JUDGMENT Anil Kumar Sen, J. 1. This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent by Union of India and two of the authorities of South Eastern Railway, namely, the Divisional Personnel Officer and the Divisional Superintendent, Kharagpur. The appellants are challenging in this appeal the judgment and order dated August 20, 1973 passed by a learned single judge allowing a writ petition of respondents Nos. 1 to 7 wherein they challenged the validity of revision of seniority list of Assistant Drivers in the electric traction and the consequent reversion of the said respondents from the post of Shunters to which they were temporarily promoted and replacing them by respondents Nos. 8 to 15. The main issue that arose for consideration in the trial court and which has also been raised before us in this appeal is as to whether the appellants while absorbing respondents Nos. 8 to 15 in the cadre of Assistant Drivers, electric traction on they being rendered surplus as firemen in the steam side could confer the seniority in the cadre of Assistant Drivers with reference to the respective dates of appointment or promotion of the said respondents Nos. 8 to 15 as firemen or they should be conferred such seniority with reference to the date they were absorbed in the cadre of Assistant Drivers. Facts leading to the dispute may shortly be stated. Sometime in 1965 respondents Nos. 1 to 7 were directly recruited as Assistant Drivers, Electric Traction in the scale of Rs. 125-155. In 1967 the railway authorities published a seniority list of such Assistant Drivers. On the basis of their respective seniority position in the said list respondents 1 to 7 were found eligible and were sent up for training for further promotion as Shunters which promotion was given to them on varied dates between October 1968 and July 1970. Such promotion, however, was conferred on them purely as a temporary measure. The extension of electric traction in that section of the railways led to curtailment of the steam side which resulted in rendering men in that side to be surplus. Respondents Nos. 8 to 15 who were serving for long years as firemen in the steam side in the grade of Rs. The extension of electric traction in that section of the railways led to curtailment of the steam side which resulted in rendering men in that side to be surplus. Respondents Nos. 8 to 15 who were serving for long years as firemen in the steam side in the grade of Rs. 125-155 a grade equivalent to the grade of Assistant Drivers, electric traction were rendered surplus and accordingly they were trained up as Assistant Drivers for electric traction and were absorbed as such on varied dates but all after 1967. The names of these respondents, namely, respondents Nos. 8 to 15 were not borne on the seniority list of Assistant Drivers of 1967 and hence on July 8, 1970 the railway authorities revised the said seniority list by bringing these respondents on the list. They were, however given seniority position determined with reference to their respective dates of appointment or promotion to the post of firemen and not with reference to their date of absorption as Assistant Drivers. Since these respondents Nos. 8 to 15 were serving for longer years as firemen than the period respondents Nos. 1 to 7 were serving as Assistant Drivers they were naturally conferred higher seniority than respondents Nos. 1 to 7. Seniority list of Assistant Drivers being so revised, as a necessary consequence respondent Nos. 1 to 7 who were enjoying the benefit of their previous seniority by way of temporary promotion to the next higher rank of Shunters were reverted to the post of Assistant Drivers by an order dated January 5, 1971 and they were replaced in their respective Post of Shunters by one or other of respondents Nos. 8 to 15. Respondents Nos. 1 to 7 felt aggrieved by the aforesaid revision dated July 8, 1970 of the seniority list of Assistant Drivers, electric traction and the order of reversion dated January 5, 1971 and they as petitioners challenged them in the writ petition out of which the present appeal arises. According to them, respondents Nos. 8 to 15 could be conferred seniority position in the seniority list of Assistant Drivers only with reference to the date of their respective absorption as Assistant Drivers and not with reference to the date of their respective appointment or promotion to the post of firemen. According to them, respondents Nos. 8 to 15 could be conferred seniority position in the seniority list of Assistant Drivers only with reference to the date of their respective absorption as Assistant Drivers and not with reference to the date of their respective appointment or promotion to the post of firemen. According to them, seniority must be fixed up with reference to the date of appointment to a grade which can only mean a particular grade in a class and not with reference to the date of appointment or promotion in a grade in a different class though both may be equivalent. They claimed that seniority in the grade of Assistant Drivers can be determined only with reference to the date of appointment or promotion to that grade and respondents 8 to 15 being appointed to that grade on their respective dates of absorption they are entitled to seniority from such dates only. They further claimed that they having been promoted to the next higher post of Shunters they could not lawfully be reverted in the manner done particularly on the basis of revision of a seniority list which revision itself was not in accordance with the rules. 