ORDER D.N. Jha, J. - The petitioner, Hira Singh, has directed this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for quashing of the order dated 12-8-78 passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Lucknow, contained in Annexure 12. 2. Briefly stating the facts are that the petitioner Hira Singh is carrying on his restaurant business in shop No. 39 situate on the ground floor of Kanhaiya Lal Dharamshala Building, Faizabad Road, Daliganj, Lucknow. It is the case of opposite party Sardar Avtar Singh that originally he had been tenanted shop Nos. 38 and 39 by the landlord Kanhaiya Lal Dharamshala Trust. In part of this shop No. 38 Sardar Avtar Singh had been carrying on his vegetable business while shop No. 39 had been sublet to the petitioner. It is not disputed that for over 12 years there was no dispute between the petitioner and opposite party No. 3 Sardar Avtar Singh. On 14-9-1976 an application was moved by the petitioner under Section 14 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) for regularisation of his tenancy. During the pendency of this application opposite party No. 3 Sardar Avtar Singh moved an application under Section 21 of the Act for release of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner. This application was confined with respect to shop No. 39. The release application was contested by the petitioner and the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 31-3-1978 rejected the application holding that the need of opposite party No. 3 Sardar Avtar Singh was not genuine and pressing as compared to that of the petitioner. Sardar Avtar Singh feeling aggrieved by the order went up in appeal which came up for hearing before the 4th Additional District Judge, Lucknow. It is worthwhile to mention that a cross-objection had also been preferred by the petitioner before the appellate authority. The 4th Additional District Judge, Lucknow, by his order dated 12-8-1978 reversed the order passed by the Prescribed Authority and allowed the appeal. This order is Annexure 12. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has come up before this Court impugning the order passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Lucknow. The petition has been resisted on behalf of Sardar Avtar Singh and a counter-affidavit has also been riled. This order is Annexure 12. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has come up before this Court impugning the order passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Lucknow. The petition has been resisted on behalf of Sardar Avtar Singh and a counter-affidavit has also been riled. It is asserted that the order impugned in the writ petition does not suffer from any manifest error and is concluded by rank findings of fact recorded on appreciation of evidence and calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of power under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the various materials brought on the record of this case. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that he had preferred a cross-objection against the finding of the Prescribed Authority rejecting his plea that he was not a sub-tenant but a tenant of the premises in dispute. He argued that since he was a tenant of the building owned by Kanhaiya Lal Dharamshala Trust, hence the application under Section 21 moved by opposite party No. 3 Sardar Avtar Singh was not maintainable. In reply to this argument the learned counsel for the opposite party argued that the dispute was concluded by rank findings of fact recorded by the two Courts below and it was not for this Court to re-sift the evidence. In a nutshell the argument is that howsoever erroneous the findings of fact may be they cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution There is no doubt so far as the legal proposition has been propounded by the learned counsel for the opposite party but, the question which needs consideration is whether the findings recorded by the Courts are based on evidence or record or are based on extraneous consideration or while disposing of the dispute the Courts below exceed the jurisdiction or failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them. It, therefore, follows that unless the facts are not scrutinised it would not be safe to accept the findings recorded by the Courts below unless it is shown that the findings reached on the application of evidence arc nothing but an irresistible conclusion. In this petition the entire material has been placed so far as this plea of the petitioner is concerned. In this petition the entire material has been placed so far as this plea of the petitioner is concerned. There is no doubt that an application had been moved for regularisation of the tenancy. It is also not in dispute that the shop had been given possession of to the petitioner by opposite party No. 3. It is also clear from the averments that the rent prior to the moving of the application under Section 14 of the Act was being paid by the petitioner to opposite party No. 3. This clearly indicated that the petitioner was admitted as a sub-tenant. I