ORDER.-All these writ petitions can be dealt with under a common judgment. The common issue involved can be determined by referring to the facts of Writ Petition No. 4011 of 1977 alone. The facts are identical in all these cases. 2. The petitioners were engaged as casual labour/Khalasis on projects on daily wages. They were required to work in Railway Yards to execute construction work, laying of cables along the track, erection; of signal poles, dressing up of permanent way points, works relating to installation of point machine, and signals and various other sophisticated materials, providing new signalling arrangements, etc. Under the rules, to be fit for appointment, each candidate must be in good mental and bodily health and free from any defect likely to interfere with the efficient performance of the duties of his appointment, Medical examination for fitness for employment will include- (i) General physical examination; (ii) Vision tests. Vision tests are carried out according to paragraph 1018 Rule (it) of the Railway Establishment Manual. For the purpose of vision tests all candidates for appointment will be allocated by group and class, to the appropriate category. The petitioners were engaged in works which fall under category B-1. The petitioners were required to under go medical examination to test their fitness for the works for which they were engaged. In the medical examinaiton it was certified that the petitioners were unfit for service in class B-l and hence could not be continued in the works for which they were engaged. Hence by order dated 1st October, 1977 the petitioners were given notice that their services would not be required any longer beyond 31st October, 1977. The petitioners have filed the above writ petitions seeking to quash the said order, on the following among other grounds. 3. The petitioner in W.P. No. 4011 of 1977 had put in continuous service from the year 1970. He had put in continuous service within the meaning of section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act for the purpose of Chapter V-A of the Act. The present termination under the impugned order amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the termination in the instant case is not by way of punishment and it is not a voluntary retirement or the retirement on reaching superannuation or termination on the ground of continued ill-health. The present termination under the impugned order amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the termination in the instant case is not by way of punishment and it is not a voluntary retirement or the retirement on reaching superannuation or termination on the ground of continued ill-health. It is a retrenchment as laid down by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Sundaramoney1and again reiterated by the Supreme Court in a subsequent judgment reported in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa2 . 4. The impugned order retrenches the petitioner without complying with the requirement of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore is bad and liable to be quashed. 5. Although the petitioner is called a casual labourer the definition in rule 2501 (a) of the Manual does not apply to him and therefore he is not a casual labourer. Even otherwise having completed continuous service of more than six months, the petitioner had attained temporary status within the meaning of rule 2501 (b) (i) of the Manual. 6. Chapter XXVI of the Manual specifically provides for absorption of medically incapacitated staff in the alternative employment. No attempt has ever been made to absorb the petitioner in any other category, even assuming without admitting that he is not fit for B-1 category. In the counter affidavit of the respondents it is stated: “The dates of engagement of the petitioners as casual labour/Khalasis, nature of work lor which they were engaged and the standard of......................medical classification required, the dates when they were medically examined and other details are given in Annexure-I. The minimum standard of medical fitness required for the petitioners is B-l classification and on medical examination it was certified that they were unfit in Class B-l” Hence by the impugned notice the petitioners were informed that their services would no longer be required beyond 31st October, 1977. It is further submitted that the petitioners were engaged on projects and they are not entitled to be conferred with temporary status and therefore they are not treated as temporary and they are therefore not entitled to all the rights and privileges admissible to temporary Railway Servants as laid down in Chapter XXIII of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual. 7. The petitioners are put to strict proof of the allegations contained in paragraph 5. 7. The petitioners are put to strict proof of the allegations contained in paragraph 5. Even assuming without admitting that the petitioners have put in continuous service within the meaning of section 25 (8) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not relevant for the purpose of these writ petitions as the petitioners are not retrenched from service. 8. The petitioners are only casual labourers as defined in Para. 2501 of the Railway Establishment Manual and as the petitioners were labour on project they were not entited to be treated as temporary and are not entitled to all the rights and privileges admissible to temporary Railway servants as laid down in Chapter XXIII of the Railway Establishment Manual. The project casual labourers do not attain temporary status and are not governed by Para. 2501 (b) (i) of the Railway Establishment Manual. 