JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J - This is a tenant's writ petition filed against a judgment of the District Judge, Etawah, dismissing an appeal flied by him against the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. 2. An application under section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 was filed by the landlord for release of the accommodation in dispute on the ground that he wanted to shift to Etawah and intended to settle down there, and further wanted to start his Homoeopathic practice in a portion of the premises. The landlord also claimed that he was a Government servant and retired from service and, therefore, he was entitled to the benefit of Explanation (ii) to Section 21(i). 3. The application was resisted by the petitioner. He denied that the landlord intended to shift to Etawah. According to the petitioner, the application was merely a device for the purpose of evicting him. He claimed that his need was greater than that of the landlord. 4. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties adduced evidence and filed affidavits. The Prescribed Authority applied Explanation (ii) and found that presumption had to be drawn with regard to the need of the landlord. Having held that the need was bonafide, he allowed the application. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. Hence, the writ. 5. Sri V.P. Goel, counsel appearing the petitioner, made three submissions before me. The first was that as Explanation (ii) had been deleted by U.P. Act XXVIII of 1976 the effect of deletion being retrospective, the judgment of the appellate authority holding the need of the landlord to be bonafide on the basis of the said Explanation was liable to be set aside. There would have been no difficulty in accepting the submission, had I found that the judgment was based solely on Explanation (ii). I find that the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority both found that the premises was required by the landlord for residence as well as for Homoeopathic practice. 6. The next submission was that as the need for which the application was filed by the landlord was for non-residential purpose, the application was liable to be rejected. I find that the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority both found that the premises was required by the landlord for residence as well as for Homoeopathic practice. 6. The next submission was that as the need for which the application was filed by the landlord was for non-residential purpose, the application was liable to be rejected. Counsel placed reliance on clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21(i) which lays down that no application for release under clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act shall be entertained if the landlord wants to use or occupy a residential building for business purposes. In the instant case, the appellate authority found that the basic requirement of the landlord was that of residence. In my opinion, the view taken by the appellate authority is correct. It is the dominant purpose which is required to be seen in these matters. The landlord did not intend to use the premises exclusively or prominently for the purpose of starting Homoeopathic practice. He intended to shift to Etawah and wanted to reside in the house. In the application, he had merely specified the purpose of shifting to Etawah, that he intended to start his Homoeopathic practice. Looking to the purpose one is bound to hold that the main purpose was residential. That being so, the application was not barred by that the provisions. 7. The third submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is definitely correct, and must be accepted, the same as that the appellate authority as also the Prescribed Authority committed an error in allowing the application of the landlord without comparing the need of the tenant. Proviso (iv) added to Section 21(i) U. P. Act 28 of 1976 made it incumbent on the authorities to consider the likely hardship of a tenant which was going to be caused to him from the acceptance of the application as against the likely hardship which was likely to be caused to the landlord from the rejection of the application. The proviso was given retrospective effect. Consequently, the judgments of the two courts below refusing to compare the need of the tenant with that of the landlord were incorrect. 8. The proviso was given retrospective effect. Consequently, the judgments of the two courts below refusing to compare the need of the tenant with that of the landlord were incorrect. 8. Sri S.N. Agarwal counsel' appearing for the landlord, however, submitted that as Hukum Singh, the son of the petitioner, had acquired a house the need of the tenant was not required to be taken into consideration. For this proposition, he placed reliance on Explanation (i) to Section 21(i) A similar argument had been advanced on behalf of the landlord before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority held that as Hukum Singh as a member of the family of the petitioner, the acquisition made by Hukum Singh could be taken into account for the purposes of applying Explanation (i) to section 21(1). Sri V.P. Goel countered the above submission by urging that since Hukum Singh had been adopted, he ceased to be a member of the family or Chandra Singh. 9. There is no clear finding given either by the Prescribed Authority or the appellate authority about adoption. It is the settled law that after adoption the child becomes a member of the family of the adoptive father and ceases to be a member of the family of the original parents. Accordingly, the question which was required to be considered by the courts below, was whether Hukum Singh had been adopted by Sunder Singh. If the answer to the said question was in the affirmative, the acquisition of the house in the name of Hukum Singh could not disentitle the landlord to make a claim of consideration of his need. In case, however, the courts below found that Hukum Singh had not been adopted, the position would be in the reverse. As I have upheld the finding of the appellate authority on the question of bans fide requirement the same need not be gone into. 10. For all these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge, Etawah dated 18-5-1976 and that of the Prescribed Authority dated 15-1-1976 are quashed. The Prescribed Authority is directed to decide the release application filed by the landlord afresh in accordance with law and the observations made above. No order as to costs.