 of the Rules had not been made, the allotment order made in favour of Shyam Swarup Garg was liable to be set aside. On this finding, he sent back the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for deciding the question of allotment in accordance with Rule 11. After remand, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the premises to respondent 3 on 28-3-1977. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred a revision. The revision was also rejected. Hence, this writ. 4. Sri H.S. Nigam counsel appearing for respondent 3 took a preliminary objection. The objection was that as Shyam Swarup Garg died during the pendency of the writ petition, the same is liable to be rejected. He contended that the right to get an allotment order was a personal right of the deceased Shyam Swarup Garg. Accordingly, with his death, the cause of action was lost, and that no action for enforcement of the said right could be maintained by the heirs of the deceased Shyam Swarup Garg. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on a decision reported in Mrs. Ratana Prasad v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1978(1) R.C.J. 491. 5. Section 34(4) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is the provision relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent 3. This section mentions the cases in which a proceeding could be continued by a legal representative on the death of the original party. Sub-section (4) of section 34 mentions two cases for the said purpose. 5. Section 34(4) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is the provision relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent 3. This section mentions the cases in which a proceeding could be continued by a legal representative on the death of the original party. Sub-section (4) of section 34 mentions two cases for the said purpose. One is of determination of rent, and the other is for eviction from building. Clause (b) of Sub-section (4) of Section 34, however, confers a right on the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased party in case the possession of the legal representatives is said to be unauthorised. Relying on this clause of section 34(1) the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as after the death of Shyam Swarup Garg, action will now be taken for dispossession against the heirs of the deceased, the heirs were entitled and competent to contend that the allotment order made in favour of respondent 3 was illegal. 6. I am unable to find substance in the objection of respondent 3. Admittedly an allotment order had been made in favour of Sewa Ram Garg, who was the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. This allotment order had been set aside and the premises was allotted to respondent 3. However, before the allotment order was set aside, Sewa Ram Garg obtained possession. Through this petition, the allotment of respondent 3 had been challenged. Thus it is apparent that the petitioner had a subsisting right. I am unable to reject the writ petition on this ground. 7. Coming to the merits, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that Rule 11 of the Rules was ultra vires the Act inasmuch as it suttered from the defect of excessive' delegation. In this connection, it was also pointed out that Rule 11 was not mandatory but was directory and, as such, the omission to follow the directions given in Rule 11 was immaterial. The learned District Judge was therefore, not competent to remand the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the fact that under the Act only a needy application for allotment has to be preferred and, as such, competitive claims of rival candidates for allotment had to be considered. The learned District Judge was therefore, not competent to remand the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the fact that under the Act only a needy application for allotment has to be preferred and, as such, competitive claims of rival candidates for allotment had to be considered. I do not consider it necessary to go into all these questions in the present proceedings. 8. In the present case, the allotment order had been made in favour of Respondent 3. Even if, therefore, Rule 11 is held to be mandatory, it was necessary on the part of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to give a finding whether his need was bonafide. It cannot be argued that simply because a person is the first applicant for allotment an allotment order has got to be made in his favour irrespective of the fact that his requirement of the premises was not bonafide. Rule 11 imbibes within itself the requirement of considering the bonafide requirement of all the persons for allotment. It is after such a finding has been recorded in favour of a person that the benefit of rule 11 can be conferred upon him. 9. In the instant case, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not give any such finding in his order dated 28.3.1977 by which the allotment order had been made in favour of respondent 3. He had taken the direction of the District Judge given in the order dated 10.8.1976 as a mandate for allotting the premises to Rishipal Agarwal. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was incorrect in doing so. The District Judge did not say that even the bonafide of the requirement of respondent 3 had not to be considered. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was required to pass the allotment order in accordance with rule 11, only after he had given a finding about the bonafide requirement of the premises by respondent 3. 10. Sri H. S. Nigam, counsel for respondent 3, pointed out that the need of respondent 3 had been considered by the District Judge and the same had been found to be bonafide. I am unable to accept the said submission. 10. Sri H. S. Nigam, counsel for respondent 3, pointed out that the need of respondent 3 had been considered by the District Judge and the same had been found to be bonafide. I am unable to accept the said submission. It appears that the District Judge did not go into the said controversy because he was of the view that the said question was one of fact and could not be investigated in a revision. Had the Rent Control and Eviction Officer given a finding, the view of the District Judge could be upheld. But, as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not record any finding about the bonafide requirement of the premises by respondent 3, the District Judge was wrong in not either deciding the question of bonafide requirement himself or sending the matter back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for doing so. 11. For all these reasons, I hold that the allotment order made in favour of Respondent 3 is liable to be set aside. 12. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge, Dehradun dated 7.6.77 as well as that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 28.3.1977 are quashed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to decide the question of allotment afresh denovo. He will first consider the question of bonafide requirement and thereafter shall pass the allotment 'order considering the priorities given in Rule 11. There shall be no order as to costs.