JUDGMENT : K.C. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against a judgment of the District Judge, Dehra Dun, dated 10-10-1975. 2. Jogeshwar Prasad, Respondent 3, filed an application under Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 for release of the premises in dispute. He alleged that the portion let out to the Petitioners comprising of two rooms with a tin-shed was required by the landlord for himself. It was also alleged that the premises was in a dilapidated condition and required to be reconstructed. 3. The application was contested by the Petitioners. They denied that the need of the landlord was bona fide, and also asserted that the building was not in a dilapidated condition. 4. On 24-6-1975, the application of Respondent 3 was allowed on the finding that the premises was required by the landlord for his personal occupation. The Prescribed Authority also held that the building was in a dilapidated condition, and that the landlord was entitled to get the release under Clause (b) of Section 21(1). While allowing the application under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1), the Prescribed Authority gave a direction to the landlord to demolish and reconstruct the building within one year. He further directed that after the building had been reconstructed, the Petitioner would be entitled to get possession of a portion of the same u/s 24 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. 5. The Petitioner preferred an appeal. As Respondent 3 was also aggrieved by the order directing him to give possession of a portion of the building after its reconstruction, he also preferred an appeal. Both these appeals were dismissed on 18-10-1975. 6. Thereafter, an application was filed by the Petitioners for setting aside the order of the District Judge on the ground that the same being ex-parte was liable to be recalled. In the said application, the Petitioners also gave the reasons which prevented them from appearing in the court on the date of hearing of the appeals. On 17-11-1975, the District Judge dismissed the application holding that as the appeals had been decided on merits, and not in default, the application filed by the Petitioners was not maintainable. 7. Aggrieved, the Petitioners filed the present writ petition. 8. On 17-11-1975, the District Judge dismissed the application holding that as the appeals had been decided on merits, and not in default, the application filed by the Petitioners was not maintainable. 7. Aggrieved, the Petitioners filed the present writ petition. 8. The first contention raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners was that the District Judge committed an error in holding that the application filed by the Petitioners for recalling the order dated 18-10-1975 was not maintainable. Order XLI Rule 17 of the CPC permits a Court to dismiss an appeal in default, if a party filing the same does not appear when the appeal is called for hearing. It also, however, gives a discretion to the Court to decide the same on merits. Order XLI Rule 19 confers power of re-admission of an appeal dismissed for default under Rule 11, Sub-rule (2), or Rule 17 or Rule 18. The provisions of Order XLI Rules 17 and 19 are applicable to the proceedings of an appeal filed before the District Judge. The application was thus maintainable. Of course, this application could be allowed only if the Petitioners succeeded in satisfying that there was sufficient cause for not appearing before the appellate authority on the date of hearing of the appeal. 9. The District Judge, however, held that as the appeal had not been dismissed for default but had been decided on merits, the application filed by the Petitioners was not maintainable. The view taken by the District Judge is patently erroneous. Even if a Court decides an appeal on merits after hearing the Respondent, the order has to be treated as one under Rule 17, and as such the provisions of Rule 19 of Order XLI will be applicable. An application to set aside an order would be competent, and the manner in which the appeal was decided would be immaterial. Rule 19 will apply to a case where an appeal is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 17 CPC irrespective of the fact that it was either done in default or on merits. 10. Placing reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Babu Ram v. Bhagwan Din 1965 AWR 231 the District Judge held that as the appellate court had jurisdiction even in the absence of the Appellant and his counsel to dispose off the appeal on merits, the application was not maintainable. 10. Placing reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Babu Ram v. Bhagwan Din 1965 AWR 231 the District Judge held that as the appellate court had jurisdiction even in the absence of the Appellant and his counsel to dispose off the appeal on merits, the application was not maintainable. This view appears to be erroneous. In Babu Ram's case (supra), this Court was not called upon to decide whether an application under Rule 19 of Order XLI is maintainable even in a case where the appeal had been decided on merits. It was called upon only to decide the controversy whether in the absence of an Appellant or his counsel, the appellate court could decide an appeal on merits. The fact that an appellate court has power to decide the appeal on merits could not show that the order was not covered by Rule 17 of Order XLI Civil PC. Such an order would still be one which would be liable to be set aside if a case for setting aside the same is made out under Rule 19 of Order XLI Code of Civil Procedure. 