2. The writ petition was contested by the present appellants who were respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in that petition. According to these appellants, respondents Nos. 8 to 15 were under the relevant rules of seniority entitled to seniority with reference to the date of their appointment or promotion to the post of Firemen where they being rendered surplus had to be brought over to the equivalent grade of Assistant Drivers. The appellants further pleaded that the seniority list of 1967 had to be revised in such circumstances and the revised list had been correctly prepared conferring higher seniority to respondents Nos. 8 to 15 since they joined as Firemen prior to dates respondents Nos. 1 to 7 joined as Assistant Drivers. The appellants further supported the order of reversion on the ground that the promotions conferred on respondents Nos. 1 to 7 were all provisional and temporary which conferred on them no right to the post to which they were promoted and that they were reverted when the seniority on the basis whereof they were promoted was lost by them. 3. The learned judge in the trial court accepted the contention of the petitioners before him that is respondents Nos. 3. The learned judge in the trial court accepted the contention of the petitioners before him that is respondents Nos. 1 to 7 in this appeal and held that seniority could be determined only with reference to the date of appointment to a particular grade and not with reference to the date of appointment and/or promotion to a grade in a different class though the two may be equivalent. According to the learned judge, respondents Nos. 8 to 15 could not have been conferred seniority in the list of Assistant Drivers with reference to their respective dates of appointment or promotion as Firemen but should have been conferred seniority with reference to the date they were absorbed as Assistant Drivers. Consequently it was held that these respondents Nos. 8 to 15 must stand in a position lower than respondents Nos. 1 and 7 in the seniority list so that revision of the seniority list giving them higher seniority as made on July 8, 1970 and the consequent reversion order dated January 5, 1971 cannot be sustained in law. The learned judge, accordingly, allowed the writ petition and set aside the revised seniority list as also the order of reversion. That is the order which is being challenged in the present appeal. 4. Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has raised a short but an important point with reference to the rules governing seniority. According to Mr. Banerjee, respondents Nos. 8 to 15 were brought over from the cadre of Firemen to the cadre of Assistant Drivers both the cadres being on the same scale of pay, namely, Rs. 125-155/- in the interest of administration. Incase of such a transfer Rule 311 Chapter III of the Manual containing Rules regulating seniority of non-gazetted railway servants is applicable and in terms thereof the transferee employee is entitled to carry with him his original seniority in the cadre from where he is being transferred. According to Mr. Banerjee, the learned judge in the trial court failed to apprenciate the true import of Rule 311 and in particular he failed to note the distinction between Rule 302 and Rule 311 of the aforesaid Rules. Mr. Banerjee, therefore, C0ntrnds that the appellants bad rightly revised the seniority list on July 8, 1970 and had rightly passed the consequent order of reversion. 5. Mr. Mr. Banerjee, therefore, C0ntrnds that the appellants bad rightly revised the seniority list on July 8, 1970 and had rightly passed the consequent order of reversion. 5. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 7, has contested the point thus raised by Mr. Banerjee. According to Mr. Gupta, even if Rule 311 is attracted the seniority is to be determined with reference to the date of promotion or appointment to the grade and this grade must necessarily be the particular grade to which railway servant is being transferred and not the grade from which he is being brought on transfer. Alternatively it has been contended by Mr. Gupta that the present case does not come under Rule 311 because there was really no transfer of the respondents Nos. 8 to 15 as contemplated by Rule 311 nor was the transfer effected in the interest of administration. Mr. Gupta has further contended that at least when respondents Nos. 1 to 7 got themselves promoted to the still higher rank of Shunters before respondents Nos. 8 to 15 could came into the cadre of Assistant Drivers it would be highly discriminatory to direct their reversion in the manner proposed Mr. Gupta also pressed the claim as put forward in the writ petition but not considered by the learned judge in the trial Court that respondents Nos. 1 to 7 are entitled to claim confirmation in the cadre of Shunters under the eighteen months Rule and reversion directed infringes the said Rule. 6. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 8 to 15, has supported the appellants. 7. In contesting the principal issue as to how the seniority is to be fixed up to the given circumstances of the present case we should first refer to the relevant Rules. It is agreed between the parties that such seniority would be governed by the Rules incorporated in Chapter III of the Manual referred to hereinbefore. Rules 302 to 308 deal with seniority in initial recruitment grades. Rule 302 provides that unless specifically stated otherwise, the seniority amongst the incumbents of a post in a grade is governed by the date of appointment to the grade. Rules 302 to 308 deal with seniority in initial recruitment grades. Rule 302 provides that unless specifically stated otherwise, the seniority amongst the incumbents of a post in a grade is governed by the date of appointment to the grade. This Rule further provides that in categories of posts partially filled by direct recruitment and partially by promotion, criterion for determination of seniority should he the date of promotion in the case of a promotee and date of joining the working post in the case of a direct recruit, subject to maintenance of inter se seniority of promotees and direct