JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. This is a second appeal by the Union of India representing the North Eastern Railway Administration. The respondent was the plaintiff in the suit giving rise to the appeal. He was employed as a senior telephone operator at Chapra Junction Station when the plaint was verified on 13th January, 1971, the suit having been filed on the 2nd February, 1971. The relief claimed in the suit is for a decree of injunction ordering the defendant 'to put the plaintiff's name at the top of the Seniority List of Senior Telephone Opperators 130300 as on 1.5.1969 in List No. A/N/55 II dated 30.10.1969 prepared by the Divisional Superintendent, North Eastern Railway, Varanasi and allow the plaintiff consequential promotions and increments in pay with retrospective effect'. The suit was dismissed with costs by the court of the III. Additional Munsif, Gorakhpur. But the lower appellate court has decreed the suit for injunction obviously in the terms of the relief claimed in the plaint, quoted hereinabove. Without even applying its mind to the question whether an injunction in those term should be granted by civil court, which has no supervisory or appellate jurisdiction over the administrative acts of the Government, but it is concerned only with the enforcement of the constitution and the laws within the limits of its jurisdiction in a dispute of civil nature which is brought before it. On the issues which arose on the pleadings of the parties, the trial court found, (1) that the plaintiffs seniority shall be fixed in accordance with circular No. F/3/(P) 7773 dated 22.12.49 pa5sed by the General Manager Resettlement (ii) that 'according to rule 6 of Rules for determining the Seniority of nonGazetted Staff, given personal Branch Gazette of N. E. Railway, the seniority shall be fixed from the date of entry in the grade' that 'In the instant case the plaintiff entered in the grade 130300 on 1. 10.62 while three others, placed above him, entered in that grade on 1.4.56 and 14.12.59 respectively, 'and accordingly,' the plaintiff has been correctly placed at serial no. 4 below to P. B. Singh, S. B. Saran and Hira lal Srivastava, in the seniority list Ex. 10.62 while three others, placed above him, entered in that grade on 1.4.56 and 14.12.59 respectively, 'and accordingly,' the plaintiff has been correctly placed at serial no. 4 below to P. B. Singh, S. B. Saran and Hira lal Srivastava, in the seniority list Ex. 24'., and was not entitled to be placed at the top in the seniority list in question (iii) that the suit was barred by time (iv) that the suit was barred by estoppel and acquiescence; (v) that the court had the jurisdiction to decide the question about the plaintiff's right to office on the basis of seniority and (vii) that the suit as not barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as the plaintiff had not claimed a mere declaration but had also claimed consequential relief. The lower appellate court formulated only two questions for its determination in the appeal before it by the plaintiff namely, (1) whether the plaintiff is entitled to have his seniority fixed in pursuance of circular letter No. F/3/P/7773 dated 22.12.49 or on basis of entering the grade of 130300' and (ii) whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by time." The first question so raised by the lower appellate court was answered by saying that 'the plaintiff was entitled to get the seniority from the date of his appointment in the Food grains Department i.e. with effect from 24.10.1944." and hence the plaintiff was entitled to seniority in the higher grade in the seniority list on. A/N/55/2 dated 30.10.1969 as on 1.5.69 the date 1.5.59' appears to be a mistake for 1.5.69 which was the date with reference to which the seniority list dated 30.10.69, Ex. 24, appear to have been finalised in the scale of Rs. 130330 over and above P.B. Singh C.B. Saran and Hira lal for the post of Senior Telephone Operator, and the second question by saying that the plaintiff having made representations and moved the proper authorities at all stages 'it was a case of continuing cause of action' and 'not a case where relief could be declined on account of laches and delay and that, therefore, the suit was not barred by time. Mr. Mr. A. R. Man Singh, learned counsel for the Railway Administration raised the following points, (1) that Injunction is a discretionary relief and the lower appellate court should not have granted it in view of the facts, firstly that the court was not capable of enforcing the performance of the acts for compelling which the injunction had been granted, and secondly because at least three of the officials whose rights were directly affected by the injunctions had not been made parties to the suit and had not been given any opportunity of being heard, (ii) that the suit was barred by limitation (iii) that the suit was barred by estoppel and acquiescence, and (v) that, at any rate, the place given to the plaintiff in the seniority list in question was in accordance with the relevant rules and was correct. Taking up the question of limitation first, although the cause of action for the suit may have accrued for the first time, much earlier than the publication of the seniority list dated 30.10.1969, yet the fact remains that the seniority list impugn, by the plaintiff is the one dated 30.10.1969. It cannot therefore, be said that the claim for injunction was barred by time. It may, however, be observed that the determination of a person's seniority when made cannot give rise to any continuing cause of action so as to attract section 22 of the Limitation Act. It may also be observed that although the plaintiff has in the plaint specifically stated that the cause of action arose on various dates between 3/19/21963 and 30.10.1969 the earlier date would be material only if the plaintiff could not get the relief claimed unless the earlier seniority list, the date of which was 3/19.8.1963 according to the amendment made in the plaint, (and. not 3/1921963 as suggested in paragraph 34 of the plaint was also declared to be a nullity. However, since the plaintiff has not claimed any relief for declaration of the invalidity of the seniority list of August, 1963 but has claimed only a mandatory injunction for placing his name at the top of the seniority list dated 30.10.69 it may be that the relief claimed by the plaintiff may be liable to be refused on that ground, but it cannot be said that the claim made by him is barred by limitation. With regard to the bar of estoppel and acquiescence the trial court found that the plaintiff accepted the pay of the scale offered to him that he was placed in the grade Rs. 55139 with effect from 23.5.1952 and was promoted to the grade 133300 