do not find much substance in the alternative plea set up by the petitioner that it was a case of joint tenancy over the shop in dispute. There is no material before this Court from which it can be legitimately concluded that the petitioner had entered into joint tenancy with opposite party No. 3 with respect to shop Nos. 38 and 39. Both these shops were let out to opposite party No. 3 about 12 years ago according to the averments flowing out from the various assertions made in the affidavits. The question that required serious consideration was regarding the status of the petitioner after the order was passed on 13-4-1977 by the Prescribed Authority on the application moved for regularisation of tenancy. In those proceedings, it is not in dispute, the owner landlord - Kanhaiya Lal Dharamshala Trust was one of the respondents along with opposite party No. 8 Sardar Avtar Singh. The Trust was duly represented through Sri Banarsi Lal after a notice had been served on the Trust. It is also not in dispute that no objections to the application had been filed on behalf of the Trust. Objections had been filed by Sardar Avtar Singh alone. The copy of the exact objections is not before this Court but it is evident that a dispute had been raised with respect to part of the tenancy of shop No. 38 and the whole of the tenancy relating to shop No. 39. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 13-4-1977 is also on record and is Annexure 4 (4). In this order it has been observed that there was no dispute so far as shop No. 39 was concerned and the petitioner was the tenant of the same. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 13-4-1977 is also on record and is Annexure 4 (4). In this order it has been observed that there was no dispute so far as shop No. 39 was concerned and the petitioner was the tenant of the same. So far as shop No. 38 was concerned there was a dispute. The Prescribed Authority felt that there was no necessity for separate orders and it was also observed that so far as proceedings under Section 2l of the Act were concerned it had no relation with the proceedings under Section 14 of the Act. It has been asserted in the reply to the application under Section 21 that after the order passed by the Prescribed Authority with respect to his application for regularisation of tenancy the landlord i.e. Kanhaiya Lal Dharamshala Trust refused to accept the rent and it was deposited in the Court of Munsif South, Lucknow, (vide Misc. Case No. 130 of 1977). The Prescribed Authority and the learned appellate Court have ignored the relevant evidence and material so far as this aspect of the matter was concerned. The Prescribed Authority was swayed away by reason of fact that certain rent receipts had been filed by Sardar Avtar Singh which related to the rent of shop Nos. 38 and 39 amounting to Rs. 86/-. None of the authorities examined the period to which these rent receipts related. The fact should have been examined, whether, these rent receipts were of the period subsequent to the order dated 13-4-1977 oi were of the period prior to the order dated 13-4-1977. It is only after 13-4-1977 that the real dispute started when the petitioner was recognised as a tenant. The learned counsel for the opposite party vehemently argued that the words "recognised as tenant" relate to the recognition of the petitioner .as tenant of the chief tenant and not recognition as a tenant-in-chief. Such an inference, in my opinion, cannot be deduced from the wordings of the order. Except with the bald suggestion of the learned counsel for the opposite party there is no relevant material for this Court to record a specific finding regarding the status of the petitioner. Such an inference, in my opinion, cannot be deduced from the wordings of the order. Except with the bald suggestion of the learned counsel for the opposite party there is no relevant material for this Court to record a specific finding regarding the status of the petitioner. There is no assertion in the application under Section 21 moved by the opposite party nor in the counter affidavit that even after the application had been moved on 14-9-1976 under Section 14 of the Act for regularisation of the tenancy the petitioner continued to pay the rent of the premises in dispute to the opposite party. The Courts, therefore, had to decide the question in the light of the evidence that was on the record so far as the status of the petitioner was concerned. The corollary deduced by the Prescribed Authority and the appellate Court on the existence of the rent receipts in possession of the opposite party was not justified and in deciding that question the Courts below failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them. The maintainability of the application had been pleaded and seriously questioned. The matter could not be decided lightly brushing aside the evidence as has been done by the courts below. I have deliberately avoided recording any finding regarding the exact status of the petitioner as I am inclined to remand the case to the authority for decision afresh because of several