recruits among themselves. It will not be necessary for us to refer the Rules 304 to 308 nor to Rule 309 which provides for seniority on promotion. Rules that follow are Rules 310, 311 and 312. Rules 310 provides for mutual exchange and lays down that Railway servants transferred on mutual exchange from one cadre of a division, office or railway to the corresponding cadre in another division, officer or railway shall retain their seniority on this basis of the date of promotion to the grade or take the seniority of the railway servants with whom they have exchanged, whichever of the two may be lower. Rule 311 provides for transfer in the interest of administration and lays down that seniority of railway servants on transfer from one cadre to another in the interest of the administration is regulated by the date of promotion/date of appointment to the grade as the case may be. Rule 312 provides for seniority in case of transfer on request and lays down that seniority of railways servants transferred at their own request from one railway to another should be allotted below that of the existing confirmed and officiating railway servants in the relevant grade in the promotion group in the new establishment irrespective of the date of confirmation or length of officiating service of the transferred railway servants. This Rule also applies to cases of transfer on request from one cadre/division to another cadre division on the same railway. It is not necessary for us to refer to the other Rules contained in this chapter and in our view Rule 320 which has been referred to by the learned judge in the trial court has no bearing on the issue under consideration. 8. On these Rules Mr. It is not necessary for us to refer to the other Rules contained in this chapter and in our view Rule 320 which has been referred to by the learned judge in the trial court has no bearing on the issue under consideration. 8. On these Rules Mr. Banerjee, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has asked us to interpret Rule 311 to mean that when a railway servant is transferred from one cadre to another in the interest of administration his seniority in the cadre where he is transferred should be regulated with reference to the date of promotion or date of appointment to the grade in the cadre from which be is being so transferred. Mr. Gupta, appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 7 on the other hand has drawn our attention to the definition of the term grade in the Rule 103(iii) Chapter I Section 'B' which contains Rules for recruitment and training of Class III and Class IV Staff. Clause (iii) defines grades as sub-divisions of a class, each bearing a different scale of pay and class has been defined in clause (ii) to comprise all appointments in the same branch or department bearing the same designation. Relying on these definition clauses it bas been contended by Mr. Gupta that in order to constitute a grade that must be a particular sub-division of a particular class bearing a specific scale of pay. Such being the definition of the term grade it has been contended by Mr. Gupta that in the different Rules incorporated in Chapter III the term grade must be interpreted with reference to the aforesaid definition so that reference to a grade must necessarily mean reference to a particular grade and would not incorporate therein the equivalent grades. According to him therefore, even if Rule 311 to be attracted when it speaks of seniority being regulated from the date of promotion or appointment to the grade, that must be meant the particular grade to which the railway servant is appointed on transfer and not his original grade. It appears to us that though the learned judge in the trial court made a cursory reference to Rule 311 he did not specifically consider whether the said Rule would apply and if that Rule would apply whether the interpretation put forward by Mr. Gupta should be accepted. It appears to us that though the learned judge in the trial court made a cursory reference to Rule 311 he did not specifically consider whether the said Rule would apply and if that Rule would apply whether the interpretation put forward by Mr. Gupta should be accepted. The learned judge in the trial court, however, proceeded on the basis that seniority even in the present case should be governed by Rule 302 and when that Rule provides that seniority among the incumbents of a post in a grade is governed by the date of appointment to the grade it must necessarily mean the particular grade to which a person is being appointed. Proceeding, as such the learned judge in the trial court held that when respondents Nos. 8 to 15 were absorbed later as Assistant Drivers the dates of their adsorption would be the date of their appointment to that particular grade of Assistant Drivers and their seniority must depend on that date alone. In our view on the terms of Rule 302 it might be correct to say that in case of appointment to a post in a grade normally as prescribed by Rule 302 seniority is to count from the date of appointment to ti1at grade. Such interpretation follows on the terms and in the particular context of the Rule. But in our opinion the learned judge in the trial court failed to appreciate that in the present case the seniority is to be fixed up in accordance with the Rule 311 and not in accordance with Rule 302. We shall give reasons hereinafter why we hold as such but assuming the position that Rule 311 will apply we should now consider the contention of Mr. Gupta that even applying the said Rule the seniority must count from the date of appointment to the grade, that is to the particular grade to which railway servant is being appointed on transfer. We are, however, unable to accept such a contention put forward by Mr. Gupta. Rules 310 and 311 speak of fixation of seniority on transfer. Both the