JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Dy. Director of Consolidation, Agra, dated 10973 in revision no. 1137, under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Dhani Ram v. Lakhan Singh and others. In the basic year the disputed Khata no. 22 was recorded in the names of Dhani Ram, Mani Ram and Kalyan. Kalyan had died and his heirs were vidya Ram Suckh Dayal and Jai Ram. Lakhan and Raja Ram had filed an objection claiming 2/3rd share in the disputed Khata as they were auction purchasers of the share of Dhani Ram and Kalyan. The Assistant Consolidation Officer had decided the case ex parte but in appeal the order was set aside and the Consolidation Officer through his judgment dated 12570 accepted the claim of Lakhan Singh and Raja Ram auction purchasers to the extent of 2/3rd share in the disputed Khata and ordered their names to be recorded over the aforesaid share. Aggrieved by the decision of the Consolidation Officer, Dhani Ram preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the appellate authority through its judgment dated 7970. Thereafter Dhani Ram preferred the aforesaid revision petition which was allowed by the D.D.C. through his judgment dated 10973 and the claim of the auction purchasers was rejected. Now the petitioners have come to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and they have challenged the order of the revisional court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the D.D.C. has patently erred in negativing the claim of the petitioners, without considering the effect of sale certificate in their favour. The learned counsel for the petitioners has emphasized that even if the decree was a fraudulent decree in pursuance whereof the petitioners had purchased the 2/3rd share in the disputed Khata, their claim should not be negatived unless the sale certificate had been cancelled by a competent court in a proper proceeding. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted before me that when the decree was set aside the sale of the disputed land in favour of the auction purchasers would be of no effect and the D. D. C. was fully justified in not recognizing the claim of present petitioners (auction purchasers). I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. The D.D.C. has dealt with the claims of the parties in the following words: "Jab Munsif Fatehabad he Panohayat ki decree ko Dinank 2291966 ko Khandit kar diya hai aur uske Viruddha fcoi bhi Agrim Karyavahi nahin ki hai to phir bhoomi Kray Praman Patra ke Aadhar par ki gai Karyawahi Vaidhahik kis Prakar ho Sakti hai jab decree ka Adesh hi Khandit ho gaya to phir kisi Karyawahi ka Prashna hi Nahin Uthata hai. Isliye main yah Samajhata hun ki Nigrani Karta ke Vidwan vakil ka tark sahi hai aur woh Nigrani Swikar hone yogya hai. In Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and another (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 608), their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 4 of the judgment have observed as below: ".........Section 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that where immoveable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when it is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. The result is that the purchasers' title relates back to the date of sale and not the confirmation of sale. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 either in O. XXI or elsewhere which provides that the sale is not to be confirmed if it be found that the decree under which the sale was ordered has been reversed before the confirmation of sale. It does not seem ever to have been doubted that once the sale is confirmed the judgment debtor is not entitled to get back the property even if he succeeds thereafter in having the decree against him reversed" To my mind the D.D.C. has patently erred in negativing the claim of the petitioners without considering the effect of sale certificate in favour of the petitioners. It has been shown to me in the present case that the sale certificate in favour of the petitioners has been rendered ineffective at the instance of the judgment debtors. It has been shown to me in the present case that the sale certificate in favour of the petitioners has been rendered ineffective at the instance of the judgment debtors. It is true that the decree in pursuance whereof the petitioners had purchased 2/3 share in the disputed Khata has been set aside but it is not clear that the auction purchasers were blameworthy in purchasing the 2/3 share in the disputed Khata in any manner. In para 11 of the above mentioned Supreme Court ruling it has been observed as below: "In ZainulAbdin Khan v. Muhammad Asghar All Khan ((1888) I.L.R. 10 All. 166 (P.C.)), certain sales had been held in execution of an ex parte decree and some of the properties were bought by bona fide purchasers. The decree was modified afterwards as a result of an appeal to Her Majesty in Council and it was found that as the decree finally stood, it would have been satisfied without the sales in question having taken place. The judgmentdebtor sued the purchasers of some of the sales including holders of the decree and bona fide purchasers. It was held by the judicial committee that as against the bona fide purchasers who were strangers, the suit must be dismissed." Since the D.D.C. has not examined the claim of the petitioners from correct angle and has negatived their claim without examining the question as to whether they were bona fide purchasers and whether their title can be legitimately negatived in the present proceedings. The judgment of the D.D.C. is a judgment of reversal. The Consolidation Officer and the A.S.O.C. have relied upon various rulings mentioned in their judgments and the D.D.C. has failed to consider the effect of the decisions on the claim of the petitioners. I think that the D.D.C. has manifestly erred in not meeting with the reasoning given in the judgments of the first two courts. In the present circumstances, it is desirable that the judgment of the D.D.C. should be quashed and the D D.C. be asked to reexamine the claim of the petitioners in accordance with law. He should be careful to give a reasoned judgment meeting with the observations of the subordinate authorities. In the present circumstances, it is desirable that the judgment of the D.D.C. should be quashed and the D D.C. be asked to reexamine the claim of the petitioners in accordance with law. He should be careful to give a reasoned judgment meeting with the observations of the subordinate authorities. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the D.D.C. is hereby quashed and the D.C.C. is directed to reexamine the claim of the petitioners in accordance with law and the observations made by me above. No order as to costs.