legal infirmities discovered in the order, hence am leaving this question also open for decision. "(a) on the ground that his eldest son has become major and is still unemployed and he wants to settle him in the General Merchandise business. (b) He also filed affidavit to this effect. (c) This need of the landlord was not contested by the respondent in any of his affidavits. For the first time it was disclosed in the cross objection that the eldest son of the landlord is employed in Dyer Meakins, Lucknow. (d) Even then the respondent could not dare to file any affidavit in that regard." The learned counsel argued that all these observations are contrary to the evidence on record. As regards observation (a) he referred to the application moved under Section 2l which is attached as Annexure I and maintained that nowhere the word "unemployed" had been used. (d) Even then the respondent could not dare to file any affidavit in that regard." The learned counsel argued that all these observations are contrary to the evidence on record. As regards observation (a) he referred to the application moved under Section 2l which is attached as Annexure I and maintained that nowhere the word "unemployed" had been used. He also took me through the various averments undoubtedly from which it appears that the word "unemployed" has not been used with respect to his son Gur Charan Singh. The learned counsel for the opposite party in order to repudiate this referred to para 3 of the application and he maintained that from the averments it was clear that Sardar Avtar Singh wanted to establish his son in general merchandise business. If the son was employed then there was no question of his being established in the business. I do not find myself in agreement with the submission because establishing Gur Charan Singh in the general merchandise business would not show that he was sitting unemployed at home. The purpose to start a general merchandise business, therefore, could be either to augment his present earnings by putting his son in this business or secondly it might be to settle him down permanently in business. It is not in dispute that Sardar Avtar Singh had already been doing the business of vegetables in part of shop No. 38. This observation, therefore is based on conjectures and surmises. Likewise, I have also not found any affidavit in support of observation in respect of unemployment of Gur Charan Singh. It is also incorrect that this need of settling down his son in the general merchandise business set up by Sardar Avtar Singh was not contested. The averments followed on in para 4 of the application had been denied by the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no resistance on behalf of the petitioner to the application moved by opposite party Sardar Avtar Singh for release of the shop. The other observation that for the first time the plea regarding the son being in service with Dyer Meakin was set up in cross objection is also incorrect and contrary to the evidence on record. The other observation that for the first time the plea regarding the son being in service with Dyer Meakin was set up in cross objection is also incorrect and contrary to the evidence on record. For the first time, it appears that this assertion of Gur Charan Singh being in service was made in para 8 of the affidavit dated 17-2-1978, copy of which is Annexure 8. This affidavit was filed before the Prescribed Authority, hence thus observation is also incorrect. The next observation that the respondent could not dare to file any affidavit As also, therefore, belied. If the intention was that no affidavit had been filed before the appellate court then I would like to observe that it was not necessary as the supplementary affidavit had already been filed before the Prescribed Authority and so far as its effect was concerned it should have been seen by the appellate court and if it was not satisfied it could have rejected the same. But there was hardly any occasion for observing regarding the courage to file an affidavit as regards Gur Charan Singh being in service with Dyer Meakin. The order, therefore, shows that the learned Judge did not take due account of the relevant evidence on record and in a reckless manner he proceeded to observe whatever was thought proper to allow the appeal. Such an approach is highly unwarranted specially in such important matters like the eviction of a tenant from a shop or a house. It is not that the authorities are not aware of the shortage of, accommodation whether it be a shop or a house, hence the courts are expected to act in more cir cumspect manner. 