JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a landlords' writ petition filed against a judgment of the District Judge, Mathura, dated 13.10.1976, allowing an appeal of Phagun Mal, respondent 2. The dispute is with regard to a house situate in mohalla Gali Balli, in Mathura. 2. An application under Section 21(l)(a) and (b) was filed by the petitioners for release of the premises in dispute on the ground of personal requirement. The petitioners alleged that respondent 2 had since acquired a house in the name of his daughter-in-law, he did not stand in need of the premises in dispute. The petitioners also alleged that the building was in a dilapidated condition and was required to be demolished and reconstructed. 3. The application was contested by respondent 2. He did not only deny that the need of the petitioners was bonafide, but also alleged that he was likely to suffer greater hardship. Respondent 2 also alleged that the house mentioned in the application of the landlords had not been purchased by him, but his daughter-in-law, who was not a member of his family. He also claimed that the building was not in a dilapidated condition. 4. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties adduced evidence. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlords for the release under Clause (a) of Section 21(1). It however, refused to grant the release in favour of the landlords on the basis of clause (b) of Section 21(1). In allowing the application, the Prescribed Authority strictly confined itself to Explanation (1) of Section 21(1), and held that as a house had been acquired by member of the family of the tenant, the landlords were entitled to at the release. 5. Aggrieved, respondent 2 preferred an appeal. The appellate authority differed with the finding of the Prescribed Authority on the question of applicability of Explanation (1) to Section 21(1), and also found that the landlords were not entitled to get the release under Clause (b) of Section 21(1). 6. Dissatisfied, the landlords filed the present writ petition. 7. I would first take up the submission of the learned counsel for the landlords made on Clause (b) of Section 21(l). It is no doubt true that the landlords had filed the application for release on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition. 6. Dissatisfied, the landlords filed the present writ petition. 7. I would first take up the submission of the learned counsel for the landlords made on Clause (b) of Section 21(l). It is no doubt true that the landlords had filed the application for release on the ground that the building was in a dilapidated condition. In order to succeed in such an application, a landlord is required to fulfil the requirements of Rule 17 of the Rules framed under U.P. Act XIII of 1972, Rule 17 requires that before allowing an application for release of a building under Section 21(l)(b) the Prescribed Authority must satisfy itself :- (i) That the building requires demolition; (ii) That a proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and new construction has been prepared ; (iii) That a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the by-laws or regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority under any law in that behalf for the time being in force ; and (iv) That the landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction. 8. The Prescribed Authority found that the landlords had not established the requirements of the aforesaid rule, and rejected the application. In appeal, the landlords filed an application for admission of additional evidence and claimed that since by the time the plan had been sanctioned, the additional evidence be permitted to be brought on record. Dealing with the argument of the landlords made on Clause (b) of Section 21(1), the District Judge. held that the landlords bad not complied with the requirements stated in latter three clauses of Rule 17. 9. There may be some substance in the argument of the landlords' learned counsel that the plan, which had been sanctioned after the decision of the Prescribed Authority, ought to have been admitted as additional evidence in the appeal, but there can be no reply to the non-compliance of Clauses (ii) and (iv) of Rule 17. The landlords should have complied with the requirements of the aforesaid clauses before the Prescribed Authority. I see no justification for not having done so. In this view of the matter, I am not prepared to hold that the finding of the courts below holding that the landlords were not entitled to the release under clause (b) suffers from any error of law. 10. I see no justification for not having done so. In this view of the matter, I am not prepared to hold that the finding of the courts below holding that the landlords were not entitled to the release under clause (b) suffers from any error of law. 10. Coming to Clause (a), it appears that the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority confined themselves only to Explanation (i) and did not record any finding with regard to the bonafide requirement of the premises by the landlords. Even if it be assumed that Explanation (i) did not apply, the landlords were entitled to get a finding from the Prescribed Authority as well as from the appellate authority about the bonafide requirement of the premises. The effect of in application of Explanation (i) would only mean that the need of a tenant would be required to be considered and compared with that of the landlord. But, it did not absolve the appellate authority from its duty to consider the application of the landlords on merits. It may be that the appellate authority was swayed away from the fact that Explanation (i) was applicable and he was not called upon to consider the application on merits. This was manifestly an erroneous view. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners also challenged the finding given by the appellate authority on Explanation (i). The case of the landlords was that Explanation (i) applied because respondent 2 had acquired a house in the name of his daughter-in-law. Admittedly, a daughter-in-law does not fall within the definition of the word "family", as defined in Section 3 (g) of the Act. It would be seen that the definition uses the expression 'means'. The use of the expression 'means' denotes that the definition is exhaustive, and that anything which may be foreign to the said definition cannot be included therein. In the definition, a daughter-in-law is not included. As such, the daughter in law of respondent 2, in whose name the property had been purchased, was not a member of his family. 12. The use of the expression 'means' denotes that the definition is exhaustive, and that anything which may be foreign to the said definition cannot be included therein. In the definition, a daughter-in-law is not included. As such, the daughter in law of respondent 2, in whose name the property had been purchased, was not a member of his family. 12. Sri R.P. Goel, counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that the case of the landlords had been that the purchase of the house in the name of the daughter-in-law was benami, and that even if she was not a member of the family of respondent 2 within the meaning of that word used in Explanation (i) the landlords were entitled to urge that Explanation (i) applied. As I am sending back the case to the Prescribed Authority for deciding the case on the question of Clause (a) of Section 21(1), 1 consider it expedient in the interest of justice to leave this question open and direct the Prescribed Authority to decide the said question afresh. 13. For these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge as well as that of the Prescribed Authority are quashed. The Prescribed Authority is directed to decide the application of the landlords afresh only on the question of Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. No order as to costs.