9. The petitioners are not retrenched within the meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the circumstances compliance with provisions of section 25-F does not arise. As the petitioners were found medically unfit for the category of service they were engaged, there could not be continued in service. In these circumstances it does not amount to retrenchment as contended by the petitioners and the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision of the Supreme Court referred to by the petitioners had no application to the case of the petitioners. 10. Mr. B. R. Dolia, learned counsel for the petitioners, reiterating the various grounds, argues as follows: — 11. The petitioners in this case have acquired what is known as temporary status, which is dealt with under Chapter 23 of the Railway Establishment Manual. All these petitioners were working in Signalling and Telecommunication Section which certainly cannot be considered to be project within the meaning of paragraph 2501 of the Railway Establishment Manual, in which event alone it could be said that they could be called ‘casual labour’. Under the note to that paragraph, what is meant by a ‘Project’ has been explained and this particular Signalling and Telecommunication Section does not come within the same. Under the note to that paragraph, what is meant by a ‘Project’ has been explained and this particular Signalling and Telecommunication Section does not come within the same. In fact, the meaning of Project has come to be laid down in B. Mukherjee v. Union of India1, succinctly and judged in the light of that ruling it cannot, however, be said as stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioners were working in a project. If their services are terminated after they had acquired temporary status, it would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The non-compliance of section 25-F of the said Act would render the termination illegal. In support of this submission, learned counsel relies on Assistant Personnel Officer v. K. T. Antony2, based on the ruling reported in D. C. & General Milk v. S. M. Mukherjee3, where in it was held even striking of a name of an employee would amount to retrenchment. In this case, it is worse because there was termination of services. Termination for any reason constitutes retrenchment as laid down in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Crista4and Stale Bank of India v. Sundaramoney5. 12. Mr. K. Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel for the Railways would submit that if it is the case of the petitioner that there has been a retrenchment, the proper remedy would be to raise an industrial dispute and not to come to this Court by way of writ petition. Retrenchment contemplates dispensing with surplus labour. Here the cause for termination is not that the petitioners were found surplus but they were medically unfit. Where they have been so found, it will not be a case of retrenchment. It has been categorically laid down in Workmen v. Bangalore W.C. & S. Mills Co.6 13. It is not correct on the part of the petitioners to contend that they have acquired temporary status. But even assuming that they had obtained such a status it is rule 152 of the Railway Establishment Code that will apply. If that rule is applicable, there is no obligation on the part of the Railway to provide alterna;ive employment. In fact, the petitioners being casual labours, cannot be considered to be Railway servants at all within the meaning of rule 102, clause 13 which clearly excludes the casual labour, while defining the railway servant. If that rule is applicable, there is no obligation on the part of the Railway to provide alterna;ive employment. In fact, the petitioners being casual labours, cannot be considered to be Railway servants at all within the meaning of rule 102, clause 13 which clearly excludes the casual labour, while defining the railway servant. If the petitioners are temporary Railway servants it is paragraphs 2604 and 2606 that will apply. This is not a case in which during the course of employment or arising out of the employment, the petitioners became medically unfit. Therefore, the question or providing alternative employment cannot arise. 14. Having regard to the above contentions, the questions that arise in this case are: — (1) Does the termination of the services of the petitioners amount to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act? If so, have the provisions of section 25-F of the said Act been complied with? (2) Whether the petitioners have acquired temporary status so as to gain the benefit of the provisions of Chapter 23 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual (hereinafter called Manual for the sake of brevity) or are they casual labourers as defined under paragraph 2501 of the Manual ? (3) Even if they have acquired temporary status, could it be said that it is obligatory on the part of the Railways to provide them with alternate employment? Question No. (1). — In this case, the petitioners were engaged in works which fall under category-1. They were required to undergo medical examination to test their fitness, which included (i) general physical examination and (ii) vision test. They were carried out in accordance with paragraph 1018 of the Manual. By that medical examination, it was testified that they were unfit for service in class B-1 category. Where, therefore, consequent to their being declared medically unfit, if their services are terminated it cannot amount to retrenchment. In fact, in Workmen v. Bangalore W. G. & S. Mills Co.1, the identical question arose. By that medical examination, it was testified that they were unfit for service in class B-1 category. Where, therefore, consequent to their being declared medically unfit, if their services are terminated it cannot amount to retrenchment. In fact, in Workmen v. Bangalore W. G. & S. Mills Co.1, the identical question arose. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in paragraph 7 thus:- “Now when a workman is discharged on the ground that he is medically unfit as happened in the case of the ten workmen with whom alone we are concerned in this appeal, it cannot be said that they had been discharged on the ground that their services were no longer required; on the contrary they were not in a fit condition of health to continue in service at all. Their physical condition prevented them from rendering the service for which they had been employed. The reason for their discharge was that they could not render the services required of them and which under the contracts of service they were bound to render. Their services cannot be said to have been terminated on the ground that such services were not required. But Mr. Jha says that we have to construe the award by itself. According to him, under the award the company is bound to pay gratuity according to the terms of the Ordinance, and, therefore, to all whose services were terminated by way of retrenchment within the definition of that word inserted in the principal Act by the Ordinance. We do not think that this contention either of Mr. Jha is tenable. The definition makes retrenchment a termination of service. It seems to us that a service cannot be said to be terminated unless it was capable of being continued. If it is not capable of being continued, that is to say, in the same manner in which it had been going on before, and it is therefore, brought to an end, that is not a termination of the service. It is the contract of service which is terminated and that contract requires certain physical fitness in the workmen. Where therefore a workman is discharged on the ground of ill-health, it is because he was unfit to discharge the service which he had undertaken to render and therefore it had really come to an end itself. It is the contract of service which is terminated and that contract requires certain physical fitness in the workmen. Where therefore a workman is discharged on the ground of ill-health, it is because he was unfit to discharge the service which he had undertaken to render and therefore it had really come to an end itself. That this is the idea involved in the definition of the word ‘retrenchment’ is also supported by section 25-G of the Act which provides that where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take in his employ any person he shall give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen to offer themselves for re-employment and the latter shall have preference over other persons in the matter of employment. Obviously, it was not contemplated that one whose services had been terminated on grounds of physical unfitness or ill-health would be offered re-employment; it was because his physical condition prevented him from carrying out the work which he had been given that he had to leave and no question of asking such a person to take up the work again arises. If he could not do the work, he could not be offered employment again. It would follow that such a person cannot be said to have been retrenched within the meaning of the Act, as amended by the Ordinance.” Therefore, it will clearly follow that this is not the case of dispensing with surplus labour, in which event alone section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act would apply and the necessity to comply with section 25-F of the said Act, would ever arise. Therefore, the decisions reported in State Bank of India v. Sundaramoney2; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa3; D. C. &38; General Mills v. S.N. Mukherjee4; and Assistant Personnel Officer v. K. T. Antony5, have no application to the facts of this case. 15.Question No. (2): — The definition of casual labour’ is contained in paragraph 2501 (a) of the Manual, which runs as follows:- "Casual labour refers to labour whose employment is seasonal, intermittent, sporadic or extends over short periods. Labour of this kind is normally recruited from the nearest available source. 