4. The learned counsel for the opposite party in order to support the order passed by the appellate authority argued that the sum and substance of the order was to the effect that the petitioner did not plead about his hardship nor did he controvert the genuine need, hence in the absence of the pleadings, the appellate court rightly discarded the evidence because it is not open for a party to traverse beyond his pleas. The appellate court was impressed by the fad that these two important ingredients as mentioned above, had not been pleaded hence the petition was devoid of substance and any amount of evidence would not justify entering into the comparison of the respective need and hard ship of the contesting parties. In support of his contentions he placed reliance on the decision: Taqdeer Ali v. Prescribed Authority (1978 All Rent Cas 133) wherein it has been held; "Plea of comparative hardships not raised before the lower courts, the plea must fail even if law requires comparison of the need." The other case relied on is Kailash Chand v. Illrd Addl. District Judge (1977 (U.P.) RCC 211) wherein also the same proposition has been laid down that a plea not raised in written statement, affidavit and evidence beyond the plea raised should be discarded. The proposition laid down is of a very salutary nature. True it is, that no party to the suit should be permitted to go beyond his pleadings and that no fact should be allowed to be proved which has not been pleaded. The fairness of trial demands that no party should be taken by surprise and he must know the case he has to meet. It, is, however, equally settled that the courts would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side, howsoever clumsily or unartistically the plaint may be worded. See Kedar Lal Seal v. Hari Lal Seal ( AIR 1952 SC 47 ). While applying this principle to the facts of a case the court has to bear in mind that consideration of forms cannot override the legitimate considerations of substance. It was laid down in Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul (AIR 1955 SC 735) : (1966 All LJ 799): - "If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by implication and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence." 5. In Ram Saroop Gupta v. Bishan Narain Inter College (First Appeal No. 18 of 1965, decided on 13-2-1978) Reported in (1978) 2 Ren CJ 259 (All). In Ram Saroop Gupta v. Bishan Narain Inter College (First Appeal No. 18 of 1965, decided on 13-2-1978) Reported in (1978) 2 Ren CJ 259 (All). Misra, J. held "In construing pleading in this country the court should not look merely to its form or pick out from it isolated words or sentences; it must read the petition as a whole, gather the real intention and reach at the substance of the matter". 6. The pleadings, therefore, have to be interpreted not with formalistic rigour but with latitude or awareness oi legal literacy of poor people. Pleading are at times loosely drafted and court should not scrutinise the pleadings with such meticulous care so as to result in genuine claims being defeated on trivial grounds, especially when the provisions of Civil P. C. relating to pleadings have not been made applicable to the Act. Only few of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable and they are enumerated in Section 34 of the Act. The proceedings are of a quasi-judicial nature and the principle of natural justice coupled with the procedure laid down in Section 34 and the Rules have only to be observed. It would, therefore, not be just and proper to show a way the affidavits filed by the respective parties merely on the ground that they are different from the explicit pleadings of a party. The contesting parties come to know' about certain facts and it is for the parties to bring all those relevant facts on record, before the authority, in order to dispense justice The Prescribed Authority is to dispose of the dispute on the basis of affidavits which only constitute the relevant evidence. It may further be mentioned that the statement of fact set out in the application or in the written statement would not constitute evidence because it is not strictly the pleading as envisaged under the Civil P. C. That being so, I do not think that the assertions made in paras 7 and 8 of the affidavit contained in Annexure 8 and para 6 of Annexure 5 could be lightly ignored. It may further be observed that learned appellate court adopted a different yardstick while applying the law of pleading enunciated by this Court in Taqdeer Ali v. Prescribed Authority (1978 All Rent Cas 133) (supra) and Kailash Chand v. Illrd Addl. It may further be observed that learned appellate court adopted a different yardstick while applying the law of pleading enunciated by this Court in Taqdeer Ali v. Prescribed Authority (1978 All Rent Cas 133) (supra) and Kailash Chand v. Illrd Addl. District Judge (1977 (U.P.) RCC 211) (supra) with respect to the petitioner and ignoring the same with respect to the opposite party who had not pleaded regarding the unemployment of his son. On this discriminatory treatment also the order passed by the learned appellate court cannot be said to be legal, just and proper. The order, therefore, as discussed above bristles with errors which are apparent in the order. The order, therefore, cannot be sustained. 