Judgment 1. This is an application in revision directed against an order passed under S.11A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. 2. It appears that the plaintiff filed a suit against the petitioner and another person saying that the latter was the tenant and the petitioner (the second defendant) was a person to whom the shop in question had been sublet without the plaintiffs consent. He prayed for eviction on grounds of non-payment of rent as also for sub-letting of the building in question. During the course of the suit a petition under S.11A of the aforesaid Act was filed which led to the present order passed on the 13th of Dec. 1976, by which the court below has directed both the defendants to deposit the arrears of rent from the date of the filing of the suit within 15 days of the order, and the current and future rent by the 15th day of every month failing which their defence against ejectment is to be struck off. Hence this application. 3. The defence of the petitioner is that he is merely a salesman and not a sub-tenant at all. He objected to any order being passed against him under S.11A of the Act. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the other defendant also denied the relationship of landlord and tenant existing between him and the plaintiff. 4. The court below, however, found the relationship of landlord and tenant existing between the parties and accordingly passed an order directing both the defendants to deposit the arrears of, and current and future rents, as stated earlier. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has urged two points. Firstly, that the order was passed on a date, namely, the 13th of Dec. 1976, when the aforesaid Act had ceased to exist on the statute book. Secondly, that on the plaintiffs own case, the petitioner was a sub-tenant and in view of a decision of this Court no order under S.11A of the Act to deposit rent can be passed against a sub-tenant. I may state at the very outset that while there is force in the second contention, there is none in the first. 6. Secondly, that on the plaintiffs own case, the petitioner was a sub-tenant and in view of a decision of this Court no order under S.11A of the Act to deposit rent can be passed against a sub-tenant. I may state at the very outset that while there is force in the second contention, there is none in the first. 6. I had occasion to consider at great length the question which is now being raised, namely, as to whether an order passed after the expiry of the Act, would be deemed to be a legal order by virtue of the retrospective clause contained in S.3 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act of 1977. The same point had arisen in Civil Revn. No. 232 of 1977 Probhat Kumar Das V/s. Santhal Paharia Sewa Mandal, disposed of on 16-12-1977 : 1978 BLJR 442. I had come to the conclusion that the Act having retrospective effect, it would be deemed to be in existence after the actual expiry of the previous Act of 1947. In that view of the matter the Act of 1977 being deemed to be in force on the date of the order passed in the present case, the order cannot be assailed on that ground. 1978 BLJR 442. 7. The second contention of learned counsel must succeed. In the case of Babu Sheonandan Lall V/s. Ramprit Bhagat, 1968 0 BLJR 643 the same point had arisen and the learned Judge held that in the absence of any contract between the plaintiff landlord and the alleged sub-tenant, no order for deposit of rent by the latter could be passed under S.11A of the Act. I respectfully concur in the view. The learned Judge, for coming to the conclusion aforesaid, had taken into consideration the fact that there was no contract between the plaintiff and the sub-lessee and thus there could not be said to be any arrears of rent payable by the latter to the former. For that reason for the purpose of S.11A, the learned Judge said that "tenant" could not include a "sub-tenant". 8. Besides the aforesaid, I would like to add to the reasons. The definition of the word "tenant" contained in S.2(f) lays down that it means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building. For that reason for the purpose of S.11A, the learned Judge said that "tenant" could not include a "sub-tenant". 8. Besides the aforesaid, I would like to add to the reasons. The definition of the word "tenant" contained in S.2(f) lays down that it means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building. Thus a sub-tenant who has been inducted with the consent of the landlord becomes a person who may pay rent to the landlord through the tenant or directly. Such a person may also be called a person on whose account rent is payable. It may be payable by the tenant on behalf of the latter or by the latter directly. I am unable to take the view that rent may be considered to be payable on account of a sub-lessee who has been inducted without the consent of the landlord and who is not recognised by the landlord. The relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to be existing between a landlord and a sub-lessee so inducted. The second consideration which occurs to me is that where a sub-lessee has been inducted in defiance of the law, he cannot legally be recognised as such. As would appear from S.11A, sub-letting a building without the consent of the landlord is not legal and is considered to be a good ground for ejectment of the tenant himself. If that be so, how can the said sub-lessee be treated as a tenant for the purpose of payment of arrears or current or future rent. Thirdly, where the sub-lessee has come into existence without the consent of the landlord, it cannot be said that he is liable to pay any rent to the landlord unless the landlord recognises him. It is well known that rent is payable on account of the contract between the parties and in the case of a tenancy the parties are the landlord and the tenant and no third person. Rent cannot, therefore, be payable to any person other than the landlord except in accordance with any contract to the contrary. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that a sub-lessee not recognised by the landlord is bound to pay rent to the landlord or that on his account any rent is payable to the landlord. 9. Rent cannot, therefore, be payable to any person other than the landlord except in accordance with any contract to the contrary. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that a sub-lessee not recognised by the landlord is bound to pay rent to the landlord or that on his account any rent is payable to the landlord. 9. Counsel for the opposite parties conceded that for the purpose of S.11A of the Act the word "tenant" will not include a sub-lessee inducted without the consent of the landlord. He, however, drew my attention to the Bench decision in the case of Suresh V/s. Shamal, AIR 1957 Pat 437 where it was held by a Bench of this Court that tenant included a sub-lessee. In that view of the matter, my first re-action was to refer this case to a larger Bench for considering the correctness of the decision in that case. Counsel for the parties, however, persuaded me to decide the case on the limited point since the civil revision petition itself has been lying in this Court for over a year and the order has been in suspense for the last one year and a half and the plaintiff-opposite party is suffering injury on that account. It is said that he is not interested in getting the law settled and in no more than getting the case disposed of. It appears that the aforesaid decision was cited before Tarkeshwar Nath, J., and he distinguished it on the ground that in the Division Bench case the question was as to whether a sub-lessee could be evicted being considered to be a tenant within the meaning of S.2(f) and the question as to whether he would be a tenant for the purpose of S.11A of the Act was not the point to be decided in that case. It is well known that every decision is given on the facts of the case and is a law on that point. The facts in that case were different inasmuch as Bench was considering as to whether the sub-lessee could be evicted. If I may say so with great respect the dominant consideration in the minds of their Lordships was that if a sub-lessee is not deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of S.2(f), then he cannot be evicted at all under S.11. If I may say so with great respect the dominant consideration in the minds of their Lordships was that if a sub-lessee is not deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of S.2(f), then he cannot be evicted at all under S.11. In this background the definition of the term "tenant" was said to include a sub-lessee as well. In that case, it appears, the order was passed against the tenant alone and not against the sub-tenant. The order was executed in the civil court and an objection under S.47 was taken. The objection was dismissed. The appellate court affirmed it. Further appeal to this Court was also unsuccessful and thus there came to be a Letters Patent Appeal of which their Lordships were ultimately seized. The law laid down in that case must, therefore, be limited to the application thereof in so far as an order of eviction against a person who is said to be a sub-lessee without the consent of the landlord, is concerned, and the observations of their Lordships cannot be construed to cover other cases, for instance, a case under S.11A of the Act as well. Although I have expressed my views slightly differently in so far as the present case is concerned, I am conscious that I am bound by the decision of their Lordships in the Division Bench. But that does not stand in the way of my deciding the present application being on distinctly different grounds. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the order must be struck down as a whole, that being a composite one. I am afraid, I cannot persuade myself to accept this contention. The order directs both the defendants to deposit and there is no reason why the order cannot be severed into two. So far as the present petitioner is concerned he has no liability. There can hardly be any doubt that the liability is of the principal defendant, the tenant, and therefore, there is no reason for striking down the order passed against him, more so, when he has not come to this Court in revision. 11. In the result, I would set aside the order of the court below in so far as the present petitioner is concerned. This application is accordingly allowed to that extent. In the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. 12. 11. In the result, I would set aside the order of the court below in so far as the present petitioner is concerned. This application is accordingly allowed to that extent. In the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. 12. In view of the delay already occurred, the court below will do well to expedite the hearing of this case.