Rules contemplate that subject to the limitations incorporated in the Rules themselves in case of a transfer as provided the transferee curies with him his original seniority. We are, however, unable to accept such a contention put forward by Mr. Gupta. Rules 310 and 311 speak of fixation of seniority on transfer. Both the Rules contemplate that subject to the limitations incorporated in the Rules themselves in case of a transfer as provided the transferee curies with him his original seniority. The term the grade in Rule 311 may have the same meaning as in the definition but the term refers to the grade from which the employee concerned is being transferred and not the grade to which he is transferred. An employee transferred from one post in a grade to a post in another is not appointed to the post be is transferred. Transfer contemplated by these Rules does not mean fresh appointment. As we have indicated hereinbefore this Rule speaks of transfer from one cadre to the other and provides that in case of such a transfer the transferee's seniority is to be fixed up with reference to the date of promotion or date of appointment to the grade and this obviously refers to the grade to which he was so promoted or appointed before his transfer. If the intention had been otherwise or in other words if the intention had been that even in case of such a transfer, the transfer constitutes fresh appointment and that the seniority would be counted from the date of appointment to the grade to which he is being transferred a separate Rule in the form of Rule 311 would have been unnecessary because in that case if should automatically come within Rule 302 itself. These Rules, namely, Rules 310 to 312 contemplate situations totally different from those preceding them and in particular Rule 302 and they prescribe special provision for safeguarding and/or providing for seniority in case of transfer under different circumstances. This being the position, we have no manner of doubt that if the present case be governed by Rule 311 then respondents Nos. 8 to 15 were rightly given their seniority with reference to their respective dates of appointment or promotion as Firemen when they were absorbed as Assistant Drivers on transfer in the seniority list of Assistant Drivers. 9. We will now proceed to consider the objections raised by Mr. 8 to 15 were rightly given their seniority with reference to their respective dates of appointment or promotion as Firemen when they were absorbed as Assistant Drivers on transfer in the seniority list of Assistant Drivers. 9. We will now proceed to consider the objections raised by Mr. Gupta that on the facts of the present case Rule 311 is not at all attracted since there was no transfer so far as respondents Nos. 8 to 15 are concerned and at any rate such transfer was not in the interest of administration. Having carefully considered the objections so raised we have come to the conclusion that it is not possible for us to uphold the same. Looking at the transaction having regard to its substance there is no doubt our mind that these Firemen, namely, respondents Nos. 8 to 15 when they were rendered surplus in the steam side were brought over to the cadre of Assistant Drivers in the electric traction. They were not temporary employees working on any project so that on completion of the project they being discharged from the temporary appointment were being given fresh appointment. They were regular employees holding substantive appointment in the permanent cadre of Firemen where they had faithfully served the administration for long. When they were rendered surplus in such a cadre they were for all intents and purposes transferred to the new cadre where there existed scope for absorbing them on appropriate training being given to them. That exactly was the position as has been clearly stated by appellants in paragraph 22 of their affidavit Mr. Gupta's further contention is that even assuming that they were so transferred such transfer was not in the interest of the administration. According to Mr. Gupta, such transfer was really to safeguard the interest of so many Firemen who would otherwise have been discharged from service. To accept this contention is to put a very narrow interpretation to the term interest of the administration. According to Mr. Gupta, such transfer was really to safeguard the interest of so many Firemen who would otherwise have been discharged from service. To accept this contention is to put a very narrow interpretation to the term interest of the administration. The fact that the administration would like not to put so many men who had served the administration long years faithfully to retrenchment and would like to prevent unemployment for men who if thrown out would not be able to re-engage themselves profitably because of their age or other reasons to work out a living for them and for their dependents may well be a matter of interest to the administration as well. If under such circumstances the administration prefers transfer to retrenchment in respect of these respondents Nos. 8 to 15, we cannot say that the transfer was not in the interest of the administration. It may as well serve the interest of so many individual employees but at the same time protecting the interest of such employees in the given circumstances is no less in the interest of the administration. In this view we find no merit in this objection raised by Mr. Gupta. 