11. I would have set aside the order of the District Judge dated 17-1-1975 rejecting the application and sent back the case to him for deciding the application filed by the Petitioners under Rule 19 of Order XLI CPC afresh, but as the present writ petition was also directed against the decision given on 18-10-1975, I consider it appropriate to examine the correctness of the said order also. 12. As observed, the application had been filed under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) Under Clause (a), an application is filed by a landlord for release of a premises on the ground of his bonafide requirement. For getting an order under this clause, a landlord is required to establish that he "bonafide", which means honestly and in good faith, requires the premises. Proviso (4) to Section 21(1) added retrospectively by Act XXVIII of 1976 requires further that in a case covered by Clause (a) of Section 21(1), the likely hardship of a landlord should be compared as against the likely hardship which would be suffered to a tenant. 13. Proviso (4) to Section 21(1) added retrospectively by Act XXVIII of 1976 requires further that in a case covered by Clause (a) of Section 21(1), the likely hardship of a landlord should be compared as against the likely hardship which would be suffered to a tenant. 13. In the instant case, it would be seen that the District Judge held that the need of the landlord was bonafide as the premises was required by the landlord himself for commencing a business. He, however, did not consider the question of comparative hardship. As such, the judgment of the District Judge is liable to be set aside. 14. So far as the release granted under Clause (b) of Section 21(1) is concerned, it may be pointed out that there is no finding recorded by the appellate authority that the landlord had complied with the requirements of Rule 17. In the absence of a finding on Rule 17, the application of the landlord under Clause (b) of Section 21(1) could not be granted. 15. On these grounds, the judgment of the appellate authority is liable to be set aside. I, however, wish to mention in this connection that although a composite application under Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 is maintainable, but it is necessary for a Court to specify clearly the ground on which such an application is allowed, inasmuch as the consequences of allowing an application under Clause (a) are different form those under Clause (b). If an application is allowed under Clause (a), there is no question of re-entry by a tenant u/s 24 of the Act. The question of re-entry can arise only when the release is granted under Clause (b) on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required to be demolished and reconstructed. 16. In the instant case, the District Judge found both the grounds in favour of the landlord. Since he held that the landlord was entitled to get the release under Clause (a), he could not give a direction to the landlord to give a portion of the premises, after reconstruction, to the tenant. It may be true that under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21, a landlord may require a premises for his use in the present form or may allege that he would use it after reconstruction and demolition. It may be true that under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21, a landlord may require a premises for his use in the present form or may allege that he would use it after reconstruction and demolition. But, that would not entitle the tenant to reoccupy the same after reconstruction. Under Clause (a) of Section 21(1), a landlord gets permission for occupying a premises himself. If in pursuance of an order he succeeds in getting the possession under Clause (a), he can retain it with himself. Of course, in a case of release under Clause (b), a tenant has a right u/s 24 to re-enter. A direction of re-entry, however, could not be given at the stage when the application under Clause (b) of Section 21(1) is allowed. The reason being that under Sub-section (2) of Section 24, the power to give such a direction has been conferred on a District Magistrate, whereas an application u/s 21 is decided by a Prescribed Authority who is different from a District Magistrate. 17. Before closing, I wish to make it clear that in a case of a composite application, filed under Clauses (a) and (b), it is open to an authority to pass an order under both the clauses. But, of course, in such a case a tenant would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 24(2) inasmuch as the relief was granted to the landlord under Clause (a) of Section 21(1). Merely an alternative ground of Clause (b) cannot entitle him to get possession. 18. For all these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the learned District Judge dated 17-11-1975 and 18-10-1975 are quashed. The District Judge is directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law, within three months from today. In the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.