on 1.10.1952 and during all the period he accepted the pay and his conduct was such that it disentitled him from denying the same and the result held that the suit was barred by estoppel and acquiescence. This may not be correct approach to the question of estoppel and acquiescence in a case like the present one in as much as it may not be possible for a government servant to do otherwise than to submit to the orders issued from time to time by his superiors and in case he is aggrieved all that he could do is to make representations. The question of estoppel could arise only if it were shown that the defendant Railway Administrations had changed its position on account of some representation or conduct of the plaintiff. That is not the case here, for all that has been pleaded in paragraph 41 of the written statement relied upon by the trial court, is 'that the suit is barred by estoppel and acquiescence'. No details have been given and no facts have been alleged in support of the plea. Under the circumstances, the plea of estoppel could not be upehld by the trial court. As to the plea of acquiescence quite apart from the fact that no details have been given in support of the plea in the written statement, the lower appellate court has found that the plaintiff had been making representations from time to time. That being so, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's suit was barred by acquiescence. However even if the place given to plaintiff' in the impugned seniority list was not in accordance with the relevant rules and was incorrect the first point raised by the learned counsel for the Railway Administration presents a serious hurdle in the grant of any relief to the plaintiffRespondent. As noticed earlier the only relief claimed by him was for an injunction ordering the defendantappellant to place his name at the top of the impugned seniority list and to give him all the consequential promotions and increments in pay with retrospective effect. As noticed earlier the only relief claimed by him was for an injunction ordering the defendantappellant to place his name at the top of the impugned seniority list and to give him all the consequential promotions and increments in pay with retrospective effect. The lower appellate court has found that three of the plaintiffrespondents calleagues, namely, P. B, Singh, C. B. Saran and Hira lal were liable to be placed below him in the impugned seniority list. They were not made parties to the suit and have thus been denied a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. In the result, the Railway Administration has been required by the lower appellate court's decree to demote three of the plaintiffrespondent's colleagues in seniority without hearing them. This is violative of the principles of natural justice. The Railway Administration is bound to give effect to the device of the lower appellate Court by altering the seniority list. This amounts to requiring it to act prejudicially to the interest of the three colleagues of the plaintiffrespondent in violation of the principles of natural justice. Such an injunction ought not to have been issued. On a parity of reasoning a declaration to the effect that the plaintiffrespondent is senior to P. B. Saran and Hira lal in the grade could not also be granted, even assuming that a mere declaration to that effect could have been made inspite of the fact that the plaintiffrespondent had not prayed for the same. Probably the plaintiffrespondent was apprehending that a prayer for a mere declaration to that effect would be barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It was on account of his having claimed the consequential relief of injunction that the defendantappellant's plea of the bar of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act was negatived by the trial court. On this account also it would be unjust to think of granting the relief of a declaration to the effect that the plaintiff was senior to his colleagues P.B. Singh, C.B. Saran and Hira lal in grade of Senior Telephone operators. The provisions of Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 governing the grant of mandatory injunction may also be noticed in this context. It reads as under: 39. The provisions of Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 governing the grant of mandatory injunction may also be noticed in this context. It reads as under: 39. When to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite Acts." Now, under these provisions the Court may in its discretion grant an injunction compelling the performance of any act, in case it is necessary to do, so for preventing the breach of an obligation by the defendant, only if the court is capable of enforcing the performance of that act. The act to be performed is a specific act. Section 14 of the specific Relief Act prohibits the specific performance of certain kinds of contracts. That provisions may not be applicable to the present case for the breach of obligation complained of does not arise from a contract but from service rules having statutory force. Nevertheless, it is apparent that if the Railway Administration were to express its inability or to neglect to comply with the injunction issued by the lower appellate court, the court could not itself perform the act which it has directed the Railway Administration to perform, and the only remedy for enforcing compliance with that the injunction would be an indictment for contempt. It is obvious that the plaintiffrespondent cannot have the decree of injunction enforced by putting it into execution for the court cannot perform the act which the defendant appellant has been required to perform. On the terms of section 39 of the specific Relief Act, such an injunction could not have been granted, and even a declaration could not have been made. In view of the above finding on the first point raised by the learned counsel for the defendantappellant the fourth point raised by him on the merits of the plaintiffrespondent's case with regard to seniority does not survive for consideration. This does not, however mean that I agree with the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court. I refrain from making any observations because it is unncessary to do so for the decision of this second appeal. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. This does not, however mean that I agree with the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court. I refrain from making any observations because it is unncessary to do so for the decision of this second appeal. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. Judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside, and the trial court's decree dismissing the suit shall stand restored with costs throughout.