10. Mr. Gupta next contended that bringing in so many men into the cadre of Assistant Drivers at this late stage and giving them higher seniority with reference to their date of appointment as Firemen is highly discriminatory since it leads to reversion in so far as respondents Nos. 1 to 7 are concerned for no fault of their own. These respondents Nos. 1 to 7 no doubt deserve sympathy since they are facing reversion after a few years of service in the higher rank. But even then, in our view, action of the appellants cannot be condemned as discriminatory. Absorbing respondents Nos. 8 to 15 in the cadre of Assistant Drivers by giving them higher seniority in the manner referred to hereinbefore results in only substantial injury of putting the respondents Nos. 1 to 7 a few places down in the seniority list. It is now settled principle that none can claim an indefeasible right to a particular position in the seniority list so indefeasible that it cannot be altered even for a rightful cause. 1 to 7 a few places down in the seniority list. It is now settled principle that none can claim an indefeasible right to a particular position in the seniority list so indefeasible that it cannot be altered even for a rightful cause. In the case of Sitala Sahai vs. N.E. Railway, AIR 1961 SC 1197, referring to its earlier decision in the case of High Court at Calcutta vs. Amal Roy, AIR 1962 SC 1704 , Supreme Court observed "This decision has established the following principle, namely, the expression rank in Article 311(2) has reference to persons' classification and not his particular place in the same cadre in the hierarchy of the service to which he belongs and therefore losing some places in the seniority list is not tantamount to reduction in the rank within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution." Such being the position in law respondents Nos. 1 to 7 no doubt lost a few places of seniority in the seniority list as a result of respondents Nos. 8 to 15 being brought over in terms of Rule 311 of the Rules. Yet fixation of the seniority position in such circumstances can neither be said to be arbitrary nor discriminatory. Such revision was effected to implement a Rule which itself incorporates an equitable principle. Such loss of seniority in its turn no doubt entails reversion so far as respondents Nos. 1 to 7 are concerned but when they were so reverted from a post fortuitously held by them to accommodate men having preferential right it cannot be said that there had been any unfair discrimination against them. Mr. Gupta very strongly contended that the promotion of respondents Nos. 1 to 7 to the higher rank was never fortuitous-they being promoted against regular vacancies on their own seniority. But it is the clear case of the appellants made out in their affidavit-in opposition that those respondents Nos. 1 to 7 were so promoted to officiate entirely on provisional basis. Some of the orders of promotion produced from the records before us fully corroborate the stand of the appellants when we find the following recital as a note in case of such orders of promotion this order is purely on stop-gap measure in the administrative interest. This promotion will not entitle the parties to claim for higher seniority/similar acting or continuance in the post. This promotion will not entitle the parties to claim for higher seniority/similar acting or continuance in the post. Considering all the attending circumstances we have no doubt in our mind that though promoted against regular vacancies these respondents Nos. l to 7 were so promoted only in a fortuitous manner which conferred on them no right to the post to which they were promoted and their reversion to accommodate persons of higher eligibility cannot be said to be illegal in any manner. In this view, this objection raised by Mr. Gupta fails and is overruled. 11. The last point raised by Mr. Gupta is that since two of the respondents whom he represents, namely, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had completed more than eighteen moths' service as Shunters they could not have been reverted except by way of disciplinary action Reliance is obviously placed on the principle known as eighteen months' rule incorporated in the Railway Board circular dated May 21, 1956. In our view, however, such a claim on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 can hardly be sustained in view of the earlier decisions of this court. This court ruled in the case of General Manager, General Manager, Eastern Railway vs. Bibhuti Bhusan, 1976 (2) LLJ 260, that in case of revision where the reversion order is challenged as being violative of the eighteen months' rule incorporated in the circular dated 21st May, 1956, the displinary proceeding is required to be adopted and followed when the basis of the order of reversion is unsuitability or unsatisfactory performance of work and not when reversion is directed on administrative ground which justify such reversion. On our finding made here-in-before respondents Nos. 1 to 7 were reverted not on any ground of unsuitability or unsatisfactory performance of work. On the other hand, they were so reverted on administrative ground when respondents Nos. 8 to 15 were transferred to the cadre of Assistant Drivers and they having brought with them higher seniority acquired preferential claim to these promotional posts from which respondents Nos. 1 to 7 were reverted Reversion being therefore, based on administrative ground which justifies such reversion the eighteen months rule can be of no help to any of the respondents Nos. 1 to 7. In this view, the last point raised by Mr. Gupta on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 7 fails and is overruled. 12. 1 to 7 were reverted Reversion being therefore, based on administrative ground which justifies such reversion the eighteen months rule can be of no help to any of the respondents Nos. 1 to 7. In this view, the last point raised by Mr. Gupta on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 7 fails and is overruled. 12. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned judge are set aside. The writ petition preferred by respondents Nos. 1 to 7 is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their costs throughout. I agree. Appeal allowed.