7. The learned counsel for the opposite party further vehemently argued on the basis of Taqdeer Ali v. Prescribed Authority (1978 All Rent Cas 133) (supra) that the plea of comparative hardship since it had not been raised before the lower court, it was not incumbent on the authorities to dwell upon the same between the landlord and the tenant. A reading of Section 21 clearly shows that the intention of the Legislature in the elaborate provisions made in Section 21 is clear and there can be no deviation from the fact that before an application for rejectment and release is allowed the two mandates of the Legislature have to be carefully examined, firstly, the genuine need of the applicant and secondly, the comparative assessment of hardships of the contesting parties and to hold otherwise that in the absence of pleadings the assessment envisaged by Section 21 could be ignored would tantamount to abrogation of the language incorporated in Section 21. The pleadings cannot be permitted to override the effect of the principle imbibed within Section 21 of the Act by the Legislature. The two factors envisaged in Section 21 have to be adjudged in the light of averments and evidence that is brought on record by the contesting parties. The evidence, therefore, cannot be allowed to be scuttled on the ground that it traversed beyond the pleadings. It is the cumulative effect of the evidence and the pleadings that has to be taker into account by the Prescribed Authorities while disposing of an application for eviction. The evidence, therefore, cannot be allowed to be scuttled on the ground that it traversed beyond the pleadings. It is the cumulative effect of the evidence and the pleadings that has to be taker into account by the Prescribed Authorities while disposing of an application for eviction. I, therefore, do not think that the authorities are precluded from considering the assertions made in the affidavits merely on the ground that it had not been specifically asserted that by eviction the tenant would be adversely affected. It is in fact the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff and to reach to a just and proper conclusion. The contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party, therefore, cannot be upheld. 8. The learned counsel for the opposite party next argued that the matter was concluded by findings of fact and in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 22(1 oi the Constitution those findings based on appreciation of evidence could not be interfered with. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the observations made in Muni Lal v. Prescribed Authority, ( AIR 1978 SC 29 ). There is no dispute regarding the proposition and it is well accepted principle for purposes of exercise of jurisdiction inasmuch as it travessed beyond the evidence on record and proceeded to take into account the facts which were altogether extraneous and not borne out from the evidence on record. That being so, it cannot be said that the findings were based on appreciation of evidence and could not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This submission also, therefore, fails. 9. Further, I would like to observe that neither the Prescribed Authority nor the appellate authority took into account the pleadings of the petitioner regarding his occupation of part of shop No. 38. The petitioner had asserted his possession with respect to part of shop No. 38 also. The release application was confined to shop No. 39 only. The courts ought to have taken into account the plea of possession of the petitioner with respect to part of shop No. 38. It appears that no effort has been made by the Prescribed Authority or the appellate authority to find out about the correct position of possession of the respective contesting parties. The courts ought to have taken into account the plea of possession of the petitioner with respect to part of shop No. 38. It appears that no effort has been made by the Prescribed Authority or the appellate authority to find out about the correct position of possession of the respective contesting parties. Even if the comparative assessment was not desire-ed necessary, at least in order to assess the genuine need of shop No. 39 the correct position regarding possession should have been investigated before allowing the application. 10. The learned counsel for the parties prayed that since the case is being remanded they may be given an opportunity to lead evidence also. The case is normally remanded to the appellate court to decide the dispute between the parties but since it is a question of production of additional evidence I think it just and proper to remand the case to the Prescribed Authority in fairness to the parties to the dispute. 11. In view of the observations made above the petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders passed by the IVth Additional District Judge and the Prescribed Authority are quashed. Let certiorari issue accordingly to cancel the originals of the same. I further direct that the parties will appear before the Prescribed Authority on 5th Jan. 1979 to obtain a date for further hearing in the case. The Prescribed Authority will dispose of the dispute expeditiously and if possible within three months from the date of appearance on 5th Jan. in Court. Let mandamus issue accordingly. I, however, make no order as to costs.