15.Question No. (2): — The definition of casual labour’ is contained in paragraph 2501 (a) of the Manual, which runs as follows:- "Casual labour refers to labour whose employment is seasonal, intermittent, sporadic or extends over short periods. Labour of this kind is normally recruited from the nearest available source. It is not liable to transfer, and the conditions applicable to permanent and temporary staff do not apply to such labour." Paragraph (b) reads:- "The casual labour on railways should be employed only in the following types of cases, namely:- (ii) Labour on projects, irrespective of duration, except those transferred from other temporary or permanent employment." What is meant by ‘Project’ is contained under Note 1 of paragraph 2501 of the Manual, which reads:- "A project should be taken as construction of new lines, major bridges, restoration of dismantled lines and other major important open line works like doubling, widening of tunnels etc., which are completed within a definite time-limit. The General Manager/Heads of the Department concerned, in consultation with the F.A. & C.A.O. will decide whether a particular open line work is a ‘Project’ or not. In deciding whether a particular open line work should be treated as a ‘Project’ or not the test to be applied will be whether the work is required for the day-to-day running of the railway, as distinct from the provision of large scale additional facilities to improve the carrying capacity of the railway." In fact, this has come up for discussion in B. Mukherjee v. Union of India1. That case related to electrification. It was held therein:- "The word ‘Project’ generally conveys the idea of a scheme or a venture. As a matter of fact it has been stated in the Note (1) of Chapter XXV of Railway Establishment Manual that in deciding whether a particular open line work should be treated as project or not the test to be applied is to see whether the work is required for the day-to-day running of the railway as distinct from the provision of large scale facilities to improve the carrying capacity of the railways. Judged by this standard Railway Electrification would certainly be a project." But the question here is, so long as they have not been given an order in writing conferring temporary status, it cannot be held they had acquired temporary status. Judged by this standard Railway Electrification would certainly be a project." But the question here is, so long as they have not been given an order in writing conferring temporary status, it cannot be held they had acquired temporary status. If they are casual labourers, they could not be called railway servants in view of rule 102 (13) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I, which runs as under: " ‘Railway servant’ means a person who is a member of a service or who holds a post under the administrative control of the Railway Board and includes a person who holds a post in the Railway Board. Persons lent from a service or post which is not under the administrative control of the Railway Board to a service or post which is under such administrative control do not come within the scope of this definition. This term excludes casual labour for whom special orders have been framed." 16. Question No. (3).-Turning to question No. 3, I will assume that they had acquired temporary status, in which event it is paragraph 2511 of the Manual, relating to rights and privileges, that will apply and it says:- "Casual labour treated as temporary are entitled to all the rights and privileges admissible to temporary Railway servants as laid down in Chapter XXIII of the Indian Railways Establishment Manual." But where rule 152 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code applies, what is the position? That Rule reads:- "152. Termination of service on account of inefficiency due to failure to conform to the requisite standard of physical fitness. A Railway servant who fails in vision test or otherwise becomes physically incapable of performing the duties of the post which he occupies but not incapable of performing other duties, should not be discharged forthwith but should be granted leave in accordance with rule 2237-A-R. During the period of leave so granted, such a Railway servant must be offered some alternative employment on reasonable emoluments having regard to his former emoluments. Further, the extraordinary leave portion of the leave granted in accordance with rule 2237-A-R should not be cut short purely on account of his refusing the first offer which is made to him, but he must be discharged if he does not accept one or more offers during the period of his leave." The Railway Board’s Orders above referred to clearly state that the alternative appointment could be purely as an ex gratia measure. Therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the Railways to provide alternative employment. In fact, as correctly stated in the counter-affidavit, the moment the petitioners were medically declared unfit, their services should have been terminated, but by mistake that was not done. The fact that they were allowed to continue for some more time after their declaration of medical unfitness, does not confer upon them any right. Where the petitioners had become medically incapacitated, paragraph 2604 of the Manual would apply. That lays down: - "If a temporary employee has become medically unfit for the post held by him, on account of circumstances which did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, the benefit of rule 152 will not be admissible. While, therefore, it is strictly not obligatory to find alternative employment for such an employee, every effort should, nevertheless, be made to find alternative employment." However, inasmuch as I have held that there is no obligation on the part of the Railways to find alternative employment, the petitioners cannot put forth a claim to that effect. In the result, I hold the order of termination is perfectly legal and valid and these petitions are hereby dismissed. However they being casual labourers, I do not think that they should be mulcted with costs.